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CHAPTER 1 : CRITERIA FOR ADEQUACY
1
This work is principally concerned with theories in
several areas of language development and, more particularly,
with the status of proposals as explanations in some domain
of this general area of study. In this introductory
chapter I shall develop a set of concepts for evaluating
the status of theoretical proposals made in a developmental
context. I shall be essentially defining a set of standards
which we might reasonably ask such proposals to meet if
they are to be seriously regarded as adequate developmental
theories, i.e. as having explanatory force within the
domain in question. The discussion is necessarily general
and abstract but, wherever it is appropriate, I shall
illustrate points using hypothetical or real examples from
language development.
l'here are two principal reasons for believing that this is
an interesting and reasonable undertaking. The first is
that it is useful from time to time for any discipline
to be reflective and examine its own methods and standards
critically. In the natural sciences theoretical insight
and metatheoretical discussion have often gone hand in
hand and we should always be aware of a proliferation of
uncritical and uncriticized (from the standpoint of general
principles) theories. The second, and more particular,
reason is that the field of child language development
appears to be in great need of such a feflective treatment.
A good deal of the theorising with which I am acquainted
lacks rigour. In itself this may not be a bad thing as
2
the material the child language theorist has to deal
with is undoubtedly resistant to systematic formal analysis
and, in such a situation, it would be misguided to insist
on rigour and precision for their own sake. In addition,
however, much of the theorising seems to lack direction
and to take on a somewhat desperate quality where it
becomes divorced from any overall view of human development.
This is clearly undesirable and it is part of the function
of this work to pinpoint some of the problems and provide
#
a tentative framework for their solution. From my own
point of view the former of these goals is the more import¬
ant as a successful attainment of it amounts to an
increased awareness of the problem of explanatory adequacy
in child language theories.
At the outset I wish to make clear that I have no well-
argued position to take on whether the analysis which
follows is best interpreted as descriptive of those
properties of theories of language development which
contribute to their acceptability in the relevant scientific
community or as prescriptive of what any theory of language
development should look like in order to be taken seriously.
Largely through the work of such philosophers of science
as Kuhn and Feyerabend the former view is favoured among
those who reflect on the status of theories in the natural
sciences but it seems to me that we are in a position in
language development studies where no theories have won
the sort of universal acclaim which would enable us to
partition proposals into a successful set and an unsuccess¬
ful set with any confidence. Therefore, although I would
3
like to suggest that the proposals which fare "best under
the analysis which follows are just those theories which
have been judged reasonably successful and which have left
the consumer relatively content, I am eager that too much
shouldn't hang on this suggestion. To my knowledge there
has been little systematic discussion of the issues
raised here in the literature on language development and
very little in the general field of child development and -
so it shouldn't be expected that the answers to such
fundamental questions will be easy.^ *
This lacuna of reflective criticism should not occasion
much surprise as far as work on language is concerned as it
is commonly agreed that it is only in the last few decades
that the tools for beginning to formulate theories at all
adequately in this domain have themselves been fashioned.
I refer here particularly to the technical apparatus of
descriptive linguistics. Without this apparatus discussions
of language development were conducted in an often
stimulating but theoretically impoverished framework. One
can point to a concern with very general issues concerning
the functions of language and their ontogenesis such as
that found in Buhler (1934), to discussions of the emotional-
intellectual issue as, for example, in Leopold (1949) and
1. Exceptions can be found dotted around the child language
literature and, of course, there are some systematic treat¬
ments of the concept of development in the literature on
developmental psychology (see, for example, Harris (1957),
Mischel (1971). Very often these latter concentrate on
such issues as 'purpose' and 'teleology' which will not
be central in the discussion which follows.
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to discussion of the role of imitation and reinforcement
in language development such as is found in the work of
early behavicirists such as Watson (1928) and persisting
in the work of Mowrer (1960). With some exceptions early
work was conducted within some dominant psychological
paradigm by investigators who were largely ignorant of
p
the tools of descriptive linguistics. During the second
half of this century, however, and particularly during the
last fifteen years, we have seen an enormous growth in
the number of studies of different aspects of child 'Language
and a greater reliance on the concepts and techniques of
descriptive linguistics as well as a rapprochement between
linguists and psychologists leading to the development of
theoretical statements which, in many cases, are clearly
formulated, reasonably precise, and, one would expect,
capable of evaluation. It seems to me that the time Is
ripe to submit some of these proposals to an analysis
within a meta-theoretical framework.
The central problem to be discussed can be summarised very
simply. Let us suppose that a language acquisition theorist
specifies some domain of language development which is to
2. This somewhat dismissive tone should not be taken as
implying a dismissive attitude. I believe that the pioneer¬
ing work of Leopold as well as that o.f such scholars as
G-regoire (1937), Guillaume (1927), Lewis (1936) produced a
great deal of fascinating data and is, in many ways, superior
to mucb of what we have seen in the last 15 years or so.
However, the fact remains that it was not theoretically
sophisticated and, in many cases, atheoretical in emphasis.
Cf. Leopold's manifesto in the preface to Leopold (1939).
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be studied (more generally we could consider the specifi¬
cation of any domain of an organism's structure or activity
by a theorist concerned with that organism's development
but in what follows I shall restrict myself to more
particular formulations in terms of language and the
human organism). To mention a few possibilities, this
domain might be any of the following: the human's ability
to produce syntactically structured utterances; the
human's ability to comprehend such utterances; the knowledge
which underlies the human's ability to produce or comprehend
such utterances; the human's ability to produce the forms
of words; the human's ability to perform speech-acts;
the human's naming behaviour in referring to objects; the
human's ability to comprehend the relational terms more
and less. In mentioning these domains I do not wish to
suggest that all of them would constitute equally fruitful
areas of research, but they are domains which have been
studied with some intensity in the recent literature and
here they are cited merely to exemplify the notion of a
3
'domain of language development'. The theorist now studies
the behaviour of the organism which is relevant to the
establishment of a theory in the domain in question and,
3. Nor do I wish to suggest at this stage that they all
constitute clearly delimited and independent areas of
research. Furthermore, it may be nonsensical, as certain
philosophers have urged, e.g. Stich (1971), Cooper (1975),
to talk about 'knowledge underlying abilities' but child
language theorists have manipulated such concepts and have
constructed theories in such domains. A study of the
activity of theorising can remain neutral on these questions.
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as a developmental theorist, he does this at, at least,
two times, say, t^ and t^.^ For ease of reference I shall
refer to the specified domain under study as D and we can
now say that the first task for the theorist is to construct,
for each of the times at which he has sampled the relevant
behaviour, say, t1, t2, ..., tn, a theory, T1, T2, ..., T ,
such that explains the child's behaviour in D at t^
T2 explains the child's behaviour in D at t2, ..., and
explains the child's behaviour in D at t . For example
we can imagine that D has been fixed as the knowledge
which underlies the child's ability to produce syntactically
structured strings, that the data assumed relevant to
D are the structured strings which are in fact produced
by the child and that the theorist produces a sequence
of grammars, G^ , &2, ..., G^ such that each of the G^ (l£i^n)
r
is related to D in the required way for each of the t^.
As a further example we can assume that D is fixed as
the ability to produce the forms of words, that the data
are the child's actual productions of words perhaps under
defined conditions and that the theorist produces, as part
of his theory, a set of sets of phonological contrasts,
4. Obviously the exact nature of the behaviour studied will
depend upon the domain under investigation and the theorist's
own predilections as to whether he is entitled to consult
intuitions, whether a non-interventionist methodology is
'scientific', etc. Nothing in what follows depends on
taking sides in these issues.
5. It is clear that in practice the t^ must denote time-
intervals and not time points.
6. So far, of course, I have said nothing by way of
explication of what 'the required way' is.
7
, P2, Pn such that, along with other components,
each of the P^ (1^iln) is related to D in the required way
7
at each of the t^.








where the arrows indicate the direction of development. I
shall frequently refer to such sequences of theories by
O
the ordered n-tuple (T^, T^, Tn)« The question which
immediately arises is that of what is to count as an
explanatory theory in B at t^. This is not the topic with
which I am going to be principally concerned in what
follows although I shall mention it for the sake of complete¬
ness on many occasions without providing any further analysis.
7. As well as the set of phonological contrasts each theory
will have to contain at least a set of procedures showing
how a word form from the adult language involving contrasts
not found in the child's system will be produced within
the child's system. Such procedures could be phonologically
conditioned substitution rules or, more simply, context-
free rules.
8. Such a sequence of theories constitutes one aspect of
a developmental theory. For another equally important
aspect see the discussion in this chapter on p50and the
fuller discussion in Chapter 7.
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Suffice it to say now that it is obviously a necessary
condition on an explanatory developmental theory that it
provide explanatory statements for any stage of the child's
q
development in D. The problem as to what constitutes an
explanatory statement for a stage in development seems to
be indistinct from the problem of explanation in psychology
and there are, of course, a number of positions taken by
philosophers and psychologists on this complex issue. It
is not my purpose to review these opinions here but per¬
haps the best known is that developed in Fodor (1968)
4
where the author takes the view that an explanatory theory
in psychology must meet at least two conditions:
(i) the components of the theory are functionally
specified i.e. in terms of what they do and how they
are related to each other rather than in terms of how
they are realised in some actual working model e.g.
the brain.
9. The use of 'stage' here is to be interpreted neutrally.
It is a necessary concommitant of a developmental study that
behaviour will be sampled at a number of points. Analysis
of the behaviour may yield discontinuous stages which corres¬
pond to points or sets of points in the time sequence or
it may not. Nor is this to suggest that a stage theory can
only emerge from prior consideration of data by purely
observational and inductive methods. It is simply not
relevant to my concerns whether the theories constructed
at the time points have any stage related significance or
not. See below for some discussion of discontinuities.
Note further that often the developmental theorist restricts
himself to just two stages t^ (a stage in childhood) and
t^ (the stage of adulthood) and, although serious questions
could be raised in this connection, I do not wish to
suggest that theories of the' form (T^,, T^) should be
ruled out as developmental theories.
9
(ii) the theory predicts behaviour, amounting to a
r
specification of a behavioural repertoire, i.e. given
certain input conditions the theory will produce
an output which is interpretable in terms of the
organism's behaviour in D and which, when so
interpreted, is correct.^
To consider again particular examples, we can imagine D to
be fixed as the ability to comprehend syntactically
structured utterances and each T^(1fiin) to consist of
#
a grammar G^ (1£i£n) and a functionally related model of
short term memory 11 (1-i^n). Each such T^ will be
considered to provide an explanatory statement if the
relationship between the G^ and the II is perfectly explicit
and if T^ predicts that when presented with a certain
utterance the child will behave in the fashion in which
he does in fact behave when presented with that utterance.
The difficulties with this notion of the child's behaviour
in response to an utterance are, of course, well known but
this hardly affects the logic of the situation. As a
further example consider again that D is fixed as the
ability to produce the forms of words and that T^ consists
of a set of phonological contrasts, (1-ihn), plus
10. Fodor (1968, 136) says: "Hence, for an adequate
simulation to be an adequate explanation it must be the
case both that the behaviours available to the machine
correspond to the behaviours available to the organism and
that the processes whereby the machine produces behaviour
simulate the processes whereby the organism does." Fodor
later points out that the restriction to theories which
are simulations is not necessary here.
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additional components, X^ (1-i-n). T^ will provide an
explanatory statement in D if the relationship between
each Pn. and each X^ is perfectly explicit and if T^
predicts the child's behaviour in D under specifiable
conditions. In this case we may go a little further and
imagine that the specifiable conditions include an
experimenter who asks a child to repeat certain word forms
after him in which case each X^ will include at least
components to do with understanding the structure of the
experiment, understanding the instructions from the *
experimenter and certain preferences to do with pleasing
the experimenter as well as those alluded to in fn.7 above.
Again the vagueness of these proposals should not render
the general argument opaque.
Whether or not we go along with Fodor's proposals, and
they are certainly not applicable in any straightforward
way to much of what follows, it does seem that we are
11 . This is because what follows is largely concerned with
theories which have to be interpreted as involving the
'epistemological problem' and not the 'heuristic problem'
to borrow a distinction from Pylyshyn (1973). In the
transformational linguist's terms they are competence
theories and, as is well known, the problem of providing
criteria whereby such theories can be investigated by
traditional psychological experimentation has proved an
extremely difficult one. As far as developmental psychology
borrowing standards from non-developmental psychology is
concerned, Fodor hints that he might not go along entirely
with w?nt I am suggesting here: "I want to emphasise that
what I have to say concerns a rather special kind of
psychological explanation. The kind in which we account
for the behaviour of an organism by reference to its
(cont. p 11)
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justified in asserting a first condition on explanatory
theories in language development:
CONDITION 1
Given a theory T in the domain of language development D
which amounts to a sequence of theories (T^, T2, •••» ^n)
then T is an explanatory theory in D only if T^ , T2, ...,
Tn are explanatory theories in D at t^, t2, tn
respectively, where the predicate 'is an explanatory theory
in D at t^' relies for its explication on adopting some
view on the general problem of explanation in psychology.
This fundamental condition is not, as I have already
pointed out, one on which I intend to focus in what
follows. What it is vital to be clear about at this point
is that the theory T is intended to be a developmental
theory and that, as well as imposing conditions on each
of the static theories, T^, T2, T , which make up
T, we can also look to impose general constraints on the
sequence of theories qua sequence such that the sequence
provides us with a satisfactory theory of development.
Put slightly more formally, we can search for a set of
predicates, , P2, ..., Pm, which take theories as
(cont from previous page) psychological states. This
sort of account is perhaps more characteristic of certain
branches of learning theory and perception theory than,
say, social or developmental psychology." (1968,vii -viii).
While agreeing that developmental theories admit of
additional analysis it seems to me perverse to not regard
the methodology of a static experimental psychology as
contributing to the explanatory status of developmental
theories.
12
arguments (I ignore here whether the predicates need all
only be 2-place predicates and assume they can take as
many arguments as there are theories in the sequence
under consideration) such that T(= (T^, ..., T )) is
an explanatory developmental theory only if (T^,,Tn)
pfrpm m \ P (T T T 1
2 1' 2* " •' n ' •••» d 1' 2' * * *' n *
There appear to be tx«ro immediate candidates for membership
in the set of P's and I shall devote much of the rest of
this chapter to exploring them. Por simplicity's sake,
4
except when providing general definitions, I shall
restrict myself to a theory T which only samples two
stages of development, i.e. T = (T^, T^).
The first and most obvious requirement that we can impose
on T is that T^ and should be comparable, i.e. they
should both be particular examples of theories constructed
in accordance with general constraints on theories in D.
Vhat this amounts to is that the task of the theorist is
seen as that of first constraining the notion 'theory in D'
in a completely general fashion. He then constructs, in
accordance with his general constraints, and taking account
of data from D at t^ and t^, his two static theories,
T,j and Because T^ and T^ are constructed in accordance
with the same general theory they will have items in
common. By 'items' here I wish to refer to all the
contructs and construct-types which can occurin theories.
It is a term which is neutral with respect to construct
13
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and construct-type. As an example we could consider
again the case in which the T^ in a developmental theory
are grammars, i.e. T = (G^ , G-^) where G^ and G^ are con¬
structed in accordance with some general theory of linguistic
structure. Then G^ and must have items in common at
some level of generality. They may, for example, employ
the same set of syntactic categories or, perhaps, one
employs a subset of the set of syntactic categories
employed by the other. The sets of rules occurring in
the G^ may be identical, in a subset-superset relation
or have a non-empty intersection. The intersections of
both the sets of syntactic categories and of syntactic
rules may be empty but both the G^ may employ rules of
the same type and draw their syntactic categories from
some antecedently defined set. In each of these cases I
would wish to say that the G^ are comparable in the
required sense. Thus the notion of comparability is only
going to be valuable against a background of a previously
defined general theory and we cannot, as a rule, assert
that two theories, T^ and T^, are or are not comparable
1 3
simply on the basis of inspection of the theories. In
12. I borrow the term from Flavell (1971) where he intro¬
duces it as a :"suitably noncommittal and general term for
any sort of cognitive acquisition that a developmental
psychologist might define and study. Thus, an 'item' might
be a structure, skill, concept, rule, strategy, operation,
belief, attitude, or any other cognitive element, large or
small, that he has isolated for consideration." (422).
13. This is not to suggest that practice must always move
from the general theory to the particular. Obviously the
construction of theories should continue in parallel at both
levels with suggestions and advances at one level having
implications for the other level.
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these circumstances we could always produce a disjunctive
definition of a general theory such that and T^ will
he instances of it but this would amount to reducing the
notion of comparability to vacuity. he would, of course,
expect that, in the vast majority of cases, such a
disjunctive theory would be a priori quite implausible
and therefore we would not be tempted to compare the T^
in terms of it.
It should be clear that the notion of comparability, as
explicated so far, is not an all or none notion, i.e.
there are degrees of comparability. So to take again the
example of T = (G\j, G^) it seems to make sense to say that
G\j and G> are less comparable if they merely make use of
rules of the same general type and have no particular
rules and no syntactic categories in common than if one
or both of the intersections (of the sets of syntactic
rules and the sets of syntactic categories) is non-empty,
nevertheless, in what follows I shall take reference to
a general theory as diagnostic of comparability and thus
treat the latter as if it were an all or none notion.
he can now examine, in a general way, some of the consequences
of finding a T = (T^, T2) such that and are not
comparable (or only comparable to a small degree). The
question as to whether this situation actually obtains
in the language development literature is one to which I
shall return on several occasions in the chapters which
follow. To make the discussion slightly more concrete
however we can imagine that D has been fixed as the knowledge
15
which underlies the ability to produce and understand
syntactically structured strings and that and are
grammars, G^ and First of all consider the extremely
unlikely possibility of the theorist putting forward
T = (G^, G^) as an explanatory developmental theory and
claiming that G^ is a stratifications! grammar whereas
G^ is a transformational grammar constructed in accordance
with, say, the standard theory of Chomsky (1965). In
this case G^ and G^ would be radically incomparable in
that they would not share particular syntactic rules*,
arguably they would not share syntactic categories and
they would not even share formal rule-types. Next
consider the slightly less unlikely possibility (with D
fixed in the same way) of the theorist putting forward G^
as a case grammar constructed, say, along the lines of
Fillmore (1968) and G^ again as a standard theory
transformational grammar. In this case G^ and G^ would
share formal rule types, there would possibly be an overlap
in the sets of syntactic rules and again it would be
arguable as to whether the two grammars shared syntactic
categories. In an obvious way the grammars presented in
the second theory are more comparable than the grammars
put forward in the first although not, we would probably
wish to say, very comparable. As a final example we can
consider D to be fixed in exactly the same way and for
both G^ and G^ to be constructed in accordance with the
standard theory of transformational grammar. In this case
we would expect, at worst, a subset-superset relationship
to hold between the sets of syntactic categories in G^ and G^
16
and to find a considerable overlap in the sets of
particular rules employed in the theories as well as
identity or near-identity of rule types. Straight¬
forwardly in this last case the two grammars are more
comparable than in the first two cases and this is seen
as a direct reflex of the fact that they are constructed
in accordance with the same general theory.
Returning now to the question at hand we can see that,
in general to find that and are non-comparable or
only comparable to a small degree would lead us to suspect
the appropriateness of or T^ or both and hence to suspect
the status of T = (T^, T^) as an explanatory developmental
theory. This could lead us to search for reasons to
abandon either T^ or T^ and to look around for a theory
to replace the abandoned one that would be constructed
in accordance with the general principles of the retained
theory. However this is not the only possible response
and an alternative which cannot be ruled out on a priori
grounds is to believe that there is a more or less radical
discontinuity in the child's development in D which is
correlated with the switch from a theory of one kind to
a theory of a totally different kind. This amounts to
suggesting that the child develops for a certain period
employing hypotheses of a certain sort in constructing
his theories in D, suddenly abandons these and adopts, as
it were, a completely new set of hypotheses.^^ In what
14. The formulation of this point in terms of active
hypothesis testing on the part of the child is, of course,
not vital and a more neutral version could be formulated.
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follows I shall assume that to adopt this position is
to adopt the marked alternative as far as overall views
of development is concerned and that, other things "being
equal, we should "be suspicious of developmental proposals
which embrace such discontinuities and, furthermore,
1 5
that such discontinuities need to be argued for. We
shall find a number of examples of such discontinuities
in the literature and see that, in some cases, the theorist
has felt obliged to search for explanations of the
discontinuity or for arguments which render the discontinuity
less radical. In other cases, however, the discontinuity
simply stands without question and it is these cases which '
I am suggesting should arouse our critical spirit (see
Schlesinger (1967) for the suggestion but little argument
that such discontinuities should not be regarded as
aberrant). Although the notion of comparability remains
vague and unquantified except insofar as it is identified
with the reference to a general theory, I feel that we
can now propose a second condition on explanations in
language development:
15. This might appear to be in conflict with the standard
interpretation of Piaget's position on cognitive develop¬
ment which involves the postulation of qualitative changes
at certain points (see Flavell and Wohwill (1969), Have11
(1971) for extensive discussion). However the Piagetian
theory is cast within a framework where each 'novelty'
can be seen as having its genesis in the items of earlier
stages 'ind, although it would be foolhardy to state
categorically that the qualitative changes envisaged by
Piaget do not involve the sort of discontinuity discussed
in the text, it seems to me that analysis may show this
to be the case.
18
CONDITION 2
Given a theory T in a domain of language development D
where T = (T^, T^, T^) then T is an explanatorily
adequate theory to the extent that ..., Tn are
comparable. This means that, at least, T^ , T^, ..., Tn
must he constructed in accordance with the same general
theory. If T^, T2, ..., T^ are not comparable to a
sufficiently high degree then additional argument is
1 6
necessary to restore the explanatory status of T.
I
Before leaving this analysis of comparability it is worth
pointing out that it bears certain resemblances to the
16. One further question which is Immediately raised by
this general formulation and one which I am in no position
to answer at the moment concerns the status of the predicate
'comparable' with respect to the logical property of
transitivity. We can imagine that the notion of compar¬
ability has been quantified and that we have fixed some
criterion, say c, such that the comparability relationship
between T. and T. is deemed satisfactory only if T. and T.
ID i D
are comparable to some degree greater than c. The predicate
we are then concerned with is 'comparable to degree greater
than c'. It is easy to see that in a theory T = (T^T^T^),
T.| and T2 may be satisfactorily related with respect
to comparability as may T2 and T^ and yet this may not be
the case for T^ and T^, i.e. the predicate 'comparable to
degree greater than c' is not transitive. The extent
to which this might be a problem does not become apparent
in the analyses which folloxv and clearly its adequate
treatment must await a more precisely formulated notion
of comparability and fuller empirical knowledge about the
child's progression in any one domain. Note also that
considerations of transitivity can distinguish 'comparable
to degree greater than c' from 'constructed in accordance
with T*' where the latter predicate when rephrased in a
binary form is always transitive.
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problem of commensurability as it has been discussed by-
philosophers of science (see, e.g. Lakatos (1970),
Feyerabend (1975)) but it is not my intention, nor do
I have the competence, to trespass in this field of
enquiry. In addition, Chomsky's numerous discussions of
the motivation for, formulation of and application of an
evaluation measure as part of a general linguistic theory
presuppose and sometimes make explicit the view that
theories can only be meaningfully evaluated against each
other (compared) if they are constructed on the basifs of
17the same general assumptions. This idea has much in
common with what I have been discussing above with one
very important difference which will also be significant
in a subsequent context. When two theories (grammars)
are presented to the evaluation measure as part of the
procedure of linguistic theorising one condition on
them is that they both comprehend the same set of data:
they are both observationally adequate. Using Chomsky's
terminology the evaluation measure, if successful, will
select (prefer) the theory which is not only observation-
ally adequate but also descriptively adequate. But any
theory presented to the evaluation measure is assumed
to be observationally adequate and hence all such theories
'i7. "It is also apparent that evaluation measures of the
kinds that have been discussed in the literature on generative
grammar cannot be used to compare different theories of
grammar; comparison of a grammar from one class of proposed
grammars with a grammar from another class by such a
measure, is utterly without sense." (1965, 38, emphasis
in original).
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are on an equal footing with, respect to a privileged
1 8
subset of the data, in this case the set of well-formed
English senterces or the set of well-formed sentences in
some other natural language. In the situation I have
discussed above however the set of data in D do not remain
constant from t. to t.,. and, of course, this remains
X X-r I
true if we consider D to be a behavioural repertoire or
a domain of competence rather than a set of attested data.■
To illustrate, if we again consider the ability to produce
the forms of English words and collect a set of such
forms at t^ from a child and another set at t^+^ producing
theories T^ and T^+^ to explain the child's abilities,
it is clear that, ignoring sampling differences which
are of no importance in this context, the data to be
explained by T^ and T^+.j will be quite different. The
child will produce different forms for certain English
words at t.+, compared to t^, he may be capable of
producing some form for some English words at t^+^ whereas
he had no such form available at t^ and so on. In addition
there is no occasion for the comparison process I am
concerned with to select or prefer one theory to another
as they are theories for distinct sets of data. All of
this is very obvious and we can safely conclude that,
although Chomsky's evaluation measure is dealing in the
same sorts of terms as the comparison process discussed
18. The reason I resort to this phrase is because it is
clearly the case that additional data are brought to bear
in formulating an evaluation measure, data distinct from
that typified by 'S is a sentence of I'.
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here as far as reference to general theory is concerned,
the two concepts can in no sense be identified.
We can now turn to an examination of the second predicate
definable on a sequence of theories. Of more importance
in this work and also presupposing the notion of compara¬
bility, this second predicate involves a notion of simplicity.
To prevent misunderstanding from the outset it must be
emphasised that this concept of simplicity, whatever it
is, cannot be identified with the idea of simplicity
which has been extensively studied by philosophers of
science and also by transformational linguists - this
latter notion I shall refer to as 'the classical concept
of simplicity'. Briefly the problem of simplicity in
the philosophy of science has been construed in something
like the following terms: suppose we have some domain of
enquiry D and two or more theories which are equally
supported with respect to observations in D. Then it
has often been suggested that the simplest of the set of
theories should be preferred where 'simplest' is under¬
stood as involving judgements to do with elegance and
generality of rules, number of primitive terms, number of
construct-types, etc. We can note also here the reliance
in early transformational linguistics on a simplicity
metric as part of the evaluation measure which, at its
crudest, involved a straightforward symbol count (cf.
Halle (1961)). Por a refreshing and insightful treatment
of the classical concept of simplicity arguing, among other
things, that the linguist's concern, particularly in the
domain of generative phonology, can be identified with
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that of the general philosopher of science I refer the
reader to Sober (1975) but I propose to spend no more time
on it now the whole purpose of its introduction being so
that it is perfectly clear that the classical concept
is not the one I now wish to pursue. My certainty in
this respect is derived from an observation already made
concerning the data comprehended by theories. The point
about the classical concept of simplicity was that it
became applicable when two theories comprehended the same
set of data but, as we have seen, in a developmental'study
the data comprehended by the theories we are interested
in comparing, say T^ and T^+^, are at least partially,
distinct. So the concept of simplicity I am about to
attempt to justify and pursue cannot be the classical one.
How dees the concept I am interested in arise? Rightly
ur wrongly it seems to be a working assumption of people
working in child language research that, as children get
older, they get more complicated and one immediate
consequence of this is that we expect our theories of the
child's behaviour or abilities to get more complicated
1 9
as the child develops. To see this idea being used in
a critical context it is possible to refer to Brown's (1975)
criticism of Bloom's (1968, 1970) use of reduction
transformations in the grammars she wrote for the children
19. Harris (1957) contains an enumeration of what the
author considers to be essential aspects of development
including: "...(5) movement over time towards complexity
of organization; (4) hierarchization or the comprehension
of parts or part systems into larger units or "wholes"..."
(5, my emphasis - RMA).
under study on the grounds that the reduction transform¬
ation was something the children would have to 'unlearn1
with the consequence that later grammars, in this very
local sense, would he less complicated than earlier ones
(see Chapter 3 for more extensive discussion). Podor,
Bever and Barrett refer to the position Brown criticises
as 'mildly paradoxical' (1974, 487n) and so, although no
logical incoherence attaches to the notion of the child
and the theories which characterise his abilities becoming
simpler as he gets older, there is the beginning of 4
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tradition which is uneasy with such a suggestion.
To highlight the problem we can consider hypothetical
examples. Let us assume again that D has been fixed as
the domain of knowledge underlying the ability to produce
and comprehend syntactically structured strings and that
the theorist,, sampling the relevant behaviour at t^ and t^,
has produced a theory T = (G^ , G,.,) where the G^ are
grammars constructed in accordance with the standard theory.
Suppose further that G^ contains a set of 32 phrase-
structure rules and 26 trasnformational rules (restricting
attention to the most important rule-types in the standard
theory) and that G2 contains only 10 phrase-structure miles
and 4 transformational rules and that each of these rules
from G2 also occurs in G^. In these circumstances, unless
20. It is necessary to add one important rider here. Some
theories, particularly theories of phonological development
are best interpreted as theories of constraints on the
child's abilities or knowledge structures. Obviously we
expect such constraints to be relaxed as the child gets
older and the theories to become correspondingly simpler.
This is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
the theorist were to produce extensive argumentation
to back his analyses and the manner of development, we
would surely b3 justified in treating his theory with
some suspicion and would be tempted to believe either
that he has credited the child with too much at t^, per¬
haps because of overgenerous interpretation or that he
has seriously undersampled the child's abilities at
However the situation is not as simple as might first be
supposed. To illustrate this we can consider another
example which corresponds to an existing aspect of
language development. Suppose we fix D as the ability
to produce morphologically complex forms of English
words and, in particular, we focus on the production of
past tense forms. At t^ we find a few regular past tense
forms, e.g. walked. cooked, climbed and also some irregular
pasts, e.g. came, went, slept, drew and, in addition,
that the irregular past forms outnumber the regular past
forms to a significant degree. At t^ we find a relatively
large number of regular past forms and approximately the
same number of forms requiring an irregular past as we
found at t^ except that now the regular past tense ending
is overgeneralised to these forms, i.e. we find such forms
as corned, goed. sleeped. drawed (I omit any consideration
of the allophonic variation in the past tense morpheme as
that is not what is at issue). Paced with these facts
the theorist might very plausibly proceed by suggesting
theories having the following characteristics: T^ contains,
in its relevant aspects, a list of basic verbal forms
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paired with their appropriate past tense forms: on the
basis of the data he has collected he doesn't appear to
be justified in crediting the child with any generalisation.
At however, the child clearly does control a general¬
isation, in fact, an overgeneralisation and so T2, again
in its relevant respects, will contain a version of the
rule for forming past tense forms from basic verbal forms
in English. Given the data it will be a rule which
admits of no exceptions. Nov; it is easy to see that at
some subsequent time, t^, when the child has sorted but
his past tense morphology, the theorist will want T^ to
contain aspects of both (i.e. there will be a list
which in this case amounts to a list of exceptions) and T2
(i.e. there will be a rule which applies in all the non-
exception cases) and, on this basis, we can intuit that
is more complex than either or T2, "but the difficult
question arises in connection with the relative complexity
of and T^. If it were the classical concept of
simplicity in which we were interested then, presumably,
T2 would be preferred to on the grounds of elegance
and economy of statement but, as has already been made
clear, such notions are not at issue here and the question
of preference simply does not arise. The situation we
have is that of a formal device of a particular kind, in
this case a context-sensitive rule, usurping the function
of a formal device of a different kind, in this case a
list, ard it seems to me that there are no a priori
judgements which we can bring to bear on this situation
from the point of view of a developmental concept of
26
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simplicity. There appear then to be three possibilities
for what we might meet given the rough and ready notion
of simplicity we are operating with and which awaits
further analysis:
(i) of two theories, T_. and T^+^ , in a developmental
theory T = (T^, T2, T^), T± is simpler than T±+1.
(ii) of two theories, T^ and T^,^» in a develop¬
mental theory T = (T1, ..., T^) is less
simple than T^+^.
4
(iii) two theories, T^ and , in the develop¬
mental theory T = (T1, T^, ..., T ) cannot be compared
in any straightforward way with respect to their
relative simplicity.
Before going on to examine the required notion of simplicity
I would like to make three additional remarks. The first
is that there are many cases of developmental theories in
the literature which are amenable to analysis in terms of
simplicity and which are not instances of the third
possibility above as will become evident. This justifies
further examination of the concept. Second, in connection
with the troublesome case (iii), we might hope that
arguments could be brought forward to substantiate the
explanatory status of a theory which would render simplicity
21 . A similar situation can be envisaged where, in
developing grammars, transformational rules are presented
as taking over the function of a complicated set of phrase-
structrre rules. Again on the grounds of formal elegance
we might wish to say that the later grammar is simpler
but for the developmental sense of simplicity no such
assertion is justified.
criteria redundant. Without going into detail on this
point which would take us too far afield, we can imagine
that in some domain D the passage from t^ to t^ is marked
in the corresponding theories, and ^y intro¬
duction of theoretical constructs of type TC^ perhaps
over and above or perhaps entirely replacing constructs
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of type TC.j (in the morphological example above
would be 'rule' and TC^ would be 'list'). Suppose further
that in D', which, of course, need not be a linguistic
domain, the passage from t^ to -'-s marked in the '
corresponding theories, T.j and T£, by the introduction
of theoretical constructs of type i.e. we assume
there is some sort of isomorphism between the structures
of the theories in the two disparate domains. Then,
despite the fact that there is no obvious simplicity
relationship between T., and we could see the above
state of affairs as contributing to the overall explanatory
status of T = (T^ , T^).^
The final remark I wish to make in connection with
22. If the constructs of type TC2 are introduced over and
above those of type TC^ then it is possible that our
complexity judgements would give us the unequivocal answer
that f£ is more complex than T^. It could nevertheless
be argued that the considerations of this paragraph are
relevant to this case: on the one hand we have additional
arguments rendering simplicity considerations redundant
and on the other we have similar arguments supplementing
simplicity considerations.
23. To some extent this point anticipates the discussion of
reduction in Chapter 4 and later discussion in the current
chapter.
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possibilities (i) - (iii) concerns our evaluation of
overall theories of development on the basis of 'local'
properties in the sequence of theories. Consider again
a theory of development f = (T^, T^, ..., T ) and assume
that, according to some satisfactory notion of simplicity,
is simpler than T^, 3^ is simpler than , ..., and
T , is simpler than T . In this situation we wouldn-1 ^ n
obviously be justified in concluding that the theory T
satisfies our simplicity criterion. But there is no
reason to expect that we shall often come across thil
straightforward case and 'mixed' cases are going to cause
problems. At this stage all it is possible to do is spell
out alternatives. So, if we find a developmental theory
T = (T.j , Tgt ...» !n) such that, for all pairs (11, ),
(l-i£n-1), either is simpler than 31+.j or there is
no clear simplicity relation between It and 31, then,
particularly in the presence of an argument of the sort
outlined above concerning the generality of the intro¬
duction of theoretical construct types, we should be
prepared to assign T explanatory status, at least as far
as considerations of simplicity are concerned. If, to
consider another possibility, we find a T such that
for all pairs of adjacent theories, (T^, 31+.j ), either
31 is simpler than 31+.j or vice versa, then we should be
suspicious of the status of the theory and further analyse
the pairs which go the 'wrong' way in the simplicity
judgements. Anything worse than the two 'mixed' cases
described here would clearly deserve further analysis.
Such analysis may simply involve the checking of sampling
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techniques and, particularly in studies involving small
numbers of children, attention to idiosyncratic variables
such as the child's health at particular sampling sessions.
In fact, in most of the cases which are analysed in the
subsequent chapters of this work we are not presented
with T's which embrace more than two developmental
stages and so the problems are somewhat hypothetical for
now.
In summary then we can describe the logic of our investi-
I
gations so far in the following terms. Given a develop¬
mental theory T = (T^, T^) we ask whether and
amount to adequate explanations for the data in D at t^
and t^. Assuming a positive answer to this question we
then ask whether and are comparable or what is to
some extent the same question, whether they are constructed
in accordance with the same general theory. Often in
what follows the question will centre not on whether
theories in the sequence refer to the same general theory
but rather on whether there is any general theory for any
theory in the sequence to be related to. A negative
answer to versions of this question leads us to search
for special reasons for accepting what amounts to a
discontinuity in development in D and a positive answer
leads immediately to the question as to whether is
simpler than in the required sense. An inability to
answer this question in any clear way leads to an investi¬
gation of other domains looking for generalisations which
will enable us to subsume the development in D as a special
case; a negative answer leads us to question the status
30
of the theory while a positive answer leaves us content
in at least this respect and we now move on to an
explication of what is involved in providing a positive
(or negative) answer. Before doing this we can state
the third condition on the adequacy of explanations in
language development:
CONDITION 3 •
Given a theory T in the domain of language development D
which amounts to a sequence of theories T^ , '''',
then T is an explanatory theory in D only if for all i,
1-i-n-1, is simpler than , on the assumption that
considerations of simplicity are applicable to the
theories in T. A somewhat weaker version of this condition
is formulable in accordance with the discussion above
on 'mixed1 cases.
I turn now then to a discussion of the relevant notion
of simplicity as we find it in the child language literature.
The first category we must consider for the sake of
completeness is the intuitive one. So, given T^ and 1^,
we are told that is 'obviously' or 'self-evidently'
simpler than T^ and the sceptic only has to look at the
two theories to check for himself. Without wishing to
denigrate the role of intuition in any sort of scientific
enquiry, by itself this intuitive notion of simplicity
cannot constitute a sufficient foundation for being
simpler than . It is an interesting question as to
whether it constitutes a necessary condition but, in the
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absence of a more formal theory of simplicity, we must
put the question in abeyance. It will be one of the central
arguments of sections of this work that in several
domains of enquiry in language development this intuitive
notion of simplicity is the only one which the investi¬
gator embraces and further analysis, in the terms to be
developed below, often shows that intuition is not a
transparent indicator. This is particularly true in
the domain of syntactic development which receives exten¬
sive discussion in Chapter 3 and, to this extent, prdposed
explanations in this domain become questionable.
Of more substance and, in fact, forming one of the central
themes of much that follows, is what we might refer to
as additive or logical complexity. This is a notion
which has already received some attention within the
general theory of developmental psychology and so we
find in Taylor (1971, 394) in a discussion of alternatives
to a Piagetian account of cognitive development:
The major antagonist to a genetic psychology is
thus an incremental view of learning, in which all
development is seen as the addition (or sometimes
subtraction) of homogeneous units such as Hull's
SHr's (or "habits") linking stimuli and responses.
and again, in Hagel (1957, 17):
The connotation of development thus involves two
essential components. The notion of a system
possessing a definite structure and a definite set
of pre-existing capacities; and the notion of a
sequential set of changes in the system, yielding
relatively permanent but novel increments not only
in its structure but in its modes of operation as
well. (My emphasis. B.MA.)
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There are two remarks to make in connection with these
statements. The first is that developmental theorists
working within a Piaget-like framework which eschews
the simple addition of elements of a single type in
favour of the transformation and genesis of new structures
will admit incremental development within stages and so,
within such a framework, there is a place for the notion
of additive complexity. There is also a sense in which
later stages in the Piagetian view of development can
be seen as containing and 'presupposing' earlier ones
and perhaps the issue boils down not to additive vs.
non-additive but rather to non-novel vs. novel (cf. fn.
15 above). The second remark is that theorists of language
development, without regarding themselves as working within
anything like a Hullean tradition, have nevertheless
attended to aspects of development in additive terms. It
therefore appears that we are justified in beginning to
develop some general concepts in this regard;
Suppose, then, that we have a developmental theory
T = (T^, T^) and that we can regard the theory as involving
a set of primitive substantive terms, , B^, ..., B^j ,
and a set of formal principles, {^» •••» *] an<^
that, furthermore, T^ uses only a subset of both the set
of substantive terms and the set of formal principles, say
{Br B2, .., Bh] (h<j) and ^ , F£, ..., P±j (i<k).24
24. The distinction between substantive and formal aspects
of theories is not vital to the discussion at this point
although it will take on added significance in Chapter 4.
It is based on the Chomskian distinction between substantive
and formal universals although it obviously cannot be
identified with that distinction.
Then, in an obvious sense, the vagueness of 'primitive
substantive terms' and 'formal principles' aside, we can
see that, if T^ utilises the full set of substantive
terms and formal principles, then it will involve every¬
thing that T.j does plus some additional items and, in
this sense, will be more complex than T^. Examples
invoking a variant of this additive concept of complexity
are legion in the child language literature although,
to my knowledge, there has been no systematic analysis
of it. One of the most careful pieces of work in this
spirit and which is explicit with respect to its rationale
is Brown and Hanlon (1970) which is an attempt to inter¬
pret the derivational theory of complexity first aired in
experimental psycholinguistics in developmental terms.
This study will be analysed in detail in Chapter 3. Less
explicit but interpretable in a similar way, are such
disparate pieces of work as E.Clark's (1973, 1974)
attempt to construe the development of word-meanings in
terms of the successive acquisition of features and
Jakobson's (1968) speculations on phonological develop¬
ment which will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 5 respectively.
As will become apparent these studies by no means exhaust
the phenomena which have been examined in these terms.
Before leaving the topic of additive complexity it is
necessary to re-emphasise the problem which was raised
in the general discussion of simplicity. There are
undoubtedly a large number of instances of developmental
theories which do not admit analysis in terms of simplicity
and this will be even more frequently the case if we rule
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out the intuitive notion of simplicity and insist on it
being replaced by the additive one. There may be alterna¬
tive notions of simplicity which will be applicable to
the problematic cases or we may have to resort, as
was suggested earlier, to alternative forms of argument
to persuade ourselves of the explanatory status of our
25
theory.
I want now to move on to what I consider to be a fundamental
weakness in explanations which proceed simply on the
basis of additive complexity and considerations of tkis
issue raise what are undoubtedly the central problems of
this work. Imagine that in some domain D we have a theory
T which satisfies the conditions I have discussed so
far, i.e. T = (T^, T^), T^ and T^ are adequate explanations
of the data in D at t^ and t^ respectively, T^ and are
^oth constructed in accordance with the principles of
some general theory and T^ is simpler than in the
straightforward sense that utilises all the items T^
utilises and some additional ones% For the sake of
25. Obviously we have to be clear that Condition 3 is not
a necessary condition on satisfactory explanations. If it
is applicable then it must be satisfied but it need not be
applicable. We can hope that, for theories to which it
does nob apply, alternative criteria will be developed
but, as I have pointed out in the text, there appear to
be enough proposals to which it does apply to justify
its inclusion as a central condition.
26. In fact the considerations which follow apply equally
well to theories to which Condition 3 is not applicable.
Where necessary I shall indicate in footnotes alternative
formulations but the main text will assume that we are
discussing theories which do satisfy Condition 3 in an
additive fashion.
35
clarity let us refer to the item structure of "by 'X'
and to that of by 'X+Y'. 'X' and 'Y' are best inter¬
preted here as referring to 'chunks' of theory. They
may, of course, he related by more than addition of
items. What we have is a developmental sequence which
can be represented as X—>X+Y and the question to ask at
this point is whether the theorist can provide reasons
as to why we get this developmental picture rather than
the alternative Y-*X+Y because if T has the desirable
features claimed for it then so does T' = The
question that is being asked here can, at a certain
level of abstraction be compared to the request for
explanatory adequacy in the theory of transformational
grammar although the similarity shouldn't be pushed too
hard (see Chomsky (1964, 1965 and many other places for
extensive discussion). In both cases certain criteria
for adequacy are established; in the case of transform¬
ational grammar, grammars must be observationally adequate
and, in the case under discussion, theories must meet
the sort of conditions described above. In both cases,
the problem arises when it is realised that the criteria
do not, in conjunction with the facts, provide us with a
unique solution. In principle, the theorist is faced
27. Strictly speaking this is not true as Condition 1
will not be satisfied by T' if it is satisfied by T. This
is one reason why the comparison which follows in the
text she uld not be pushed too hard but I think it pin¬
points the fact that we are now asking why development
proceeds in the way it does and are not content to
simply have a good theory which shows that it does.
with a surfeit of theories which satisfy the criteria;
in transformational grammar we have a set of observation-
ally adequate grammars and in language development we
have a set of developmental theories. In both cases
we require some additional machinery to determine the
correct grammar (theory) from the presented set; in
transformational grammar the correct grammar is the
descriptively adequate one. In. the case under discussion
the correct theory is the one that actually corresponds
to the course of development.
Although theorists of child language don't seem to have
been systematically aware of this problem a large number
of proposals found in the literature can be seen as
attempts to deal with it and many of these involve ref¬
erence to some other domain of the child's development
which is regarded as more basic than the child's language
development. In the examples I discuss in what follows
this domain will often be the domain of 'general cognitive
development' or, more particularly, perceptual development.
Before moving on to consider the logic of this situation
it is useful to consider a special case where additive
complexity can receive its justification from the actual
structure of the theory in which the proposals are made.
An answer to the question raised immediately above is
then supplied by reference to Condition 2. Assume again
that the theory can be described schematically as X-*X+Y.
Then we can easily imagine situations where the theoret¬
ical constructs involved in Y depend for their intelligibility
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on those involved in X, i.e. a theory which embraced
those constructs which we find in Y without, at the same
time, embracing those we find in X would not be a theory
of the required type. To consider a particular example,
we assume again that D is fixed as the domain of knowledge
underlying the ability to produce and comprehend syntact¬
ically structured strings and that a theorist has put
forward a theory T = , G^) where the G^ are transform¬
ational grammars constructed in accordance with the standard
theory except that the degenerate case of a grammar *
without transformational rules (except for those involving
lexical insertion) is permitted. Assume further that G^
is such a degenerate transformational grammar and that
G^ is identical to G^ in its non-transformational part
and, in addition, contains transformational rules. In
this case we have a very powerful reason for why we get
the sequence X—?X+Y rather than Y-^X+Y. This is that the
theory represented here as 'Y' would simply not be a
theory of the right sort, indeed, it would not be a theory
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of any sort, since, within the context of transformational
grammar, a set of transformational rules in a grammar
presupposes a set of phrase-structure rules which
build the structures on which they operate. Given the
normal interpretation of transformational' rules a grammar
consisting exclusively of such rules is quite unintelligible.
28. What this means of course is that there can be no
resort to a special argument for a discontinuity here as
was discussed above. In this case we have something
much worse than a discontinuity.
As a slightly more sophisticated example we can assume
that D is fixed as before and that again T = (G\j , GA,)
where the G-^ are as before. In this case assume that
G^ and G^ are identical except that G^ contains a single
rule which is not contained in G^ and which, furthermore,
is intrinsically ordered with respect to some rules in
dj , i.e. the rule, call it R , depends on the prior
operation of some subset of R^, ..., Rn for its
operation. The situation as described then can be
represented as X—?Rn+X and again we can make the obvious
point that in the schematic representation R —? X+R ,.r
n n'
Rn would not be a theory of the required type. However
we can also go further and, on the assumption that, say,
R^ (m<n) is one of the rules in G. with respect to whichm I
Rn is intrinsically ordered, we can see the theory -
jnternal reason for why we find the sequence X—*R +X
rather than (X-R^)+R^ —? where, I hope, the rather
21
bizarre use of arithmetic operators is self-explanatory.
As one final example of a rather different sort we can
consider the ability to produce or perform speech-acts.
Assume that the successful performance of certain speech-
acts depends on the fulfilment of appropriacy conditions
and that, in addition, these appropriacy condtions can,
in certain cases, only be realised by the performance of
29. Rote that in this case it is not obvious that (X-R )+R
nr n
is not a theory of the required type unless the general
theory contains a clause prohibiting vacuous rules.
There seems to be no reason why it shouldn't.
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other speech-acts of a distinct type. Assume that a
particular speech-act, S , has attached to its successful
performance an appropriacy condition, A , which can
only be realised by the performance of another speech-
act, S . The analogies between this situation and that
m
already discussed in connection with intrinsic ordering
should be clear. Briefly, if the theorist produces an
inventory of speech-acts as part of his theory, then we
would expect to find the developmental sequence schematised
as X —* S+X where X contains S and we would not expectn m
to find the sequence (X+Sn)-Sm—>X+S^. Several examples
of this sort of theory-internal explanation for the order
of development will be found in the chapters which follow
and it seems to me that, in the present state of research,
this is probably the strongest way in which the question
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confronting us can be answered. If a theory of language
development can be justified in this theory-internal way,
I shall say that the theory is logically grounded.
leaving this special case we now turn to the attempts
already alluded to to reduce a supposed explanatory
statement in language development to one in some other
domain of the child's activity and thereby to contribute
30. The extent to which this is true seems to depend on
the confidence we have in our theories as theories of
adult behaviour or adult knowledge-structures. If we
have a theory in which we are extremely confident which
is put together in a certain way then surely it follows
that items can only be acquired in an order which reflects
this structure and this should count as an explanation
for the order of development.
to the explanatory status of the linguistic theory. The
assumption is usually implicitly made that the explanatory
statement in the new domain has whatever features we
want it to have. So, beginning to set up a general
framework, we have a theory T which can be represented
as X—? X+Y and we have no reason available for believing
that this is the sort of theory we shall meet in D rather
than some alternative, in particular, Y —* X+Y. The
solution frequently proposed, although it is not proposed
as the solution to this problem in these terms, is fo
refer the development to another psychological domain
and in Chapter 4 the domain which will receive extensive
discussion is the domain of general cognitive development.
The assumption is that this latter is, in some sense,
more basic than the domain of language development we
start from and the solution requires, what often remains
implicit, reference to a developmental theory of cognition
which we could represent as x —> x+y where 'x' and 'y'
refer to 'chunks' of cognitive theories in an analogous
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way to 'X' and 'Y' for linguistic theories. There are
a number of remarks to make in connection with this
outlined procedure and one of the most difficult tasks
facing an analytic approach to child language theories
is to be precise about what is involved in the sort of
claim we are going on to examine.
31 . If we consider theories to which Condition 3 is not
applicable then we have a theory in the relevant linguistic
domain schematised as X -> Y and implicit reference to a
theory of cognitive development schematised as x—> y.
41
Let us begin with an obvious remark and that is that there
is little point in transferring the burden of explanation
from an autonomous theory of language development to a
general theory of cognitive development if this latter
doesn't satisfy the various criteria for constituting
an adequate developmental theory, i.e. we can ask exactly
the same questions of the sequence of cognitive theories,
(C^, Cp, ...f C^) as we have already asked of the sequence
(T^ , T£, ..., T ) in some linguistic domain. So far as
I know there has been little systematic discussion ot
these issues in the literature on cognitive development
(but cf. references cited earlier).
Equally important if slightly less obvious is the fact
that there must be some reasonably effective way of
pairing concepts in the two sequences of theories, i.e.
chere must be something like correspondence rules mapping
the items of the theory of language development onto the
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items of the cognitive theory. Whether this sort of
reductionism is desirable or even possible is an inter¬
esting question. There now seem to be compelling reasons
32. Clearly at some point the buck must stop being passed
and we must refer to non-reducible aspects of development
operating with such concepts as 'maturation'. The
fascinating question is that which asks exactly where
this point is. I shall return to this question briefly
in Chapter 7.
33. In Chapter 4 these issues are taken up again in much
more deuail where it is argued that the informal state¬
ment in the text constitutes one necessary condition on
the reduction.
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why we■shouldn1t expect a reduction of, e.g., psychology
to physics via neurophysiology, biochemistry, etc. while
still maintaining a materialist stance on the reference
of theoretical terms in psychology (see Fodor (1976)),
and, presumably, similar sorts of arguments could be
constructed within the domain of developmental psychology
although Fodor's discussion doesn't make clear his position
on this issue. For the sake of argument, however, let
us assume that such reductionism is possible. Then clearly
it will be mediated by some sort of correspondence rules.
Note that even with these two conditions satisfied
there remains at least one residual problem. The situation
we have is a theory of some aspect of language develop¬
ment schematised as X—* X+Y and a theory of cognitive
development schematised as x —? x+y with a set of correspond¬
ence rules such that for any substantive term or formal
principle, Z, occuring in X or Y, there is a z occurring
in x or y such that Z and z are related by one of the
correspondence rules. However there is no logical reason
why, once the child has developed the cognitive apparatus
designated by 'x', he should immediately realise the
linguistic potential corresponding to x, i.e. X. There
is no logical reason why he shouldn't merely retain a
latent ability, then, when he acquires the cognitive
apparatus designated by 'x+y' realise his linguistic
abilities corresponding to y, i.e.,Y, before he does the
same thing for X. Thus we could have cognitive develop¬
ment in which x preceded y corresponding to linguistic
development in which Y preceded X. It therefore appears
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to be difficult to draw up a very satisfactory set of
necessary conditions on the reduction involved in treating
language development as an aspect of general cognitive
34
development. Nevertheless I believe that enough has
been said to justify the extensive analysis in Chapter 4.
Examples of attempts to reduce aspects of language
development in this way can be found in Cromer's (1968)
work on the development of the linguistic encodings of
temporal notions, in Brown's (1973) claim that the semantics
of the earliest structured utterances can best be under¬
stood in relation to the output of the Piagetian period
of sensori-motor intelligence and in Sinclair-de Zwart's
view (1969, 1971, 1975) that formal syntactic operations
have their origins in non-linguistic cognitive development.
Eor future reference I shall say that if a theory of some
part of language development is related to a theory of
cognitive development in such a way as to satisfy the
conditions outlined above and developed more fully in
Chapter 4, then the theory of language development is
grounded in the theory of cognitive development.
It is not only in the area of general cognitive develop¬
ment that one can attempt to ground one's theory of language
development. So, for example, we can refer to E.Clark's
34. In Chapter 4 I distinguish between necessary conditions
and 'desirability' conditions the latter being patently
concern 3d with peace of mind of the consumer. The set
of necessary conditions is, as suggested here, impoverished
almost to the point of being uninteresting.
44
(1973, 1974) attempt to ground a theory of the develop¬
ment of word-meanings in a theory of perceptual
development. The extent to which she is successful in
this respect constitutes the first section of Chapter 2.
Similarly there are a number of recent attempts to ground
a theory of the development of speech-acts (and ultimately
a theory of the development of syntax) in a theory of
non-linguistic communicative behaviour (see in this
respect Ryan (1974), Bruner (1975a, 1975b)). There will
be some discussion of such studies in Chapter 6.
For is it necessary to refer to some other psychological
function (where this is construed widely) when attempting
to ground theories. Heider's (1971) work on the acquisition
of colour vocabulary can be seen as relating a restricted
area of lexical development to do with the denotation
of colour terms to biological properties of the developing
child and, in a different vein entirely, Halliday's (1975)
main thesis attempts to relate semantic development to
what are best interpreted as sociological variables. These
ideas will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 6 respectively.
In each case we shall ask how successful the theorist
is in grounding the theory in the relevant domain with
respect to the conditions outlined above.
A further distinct type of explanation for the direction
rz [r
of development (when the development is additive) can
35. This qualification is important here. The following
considerations do not apply to theories which fail to
satisfy Condition 3 for reasons which are quite obvious.
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be sought in generalisations concerning properties of
the world's languages. Such generalisations might be
absolute in which case we shall be dealing with linguistic
universals or they may be statistical. The logic of
investigations of this type is somewhat different to
what we have seen so far and so we may begin by consider¬
ing the general case where in D we have a theory of
development which may be schematised as X—> X+Y. V/e
assume that we are concerned with just those aspects of
X and Y which are linguistic and, therefore, we are *
justified in believing that the theoretical terms which
we find in these sections of X and Y are the theoretical
terms of some linguistic theory. Among other things this
linguistic theory may formulate, or may make available
the formulation of, generalisations to do with the
distribution of linguistic features in the world's
languages. In particular, we can imagine that the
linguistic theory makes available the generalisation
that all the world's languages possess the relevant feat¬
ures in X but that this is not true for Y. In such a
case the explanation of the direction of development
can be reduced to a meta-principle that the child learns
in D just those features which are universal before
proceeding to learn language specific features. Whether
this meta-principle constitutes an explanation or, indeed,
whether it is reasonable will not concern me here.-5 Examples
36. In that it brings two disparate sets of facts together
it would seem to constitute at least the first part of
an explanation. Cf. the total structure of the argument
in Jakobson (1968) in this respect.
of such theorising, although again I must emphasise
that it was not theorising designed to answer the questions
in which I am interested, can be found in Mcheill's early
views (1966) on the primacy of standard theory deep-
structures and grammatical relations in a theory of the
knowledge underlying the ability to produce and comprehend
syntactically structured strings, in Lyons' (1975)
suggestion that there is a universal core to the grammars
of the world's languages, at least as far as the features
of language he is interested in there are concerned,* and
that it is this core that the child learns first and in
Jakobson's (1968) view that there is a small set of
universal phonological contrasts which are exactly those
learned first by children.
Obviously one can produce the same sort of theorising
un the basis of statistical linguistic universals (for
the three-way distinction of absolute, statistical and
implicational universals, see Greenberg (1966)), but
more interesting, perhaps, are attempts to utilise
implicational universals into explanatory developmental
statements. An implicational universal has the form:
if a language has the feature F (where F is here neutral
between category, rule, rule-type or any other sort of
linguistic construct), then it will also have the
feature F'. Such statements can be imported into a
developmental context when we find the situation I am
representing as X—) X+Y. For assume that Y is identical
to F, i.e., development has proceeded to exactly that
point where the feature F has been added to the system.
If we find F' in X we can invoke the implicational
universal given above to explain for us why we find this
order of development and not that which we can represent
as X'—*X'+F' where X' includes F. Examples of this
sort of argumentation being used in the child language
literature are, surprisingly, quite difficult to come
by but there are at least two to which I shall be paying
attention in what follows: Jakobson's attempt to relate
the progress of the child's phonological development to
the Laws of Universal Solidarity once the child has '
passed beyond the universal 'core' stage already alluded
to above and Heider's investigation of Berlin and Kay's
(1969) ordering of colour terms in a developmental
context. Although in both cases the authors do not
formulate their conclusions explicitly in terms of
implicational universals, it is straightforward to do so
and the logic of the child language investigation then
becomes quite clear. Interestingly both Jakobson and
Heider feel that they have to go beyond relating the
developmental facts to the linguistic facts and so it is
evident that authors have been somewhat dissatisfied
with this sense of 'explanation'. If a developmental
theory can be related to distributional facts in the
above fashion I shall say that it is linguistically
grounded.
In summary of the above, often inconclusive, discussion
it seems that we can impose a fourth condition on the
explanatory status of theories:
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CONDITIO!'! 4
Given a theory T = (T^, T^, T^) in the domain of
language development D, then T is an explanatory theory
in D only if Conditions 1 - 3 above are satisfied (assuming
Condition 3 is applicable) and, in addition, for all i,
1-i-n-1, the relationship of simplicity between T^ and
3h+1 can be related to either
(i) logical relationships between constructs in and
. In this case we say that T is logically grounded.
(ii) a theory of development in some other sphere of the
child's activity, T' (typically a theory of cognitive
development), or some domain not solely in the child's
activity (e.g., the child's biological development or
his social development). In this case we shall say that
T is grounded in T'.
(iii) a set of generalisations concerning the world's
languages. In this case we shall say that T is linguistically
37
grounded.
Failure to satisfy Condition 4 leaves us with a theory
which may well work and which is satisfactory in several,
important respects but which, nevertheless, fails to
provide us with any reasons as to why it works.
It is my claim that Conditions 1 - 4 form a set of
37. Another version of this condition can easily be formul¬
ated fcr theories to which Condition 3 is not applicable.
Such a formulation would contain an equivalent of only
the second clause.
minimal conditions on the adequacy of theoretical proposals
in the various domains of language development. I do
not claim that they constitute a set of sufficient
conditions and, in fact, it is quite likely that no
formulahle set of sufficient conditions exists. It is
a further claim that the vagueness which resides in some
of the conditions should not he seen as a complete
inhibitor of analysis as I believe that only by taking
what are perhaps poorly formulated proposals to the
analytic problems shall we be able to pinpoint their
inadequacies and produce more satisfactory versions. The
rest of this work is concerned with attempting to get
clear the exact nature of the theories put forward by
child language theorists and to set these theories
against Conditions 1 - 4. Often this will involve a
good deal of interpretation of theories and often I may
be accused of not giving the theorist the benefit of
the doubt in my interpretations. I contend that it is
a valuable exercise to discover where the doubt resides.
V/e shall meet some examples of at least partial success
but generally the picture that emerges is that, although
we now have a considerable amount of acquisition data,
our theorising is still at a very rudimentary stage. This
should occasion no great surprise nor should it be seen
as criticism of the theorists whose work is discussed.
The hope is that we can begin to take a more critical
view of ourselves as theorists. It seems to be a truth
of most domains of enquiry that the critics of the
theorists are not usually the theorists themselves, and
to a large extent this is true of what follows although
a small section is devoted to an analysis of some of
my own theorising. Hot surprisingly I find it difficult
to he wholeheartedly critical in this section.' For now
I would merely like to acknowledge the theorists whose
work is discussed below for making the discussion possible.
Before closing this opening chapter I would like to make
one further remark to allay a possible confusion. When
talking about theories in a developmental sequence, we
*
can ask, as I have here, questions concerning the formal
relations between the theories. In fn. 8 above I pointed
out that the sequence of theories was only one aspect
of a developmental theory. We can also ask questions
concerning the processes and mechanisms by which the
child passes from the stage characterised by one theory
to that characterised by the next in the sequence and
we can enquire as to the logical cogency of such postul¬
ated processes. So far I have raised no questions of
this type which would include reference to such mechan¬
isms as hypothesis formation, reinforcement, etc. and to
the role of such variables as expansion, imitation, etc.
depending 011 one's view as to what is involved in
learning.
In Chapter 7 I tentatively develop what I can introduce
informally here as Condition 5:
CONDITION 5
A developmental theory T = (T^, ..., T ) in the
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linguistic domain D is adequate only if it includes a
mechanism, M, which explains how the child progresses
from T. to (l-i-n-1).
In many ways this is the most interesting condition put
forward so far and leads to a general formulation of
developmental theories as ordered n+1 -tuples, (T^, T^,..,Tn,M)
and even preliminary analysis of this conception reveals
many complications some of which are discussed briefly
in Chapter 7. It is an assumption throughout this work
that it is possible to ask and, at least tentatively'
answer, the purely formal questions without paying
attention to the nature of the mechanisms which give the
sequence its 'dynamic' aspect. I may be wrong in this
respect but to give it full consideration would demand
another opening chapter at least as long as this one.
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CHAPTER 2 : MODELS OF LEXICAL DEVELOPMENT
In this chapter I shall consider, from the point of view
of the framework developed in Chapter 1, a number of
proposals which can he broadly construed as being concerned
with the lexical development of the child. The proposals
are not to be seen as rivals and, indeed, although some
indeterminacy exists in fixing the domain of enquiry,
D,in some cases, it seems likely that they are not all
concerned with the same set of problems. Nevertheless,
I
two broad alternatives emerge on how the meanings of
the child's early words are to be conceptualised. One
view has it that word-meanings can be broken down into
semantic features (we meet this view in 2.1, 2.2, and,
less explicitly, in 2.3 below) and the other that word-
meanings make vital reference to a prototype or 'focal
instance' from the extension of the word (this viexf
appears in 2.4, less centrally in 2.5 and, perhaps,
although this is difficult to be clear about, in 2.3) .
Depending on the emphasis adopted by different authors,
D may be fixed as the child's lexicon viewed simply as
a set of word-forms, as the meanings attached to words
in the lexicon, as the range of reference of particular
words in the lexicon or as a combination of these. It is
intended that the discussion will have the virtues of
illustrating in fairly concrete terms the rather abstract
framework of Chapter 1 as well as making a substantive
contribution to the evaluation of hypotheses in the
above domain.
In 2.1 I shall consider Eve Clark's semantic feature model
as it has been applied by her and others to the child's
acquisition of forms having concrete reference in the
earliest stages of language development. 2.2 considers
the extension of Clark's theorising to the domain of
relational terms for children who fall principally in
the 3-5 age group. Katherine Nelson's functional core
concept model as developed in Nelson (1973a, 1973b and,
particularly, 1974) forms the subject matter of 2.3. The
relationship of her proposals to theories of cognitive
development is examined in some detail. In contrast to
2.1 - 2.3 which are concerned with general, if not
global, theories of lexical development, 2.4 focusses on
a restricted problem concerning the range of reference
of colour terms. Heider's (1971) work on the experimental
investigation of the early use and comprehension of colour
terms and its relationship to the implicational universals
postulated by Berlin and Kay (1969) are considered. The
extent to which some of the suggestions made here can be
extended to handle other areas of lexical development is
discussed in connection with the proposals of Griffiths
(1976). Finally 2.5 is concerned with the recent work
of Rosch and her associates (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson
and Boyes-Braem (1976)) manipulating the notion of
'basic object' and the sense in which this can be seen
as attempting to explain the presence of particular words
in the early language of the child as a reflex of a
general principle to do with the maximisation of category
information obtainable from incomplete cues - what we
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might want to see as a fundamental cognitive principle.
2.1 Clark's semantic feature model and early concrete
vocabulary.
Eve Clark's work represents one of the most systematic
investigations of early lexical reference and it is this
aspect of her theorising that I wish to concentrate on
first. The main ideas were put forward in two papers,
E.Clark (1973a, 1974), and have been criticised from
different standpoints by Eelson (1974)^ and Griffiths
(1976). I shall begin with a short account of the main
features of the theory and then go on to examine its
39
explanatory status in terms of Conditions 1 - 4. Where
criticisms such as those developed by Eelson and Griffiths
are relevant they will be raised but a point to be clear
about from the outset is that I am not concerned to
establish a rival theory as were those authors but
merely to evaluate Clark's proposals against what I
38. Eor further discussion of Eelson's criticism of
Clark, see 2.3. In addition it is worth pointing out that
the view of word-meanings subscribed to by Clark has come
under concerted attack recently from philosophers such
as Putnam (1970, 1975) and Kripke (1972) whose ideas
are themselves much more akin to those of psychologists
such as Rosch and Rips and. his associates (Rosch (1973a,
1975a and many other references), Rips, Shoben and Smith
(1973), and Rips (1975)).
39. Coniition 5 will be explored, and then only tentatively,
in Chapter 7.
hope are uncontroversial criteria.^
The pedigree of Clark's model is somewhat difficult to
determine. In its notational devices it clearly owes a
lot to the componential semanticists of anthropological
linguistics and to the linguistic semantics of Katz and
his associates and, from a slightly different perspective,
Bierwisch. However, it lacks the methodological constr¬
aints of the former, i.e., whereas the anthropological
linguist can ask his native informant about the semantic
4
relations between words and about the denotation classes
of words, the child language theorist, in general, cannot,
ana it lacks the philosophical motivation and sophistication
of the latter, i.e., there is no concern on Clark's part
for an explication of such notions as synonymy, ambiguity,
4-1
paraphrase, analyticity, etc. We can safely assert that
40. To put this another way, we can say that the criticisms
raised by Nelson and by Griffiths are largely, though not
exclusively, concerned with the fact that Clark's theory
cannot handle certain attested phenomena from lexical
development, i.e. it makes incorrect predictions. Clearly
this can be related to Condition 1 but a more profound
way to fail to satisfy Condition 1 is met when we can
demonstrate that the theory cannot, in principle, make
predictions in the relevant domain. Insofar as I shall
be concerned with Condition 1 in what follows it will be
this sense of failure which is attended to.
41. This should not be seen as implying any positive
evaluation of Katx's or Bierwisch's approach to semantics.
It seemf to me that the arguments of Putnam referred to
in fn. 38 are conclusive in this respect but the point
still stands that Katz is motivated by more than a simple
desire to break down the meanings of words into components.
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the theory "borrows little of substance from these approaches
beyond the notational devices and, furthermore, we might
note that there is no clear statement as to whether the
theory only countenances binary features or admits
42
n-valued features.
The first question to get clear is the identity of the
domain D of linguistic activity or linguistic knowledge
in which the theory purports to provide explanatory
statements. The most central phenomenon tackled by the
theory is that referred to as overextension where a small
child uses a word which is recognised as a token of
a word-form which exists in the adult language and does
so in a non-standard fashion, i.e., uses it to refer to
some object or event for which an adult would not judge
it appropriate (cf. fn. 43 below for a possible complication),
figure 2 presents some examples collated by Clark in
her 1973a paper.
Assuming then that the phenomenon of over-extension is
well-attested and a good deal of evidence is now avail¬
able from modern studies to show that this is so (see,
in particular, Grieve and Hoogenraad (1977 ) and, for a
42. Cf. E.Clark (1973a, 74) : "ho theoretical issues will
be raised here, although I will use a binary type of
notation to represent the child's semantic knowledge about
particular sets of words. This notation does not imply
any theoretical commitment to binary features and will
simply be used for clarity's sake in presenting the data."
From some of the examples subsequently discussed it is
clear that the intention expressed in this passage is not
adhered to by the author cf. p i>6 below.
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Figure 2. Some examples of overextension in child



























































43. One thing which is immediately obvious from Figure 2
is that there' is an intolerable amount of vagueness in the
right-hand column; vagueness which is going to be crucial
in any study interested in determining the principles
which fix the extensions of terms in the child's
vocabulary. I/hat this amounts to is one aspect of a
general reservation concerning the sources from which
Clark drew up her generalisations particularly with
respect to their variant methodologies and differing
standards of precision. A second point which emerges
and which, in fact, is presupposed in the use of the
term 'overextension' is the assumption that the word
which is overextended has been used appropriately by the
child. That this is not an obvious consequence of
Clark's theory will emerge presently.
cautionary note on the generality of the phenomenon,
Griffiths (1976, 167ff), it is clear that the aspect
of linguistic activity in which Olark is interested is
small children's use of concrete nominals in a referential
fashion and coupled to this activity is the domain, D,
the child's lexicon which plays a crucial role in the
activity.^ At this point it is worth noting the distinction
drawn by Lyons (1975, 1977a) between reference and quasi-
reference.. where the former is tied to a concomitant not¬
ion of predication whereas the latter can stand alon£
and is, to Lyons' way of thinking, indeterminate between
reference and predication. Since a great deal of the
data which can be used in evaluating Clark's proposals
comes from a stage where it is difficult to distinguish
reference from quasi-reference in the speech of the
child (Lyons would say that there are a large number of
instances of quasi-reference), my usage of 'referential'
above should be seen as neutral with respect to Lyons'
distinction. This distinction and its implications will
be discussed in Chapter 6. Clark's theory then is con¬
cerned with the development of the child's lexicon insofar
as this is revealed by his concrete naming behaviour and,
44. Note that it is possible to make a distinction here
between the lexicon containing information governing the
application of a nominal and it containing the meaning
of the nominal. That these two notions should not be
conflat3d lightly has been argued, in a different context,
by Kripke (1972). Clark appears to conflate the two
and I shall assume that, as far as her intentions are
concerned, nothing untoward follows from this.
59
in particular, with the development of the meaning
representations in that lexicon. It might also be seen
as making claims about the order in which we can expect
particular forms to enter the child's vocabulary but
this is of somewhat marginal interest in the present
context. I turn now then to what I regard as the
central theses of the theory. It can be seen as embodying
at least six such theses:
(i) the meaning of a word is to be understood as specif-
4
45
iable in terms of a set of features.
(ii) the set of features which comprise the meaning of
a word in the adult language may not be identical with
the set of features comprising the meaning of the word
AS
for the child at the stage under investigation.'
(iii) the mismatch referred to in (ii) is to be explained
in terms of the child sampling from a certain set of
features when he first encounters an application of
45. Clark says (1973a, 74) : "One of the basic assumptions
of the theory clearly is that the meanings of words can
be broken down into some combination of units of meaning
smaller than that represented by the word."
46. Although the child's semantic features are seen as
drawn from the set also used by the adult whether this
is also true for each item acquired by the child is not
made clear by Clark. The possibility is raised but
nowhere explored that the child may abandon features as
he devflops. The clearest position Clark adopts demands
that this is viewed as unlikely if not impossible. See
Bloom (1973) for examples of 'underextension' which




(iv) the subset sampled by the child is a subset of a
set of perceptual (as opposed to conceptual or functional)
features which is somehow contingent on the perceptual
properties of objects the word is typically used to
refer to, or, more particularly, to properties of the
object the word is being used to refer to when the child
first assimilates it into his lexicon.
(v) development in this domain consists of the child*
simultaneously learning new words and features to dis¬
tinguish them from words already learned resulting in
richer feature specifications for the words which have
already been learned with a gradual approximation to
the aault meaning,
(vi) features of meaning are acquired in an order from
most general to least general.
47. This notion of 'sampling' can, of course, be seen
as a first programmatic statement on the identity of a
mechanism, M, required by Condition 5.
48. 'Simultaneously' here hides the problem of the
directionality of the relationship between the words and
the features which are held to make up their meanings
which is not discussed in Clark's work although it is
obviously crucial to a fully explicit theory. Is it
the case that the child hypothesises that certain per¬
ceptual features are important in determining the
applicability of words and looks around for words to
hang on to the distinctions made available by the features
or is it that the child 'realises' that a plurality of
words is being used in circumstances where he would only
use one and looks around for a basis for this distinction?
There are many questions which one might wish to raise
in connection with these theses some of which are dis¬
cussed below but, for now, all I wish to do is cast the
theory into terms which render the framework of Chapter 1
applicable. I submit that this procedure does not involve
a significant perversion of Clark's thinking.
What Clark appears to be proposing is an unstructured
associative model of word-meaning in which, in some sort ,
of mental dictionary, words are paired with sets of
perceptual features which give the meanings of the words
and which provide necessary and sufficient conditions for
the application of a word to an instance (cf. fn. 44).
This is a proposal which we might represent diagrammatically
as in Figure 3.
w
< > FS1
w2 < > fs2
W t ) FSn ' n
Figure 3
Here the Vh (l<i<n) represent the child's word-forms
at the time in question ^ and the FS^ (1^i^n) designate
sets of perceptual features which constitute the meanings
49. Strictly speaking this should be restricted to the
child's 'concrete' lexicon at the stage under analysis.
This qualification should be taken as read in what
follows.
of the bl and necessary and sufficient conditions for the
applicability of the il to instances. Obviously the
feature sets will have members in common and it is Clark'
hope that a relatively small list exists out of which
the word-meanings are formed and which can be related
to, and, perhaps, identified with, a set of universal
semantic primitives such as is suggested by Postal (1966)
or Bierwisch (1970).
he now consider a later stage in the child's lexical
development and the most obvious characteristic of this
stage, when compared to the earlier one, will be an
increase in the number of words which have a referential
function. Clark's scheme demands that, at this stage,
there is also an increase in the number of features
employed by the child enabling him to make finer semantic
discriminations resulting in him having more meanings
to relate words to. A coarse-grained analysis of the
situation could be represented diagrammtically as in
Figure 4.
hi < > F8'





where n-p, VH 'corresponds' to from Figure 3 (l£i-n)
and the \I. (n<j-p) are the 'new' forms. The PS. (1-i^p)
are the associated meanings as before. But it is possible
to make a much more detailed analysis on the basis of
a hypothetical example Clark uses to investigate the
notion of 'restructuring'. Her version of hypothetical
development in that restricted part of the lexicon
dealing with common animals is reproduced here (p 64)
as Figure 5.
*
Taking account of the fact that the figure doesn't
represent the actual process of lexical development
for any one child but is a, supposedly plausible, route
based on observations Clark finds in the literature, we
are justified in assuming that it will be favourable to
Clark's position and that, therefore, negative points
arising from discussion of it should be given their full
weight. At Stage I the child is presumed to have learned
the word bow-wow and to use it appropriately (cf. the
remark abo^e on the necessity for this stage)."5® At
Stage II the child overextends the use of bow-wow to
include all common 4-legged animals and it is suggested
that a plausible candidate for the basis of the over¬
extension is a feature to do with shape. The child is
a.ssumed to have sampled this feature, on acquaintance
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with an instance of a dog, as the most 'salient* one.
50. Exactly how we are supposed to represent the meaning
0f bow-wow at this stage is not something Clark expands
upon. From Figure 5 it might appear that something like
+dog-shaped would be in order but this is clearly absurd.
51. see p 65
Figure 5. Hypothetical instance of overextension and



















(a) bow-wow dogs, cats,
horses, sheep
(b) moo c ows sound
(a) bow-wow dogs, cats,
sheep
(b) moo cows sound














(d) baa lamb sheep
(e) kitty cats shape,
inane?)
Elsewhere Clark talks about a feature, + 4-legged,
while admitting that this is not a plausible candidate
for a primitive perceptual feature, so we can assume
that at Stage II the relevant part of the child's lexicon
is as in Eigure 6.
bow-wow t > + 4-legged
W1 < » FS1
W < > ESn N 7 n
Figure 6
An important point which will receive more extended
discussion in 2.2 is that, in order for the feature,
+ 4-legged, to have a coherent status, it is necessary
That the negatively specified version, - 4-legged,
appears somewhere in the FS^ (Hi-n.~).
At Stage III there is a restructuring of the system
resulting in a reduction of the overextension associated
with bow-wow and the suggestion is that this is mediated
by the child's use of a perceptual feature encoding the
sound that cows make. For the sake of argument let us
51 . How might the child never use an overextended form
appropriately? He may meet an instance of category C
being referred to using the form a, sample the perceptual
feature, F, of the instance as the most salient and
assume that this feature governs the applicability of
the form a. However subsequent instances of F may not
be instantiated in any member of C. Then we would have
consistent inappropriate use of a without a single appro¬
priate instance.
refer to this feature as +moo
lexical changes have occurred
Then the relevant part of the




and assume that no other
between Stage II and Stage III.






At Stage IV there is further restructuring resulting
in a further reduction in the extent of the overextension
of bow-wow and this time the suggested criteria! feature
is derived from the perceptual dimension of size. Unless
we are to invoke such unlikely features as +horse-sized
we shall have to admit a non-binary feature at this point,
say, 1Size, 2Size, ..., nSize, such that the relevant part
of the child's lexicon now has the structure shown in
Figure 8.
bow-wow 4—> +4-legged, -moo, iSize
moo 4—^ +4-legged, +moo, jSize
gee-gee 4—> +4-legged, -moo, JSize
etc.
Figure 8.
Obviously this sort of treatment can be extended to the
further stages hypothesised by Clark but there is little point
in pursuing this here as the general lines of the argument
67
are clear enough. In general as the child develops
his lexicon in a semantic domain he also exterds his
inventory of semantic features without (at this stage at
any rate) going "beyond perceptual features. If we have
a set of forms, W^, covering, in their
applications, a particular conceptual field (see Lyons
(1977b) for discussion of this notion originating with
Trier), then the learning of an additional item whose
application falls within the same conceptual field involves
the utilisation of (at least) one additional perceptual
feature which, as well as providing part of the meaning
of the new form, will also have a role to play in restrict¬
ing the extension of a form already existing in the system.
If, following the procedure of Chapter 1, we now consider
theories being constructed at times, t^ and t^ we can see
that we shall have a situation which can be represented
as in Figure 9.
W1 t > FS.












where the V/. (1^i£n+1) designate child word-forms, the
FS^ (1-i-n) designate feature sets, F is the new feature
involved in the meaning of and restricting the exten¬
sion of W. and which is a perceptual feature and X and Y
3
are variables ranging over the set of appropriate
prefixes for the feature, F. That is, if F is a binary
feature, then X and Y will range over the set |+, —j and,
if F is an n-valued feature, X and Y will range over the
set ^1 , 2, 3, ..., n J . In addition we can note that X Y.
This general formulation seems to cover the case disfeussed
by Clark and to make clear the sense in which lexical
learning proceeds by way of the accumulation of new
perceptual features.
We are now in a position to consider Clark's theory in
terms of Conditions 1 - 4. One immediate point to make
is that, as presented so far, the theory cannot plausibly
be regarded as providing a model of naming behaviour as
it makes no input-output predictions, i.e., it says
nothing about when a particular form will be used approp¬
riately or otherwise nor anything about the conditions
under which it would be so used. The theory does not
admit of interpretation in terms of an infinite set of
counterfactuals. This is a common feature of the theories
we shall meet in language acquisition and a common tactic
is to resort to the view that the model is not intend.ed
to be one of behaviour, naming or any other sort, but
rather is a model of the knowledge which underlies such
behaviour and makes it possible, knowledge which also
constitutes an essential component of a model of the
behaviour in question. In this case we might suggest
that in addition to the lexicon a theory of naming behav¬
iour would have to include aspects of the child's
attentional mechanisms, motivation, communicative intent
and so on. In this work I don't wish to question the
legitmacy of this 'retreat' to competence models. It
has, of course, been searchingly examined by philosophers
and psychologists in connection principally with Chomsky's
claim for the psychological significance of grammatical
theory (see, e.g., Schwartz (1969), Atherton and Schwartz
(1974), Stich (1971, 1972), Derwing (1973), Botha (1970,
1973), Bever, Fodor and Garrett (1974) for extensive
discussion, and Chomsky (1976) and papers by Chomsky and
associates cited there for replies to many of the above).
It follows that, if we are to see Clar1-" as explaining
the development of naming behaviour, we should have to
consider a theory which we can designate as T + X where
T is a theory of the lexicon and X denotes whatever addi¬
tional machinery is necessary. It is left open, of course
whether the study of X falls into the domain of 'mysteries
(Chomsky (1976)) for which, in principle, no solutions
will be forthcoming because of inherent limitations on
the human organism qua empirical scientist. From now
on I igiore X and, so as not to get bogged down in
further discussion of this point, I shall assume that
Clark's theory can be modified in such a way as to
satisfy Condition 1 or that an attenuated version of
Condition 1 can be formulated - this would amount to
taking a different line as to what constitutes a
psychological explanation - and that the theory as it
stands would satisfy such a version.
It seems to me that Clark's theory satisfies Condition 2
in a straightforward fashion as, once the assumptions
are made explicit, as I have tried to make them above,
the theory at each stage of development seems to be
constructed with reference to general considerations^.
These considerations include claims like that the meaning
of a word, for a child, consists of a set of features,
that this set consists entirely of perceptual features
and so on. In short the considerations amount to a subset
of the theses (i) - (vi) from pp59 - 60 above. In
accordance with these constraints the theories constructed
at t.j , ..., t will be theories of the same type and,
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in the sense of Chapter 1, they will be comparable.
Clark's theory also seems to have a simple interpretation
in terms of Condition 5 and therefore I assert that that
condition is applicable. Prom t^ to in the example
above, there is a complication of the theory describing
the child's lexicon; a complication of an additive nature.
52. Of course a great deal needs to be done in delimiting
the set of perceptual features and specifying a procedure
for recognising features as perceptual or not perhaps
by reference to a perceptual theory. But, by itself,
the modifier 'perceptual' surely carries some intuitive
constraining power.
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And, in general, given a sequence of theories, (T^,
T^, ..., ^n), it will "be the case that is more
complicated (additively) than T^(1-i-n-1) if the course
of development suggested by Clark is being followed.
SIObviously new lexical forms enter the child's repertoire
leading to one sort of additive complexity and, in
addition, new features enter the system in what appears
to be an additive fashion. It is not the case that
combinatorial relationships between features change
because, although one can easily imagine a situation*where
word-meanings, after admitting only conjunctive feature
definitions, suddenly admit disjunctive or implicational
definitions, it appears that conjunction is the only such
relationship contemplated at all stages of development.
Obviously if we were to find changes in combinatorial
relationships of the type alluded to, we could conclude
that these relationships satisfied Condtion 3 additively.
So what we have is the situation which was depicted in
Chapter 1 as X —? X+Y where X and Y can be interpreted as
sets of lexical forms, sets of features or a combination
54of the two. Therefore we can now ask what is perhaps
53. he should note here the phenomenon of 'lexical mortality'
which is found in the early stages of language development
particularly with reference to the child's idiosyncratic
'words'.
54. On several occasions in what follows I have found it
convenient to isolate instances of a particular theoretical
type and consider additive complexity with respect to this
type rather than with respect to the-* theory as a whole
(e.g. in the example in the text there are lexical forms
and perceptual features). This leads to a great deal of
simplification in presentation and doesn't, in the
examples considered, distort the discussion.
the most interesting question concerning Conditions 1 - 4
with respect to Clark's theory; given and -i+-j in
the sequence of theories, (T^, ..., T ), can the
simplicity relationship which obtains between them be
grounded in any of the ways specified in Condition 4?
Consider first the possibility that the relationship may
be logically grounded. There doesn't seem to be any clear
sense in which this is the case. Concentrating on the
sets of features which obviously carry the main explanatory
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burden rather than the lexical forms themselves, there
don't appear to be any relationships between particular
features of the sort we would need. So, if we examine
the example analysed above on pp64 - 66, we can see that
it demands a sequence of features, (+ 4-legged, + moo,
iSize,...) and there is no logical reason why we should
find this sequence rather than, say, (+ moo, iSize,
+ 4-legged,...) or any of the otter numerous possibilities.
In principle, it is easy to imagine sequences of features
which do exhibit the sort of dependency in which we are
interested. For example, we could consider a binary
feature, + chromatic, and a multi-valued (perhaps infinitely
valued) feature, nWavelength, which 'presupposes' the
positive value, +chromatic. Within such a miniature
system there are obvious reasons, built into the theoret¬
ical vocabulary, for why we should find the developmental
sequence, (+chromatic, nWavelength) rather than the
sequence, (nWavelength, + chromatic). Again we could
consider the existence of an n-valued feature concerned
with Dimensionality and another n-valued feature to do
with shape, where we would want to say that the former
is 'presupposed' by the latter and this would provide
us with our explanation for why we find the sequence,
(nDimensionality, nShape) rather than (nShape, nDimension-
ality). These examples are, of course, fictitious and
perhaps rather implausible (it is an interesting fact
that Clark found no overextensions in the materials she
studied which were based on the perceptual dimension of
wavelength). However the important point is that such
relationships could exist in a theory articulated iri* an
appropriate fashion; but in the analyses proposed by
Clark based on attested or hypothetical data they are
not obvious.^ We shall see later in this chapter (2.2)
that, with regard to later stages of development, and
the acquisition of relational terms, Clark is on somewhat
stronger ground in this respect. We must conclude that
the possibility of providing a logical grounding for
early lexical development when the latter is construed
in terms of the acquisition of perceptual features is
remote.
Consider now briefly the third possibility under Condition 4
which involves reference to facts about the world's
55. Clark, as has already been indicated, has recourse to
the view that general features are acquired first but
unfortunately she gives no indication as to what is to
count as a general feature. Griffiths (1976) suggests
that she means to equate 'general' with 'occurs in the
analysis of many (vague) words' and, although this may
be a reasonable explication of the required notion of
generality, it will hardly serve the required function in
this context given the early appearance of such features
as +moo.
languages. Here the theory is on even weaker ground
because of the lack of any systematic attempt to analyse
the vocabulary of human languages in terms of perceptual
features. Apart from such remarks as can be found in,
e.g., Bierwisch (1967) semantic theorists have tended
to eschew reference to perceptual properties of the
56
human organism. In particular cases one can even go
so far as to say that it is quite clear that lexical' items
which are used to refer to concrete objects in the adult
language cannot be analysed semantically in terms of'a
conjunctive set of perceptual features. In the case of,
say, cow, given the sort of development envisaged by
Clark, it will presumably have an entry something like:
cow <—) + 4-legged, + moo, jSize, etc.
but as Putnam (1970, 1975) has pointed out, we can't
consider such a conjunctive set of features as determining
the extension of cow let alone providing the meaning of
the word because we immediately know what to call an
animal which is exactly like a cow except that it has only
three legs and also an animal which is exactly like a cow
except that it makes a peculiar noise which can't be
described as mooing and so on. In all such cases we
have a cow which is peculiar in some way but not to the
56. There is a concern for psychological reality in the
literature on componential analysis (see, e.g., Romney
and d'Andrade (1964))but little attention to components
of meaning which can be seen as perceptual. An isolated
exception, although not within the same tradition, is
Adams and Conklin (1973).
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extent of not being a cow. I therefore conclude that,
as linguists have not, on the whole, utilised perceptual
features in their analyses of word-meanings in adult
languages and as there seem to be insuperable problems
attached to the idea of a set of features providing a
conjunctive definition of the meaning of a word, there
is little hope of Clark's theory finding any explanatory
backing via this third possibility. One additional remark
which can be made here points to the seriousness of this
situation in a different fashion. Assume that Clark"s
theory is correct for the stages of development in which
she is interested and assume further that the above
remarks concerning semantic feature theory are also
correct and that some different notion of semantic struc¬
ture is going to be necessary in order to explain the
adult's abilities. Then we have the predicament described
in Chapter 1 where, viewing development as a whole, there
appears to be a radical discontinuity somewhere between
the age of 18 months and adulthood. Note that this is
the case even if we subscribe to the view that a semantic
feature theory is adequate for the adult language and
merely insist that reference to only perceptual features
will not be sufficient in it. At some stage the child
will have to move from a system in which he relies wholly
on perceptual features to one in which he uses features
of some other kind and this represents a discontinuity.
As pointed out in Chapter 1 theories which involve this
sort of discontinuity are not necessarily incorrect but
the discontinuity is something which needs to be argued
for. This leaves us then with the second possibility
of Condition 4 to which I now turn.
It would appear that it is this second possibility that
will provide the most obvious explanatory basis for
Clark's theory. After all the features comprising the
meanings of words are perceptual features and there
should be no great problem in relating them directly to
aspects of theories of perceptual development in the
visual, auditory and other sensory domains. That Clark
sees this as a possibility is put forward in her 1973
57
paper and argued more fully in Clark (1974). In the
later paper we find several references to research work
in sensory perception covering a number of modalities.
For example, in connection with shape, Clark cites the
the findings of Gibson (1969) on the infant's attention
to lines and vertices and tentatively relates this to
Hubel and Wiesel's well-known work (see,e.g., 1962) on
the visual fields of cells in the visual cortex of the
cat. Evidence of a different sort is provided by
Ricciuti's work (1963) showing that children in the
12 - 24 month age group used shape as their main criterion
in a free sorting task. As far as sound is concerned, we
are directed to Kaplan (1969) and the conclusion that
infants of four months can distinguish male and female
voices and to Eimas, Siqueland, Jusczuk and Vigorito (1971)
57. For a rather more cautious statement of the whole
theory, albeit in an introductory context, see Clark and
Clark (1977).
on infant's perception of speech, sounds. Further
evidence is presented concerning the infant's perception
of movement, of size and of texture and it isn't my
purpose here to review this evidence in detail. Rather
what I want to do is take the evidence at face-value and
enquire as to exactly what Clark demonstrates by citing it.
Taking the example of sound, the evidence presented
clearly demonstrates the child as capable of some fairly
sophisticated discriminations in this domain, discrimin¬
ations which might, in principle, be conceptualised 4n
terms of the child having available a set of auditory
perceptual features. But there are three points I would
like to make in this connection:
(i) The evidence cited by Clark all concerns the child's
perception of linguistic materials and, as she herself
points out (p.35):
The overextension based on sound are mainly based
on characteristic non-speech sounds, e.g., the sound
of a train. However there has been much less research
on the child's ability to identify or recognise
these kinds of sound than there has been on speech
sounds.
In short the evidence to which Clark draws our attention
provides no support for the child controlling the percep¬
tual features in his perception with wnich she wishes
to credit him in explaining his overextensions. Contrary
to what we supposed there is no perceptual theory such
that the terms of the theory of lexical development can
be related to the terms of that theory in a systematic
way.
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(ii) assume, contrary to what is suggested in (i), that
the evidence does argue for the existence of the required
perceptual features in perception. Then we have to
attend to the relative ordering of the appearance of the
features in the perceptual theory and the lexical theory.
Some of the evidence cited by Clark concerns children
who are beyond the typical age-range for overextension
and therefore cannot be used as a basis in a theory
explaining the overextensions. Even when the relevant
features appear in perception before they are needed'in
the lexicon, this hardly shows that such features have
any role to play in the child's lexical development.
Clark's position would be undermined by showing that the
child does not control the distinctions which are necess¬
ary in the appropriate perceptual dimensions but the best
that the situation we are concerned with can do is indicate
that the theory is consistent with facts about perceptual
development.
(iii) although there may be a chance of satisfying the
necessary conditions on the reduction required in Conditio n
4 and developed in Chapter 4, there is little room for
optimism as far as satisfaction of the 'desirability'
conditions is concerned. Eirst much of the perceptual
learning which Clark refers to takes place in the first
few months of life and so the relationship between it
and the related lexical learning would be somewhat indirect.
Second, and more to the point, it is not the case that a
sequence of acquisition of perceptual features has been
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established. To see this in its proper perspective
we can imagine a set of findings which would he support¬
ive of Clark's theory. Suppose that in research on the
development of form perception we come to the conclusion
that such perception can he seen as mediated hy a set
of features whose availability to the child is fixed in
some ontogenetic sequence, , P^, ..., Pn« Suppose,
further, that lexical development can he seen, as Clark
would have it, in terms of the successive acquisition of
features which can be represented as a sequence, f^,,
59
^n Finally assume that the F^ can be systematically
related to the f^ (l^i-n) and that we find f. being
utilised in the lexical system after F^ is utilised in
the perceptual system and before F^+^ appears in that
system. In such a situation, Clark's hypothesis would
have extremely strong support (cf. Chapter 4 for extended
analysis of this and similar states of affairs). Compare
this then to what we in fact have. We have some, fairly
fragmentary, evidence that infants utilise perceptual
features in their perception. None of this evidence points
to a developmental sequence. Ex hypothesi we have the
sequence, f^, f^, fn, this being what we are seeking
58. That Clark would dearly love to be able to refer to
such a sequence is shown by her statement that (1975a,101):
"Since learning to attach meanings to words involves the
interpretation and encoding of perceptual data, we might
expect to find an analogous sequence of development in
perception..."
59. I don't wish to seriously suggest this sort of total
ordering on sets of features and I resort to it simply
for expository purposes.
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to explain. We do not have any systematic relationship
between the perceptual features and the features used in
the lexical system (what we have is a few suggestive
remarks) nor do we have any evidence of the required kind
to do with the relative orderings of the F^ and the f.. .
Given the lack of any definable ordering on the F^ this
is hardly surprising. Insofar as we do have any evidence
at all on this issue it would indicate that a large prop¬
ortion of the relevant F^ are used by the child in his
perception long before he learns any lexical items at all.
This is so transparently a sorry state of affairs that I
feel justified in concluding that further discussion at
this stage is pointless. Although Clark's theory satisfies
Conditions 1 -3, it falls down badly on Condition 4 and
therefore fails to meet our set of minimal criteria on
explanatory adequacy in theories of language development.
The logic of the above analysis is something we shall be
repeating on a number of occasions in the pages which follow
60. Press (1974) is an attempt to investigate children's
reliance on perceptual features in a similarity judgement
study and to establish an hierarchy of such features.
While producing a number of interesting findings the
experiment failed in its main purpose with reliance on
perceptual dimensions being largely determined by the nature
of the judgement required, ho hierarchy of features emerged
A further relevant study which has only just come to my
attention is Thomson and Chapman (1975). They showed that
in some cases of overextension children were capable of
making judgements of goodness of category membership and
that these judgements went in the direction of exemplars
that would not constitute misapplications of the terms
according to adult usage. Such a finding (cont. p 81)
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2.2 Semantic feature theory and the acquisition of
relational terms
One of the attractions of semantic feature theory which
has not emerged from the above discussion is that, using
essentially the same conceptual machinery, i.e., conjunctive
sets of semantic features, Clark feels that she can
account for a number of phenomena which have been studied
with some intensity during the last ten years or so. At
the outset we should note that features employed in the
*
analyses which follow are not perceptual features and
that the interplay between perceptual and non-perceptual
features in an overall theory is nowhere discussed. This
casts doubt on the coherence of any overall theory.
The work I wish to consider concerns the development of
comprehension, in experimental situations, of such
relational adjective pairs as more and less and same and
different, of antonymic dimensional adjective pairs such
as big and small, fat and thin and wide and narrow, of
the temporal conjunctions, before and after and of the
deictic verbs of motion, come and go and their 'caus&tive'
60.(cont) is more consistent with a prototype view of
the child's lexicon (cf. below) but in fairness I should
point out that Thomson and Chapman's results were not
completely general and that there were instances of over¬
extension which seemed to invoke 'unstructured' domains




counterparts, bring and take. In 2.2.1 I shall briefly
present the main research findings in these areas. 2.2.2
will examine explanations for the facts concerning dimen¬
sional adjectives, 2.2.3 will focus on more and less
paying brief attention to same and different. 2.2.4 is
concerned with the temporal conjunctions and 2.2.5 with
come and go.
6 2
2,2.1 Empirical work on relational terms
Donaldson and Balfour (1968) showed, in a seminal sttfdy,
that Scottish nursery school children with ages falling
in the range 3 years 5 months to 4 years 1 month appear
to go through a stage where they understand less as having
the meaning of more while understanding more correctly.
Their technique involved confronting children with two
cardboard apple trees on which could be hung metal apples.
For one set of questions conditions were arranged so
that the trees held different numbers of apples and the
children were asked either 'Does one tree have more?' or
'Does one tree have less?' The children were almost 100?£
correct in producing affirmative answers to these questions
but, when subsequently asked either 'Which tree has more?'
61. This is only a sample of the work which could be dis¬
cussed in this section although, I hope, not an unrepresent¬
ative one. Notable omissions are Eve Clark's own work
on the spatial forms, in, on and under (see E.Clark (1972a),
that in collaboration with Haviland on kinship (Haviland
and Clark (1974) and Centner's work on 'transactional'
verbs (Centner (1975)).
62. 'Relational terms' is here a convenient label with
no theoretical significance.
or 'Which tree has less?', they remained substantially
correct for the first question but a large proportion of
responses to the second question consisted of choosing
the wrong tree, i.e., the one which had more apples.
These results were consistent with the children under¬
standing the meaning of more and understanding less as if
63
it had the meaning of more. The possibility that the
children simply didn't understand less is argued against
by the fact that they did respond to the questions
involving less rather than look baffled and, furthermore,
they responded quickly and confidently. This main
result of the original experiment has been replicated
under several different conditions and various factors
pointed out by H.Clark (1970) and not taken account of
in Donaldson and Balfour's study have been accommodated
(see the work of Palermo end his associates, particularly,
Palermo (1973, 1974), Holland and Palermo (1975)). Palermo
(1973) provides independent evidence for the claim that
less has the meaning of more at the stage in question
using a modified semantic differential technique and,
although the exact interpretation of the findings is
likely to remain controversial for some time, it does
appear that a reliable set of phenomena are in need of
explanation. As we shall see in 2.2.3 S.Clark has, at
different times, considered two alternative explanations.
63. In fact Donaldson and Balfour studied the children's
responses under a set of carefully constructed conditions
but the finding reported in the text was uniform across
these conditions.
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Similar results were obtained in a subsequent study by
Donaldson and Wales (1970) concerning the child's
comprehension of the pair, same and different. In
situations in which children of nursery school age were
asked either to give the experimenter an object which was
the same as some specified reference object, different
from that object, the same as that object with respect
to some particular attribute or different from that
object with respect to some attribute, the experimenters
found that, while apparently -understanding same perfectly,
children understood different as if it had the meaning
of same. Without being very explicit, E.Clark proposes
that the same general principles as she invokes to explain
the data from the more and less studies will serve for
explanation in this case too but, as we shall see, this
lack of explicitness covers up a serious gap in the
. 64argument.
64. At this point it is convenient to note a fundamental
distinction between the sort of data considered relevant
in the domain of relational terms and that already dis¬
cussed, in 2,1, in connection with early lexical reference.
Clark, in treating both, along with several other phenomena
as instances of overextension, is pointing to what she
considers to be essential similarities but, on reflection,
one notes that there are some quite alarming asymmetries
between the two situations. In the case of early lexical
reference we have a term, X, which, as well as being used
appropriately, also usurps the domain of another term, Y.
The result is that what should be called 'Y' gets called 'X'
but there is no suggestion that the child understands
instances of 'Y' as if they had the meaning of 'X', i.e.,
it is not the case that the child misunderstands, say,
horse as if it had the meaning of cow and, when (cont.p 85)
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Donaldson and 'dales (1970) also examined Scottish children's
ability to comprehend the antonymic dimensional adjectives,
biff and nee, thick and thin. tall and short. etc. The
situation they used was one in which the children were
presented with an array of objects varying along the
appropriate dimension and were asked to respond to a
series of instructions which included 'Show me the X-est
one', 'Show me one that is X-er.than that', etc. Two
findings are of particular interest to the subsequent
discussion: *
(i) children, on the whole, responded much more accurately
to the'general' pair, biff and wee, than they did to any
of the more specific adjective combinations (but see
Maratsos (1973) for caution in this regard).
(ii) children responded more accurately to the positive
member of the pairs showing a tendency to interpret
64. (cont.) presented with instructions of the sort, 'Give
me a cow' consistently gets it right whereas, when presented
with 'Give me a horse', he consistently hands over a cow
(assuming, of course, that there is a cow available). This
latter would be analogous to the situation I have been
describing for relational terms where we find the child
misunderstanding 'Y' as if it had the meaning of 'X'. For
such terms, however, there is no evidence with which I
am familiar to indicate that the child produces instances
of 'X' when he is meaning 'Y', e.g., the child says more
in a situation which demands less (see Macrae (1976) for
remarks indicating the lack of inappropriate usage of come
and go in the spontaneous speech of two-year olds). The
exact import of these remarks is not clear to me and I
certainly don't wish to suggest that the two sets of
observations are quite distinct, However, clearly, we should
be careful about imposing similarities where they may not
exist. See also Huttenlocher (1974).
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instructions including the negative member as if they
contained the positive member (Eilers, Oiler and Ellington
(1974) contains evidence which contradicts this conclusion).
In this sense the adjective pairs appeared to have important
similarities to the more-less and same-different phenomena
already discussed.
The second result is of more general interest to the
discussion which follows but the former result can be
related to a study by E.Clark (1972b) which she again
*
sees as providing evidence for the semantic feature
hypothesis and which is interesting because it employs
a very different experimental paradigm to most of the
studies reviewed in this section. Rather than involving
the child in performing some action on the basis of his
understanding one of the forms in question, Clark (1972b)
employs a game where the task of the child is to produce
the antonym of the form supplied by the experimenter.
These forms are drawn from the set of dimensional adjectives
under discussion and may be either positive or negative
65
instances from that set. What Clark found was that
responses to the 'general' forms, big and small were
considerably more accurate than responses to the more
specific items but that these latter items could be
65. The concern with antonymic adjective pairs only
constituted half the experiment. The other half took as
its subject matter the semantic field of spatial pre¬
positions and will not be analysed in this work. It is
worth pointing out here that the fact that Clark found
no systematic effect of the polarity of the supplied form
on the accuracy of the response would argue against the
generality, across experimental situations, of some of
the results already discussed.
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ranked in a way which accorded with an analysis in terns
of semantic features, further she found that 'errors'
tended to be in the direction of the more general
terms and this was consistent with the sort of incomplete
feature specification countenanced by the theory.
Results from a different domain have been interpreted
in similar fshion (E.Clark (1970, 1971, 1973)). This
work has concerned the child's understanding of instructions
involving the temporal conjunctions, before and after and
*
has required children to act out instructions, using
farm animals, of a small number of specifiable types.^
These are: 'P before Q', 'Before ?,Q', 'P after Q', 'After
P, Q', where 'P' and 'Q' refer to linguistic encodings
of events which the farm animals and dolls can be made
to perform in the apparatus used in the experiment, e.g.,
'The dog jumped over the gate before the woman sat down1.
The results of this work are somewhat complicated and
certain aspects of Clark's interpretation are questionable,
not least the constitution of the groups which are supposed
to behave according to one or another pattern, but one
claim which does clearly emerge is that children appear
to go through a stage where they interpret after as if it
meant before and so consistently get right the instructions
involving before and consistently get wrong instructions
66. Other aspects of Clark's work in this area concerned
the spontaneous production of temporal conjunctions as
well as attention to forms such as when. In the analysis
which follows I shall concentrate on the results of the
experimental work briefly described in the text.
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involving after. This is to be compared with what one
might expect if the children simply didn't understand
after. Then we would expect a good deal of confusion, non-
f)1
responding and randomness in response. Again these
phenomena prove amenable to an analysis in terms of
features which I discuss in 2.2.4. In connection with her
work on before and after, however, Clark has introduced
a further concept into the discussion which has subse¬
quently been widely employed by her to examine phenomena
which she treated originaily exclusively in terms of'
semantic features. This concept is that of a non-linguistic
strategy in one of the several senses in which that
phrase has recently been employed (see Cromer (1976) for
a recent review). Briefly, and in general terms, if we
have two forms, X and Y, and the child consistently
understands instructions involving X ar"i consistently
misunderstands instructions involving Y as if they involved
X, there are at least two approaches that the theorist
can adopt. He may, as has been implicit in the previous
discussion in this section, assume that the child has a
fully specified (in the adult sense) meaning for X which
is also attached to Y. Alternatively, he can assume that,
in the experimental situation, the child responds on the
basis of applying a non-linguistic strategy to meanings
of X and Y neither of which is fully articulated and this
67. Note again, that there is no evidence, to my knowledge,
of children meaning after when they say before nor of
their simply using before inappropriately when after is
called for. Cf. fn. 64.
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leads him to behave, in that situation, as if he fully
understood X and understood Y as having the meaning of X.
This recourse to non-linguistic strategies has found
application in Clark's work on the comprehension of simple
locative expressions (E.Clark (1972a, 1974) and in her
interpretation of the more-less data described above as
well as in the work reported below. It can obviously
be seen as an attempt to base explanations of the develop¬
ment of linguistic abilities on what are, in essence,
non-linguistic variables. *
To conclude this brief resume of some of the major research
relevant to these topics I shall discuss the theme of a
paper which relies, almost exclusively, on the coherence
of the notion of non-linguistic strategy. The study of
Clark and Garnica (1974) involves requests for children
in the age range, 5 years 6 months to 9 years 5 months,
to identify the speaker or addressee of utterances involving
the deictic verbs, come, go. bring and take when these
utterances are presented to the child as being uttered
by one of a number of potential speakers to one of a
number of potential addressees in carefully controlled
circumstances. The results of the experiment bear out
the following conclusions:
(i) children perform more accurately on utterances
containing come than they do on utterances containing go.
(ii) children perform more accurately on utterances cont¬
aining bring than they do on utterances containing take.
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(iii) the pair, come and go, are responded to more
accurately as a pair, than the pair, bring and take.
(iv) it is not the case that, when the child is performing
more accurately on, say, come sentences than go sentences,
this is because he comprehends come and fails to compre¬
hend go. Rather, because of the skewing of the results
away from what would be expected if the child were
responding at random and in a way which is intimately
related to the particular configuration of potential
speakers and addressees adopted on the different trials,
the experimenters feel justified in crediting the child
with a developing set of non-linguistic strategies which
he evolves to deal with the problem situation in which
he finds himself. These strategies are such that following
them can lead to the impression that the child does
understand come and is either performing at random on go
or understanding it as if it had the meaning of come.
Although Clark and Garnica are not specific in this respect
it is necessary to assume that the non-linguistic strategies
are taken to be operating on incompletely specified
feature representations of come and go and so, to this
extent, these results also can be assimilated to the
general framework of the semantic feature hypothesis.
Enough has been said now tc give the reader an impression
of the large amount of work which has been done in the
last few years in these related areas and also some idea
of the tendencies which have been repeatedly found in the
results. I now wish to consider the value of the semantic
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feature hypothesis as an explanation for development in
these domains. In addition, where non-linguistic
strategies have been introduced into the theorising, I
shall consider the status of theories which, as well as
employing a feature-based lexicon, embrace some notion
of non-linguistic strategy which is seen as interacting
with whatever information appears in the lexicon.
2.2.2 Antonymic dimensional adjectives
Above it was pointed out that the work of Donaldson and
hales (1970) led to the formulation of two conclusions
of interest in the present context and it is the second
of these concerning children's better performance on the
'undifferentiated' adjective pair, big and wee (small).
68
that I wish to attend to first.
In connection with this phenomenon, Clark provides the
following account (1973, p.93) :
The data on dimensional terms can also be represented
in terms of components of meaning known by the
child at different stages in the acquisition process.
Big is substituted for other unmarked dimensional
terms because it is specified (like them) as
68. I would refer again here to Maratsos (1973) (cf p 85)
and his conclusion that understanding of the word, big,
actually decreases when the child learns more specific
dimensional vocabulary like tall and short. This would
indicate that the simple additive view of the development
of word-meanings I am about to examine is, at best, over
simple. However, from the point of view of current con¬
cerns, we can say that Maratsos' results have no bearing on
the discussion of the coherence of Clark's proposals
considered as a developmental theory.
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^-Dimension (3) and +Polar but the child at this stage
has not yet worked out how many dimensions are
necessarily presupposed by the other terms such as
long and tall. He has yet to differentiate between
the dimensional properties of linearity, surface
and volume. While big simply applies to three
dimensions, tall is more complex since it supposes
(sic) that all three dimensions are present, and
then talks about one specific dimension: +Vertical.
The child appears to learn first the feature of
dimensionality, then, later on, he specifies further
what kind of dimensionality he is talking about;
for instance whether the dimension is +Vertical#as
in tall or high.or -Vertical as in long, deep, far,
etc.
While some of the phrasing in the above is somewhat
bizarre, the nature of the proposal and the way in which
it can be cast to make the framework of Chapter 1 applic¬
able is clear enough. The domain of enquiry, I shall
regard as a part of the child's lexicon which'is involved
in his ability to produce and comprehend simple sentences
including the dimensional adjectives as well as his
ability to produce and comprehend these forms in isolation
(E.Clark (1972b)). The data relevant to this domain are,
in the case of Donaldson and Wales (1970), instances of
comprehension or lack of it of sentences having a limited
set of structures and, in the case of E.Clark (1972b),
instances of the comprehension and production of isolated
69
forms. It is necessary to assume that, in the studies
69. Obviously this could be extended to take Account of the
different experimental procedures adopted in the several
studies of the acquisition of dimensional adjectives carried
out recently, e.g. Maratsos (1973filers, Oiler and Ellington
(1974), Bartlett (1976) but there is little point in
complicating the presentation in this manner at this stage.
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producing relevant data, there were no additional factors
of a systematic nature affecting the comprehension or
production of the sentences or forms. Calling this
domain of enquiry D,Clark is claiming that in D at
least the following two stages can be isolated where we
can regard the claims as theories of the relevant part
of the child's lexicon at two times, t^ and t^. At t^
that part of the lexicon has something like the structure
shown in figure 10, ignoring differences between positive
and negative adjectives as this will be discussed later.
big - wee (small) « ^ +Dimension (3), ± Polar
long - short < y +Dimension (3), ± Polar
wide - narrow • < > +Dimension (3), + Polar
etc.
figure 10
and at this same part of the lexicon will have a structure
like that shown in figure 11.





( } ^-Dimension (3), ± Polar
-Vertical
< ) ^-Dimension (3), + Polar
+Vertical




Obviously further stages would be necessary in order to
chart the full development in this domain but the general
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picture is clear enough from this simple case. That
happens between t^ and i-s that the child begins to
use an additional feature, + Vertical, which enables
him to make new distinctions in his lexical system. In
this case, unlike the case of early referential vocabulary
this additional feature is not accompanied into the system-
by a new lexical item utilising that feature in its
meaning specification. Rather it is accompanied by an
'enriched' ability to understand a lexical form in a way
more appropriate to the adult norm, although this form
is assumed to have existential status in the earlier
system. Thus the semantic feature hypothesis applied
to relational terms does not make any predictions about
the appearance of forms in the lexicon but only about the
order of development of understanding of those forms.
Turning now then to Conditions 1 - 4-, I shall assume
that some version of Condition 1 can be satisfi°d and
give no further discussion to this point.
Condition 2 is somewhat problematic as there is no
70. Clark (1972b) is of some help in this respect wdiere,
in order to handle such pairs as thick and thin, a feature
+ Secondary is introduced following Bierwisch (1967) the
idea being that such adjectives are not applicable to the
most extensive (and hence primary) dimension of objects.
Thus one can see a third stage where the pair, thick-thin
would have an entry in the lexicon something like:
Thick-thin <r~> +Dimension (9), +Polar, ^Vertical,+Secondary
and so on.
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generally accepted feature theory which addresses the
analysis of dimensional adjectives. Clark relies a
great deal on the work of Bierwisch (1967) "but, while
this work is significant and tackles a number of fundamental
problems in an interesting way, it does not provide a
well-motivated inventory of features necessary for analysing
the meaning of dimensional adjectives. Such an inventory
would appear to be one necessary component of a general
theory of the required sort. The qualifier perceptual'
must, of course, be dropped in this part of the theory
because of the presence of such features as + Polar which,
while one might wish to argue that they are induced on
the basis of perceptual experience, have no straightforward
perceptual interpretation and this emphasises the need
for a general theory. The extent of the problem can be
seen by citing a passage from Bartlett (1976,206) which
should be compared with the quotation from Clark on p.91
above.
The SFH (semantic feature hypothesis - RMA.) bases
its predictions about the acquisition of these
features on the notion of feature generality. Thus
it predicts that the dimensional feature QsizeJ will
be acquired firs£ since it can be applied without
restriction to any of the terms in the domain,
while Clark (1973) makes no further explicit pre¬
dictions about the acquisition of other dimensional
features, she does refer to the analysis of these
features in H.Clark (1973). According to this
analysis, the feature [dimension^ (corresponding
roughly to the notion of 'extended edge' or 'extension
along one dimension') will be acquired next, followed
by features which express orientation of extension
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(i.e. [verticalityj ) and relative length of the
edge to which the adjective applies (i.e. {^secondary/
which refers to the second-most extended edge of
an object).
Questions which immediately arise are whether the feature,
^Dimension (3) in E.Clark's discussion, is to be equated
with the feature, [size^ in Bartlett's, whether Clark's
"feature of dimensionality" can be identified with
Bartlett's feature, j^dimensionj , and exactly what
confusion is lurking under the qualification, "corresponding
4
roughly to the notion of 'extended edge' or 'extension
along one dimension'" in the Bartlett passage. If
something is going to correspond to both an edge and an
extension along a dimension the correspondence must indeed
be rough. Contrary to what I believe to be the case,
I shall assume, for the sake of further discussion,
that the proposal does maJke reference to a precise
general theory.
Condition 3 is applicable and satisfied in a straight¬
forward additive fashion and, in the passage from t^ to
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±2, we have one feature added : + Vertical.
So, giving the proposal the benefit of the doubt on a
number of crucial issues, we approach Condition 4- and
ask whether the theory can be grounded in any of the three
71. following from fn 70. we can consider another trans¬
ition from "k°» say, which will involve the intro¬
duction of the feature + Secondary and, again, this ■
transition will satisfy Condition 3 additively. I won't
pursue the analysis of this transition any further in the
text.
senses mentioned in that condition. Is there any reason
for finding the development which we can schematise as
X—^ X+Y rather than the development Y —> X+Y where, in
this case, X denotes the feature, + Dimension (3), and
Y denotes the feature, + Vertical? Given the lack of
precision in interpretation of the features this is diff¬
icult to answer. The third jjssibility mentioned in
Condition 4, that of linguistically grounding the proposal,-
can immediately be ruled out on the grounds that the
relevant analyses of the world's languages don't exist
and that there is no a priori reason for believing that
they would support the point at issue if they did exist.
Consider the possibility that the proposal might be logically
grounded and here the interpretation of the features
becomes crucial. The passage cited from Clark is little
help in this regard although she can be seen as suggesting
otherwise when she says : "Chile big simply applies to
three dimensions, tall is more complex since it supposes
that all three dimensions are present and then talks about
one specific dimension: + Vertical". As it stands this
statement is false as is witnessed by the existence of
tall rectangles and, presumably, what Clark is striving
towards is the claim that anything to which the contrast
tall - short is applicable must also be amenable to analysis
in terms of the contrast, big - small. Bartlett's choice
of terminology is more transparent in this regard where
we can see that having a vertical dimension 'presupposes'
having size and we can thus suggest that there is the
sort of relationship we are looking for between the
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features, [size} and [verticality] . It seems,
therefore, as if aspects of the development of dimensional
adjectives may he logically gounded hut, clearly, the
lack of a well-formulated general theory is detrimental
to any confidence we may place in this assertion. As
far as the second possibility under Condition 4 is
concerned little can he said at this stage. If we were
to postulate 'concepts' corresponding to the semantic
features under discussion and investigate their develop¬
ment, we would, presumably, find the 'concept' of sizte
before the 'concept' of verticality but this, insofar
as it is based on the logical relationships of the 'concepts',
wouldn't take us beyond the notion of logical grounding.
In summary, then, I would say that crucial weaknesses
invade the formulation of the semantic feature theory
with regard to the acquisition of 'undifferentiated' and
'differentiated' antonymic adjective pairs. These weak¬
nesses mean that, while suggestive avenues remain to be
explored, judgement on the overall theory must be reserved.
I wish to turn now to the second major finding of
Donaldson and hales (1970) : that unmarked dimensional
adjectives appear to be acquired before their marked
counterparts. E.Clark (1973) largely following H.Clark
(1970) offers an account along the following lines: for
the pairs of adjectives in question, the positive member
72of each pair is unmarked according to a number of criteria.
72. Eor extensive discussion of the notion of 'markedness'
and its several senses covering the senses which are relevant
to the points here, see Lyons (1977b, 3C5ff).
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In particular, the positive member, as well as being
used in explicit or implicit comparison (e.g. x is taller
than y. x is tall) also has a non-comparative use when
it can be seen as simply identifying the dimension in
question. Thus we find such phrases as 6 feet tall.
5 miles wide, etc. but not, unless special assumptions
are made about the context of utterance, phrases such as
? 6 feet short. ? 5 miles narrow, etc. The non-comparative
interpretation can be seen as involving one less feature
than the comparative interpretation and, at this poifit,
Bartlett can take up the story (1976, 207).
Thus, the SFH predicts that initially both terms
in a pair (of antonymic dimensional adjectives - RI-IA.)
will have a nominative (sic) meaning which indicates
the appropriate dimension of comparison, without
regard for polarity (e.g. both long and short will
mean 'having some length'). For any given pair, the
SFH further predicts that the j^+polj feature will
prediction based on the assumption that children
have a bias towards picking the greater of two
objects and that this bias makes it easier for
children to acquire meanings which encode 'greater'
relationships.
From this it is clear that three stages at least are
envisaged in the development of the child's lexicon, the
domain of enquiry not having changed from that specified
earlier in this section. At t^, using Bartlett's
features, we have the situation represented in Figure 12.
counterpart, a
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tall <; > +size, +vertical






The important facts to note about this partial lexicon
are the synonymy of each of the antonymic pairs and the
lack of any feature corresponding to their comparative
senses in the analyses. At we shall have a transition
to the situation depicted in Figure 13.
tall < > +size, +vertical, +pol
short « » +size, +vertical, +pol
wide <; > +size, -vertical, +pol
narrow <—> +size, -vertical, +pol
big < * +size, +pol
small < } +size, +pol
Figure 1 3 ^
73. That Bartiett accurately represents Clark's position
in this regard can be seen in the following statement from
Clark (1973, 94): "...both are treated as if they contain
the feature +Polar; they have not quite reached the stage
where the unmarked adjective +Polar is in contrast with
its opposite, which is eventually specified as -Polar."
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Again, here the antonymic pairs are treated as synonyms
hut now they are supposed to have an explicitly compara¬
tive use encoded in the feature £+polJ , and, furthermore,
a comparative use restricted to that of saying or implying
that something exceeds the relevant mean for the
dimension(s) in question. By t^ the system will approx¬
imate to the adult lexicon and we shall have the structure
shown in Figure 14.
tall <— +size, +vertical, +pol
short <—-> +size, +vertical, -pel
wide <- +size, -vertical, +pol
narrow <r-—> +siz3, -vertical, -pol
big < » +size, +pol
small <—* +size, -pol
74
Figure 14
Turning now then to discussion of Conditions 1 - 4, we
can see that we have a developmental theory embracing
three stages, a theory which we can represent as (1^, T2, T^).
I shall again assume thax Condition 1 can, in some
sense, be satisfied by this theory and move immediately
to Condition 2.
Much the same unease arises as in connection with the
development of undifferentiated and differentiated
74. Again, of course, additional features will be needed
to distinguish pairs within one dimension.
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adjectives and there is little point in repeating the
arguments advanced earlier. There is, however, one
additional cause for concern with the present theory. If
the authors of the theory have a standard version of a
feature theory in mind, the role of semantic features in
their theory must be to distinguish the meanings of lexical,
items. It follows that, in a system countenancing only
binary features, each such feature will occur somewhere
in the system with both a positive and a negative value.
but only positively specified and it has no distinguishing
role to play in this part of the lexicon (nor, presumably,
in any other part). Thus is not a theory utilising
semantic features in the 'normal' way and it behoves its
originators to come up with a definition of a general
theory such that T^ is an instance of it.
This point has. an immediate reflex as far as Condition 3
is concerned because we cannot see either the transition
from T.j to or transition from T^ to in terms
of the addition of features. Rather we must talk about
the addition of values of features. Even this isn't
quite correct because, as the above discussion has shown,
[pol] cannot be a semantic feature in the accepted sense
but, for nowT, I wish to assume that this way of talking
is not too misleading and go on to discuss Condition 4.
As far as the transition from T^ to T£ is concerned, we
are asking why the child acquires the feature value, [+polJ
after he has acquired the features, [size] and Jvertica]J ,
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rather than the other way round. Subject to the qualifi¬
cation expressed in the previous discussion of 'differentiated'
ard 'undifferentiated' adjectives concerning the lack of
any clear statement of logical relationship "between the
features, it appears that the same sort of considerations
as were met there could lead to the transition "being
logically grounded. The feature value, [+polJ , inter¬
preted as something like 'having more than average extent',
assumes some dimension along which extents are being
compared and the feature, [verticalJ , refers to just such
a dimension. Therefore, although the theoretical term,
[ +polJ , does not rely specifically on the term, £ vertical] ,
for its intelligibility, it does rely on terms of this
type and, given the tentative nature of the data anyway,
this seems good enough. Considerations of linguistic
grounding and grounding in some more basic theory a^d
little to the discussion at this point. Consider now
the transition from T~ to Tv. In this case there is no2 3
logical reason why we should find the development schematised
as X-?X + [-pol] (where X includes the feature value, £ +polJ)
rather than the development schematised as I-? Y + ^+polj
(where Y includes the feature value, [-pol] ). Nor is
there any chance of the transition being linguistically
grounded : any semantic theory using a polarity feature
in the description of a language would make reference to
both values of that feature for the reasons spelled out
above. Thus it is inconceivable that there could be
more languages with semantic structures demanding use
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of ^+polJ than those with semantic structures demanding
use of [-pol] . E.Clark is aware of the problem here and
invokes an assumption made by H.Clark (1970, 274) that
"the best exemplar of a dimension is an object with the
75
most extent". H.Clark refers to this as possibly "a
perceptually motivated fact" and so, to the extent that
it can be used to explain the appearance of |+pol] before
j^-polj , it can be seen as an attempt to ground the
transition from to in some more basic theory of
perception. It is not my intention here to examine £he
status of the assumption in the light of what is known
about perception: what interests me is the nature of
the theory which is supported by such an assumption. It
is clear from H.Clark's discussion that he sees the
principle as operative before the child controls the
comparative sense of the dimensional adjectives. It is
a principle which can be seen as causing the child to
act as if he understood both adjectives as having the
comparative sense of the unmarked member of the pair
when, in fact, he understands both adjectives as being
non-comparative in sense. So, for example, in the
situation devised by Donaldson and Hales, given an
instruction to the child to show the experimenter the
tallest or the shortest from a set of rectangles, at the
stage under discussion the child is going to understand
75. To be fair to H.Clark on this I should point out that
he does cite a small amount of indirect evidence which
would indicate that he is entitled to refer to this
principle as something more than an assumption.
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either of these non-comparatively, i.e. as something
like 'show me the one with vertical extent'. Coupled
with the principle introduced by H.Clark the child will
respond correctly to an instruction including 'tallest'
and incorrectly to an instruction involving 'shortest'.
But now we have a different theory to the one put forward
by E.Clark and it is not a theory which necessarily embraces
a stage where the child's lexicon includes the feature
value [+polJ and does not include £-polj . Consistent
with this theory we could have a first stage where tHe
child simply understands all adjectival forms non-
comparatively and possesses no principles for making it
appear that this is not so, a second stage where his
understanding is unchanged but the principle makes it
appear as if he understood the unmarked form and under¬
stood the marked form as having the meaning of the unmarked
form, and a third stage, mediated by the introduction
of the feature, £ polj, (both positively and negatively
specified) where the child does understand the comparative
senses of the adjectives. It seems to me that something
like this is the position which E.Clark is moving towards
(see subsequent discussions in this chapter of non-
linguistic strategies and principles interacting with
lexical meaning) although I have found it impossible to
find a clear statement of it in her work. Eor such a
position the transition from the second stage to the
third could be logically grounded for exactly the reasons
put forward above in connection with the transition from
106
T.j to and the transition from the first to the second
stage would "be marked by the emergence of H.Clark's
principle and we would expect to look to a theory of
perceptual development for reassurance in this regard.
However, it is not my purpose here to draft alternative
proposals nor, indeed, to tease out what may be implicit
in the proposals we are examining but to take what we
find in the literature at face-value. From such a
rationale it emerges that the formulations of the semantic
feature hypothesis which we meet in E.Clark (1973) ahd
in Bartlett (1976) are inadequate in several crucial
respects, respects which have become obvious in terms of
Conditions 1 - 4.^
76. Nor is it possible to turn to H.Clark's later work (1973)
involving what the author calls 'rules of application' to
find an explanation as to why the child should understand
the meaning of the unmarked forms before the meaning of
the marked forms (if indeed he does) rather than having
procedures which enable him to act as if he understood
the meaning of the unmarked forms before he understands
the meaning of the marked forms. In particular, the number
of 'reference points' involved in their application will
not provide the necessary complexity measures as both
the marked and unmarked adjectives require the same number
of reference points when used comparatively. Incident¬
ally, while Clark's claim that (36) "each adjective has
two points of reference" is clearly true for the pair he
considers, high and low, as well as for other pairs such
as near and far, it isn't true for pairs such as tall and
short. If the suggestion is that tall, like high, makes
implicit reference to ground level, I would counter that
a tall pole buried so that only a small amount sticks out
of the ground is still a tall pole. Of course, in all
cases, the unmarked form requires less reference points
than the marked form when the latter is used non-comparatively.
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2.2.3 More and less
A similar conclusion is justified for the analysis, in
terms of the semantic feature hypothesis, of the data
cited on the acquisition of more and less. Again the
domain of enquiry, D, is fixed as a section of the child's
lexicon and data relevant to D include the child's
ability to comprehend simple instructions including
more or less and also, somewhat anecodotally, the child's
spontaneous use of these forms. Clark is more explicit
than she is for dimensional adjectives when she says
(1973, 90 - 91):
First the child uses more and less in the nominal
non-comparative sense only. Next, since the nominal
term refers to extension rather than to lack of
extension, the child will use both more and less
to refer to the extended end of the scale, and
finally, he will distinguish less from more and use
it contrastively to apply to the less extended end
of the scale. At the first stage, therefore,
more is simply taken to mean "amount" or "quantity
of" and its comparative nature is not understood ...
While this nominal interpretation of both words
would explain why more and less were treated as synonyms,
it does not account for why more and less both
mean "more" ... one has to make one assumption at
this point: that the notion "having extent" is
always best exemplified by the object with the
most extent ... At the last stage more and less will
be used comparatively in their contrastive sense
and less is then differentiated from more.
Here we have a direct analogy to Clark's theorising in
connection with dimensional adjectives and we can
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less +Amount less +Amount,+pol less +Amount,-pol
t, t2 t3
Figure 1 5
Exactly the same set of problems as arose in the context
#
of dimensional adjectives arises again when we attempt
to analyse this proposal in terms of Conditions 1 - 4
and, again, it is possible to formulate a somewhat less
problematic theory by introducing a non-linguistic
principle to explain the child's behaviour at t^. There
is no point in repeating these considerations here.
However, there is an additional problem concerning the
supposed non-comparative use of more at t^ which deserves
brief discussion.
While it is possible to argue a weak case for more being
the unmarked member of the pair, more and less. on the
basis of its relatedness to much in the pair, much and
little, it is not the case that more, unlike the
unmarked dimensional adjectives, has the specialised
task of naming a dimension. To my way of thinking
there is nothing marked about the phrase, 15 less when
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compared, with the phrase, 1 5 more. And what exactly
is the non-comparative use of more which Clark refers to?
She gives no references but Bloom (1973) (see also
Brush(l976)) provides extensive and relevant discussion
of the use of more in the speech of her own daughter,
Alison. In summary, she suggests that in the earliest
stages more has two distinct uses. In the first use, an
instance of a category exists in the environment, ceases
to exist, and then appears again (or a new instance of
the category appears) to be designated 'more', and, *
according to the second, an instance of X is joined in
the environment by another instance of that category
which is designated 'more'. What she did not find is
an instance she refers to as "the comparative" where
two instances of a certain stuff together make more of
that stuff and this result of putting the two instances
together is designated 'more'. Without wishing to
quibble with Bloom's interpretation of the phenomena it
seems to me that the choice of the term 'comparative'
for the third usage is unfortunate. It carries the
77. This is to disagree with H.Clark (1970, 272) where he
says that the sentence, John has more ancles than Dick.is
ambiguous in that it may or may not carry an implication
that both John and Dick have many apples. According to
the first interpretation, more is being used nominally,
says Clark. He goes on to say that the sentence, John
has less apples than Dick is unambiguous in this respect
and always "implies that John and Dick have a paucity of
apples". It seems to me that Clark's judgements are
simply incorrect in this respect and I find nothing odd
about a use of the second sentence when both John and Dick
are well appled.
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implication of 'non-comparative1 onto the first two
usages and to refer to them in this way is misleading as
they do involve comparison and it is certainly not the
case that they can be seen as instances of more which
refer simply to amount or extent. If it is this sort
of usage to which Clark is alluding it seems to me to
HQ
require a good deal of further argument.
Without going into any more details, then, it seems
reasonable to conclude that the semantic feature hypothesis
suffers from the same defects when applied to the acquis¬
ition of more and less as it does for the dimensional
adjectives. To the extent that the explanation the
hypothesis embodies depends upon the notion of markedness
it would appear that it is on even weaker ground in the
context, of more and less.
Turning briefly to same and different, we come across a
situation which is even worse. Clark doesn't even begin
to speculate as to what the feature composition of these
words might be during the time at which they are confused
and it is transparent that considerations of markedness
78. All of this, of course, leaves untouched the data
from Donaldson and Balfour (1968) and from Donaldson and
Wales (1970) indicating that children were interpreting
more and less as having the meaning of some under some
conditions. But it also becomes difficult to relate
this non-comparative usage shown in the comprehension of
3-year olds to the non-comparative usage discussed in'the
text which is from the beginnings of lexical development.
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and non-comparative interpretations are going to be of
little use in this respect. There is no dimension of
'sameness' for same to name as same is inherently-
relational and, as far as my judgements are concerned,
there are no situational variables rendering the question,
Are X and Y different?, somehow specialised, when compared
to the question, Are X and Y the same? I conclude that
the semantic feature hypothesis has nothing to say about
the acquisition of same and different.
*
2.2.4 Temporal conjunctions
The work which E.Clark has done on the comprehension of
before and after provides an interesting example of the
interplay of the acquisition of semantic features and
non-linguistic strategies. Clark claims to discern four
stages in the acquisition of these terms insofar as
this acquisition process is revealed by the experimental
situation she employs described briefly in 2.2.1. Using
Clark's numbering, at Stage I the child, while compre¬
hending that before and after involve the ordering of
events in time, relies on an order-of-mention strategy:
79
whatever is mentioned first happens first. The
79. The extent to which this sort of partial understanding
of before and after is justified isn't clear to me. Obviously
if the child had an order-of-mention strategy and treated
before and after as 'semantic noise' we would get Stage I
behaviour. Me would also expect to get Stage I behaviour
if the conjunction were missed out, replaced by a nonsensj
form or by some other conjunction the child didn't under¬
stand. In the discussion in the text I shall assume that
the children did manifest partial understanding - an assump¬
tion which is clearly attractive to the semantic feature
hypothesis.
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conjunction of these two hypotheses leads to the child
apparently comprehending utterances of the form, P before Q
After P. Q and consistently getting wrong his
attempts to act out utterances of the form, Before P.Q
a2113- P after Q. At Stage Ila the child understands utter¬
ances containing before but still has an incomplete
specification for the meaning of after and so, for
utterances containing after, he continues to resort to
the order-of-mention strategy. In terms of performance
on the experimental task what this means is that the*
child now correctly acts out sentences containing before,
irrespective of the position of before in the sentence,
and, while still getting right sentences of the form,
After P.Q he consistently gets wrong sentences of the
form, P after Q. At Stage lib we find the situation we
have already come across where after is interpreted as
if it had the meaning of before and so now the child is
presumed to have a more complete specification of the
meaning of after than at Stage Ila but it is a specific¬
ation which is inappropriate in certain details. The
child's performance at Stage lib is such that he is
consistently correct for sentences including before
and consistently incorrect for sentences with after.
With the more complete specification of the meaning of
after the order-of-mention strategy is dropped (but see
below). Finally, at Stage III the child acquires the
vital feature value enabling him to distinguish the
meaning of before from that of after and leading to
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consistently correct responding in the experiment.
Before going on to examine the exact nature of Clark's
proposals it is necessary to make two remarks. The first
is that I have described the children's behaviour at the
different stages as if it were completely clear-cut. This
is not true, of course, and, in some cases the figures
cited by Clark are not totally convincing. The second,
and related, point is that the groups of children were
established post hoc on the basis of trends which became
apparent in the results and the children were not assigned
to groups at the beginning of the experiment on the basis
30
of their ages. Croup lib had only three children in it
and what this amounts to is an indication that the
empirical support for the Stages I - III is not compelling.
In the context of this work, I don't wish to regard this
as crucial and I shall proceed on the assumption that
each of the stages is well-established.
The domain of enquiry, D, can again be fixed as a part
of the child's lexicon but this time, in addition, we
must consider the child's strategies which he resorts to
in cases of partial understanding and the interaction of
these strategies with the lexicon. Behaviour which is
relevant to D is restricted, in this discussion, to the
child's comprehension of sentences involving before and
after as evidenced by his abilities to act out the events
80. There was a tendency for older children to belong to
the more 'advanced' groups but Clark does not provide any
analysis to show whether the correlation between age
and stage of development is significant.
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depicted "by the sentences in the situation described by
Clark (1971 ).
At Stage I, largely following Clark's informal, remarks,
one may infer that the part of the lexicon in which
we are interested will have the structure represented in
figure 16.
before 4—> +femporal, -Simultaneous
after <;—? +Temporal, -Simultaneous
4
Figure 1 6
Another component of the theory is the following strategy:
S^ : when presented with a structure of the form
(P) (-i-Temporal, -Simultaneous) (Q)
or a structure of the form
(+Temporal, -Simultaneous) (P) (Q)
assume that the event referred to by 'P' precedes the
event referred to by 'Q'. Tt (the theory for Stage I)
is thus a two component theory, which we could represent
as Lj+S^. where Lj designates the lexicon in its essential
respects at Stage I.
At Stage Ila the lexicon changes to the structure
represented in Figure 17 and S^ will be unchanged (in
order for this to be so there will have to be a convention
that Srp only applies to structures in which its feature
specification is exactly met so that it does not apply
to sentences including before). Thus = ^jto + ^
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before ^—> +Temporal, -Simultaneous, +Prior
afrer <—> -fTemporal, -Simultaneous
Figure 1 7
At Stage lib the lexicon, is as in Figure 18 and
81
S^ is dispensed with. Thus we have = ^Hb*
before ^^ +Temporal, -Simultaneous, +Prior
after < > +Temporal, -Simultaneous, +Prior
Figure 18
4
Finally, at Stage III the lexicon reaches its putative
adult state as in Figure 19 and, again, no non-linguistic
strategies play a role.
before i—> +Temporal, -Simultaneous, +Prior
after <—) +Temporal, -Simultaneous, -Prior
Figure 1 9
Thus we have a sequence of theories, (.Tj, ^jj0> ^jTb' ^III^'
and we can consider the various transitions in this
81 . To say that the strategy is 'dispensed with' is some¬
thing of an oversimplification as there is a good deal
of evidence indicating thai adults use a similar strategy
in their perception of sentences. However, there is a
considerable difference between the child relying on a
strategy to •produce an interpretation and an adult finding
it easier to deal with sentences which accord with a
particular' strategy. The sense in which the adult is
using the strategy is somewhat opaque to me and so,
while not wishing to discount the psycholinguistic evidence
(e.g. Clark and Clark (1968)), I shall assume in the text
discussion that the strategy does disappear.
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sequence with regard to Conditions 1 - 4.
As far as Condition 1 is concerned we seen to be in
essentially the position we have met repeatedly in this
chapter and there doesn't appear to be any reason to
adopt a different stance in this case.
Condition 2 is complicated by the fact that some of the
theories in the sequence are hybrid consisting of lexicons •
and non-linguistic strategies. As far as the lexicons
are concerned we merely need to express the same reser¬
vations as have already been expressed with regard to
earlier proposals concerning inventories of semantic
features. Similar reservations must be expressed concerning
the notion of 'strategy', i.e. we need some general
formulation of what can count as a strategy and how such
strategies can interact with partially specified lexical
information resulting in a form of comprehension. At
the very least then we can ask for two general theories.
One of these is a theory of the lexicon which ignores
strategies and this is not distinct from the general
theory required by the earlier proposals we have considered.
The other is a general theory of lexicon, strategies and
their interaction, for future reference I shall refer
to these, purely hypothetical, general theories as
L and LS. Clark provides no insights as to the nature
of these theories and, as we have seen, the sequence of
theories under consideration draws its members from the
two types, i.e. we have a sequence of theory-types which
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we can represent as (L.3, LS, L, L) involving a discontin¬
uity between Stage Ila and Stage lib which we might expect
to produce problems in the application of Condition 3.
Consider, then, Conditions 3 and 4 with respect to the
transition from T_ to It is accompanied by the
introduction of the feature value (cf. discussion in 2.2.2),
+Prior, as part of the meaning of before and there is
no change in the set of strategies. If we are prepared
to countenance the introduction of single feature values
*
this looks like straightforward addition thus satisfying
Condition 3 and, furthermore, the mixed sequence of
features and feature values, (+Temporal, ^Simultaneous,
+Prior) appears to be logically grounded In much the
same way as was the sequence (using Bartlett's notation
again), ( [size] , [vertical] , [+?ol] ), that is the feature,
^Simultaneous, only becomes intelligible in the context
of temporal notions and the feature value, +Prior,
'presupposes' lack of simultaneity. There Is nothing
of value to be gained by considering the other possibilities
for grounding the theory at this stage.
The transition from Txt. to Ttt-, is more problematic -Ila Ijlq
as we might expect, given that we have theories of distinct
types involved. The strategy, S^, is lost in the trans¬
ition and there is no concomitant complication in the
lexicon. In a sense, therefore, we might wish to say
that we have a straightforward simplification of the theory
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resulting in a violation of Condition 5. I hesitate
to jump to this conclusion hut only because the theory
presents what are, if anything, more profound grounds
for unease via its failure to satisfy Condition 2 for
this transition. Additional argument, of course, could
render the situation more respectable but, so far, this
has not been forthcoming.
Finally, consider the transition from to Ijjj» It
is easy to see that all that is involved here is the^intro¬
duction of the feature value, -Prior, and, again, we have
satisfaction of Condition 3 additively. As far as
Condition 4 is concerned, however, there is no logical
reason why the feature value, -Prior, should enter the
system after the feature value, +Prior nor, clearly, is
there any linguistic reason since, in any semantic
analysis of an adult language, a theorist using one of
the values will also use the other, given the usual
conception of semantic feature theories. So we are
left with the possibility that there might be some
developmental theory, T', in some domain, Df, which is
regarded as more basic than the domain, D and which is
such that our theory, T, for the transition from
to Ijjp can 706 grounded in I?.
82. At this point it is useful to remind the reader of
the weakness of the empirical evidence in favour of Stage
lib. Even If it were scrapped though the problem of
discontinuity would still arise in connection with
the transition from Stage Ila to Stage III.
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Attempts to provide such a grounding can be gleaned
from the work of the Clarks (see, particularly, H,Clark
(1973, 48 - 52)). These attempts proceed from the view
that the system of prepositions, conjunctions, etc.
encoding temporal concepts in English is based on a
spatial metaphor and they employ the 'equations':
before (temporal) = before (spatial) = in front of (spatial)
and
after (temporal) = after (spatial) = behind (spatial^)
These 'equations' establish correspondences between the
lexical items in which we are interested and lexical
items which encode spatial notions, how, the argument
goes, in the domain of the child's developing perceptual
space, it is reasonable to assert that his concept of the
space in front of him develops more quickly and is more
elaborate than his concept of the space behind him and,
furthermore, the space in front of him can be regarded
as positive when compared to the space behind him thus
establishing links between the pair, before and after
(positive and negative) and the pairs of words discussed
in earlier sections of this chapter. Whether this pro¬
cedure matches up to the rather strong constraints on
reductions discussed in Condition 4 and developed more fully
in Chapter 4 is debatable but I believe that there is
at least the beginning of a sound argument here. It is to
be noted, however, that it is an argument to 5how why
the child learns before at an earlier stage than after
and, strictly speaking, doesn't address the cognitive or
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perceptual status of the feature values, +Prior and
-Prior.
In summary, we can say that the semantic feature hypothesis
fares badly in the domain of temporal conjunctions because
of the lack of a general theory incorporating a lexicon
and interacting strategies. There appears to be a
difficult discontinuity countenanced by the theory but
not argued for and, against these major flaws, the
successes in grounding which I have discussed above have
4
a debatable significance.
2.2.5 Come and go
Some of the summary results of Clark and Garnica (1974)
have already been mentioned in 2.2.1 and I now wish to
focus on the central role played by strategies in the
explanation of the data they advance. In what follows,
I shall concentrate on the authors' treatment of come and
go; their analysis of bring and take is similar in all
33
essential respects. The data obtained in the study
seemed to justify the setting up, post hoc (cf. the
discussion of a similar procedure in 2.2.4), of four
developmentally ordered groups. The task the children
faced was that of identifying the speaker or addressee
83. The main conclusion that the pair, bring and take,
was more difficult than the pair, come and go, has already
been mentioned. That bring and take can be seen as
having one additional semantic feature, encoding their
'causative' nature, when compared with come and go makes
this conclusion consistent with the predictions of the
semantic feature hypothesis.
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of an utterance containing either come or go in a care¬
fully constructed farm-yard situation and the results
for the four groups were distributed as follows in
figure 20.
Speaker to he Addressee to Mean
identified he identified
Group Come Go Come Go
A 90 24 100 1 54
B 30 80 73 23 52
C 7 6 87 94 33 73
D 83 90 94 70 84
figure 20 Percentage of semantically correct responses
produced hy each group (reproduced without indication of
figures consistently below 50f° from Clark and G-arnica
(1974, 12)).
A gross analysis of these results talcing account only of
the means in the right-hand column would lead to the
conclusion that Groups A and 3 were performing at chance
level and knew nothing about the meaning of either come
or go and that Groups C and D did know the meanings of
both the words. A somewhat less gross analysis, averaging
responses to come-sentences and to go-sentences would
lead to the following conclusions for each group:
A : understands come and consistently goes wrong on go.
B : performs at chance level on both cone and go, i.e.
doesn't understand either.
C : understands cone and performs at chance level with go,
D : understands both cone and go.
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Clearly, insofar as the groups A - D are roughly
ordered with respect to chronological age, what we have
above, as a developmental sequence, would be difficult
to make sense of. Clark and Garnica claim, however,
that, by talcing account of the detailed structure of the
results as presented in Figure 20 and by utilising the
notion of 'strategy', it is possible to reconstrue the
development in such a way that it becomes more intelligible.
The strategies they propose are presented in Figure 21.
i
Group Speaker to be Addressee to be
identified identified
A Choose goal Choose goal.
B Choose non-goal Choose goal
C 1 . If come, choose goal Choose goa.1
2. If go, choose non-goal
D 1. If come, choose goal 1 . If come, choose goal
2. If go, choose non-goal 2. If go, choose non-goal
Figure 21. Rules used to identify speaker and addressee
(from Clark and Garnica (1974, 13)).
Following these rules will enable the child in Group A
to be consistently correct in his responses to utterances
containing come and consistently incorrect to those
containing go and, in fact, to act as if they contained
come. For a child in Group B following the rules will
lead to his being consistently correct in identifying the
speaker of an utterance containing go and in identifying
the addressee of an utterance containing come while
consistently misidentifying the speaker of an utterance
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containing come and the addressee of an utterance contain¬
ing go. The child in Group C will consistency identify
correctly in response to utterances with come; in effect,
he now controls the adult procedure. The addressee of
utterances containing go will, however, continue to "be
misiaentified. Finally the child in Group D controls
the adult rules ana performs correctly under all conditions.
Two remarks need to be made immediately in connection
with this way of looking at things. The first is that
*
the strategies or rules must be presumed to operate on
partially specified semantic specifications for the verbs,
come and go. Such a specification will provide a necessary
condition on the rules operating at all although, as was
mentioned in connection with before and after.it is not
clear that the authors have done anything to allow us to
distinguish between the children partially understanding
the verbs (e.g. as verbs of motion) and their treating
them as semantic 'noise'. However, assuming that the
former possibility is the correct one we can see tnat
this wholesale resort to strategies does not imply complete
abandonment of the semantic feature hypothesis although
this hypothesis has a very attenuated role to play in
the present context. The second point is that it is
difficult to be clear that the study tells us very much
about the children's knowledge of the meaning of the verbs.
The child has a problem to solve, a problem which a mature
acquaintance with the verbs, come and go. will render
transparent but we cannot conclude, from the child's
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inability to solve the problem and his resort; to strategies,
that he does not control the meanings of come and go. A
similar point is made by Richards (1976) who shows that,
in what he regards as more natural and more child-
oriented surroundings, it is possible to demonstrate
control of come and go at ages considerably younger than
those studied by Clark and G-arnica. This control demands
that the child be credited with some deictic information
in his meanings for come and go (cf. also Macrae (1976)).
This argument is strengthened by the recent views of*
Shatz (1977) pointing to consistent variation in children's
performances with certain linguistic materials according
to task demands. In short, although an adult knowledge
of the meanings of come and go will entail the use of
the nature strategies for identifying opeaJkers and
addressees, we cannot conclude that failure to use these
mature strategies has any implications for the nature of
the child's representations of the meanings of come and
go. Thus there is a substantive and difficult issue
here which raises problems in the delimitation of the
domain of investigation, D. Presumably, Clark and
Carnica would say that they are studying the interaction
of incomplete lexical knowledge and strategies but the
alternative that they are studying problem-solving
strategies which are highly task-specific and which make
minimal reference to the contents of the lexicon cannot
be lightly dismissed.
With this qualification in mind, then, we have a sequence
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of theories, (T., Tg, T^, where each of the T's
is a hybrid theory consisting of a partial lexicon, a
set of strategies and a statement of the interaction of
these two components. Neither Condition 1 nor Condition 2
lead to any new questions for such a sequence. The
reservations and problems we have already met merely need
to be re-emphasised.
Consider Condition 3 for each of the transitions in the
sequence. The change from T^ to Tg, although involving
no alteration as far as features are concerned, ' does
introduce a strategy at B that was not found at A, viz.,
'Choose non-goal'. Similarly, for the transition from
Tg to T^; in the latter we find the conditional strategies,
'if come. choose goal' and 'if go, choose non-goal',
which are not used in Tg although, 'Choose non-goal', a
strategy which the child does use at B, is not found in
T^. VJe therefore have this 'simple' strategy being
replaced by the two conditional strategies and, while it
might be tempting to resort to the intuitive notion of
84, In fact this is true of the whole sequence. The
sense in which a correspondence between strategies and
meanings can lead to the relatively early acquisition of
the latter, while insisted on (see, particularly, Clark
(1972a, 1974) in Clark's work, is never made clear. At
some point, presumably, the child has to learn features
which will distinguish the meanings of come and go and
exactly how following strategies which lead him to behave
as if he already controlled the meanings of come and go
facilitates this acquisition is a mystery. Similar
remarks apply to the learning of -fPolar and +Prior in
the earlier discussion.
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simplicity discussed in Chapter 1 , we have to conclude
that Condition 3 does not apply to this case. Finally,
the transition from T^ to is not marked hy the develop¬
ment of any new strategies and what we find is an extended
use of the two conditional strategies developed at C
together with the dropping of the 'simple' strategy,
•Choose goal'. On the face of it this looks like a
failure to satisfy Condition 3 as we have a simplification
occuring in the developmental sequence and there is no
suggestion that the strategies can he interpreted as*
constraints.
Condition 4 gives rise to interesting problems in connection
with the transition from TA to T-g. The question we have
to ask can be formulated: why is it that we find the
developmental sequence, X—* X + 'Choose non-goal', where
X includes 'Choose goal' rather than the sequence Y—> Y +
'Choose goal' where Y includes 'Choose non-goal'? v/hat
this boils down to is the question as to why the goal of
the movement should have some sort of ontogenetic
primacy when compared to the non-goal. Clark and Garnica
are aware of the problem and they say (19):
The goad., however, plays a basic role in the child's
strategies from the beginning. This could be
because the goal was always named in the deictic
85. Note that there can be no resort to a more complex
lexicon to off-set this, resulting in the conclusion
that Condition 3 does not apply. As pointed out in the
text, the lexicon must be assumed to be unchanging
throughout the period studied.
127
utterances. In addition the one animal at the goal-
may have been more salient because the goal was a
distinct location.
But such an explanation, while possibly valid, reveals
the limitations of the Clark and Garnica study. Insofar
as there is an attempt to ground the subsequence, (T^, T^)
in some more basic theory, this latter is intimately
related to the features of the testing situation. If
we are interested in the general question of the acquisition
of come and go, it is not the case that goals are alyays
mentioned in utterances including these verbs nor is it
always the case that the goal constitutes a definable
location. This strengthens the possibility that the
Clark and Garnica strategies are created by the children
to handle a particular problem situation and tell us
little about lexical development. Even putting this aside
there is no clearly-stated theory for the Clark and
Garnica proposal to rest on. ■.'/hat would be needed would
be an investigation of the child's developing attention,
how it is related to the content of utterances and how
it is related to 'definable locations'. If such an
investigation exists, Clark and Garnica do not cite it.
It is possible then, to give the authors credit for realis¬
ing that there is a problem here but nothing they say can
be regarded as a solution to the problem. The other
two possibilities for grounding the transition, logical
ana linguistic, do not arise and the reader can quickly
see this without further discussion on my part.
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What can we say of the transition from T-g to T^ given
that we have already noted that Condition 3 does not
apply? The question which Condition 4 leads us to formulate
is: why do we get the developmental sequence, X + 'Choose
non-goal' —^X + 'if come, choose goal' + 'If go, choose
non-goal' rather than the possible sequence , X -f 'If come,
choose goal' + 'If go, choose non-goal'—? X + 'Choose
non-goal'? There is no straightforward answer to this
question. There is a temptation to look for a logical
grounding in that the instruction comprising the non-
conditional strategy, 'Choose non-goal', a,ppears as the
consequent of one of the conditional strategies but it
is not the case that the conditional strategy is unintell¬
igible outside a system in which the non-conditional
strategy also exists; Tq is a case in point. Although
there is obviously the possibility of grounding this
transition in a cognitive theory, as Clark and Garnica
do not speculate along these lines, I shall remain
non-committal. The idea of linguistic grounding doesn't
apply because of the inapplicability of Condition 3.
Finally, as the transition from T^ to T^ has failed to
satisfy Condition 3, the question as to whether it satisfies
Condition 4 does not arise.
Summarising, it seems clear that the semantic feature
hypothesis and its association with the notion of 'strategy'
does as badly in the area of the acquisition jf come and
go as it does elsewhere. To the extent that the domain
of enquiry is difficult to determine it is tempting to
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conclude that it does worse. It is less distressing
to know what you are doing and doing it "badly than not
to know what you are doing. This lack of any clear
statement on the domain of enquiry and about the way in
which the study in question engages it renders much of
the above discussion otiose.
2.3 Ilelson's functional core concent model and its
application to lexical development
Nelson presents her central ideas on lexical development
in her nonograph (1973a) and two papers (1973b, 1974)
and it is the last of these which contains the most
forceful and systematic attempt to put forward a coherent
theory ana on which I shall concentrate in this section.
The set of facts to be explained by Nelson's proposals
overlap with those addressed by E.Clark but are not
co-extensive with them and so this renders any direct
comparison difficult. Nelson wishes to take account of
a rather wider range of observations than Clark although
she does mention overextension as one of the crucial
phenomena to be explained by an adequate model (see
below). The phenomena she regards as basic are:
1 . The fact that there are important commonalities
between sets of lexical items when the vocabularies of
a large number of children are examined. As Nelson puts
it (269)8b: "The one outstanding general characteristic
86. Unless otherwise indicated all page references in
this section are to Nelson (1974).
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of the early words is their reference to objects and
events that are perceived in dynamic relationships."
Objects which don't move, which the child cannot interact
with, which don't emit noises, etc. are not named by
children at the earliest stages of language development
(see Nelson (1973a) for data and extensive discussion).
2. A small child will often invent a word which expresses
a concept for which he can find no linguistic expression
o7
in the adult language.
*
3. Words, once acquired, are subsequently generalised in
their application. In this respect, Nelson has in mind
a phenomenon which embraces Clark's idea of 'overextension'
and includes all subsequent applications of the word to
similar instances. Her main line of disagreement with
Clark is contained in the claim that (2^9):
87. It might be pointed out here that this issue is more
controversial than Nelson suggests. She cites Leopold for
support but his conclusion to the relevant discussion is
hardly encouraging to her view. He says (1949, 117):
"My frantic search for standard bases (for apparently
invented forms - RMA) proves that my experience had by
that time convinced me that all of Hildegard's words pro¬
ceeded from standard words. Students who approach the
problem with the conviction that children do invent
words will undoubtedly take these words as proof of their
thesis." In case those readers familiar with Halliday
(1975) should feel that Nigel's early development is
supportive of Nelson I would point out that those forms
which Nigel used which were clearly not based on the adult
lexicon were not used to refer to classes of objects in
the world, i.e. they did not encode concepts in the sense
in which Nelson seems to want to use this latter notion.
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Similarity may be based on many different dimensions
of which the static perceptual dimension of shape
is only one; others include function, action, or
affect.
Prom these three points it is clear that Kelson's interests
go beyond merely explaining the referential use of
early vocabulary and, in particular, beyond explaining
overextensions. As well as being interested in the ■
structure of the entries in the child's primitive lexicon
she is also concerned with the relationship of this ,
lexicon to a set of developing concepts and with the
implications this might have for the order in which words .
enter the lexicon as opposed to the order in which feat¬
ures or attributes come to be used in lexical entries.
In 2.3.1 I shall present Nelson's critique of Clark's
semantic feature hypothesis, take issue with it, consider
the alternative she presents and argue that it is
subject to the same criticisms as she levels at Clark
and that it might also be defended in the same way as
Clark's thesis. 2.3.2 will attempt to put her proposals
into a form where Conditions 1 - 4 can be applied to
them and to evaluate them against the conditions.
2,3.1 Nelson's critique of 'abstraction theory'
'Abstraction theory', which is seen as embracing Clark's
88
semantic feature theory, among other things ° is an
88. Nelson identifies this position with that adopted
by Locke and its ancestry can probably be traced to at
least Aristotle,
approach to the development of concepts. An abstraction
theory claims that the establishment of a concept
involves the abstraction of a set of similarities from
a set of exemplars of the concept. Thus, according to
this view, given a set of instances of a concept, each
of which is analysed as a set of attributes, say I^=
-^"1 t -^"21 • • •» ^11' 2' •**> i' ^2 = * "^"2' * * '' J
B B B * T - A A ABB
21' 22' 2 j' "" n ~ 1' 2' m' n1' n2'
..., B^. where the A's and the B's refer to attributes
and none of the B^. occur in all instances, the concept
learner abstracts the similarities from these exemplars,
ignoring the differences, and ends up with, what is
essentially, a conjunctive set of properties which he
treats as providing necessary (and perhaps sufficient)
conditions for a new instance being an instance of the
concept. In the case above the learner would end up
with a concept, C, which we could represent as A^ & &
...& A^. Citing Cassirer, kelson points out what is
considered to be a fatal inadequacy in this view. This
is that it presupposes that the concept learner is
already acquainted with the concept to be learned and
this guides the establishment of the set of exemplars.
It is only if the concept learner knows that 1^, I^,..,,
are instances of C that he knows to compare them and
thus abstract the definition of C. But how does he know
that 1^, Ip, I are instances of C in the first
place unless he already possesses a definition of C?
It seems to me that the force of this criticism can be
dissolved by two additional, and not unreasonable,
assumptions. These assumptions are independent and,
either of them alone or both together trill provide a
version of an abstractionist theory which does not suffer
from the defect Nelson points to. The first assumption
is that some criterion is fixed (biologically?) which
determines whether an instance shall be Judged similar
to another instance or not (irrespective of the dimensions
of comparison). A new instance, analysed into attributes,
will be compared against the set of attributes constituting
a concept. An uninformed comparison of the sort envisaged
by Nelson will, in most cases, lead to a modified and
probably useless concept but a comparison utilising a
criterion will yield a number either above or below
criterion. If the number is above criterion the
instance will be assigned to the concept with an accompany¬
ing modification of the concept to take account of those
properties which the original concept had and which the
new instance does not have. In the event of the new
instance not being assigned to the concept in question
because of failure to reach criterion, further comparisons
could be made leading ultimately to success or, in the
limiting ca.se, to the establishment of a new concept
corresponding, to begin with, to the new instance.
Setting the criterion high would lead to a proliferation
of concepts and setting it low would lead to a small
number of very general ones. This idea clearly has much
in common with Wittgenstein's (1953) notion of 'family
resemblance' which, while developed in an entirely
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different context, has recently teen explored with regard
to adult systems of categorisation ty Rosch and her
associates (see, particularly, Rosch and Hervis (1973)).
It is not important whether this comprises a good model
89
of conceptual development at this stage tut what is
important is to see that an abstraction model of concept
development does not necessarily involve the logical-
absurdity Nelson wishes to credit it with.
The second assumption, also avoiding the thrust of Nelson's
*
argument, is that certain dimensions may be picked out
by the concept formation process as instrumental in
determining similarities whereas other dimensions are
ignored. For example, we could suggest that visual
attributes of instances are what count in the establish¬
ment of concepts and, given access to a theory which
made explicit the notion of 'visual attribute', an
abstraction theory could be saved. What this amounts
to is an assumption that the child comes to concept
learning equipped with a tendency to compare instances
along certain dimensions, an assumption which even
a philosopher with the empiricist yearnings of Quine
finds necessary and is encapsulated in his postulate, an
89. In 2.5 below I shall be investigating some of the
work of Rosch which includes assumptions of a similar
nature.
'innate quality spa.ce' (see Quine (1960)).^
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Claiming to avoid the pitfalls of abstractionist theories,
Nelson develops the notion of a 'functional core concept'.
She argues that (276):
...analysis (into attributes - Rill) is not the
•prerequisite to the synthesis of concepts. Rather
a dual process is found to be at work - first
categorising according to some principle and then
identifying common attributes. (first emphasis in
original, second emphasis mine - EliA.)
#
The question that immediately arises then concerns the
principle on which the categorisation is initially based.
ITelson's answer to this is to consider instances, not
in isolation, as abstractionist theories do, but "in
the context of their relations to other instances and
concepts." (ibid). She claims further that:
90, These remarks become important again in connection
with ITelson' s own positive proposals to be discussed
below. I ought to point out here that Clark is not, on
the face of it, concerned with concept development and
that, therefore, one or two additional steps are necessary
in Nelson's argument in order for it to be directly
relevant. These steps concern the directness of the
relationship between concepts and lexical entries and
I have seen nothing in the writings of Clark to indicate
that she would see this relationship as anything other
tnan direct. If that is so, what we can say is that
Clark's views on lexical development can be seen as
committing her to an abstractionist view on conceptual
development with the child abstracting (to begin with)
perceptual attributes from instances and assigning con¬
junctions of such attributes as the values of concepts.
Clearly contact is made here with the second assumption dis¬
cussed in the text (see below for more extensive discussion).
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Whole elements ... take on definitions as concepts
in terms of the synthesis of their functional or
dynamic relations. Subsequently, other whole elements
that enter into the same set of relations can be
granted concept status within this previously
defined concept. Analysis of parts of the whole
is unnecessary to this initial concept formation
process.
The logic behind this move is clear although the details
of the move itself are murky. What is lacking, according
to Nelson, in an abstractionist account of concept
*
learning, is some parameter with respect to which instances
can be compared which is distinct from concept-membership.
She proposes to provide such a parameter in the "functional
and dynamic relations" of the whole to other wholes.
Analysis of instances into their component attributes
will only follow on this initial concept formation and
will have a part to play in concept identification when
the functional and dynamic relations employed in the
genesis of the concept are not satisfied.
To illustrate, Nelson considers the hypothetical develop¬
ment of the concept, 'ball'. She suggests that conceptual
development in this domain begins with the child's
first encounter with a ball, assuming that this is at
an age where he is 'ready' to form concepts, which may
result in the schema shown in Figure 22 which is little
more than a representation of the situation in which the




In living room, porch.
Mother throws, picks up, holds
I throw, pick up, hold
Rolls, bounces
On floor, under couch
Figure 22 (from Nelson (1974, 277)).
To be noted especially in connection with this is the
fact that, at this stage, the child is not presumed to
control; any lexical representation of 'ball', i.e. ^ALL^
is a concept and not a lexical item, and, furthermore,
that what is represented on the right-hand side of the
arrow is intended to be relational and dynamic information.
This information is presumed to be developed on the
basis of the child's acquaintance with a single instance
of a ball, i.e., the child experiences one ball in the
living room and on the porch which is thrown by mother,
picked up by mother, etc. Nelson refers to this blending
of experiences with a single ball as 'functional svnthesis'.
Further development involves the child acquiring experience
of another ball leading to the functional synthesis which






Over ground, under fence
Figure 23 (from Nelson (1974, 277)).
he approach the crucial part of the argument. The next
1
stage involves an amalgamation of the two results of
functional synthesis and, in the respect, Kelson suggests
(277 - 8):
Certain functions here (in BAll^ - RMA) are the
same as those for BALL^ : throwing rolling and
bouncing; although the relations of location and
actor are different. Boy stands in the same relation
to the functions of ball as do Mother and I.
Applying labels to these relationships yields the
following scheme:
location of activity: living * j
room, porch, playground
Actor: Mother, I, boy
Action: throw, pick up, hold,
catch
Movement of ball: roll, bounce
Location of object: on floor,
BALL1 2 > \
'
^ under couch, under fence J
V,
Some relations will eventually be idertified as
irrelevant to the defining functional core, for
example, location of activity. The child must learn,
therefore, which relations are concept defining and
rhich are not. For some concepts the child may
retain relations that the adult regards as superfluou
But from this it is clear that Kelson is subject to
exactly the same criticisms as she herself has levelled
against the abstraction theorist because she has provided
no clear criteria for why the functional syntheses, BALL
and BAIL2, should be regarded as instances of the same
concept. To highlight the problem we can consider
another hypothetical functional synthesis as in Figure 24.
DOLL
1
( In living room, bedroom
Girl picks up, holds
Walks, lies down
In bed, around room,...
V
Figure 24
There is no mechanism within Nelson's approach to prevent
the formation of the concept schematised in Figure 25.
Location of activity: living room,
porch, bedroom
*
Actor: Mother, I, girl
BALL^DOLL^ ^ J Action: throw, pick up, hold
Movement of ball-doll: roll,
bounce, walk, lie down
Location of object: on floor,under
^ couch, in bed, around room,...
Figure 25
The reason why this is so is evident : "certain functions
(in DOLL. - RMA) are the same as those for BALL." and,
apart from a number of programmatic remarks, Nelson has
said nothing about the identity of those functions. The
way out of the dilemma is, of course, perfectly clear.
What Nelson has to do is establish a criterion for matchin
instances of functional syntheses and, presumably, she
would wish this criterion to take account of certain
aspects of the synthesis at the expense of others. But
this was exactly the way out for the abstraction theory
according to the second assumption and, logically, there
doesn't appear to be any difference between Clark's
proposals and Nelson's in this respect. Clark's theory
HO
is abstractionist but includes the assumption that the
abstraction takes place along'perceptual dimensions: Kelson's
theory is abstractionist and includes the assumption
that the abstraction takes place along certain dimensions
specified in the functional syntheses. Such a comparison,
of course, assumes that Clark's model is being inter¬
preted as a model of concept development (see above for
discussion).
Having got this much clear we can go on to consider how
4
Kelson construes subsequent conceptual development and,
more particularly, how language comes to be related to
the developing concepts. She recognises that the functional
core concept will not serve the child to identify all
instances of the concept. This is because it is necess¬
ary to identify, say, a ball as a ball even when it is
not partaking of the functional relationships which make
up the core concept. Kelson says (273):
In order to do this, he needs to analyze the whole
(object) into its relevant parts (attributes). It
is assumed that this process begins to take place
any time a concept is formed. Thus, .although it is
secondary, it is not discontinuous with the primary
formation process, for this purpose, the child may
pick out one or two salient static perceptual
attributes and rely upon them,..(first emphasis in
original, second emphasis mine - RMA.)~^
What we seem to have here is an intolerable weakening of
91 . Hote that there is a certain tension between this
claim and the implied temporal sequence pointed to in
the passage cited above (p 135).
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the functional core concept hypothesis to a point where,
apart from a slant towards functional and relational
attributes, it becomes indistinguishable from an unmodified
abstraction theory. To see this we can consider another
hypothetical development of the concept, 'ball' beginning
as in Pigure 26.
BAIL.
In living room, porch
Mother throws, picks up, holds







It is permitted, within Nelson's approach, that the
perceptual features which are the last two entries in this
schema may be stored with the concept even at this stage.
She says (278):
Initially, when the concept consists of only one
member a number of object-identifying attributes
that will prove to be irrelevant may be stored
with the concept.
Obviously, if irrelevant object-identifying attributes
may be stored, then relevant attributes may also be stored.
The next phase of the development may be another meeting










At this stage we might get the disjunctive amalgamation
which Nelson seems to envisage at the beginnings ox
development (cf, her version of BAIA^ 2» p138) but, on
the assumption that, at this point, the child begins to
discard irrelevant information from the concept, as he
must at some stage, and given that the possibility has
now been raised that he must develop a set of object-
identifying attributes, there seems nothing to prevent
the child relying on the shape of the ball and its
facility for rolling and bouncing for identifying instances
of the concept from here on, i.e., the child abstracts
the concept schematised in Figure 28.
BA1L1 2 Rolls, bouncesRound shape
Figure 28
In order to prevent this collapse into an unmodified
abstraction theory it is clear that Nelson must be.far
more precise in stating the form and role of the functional
and relational properties which can enter into the
functional core concept. This will become crucial when
we consid.er the explanatory adequacy of the proposals
in the domain of lexical development.
Turning to this domain, Nelson claims that the name of
an object may, in certain <^ases, be attached to the
structure corresponding to a concept. In cases where
this is not so we shall find instances of the child
inventing forms in an attempt to communicate about his
concepts for which either the adult language does not
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provide an appropriate expression or the child has not
been acquainted with the adult expression. Again, it
seems that what we have is an associative view of the
lexicon where a lexical form is associated with a concept
which corresponds to its meaning and which has the sort
of structure of the functional core concepts we have
been investigating. Provision is made, in the model,
for the existence of concepts without attached lexical
forms but not for lexical forms without attached concepts.
Before turning to the explanatory adequacy of the pro¬
posals we can briefly summarise the virtues Nelson
identifies in her approach in terms of the phenomena
she sees as central (pp 129 - 130).
1. The child's selectivity with regard to his first lexical
items is explained as the child can only use lexical
items which correspond to concepts and his first
concepts are the functional core concepts which have, as
instances, objects which enter into dynamic relations
with the child and others. Evidence on this point is
presented in a convincing fashion in Nelson (1973a)
where a survey of the first 50 words appearing in the
vocabularies of a number of children showed up the
stated properties.
2. The child's invention of lexical forms is explained
by his having available some concept which does not
correspond to a concept which is lexicalised in the adult
language or some concept, the lexicalisation of which
the child is not familiar with. Nelson presents no new
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evidence "to this point and, as pointed out above, sting
evidence is equivocal.
3. Generalisation to further instances is explained by
the functional core concept not restricting the application
of a term to a single instance but to anything which
satisfies the properties contained in the concept. This
leaves open the possibility that there will be overextensions,
that these overextensions will be on a functional basis
at the beginnings of language development and that they
may shift to a static perceptual basis as development
proceeds. On this question of the basis of the over¬
extensions one obviously has to be cautious given the
remarks above and the fuller discussion below. The model
also leaves open the possibility of over-restriction in
the use of lexical items but here too it is difficult
to make a substantive point as it is obvious, from
Nelson's examples, that she countenances disjunctive
conditions in concepts and she says nothing about the
sort of mechanism which would lead the child to crop a
complicated (and, perhaps, becoming more complicated)
disjunctive condition. For evidence on this point
Nelson refers to some of her own work again, notably
Nelson (1973b), where she shows that small children's
comprehension of ball was affected by the dynamic relation¬
ships which the children had been allowed to enter into
with a set of more or less ball-like objects. Some of
Clark's overextensions are also cited in this connection,
in particular, those which are based on movement or sound
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which Nelson assimilates to her idea of functional and
dynamic relations. In opposition to this it is appropriate
to refer to recent work of Bowerman (1975, 1978) where
it is claimed that the majority of overextensions she
could identify in the speech of her two daughters were
based on perceptual properties of objects rather than on
function. The extent to which such evidence is damaging
to Nelson's hypothesis will become clear in the next'
section.
4
2.5.2 'Functional core concepts' as an explanatory theory
We consider now details of Nelson's model against Conditions
1 - 4 of Chapter 1. In order to have a reasonably
directed discussion it will be necessary to make a
number of assumptions at critical points not all of
which may be true to Nelson's inclinations. It Is my
hope that making these assumptions explicit will prevent
misunderstanding and it is my contention that, without
such assumptions, the theory cannot be intelligibly
evaluated.
First, as far as fixing the domain of enquiay, D, is
concerned, it is apparent that Nelson's interests extend
to the production of a theory of the development of
concepts. However, as we have seen, these concepts are
intimately related to lexical items entering the child's
vocabulary and it seems reasonable to say that Nelson's
linguistic interests can be identified, like Clark's, as
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the development of the lexicon. The behaviour relevant
to D is varied but consists mainly of the child's
spontaneous productions.
Given this, Nelson's theory can be cast in essentially
the same form as Clark's. At a particular time, t^,
the child's lexicon (restricting ourselves to items which
are used referentially) will consist of a set of lexical
forms each associated with a concept which gives the
93
meaning of the word, i.e., we have the sort of structure
we can schematise as in Figure 29.
w2 * >
\J < > C
m N m
Figure 29
At a later time, t^, the child's lexicon will have
increased in size (ignoring lexical mortality) along
92. To be fair to Nelson she does suggest that her views
on lexical development can be seen as having implications
for the development of syntax - and, arguably, the domain of
the enquiry can be extended in that direction. These are
not ideas which I shall pursue here.
93. As Nelson has it the word form becomes part of the
concept and it is unclear that she accepts the notion
of a separate lexicon. Nothing in what follovs depends
upon the formulation adopted in the text.
with the associated set of concepts as in Figure 30.
w1 < => C'
w2 ^ > C£
\I < > C•
m x m
Vi <—* °;+i
W 4 > C'n ' n
Figure 30
Here the C^ (1-i-m) may he identical to the (1-i-m)
in Figure 29 or, if there has been a change in the meaning
of Vh between t^ and they will be different. Note that
the assumption is not that the concepts Ch (m+1-i-n) enter
the child's conceptual system for thefirst time between
t,j and 12 but only that they have lexical items attached
to them for the first time in this period, Sschewing
more detailed analysis for the moment, consider the
satisfaction of Conditions 1 - 4.
The proposal fares no better and no worse than. Clark's
as far as Condition 1 is concerned and, in accordance with
developing habit, I shall assume that it can be given
the benefit of the doubt.
Condition 2 immediately raises problems for the theory.
Obviously, at a suitably abstract level, two theories,
T.j and T^• constructed according to the above outline,
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will have general principles in common. Lexical forms
are associated with concepts giving their meanings, the
manner of association is consistent from one theory to
the next and it is intended that the available concepts
be specified by some general theory. It is with respect
to this last claim that the most pertinent questions
arise, however. What is the exact nature of the general
theory which specifies the notion, 'possible concept',
in the acquisition model? It might be thought that an
adequate formulation resides in Kelson's discussion 8f
'functional core concept' but a close examination of
Kelson's paper reveals that no clear definition of this
crucial notion emerges. We are told (277):
...in order to form a concept of the ball or the
"idea of ballness" rather than ball as many different
objects in different relationships, the child must
synthesise over time the various relations Into
which the ball enters. This functional synthesis
is the core of the child's concept.
and further (ibid):
Once functional synthesis has taken place with regard
to an object, other objects may acquire status within
the same functional synthesis or concept.
The functional core concept referred to in the first of
these passages is the analysis of BALL^ we are already
familiar with from Figure 22. This contains a combination
of locational, relational and predicative information
about the ball in question but nowhere is there any
attempt to accurately delimit the information which might
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figure in the functional core. Reference to "various
relations" is hopelessly vague. As far as the second
passage is concerned this leads into Nelson's analysis of
BAIL
2 and BALL.J 2 PP 157 - 8 above) but BAII^, apart
from displaying a rather sloppy structural similarity
to BALL^, hardly seems to require reference to the "same
functional synthesis or concept" (my emphasis - RMA).
When this sort of looseness is met it does seem to make
sense to ask for conditions of identity on functional
cores. The upshot of this discussion, and, of coursfe,
it would be possible to raise further questions concerning
the occurrence of 'non-functional' information as discussed
in the previous section, is that Nelson appears to have
little clear idea as to what a general theory of functional
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core concepts would look like. in the absence of such
a theory Condition 2 can only be met in a discursive and
informal manner, i.e., we can examine purported instances
of concepts and ask ourselves whether they 'feel' right
given the intuitions we are working from but these
94. In addition, as discussed in 2.3.1, at some point the
concept may (?must) change its status and manipulate
object-identifying attributes. This could be seen as
involving a discontinuity although it is difficult to
see Nelson as making such a precise claim. Interestingly,
she is one worker in child language who explicitly makes an
assumption of continuity when she says (1973a,2): "There
is a basic continuity in developmental processes and
structures. The same types of structures and processes
are utilized throughout development, and charges in them
are gradual and continuous.
intuitions are too poorly formulated to give us the
answer by themselves. Nevertheless, for the sake of
further discussion, as with Clark's theory, I shall
assume that Condition 2 can be met and move on to Conditions
3 and 4.
To begin the discussion of Condition 3 I shall make the
assumption that the information which can appear in a
concept can, with the exception of the information
giving the name of an instance of the concept, be partitioned
4
into sets corresponding to relational and dynamic
information on the one hand and static information on the
other, i.e. I assume that we are equipped with a procedure
for assigning information unambiguously to one of these
categories. Looking at the schematisations on pp 146 - 7
we can see that from t^ to "t^ere is a-n increase in the
number of lexical forms and in the number of associated
concepts and, at this level, we would appear to have a
straightforward case of additive complexity and satis¬
faction of Condition 3. However, this is not the
interesting level at which Condition 3 operates and,
taking account of the internal structure of the concepts,
it seems that there may be a more detailed analysis
available. What Nelson appears to be saying, in a
number of places, is that, as far as the development of
concepts is concerned, it will be possible to find a t^
and a t^ such that the information represented in the
child's concepts at t^ is exclusively drawn from the set
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corresponding to dynamic and relational information and
at ±2 "fcbi-S information will not be so restricted, i.e.
assuming that the concepts can be partitioned into a set,
RD (of 'pure' relational/dynamic concepts), a set, 13RD
(of 'pure' non-relational/non-dynamic concepts) and a
set, M (of 'mixed' concepts) we have the development
within the set of concepts which we might schematise
as RD—> RD + M. Unfortunately, as should be clear from
the previous discussion, it is far from obvious that
Kelson is making a claim as specific as this. Sometimes
she appears to suggest that there is a fixed order in the
development of concepts of the form:
1. Use relational and dynamic information only in
concepts
2. Supplement relational and dynamic information with
static information
3. Attach names to concepts,
as when, regarding a slightly more elaborate ordering,
the spirit of which is nonetheless the same as the above,
she says (276):
The order in which these processes are listed implies
a usual temporal or sequential order for initial
concept formation and naming, (my emphasis — RMA)
But if this is so, switching our attention away from
concept development to the development of the lexicon,
the emphasis on relational and dynamic information is of
no particular interest as, by the time lexical develop¬
ment gets started, the relational and dynamic information
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in the concept is already supplemented to an unknown
degree by static (presumably, including perceptual.)
information. Unfortunately, an even more confusing picture
can be deduced from the following statement (284):
It Is important to bear in mind that this process
is not proposed as a stage theory of development.
Although language development may depend on the
acquisition and elaboration of concepts ... there is
no "functional stage" or "attributive stage". Rather
all concept acquisition is assumed to involve both
of these processes, whether the concepts are formed
in infancy or adulthood. *
One way in which we can reconcile the two views embodied
in these passages is to say that the first one concerns
the development of a narticular concept whereas the
second has, as its subject matter, concept development
considered as a whole. Thus it is consistent to claim that,
in the ontogeny of every concept, functional criteria for
application to an instance precede attributive criteria
while maintaining that the child uses functional and
attributive criteria simultaneously over the whole set of
concepts so that there would be no functional stage pre-
95
ceding an attributive stage. This interpretation requires
a revision of the schematisation of Nelson's theory as
95. I am by no means convinced that Nelson has this Inter¬
pretation in mind, particularly in the light of the
discussion in 2.3.1 where it was shown that, even in the
development of a particular concept, it was possible
for non-relational and non-dynamic information to play
a criterial role right from the start. It shjuld there¬
fore be regarded as one of the assumptions referred to
at the start of this section.
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presented in Figures 29 and 30 with regard to which we
shall be able to reconsider Condition 3.
What is demanded, according to this assumption and exteiding
it into the domain of lexical development, is that we
should be able to find times, t^ and such that there
are forms in the child's lexicon at t^ which are associated
with members of RD and the same forms at are associated
with members of M. It should not be possible to find
times, tj and tT,, such that there are words in the child's
lexicon at tj associated with concepts from the set, ERF,
while at tT> the same words are associated with II IT RD.
If this view is correct what we have is a 'spreading'
of non-relational and non-dynamic information from the
set of concepts at t^ to the set of concepts at t^ in
such a way that information of this type plays a wider
and more systematic role in the structure of the lexicon
at t^ than it did at t^. Of course, it may be the case
that new non-relational and non-dynamic information is
utilised in the transition from t^ to and, if this
were always true, we would have a clear case of satisfaction
of Condition 3. As it is, however, there is nothing
t
in Eelson s discussion which indicates that it is true and,
therefore, we must conclude that there is no reason to
expect Condition 3 to be satisfied. Eor, of course, is
it the case that Condition 3 is not applicable as no new-
theoretical constructs are introduced in the second theory
at the expense of ones appearing in the first theory.
Quite simply, it looks as if Condition 3 should be applicable
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but, because of the inherent vagueness of the theoretical
framework (stemming directly from failure to satisfy
Condition 2) we are in a position of not being able to
apply it.
It follows from this that Condition 4 cannot be addressed
in a systematic fashion for the theory as a whole. We
could address it if Condition 3 were not applicable or
if it could be applied with a positive outcome but neither
of these is the case. It would do less than justice to
Nelson, however, to leave off discussion at this point
and, although the questions raised by Condition 4 cannot
be asked of the theory as a whole, we can consider
restricting the domain of the theory in such a way as
to make Condition 4 applicable. This move involves
restricting the domain of the theory to the development
of the lexical representation of a single item, say, W.
With respect to this domain, given the assumption that
functional criteria are always used before attributive
criteria, Condition 3 could well be satisfied and lead to
the formulation of the following question in connection
with Condition 4: why do we find the development we can
schematise as RD—3RD + ITRD rather than the development
schematised as HRD—3RD + NRD with respect to the
development of the lexical representation of W?
There is no answer to questions of this type in the
logical structure of the theory, i.e. there is nothing
about the information, 'I throw ball', which makes it
1
necessary that it should play a role in concept formation
and in lexical representation before the static information
'Round shape'. Thus we can discount the first possibility
in Condition 4 as providing us with a grounding for the
development.
Similarly there doesn.It seem to be any reason to entertain
the third possibility seriously. As already mentioned
in connection with Clark's work, there simply hasn't been
enough work done on the lexical structure of the world's
languages for us to be able to decide whether there is
a tendency for languages to use relational and dynamic
'features' in the semantic representations of lexical
items rather than static ones. There is certainly no a
priori reason for believing that such a tendency would
be the outcome of an investigation conducted in the
appropriate terms and, following from the vagueness of
Nelson's proposals, it is unclear how such an investig¬
ation would proceed anyway.
The second possibility remains the only candidate and it
is reasonably clear from Nelson's writings that she has
something like this in mind. Is there, then, a reason
existing in a theory regarded as more basic than the
theory of the development of the representation of N
for why the development of the meaning of W should proceed
1 56
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in the way it does? Nelson feels that there is and
that this reason resides in Piaget's account of cognitive
development. She says (279) :
It (the account she puts forward - RMA) is...in accord
with what is known of the development of cognitive
structures in infancy, for example, Piaget's account,
although much remains to be discovered about specific
cognitive constraints and structures of the pre-
language and beginning language periods, (my emphasis-
RMA)
Certainly the emphasis on action in Nelson's theorising
is consistent with Piagetian slant but this, at best, is
a vague and general statement of affiliation. More
worrying, however, is the fact that aspects of Nelson's
theorising can be seen as inconsistent with the Piagetian
view on the cognitive structures of children of the
relevant age. The argument is simple. Most small
children begin to use words and generalise their use early
in the second year. According to Nelson's scheme this
assumes that the child is acquainted with a concept to
which the word is related. The Piagetian period of
96. It is worth reiterating here that even this question
doesn't make a lot of sense within Nelson's system as,
strictly speaking, given the facts about ordering discussed
above, pp151 - 2, her theory makes no predictions about
the order of acquisition of meanings but only about the
order of acquisition of concents, acquisition of which can
be complete before the concepts enter the lexicon as
meanings. In the text I aim assuming that the lexical
development mirrors the conceptual development which is
necessary to make the theory linguistically significant.
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sensori-motor intelligence is usually taken to extend
up to about 18 months (Plavell (1963)) and the output
of this period is usually taken to include a mature object
concept, a concept of location, a concept of causality,
etc. Before this period draws to a close the child is
assumed not to control mature -versions of these concepts.
However, Kelson's functional core concepts seem to assume
an acquaintance with these concepts from the end of the
first year. She herself says (277):
The concept (BAIL^ - RMA.) depends upon a prior notion
of the boundaries of objects, events and their
relationships. The ball is not confused with self,
floor, mother or play-pen, nor is it seen as an
unbounded collection of attributes; identity as
whole object has already been conferred upon it.
One can quibble with the interpretation of Piaget's
'mature object concept' - perhaps Nelson's position does
not demand acquaintance with this concept but with one of
the more primitive versions which the child experiences
during the first eighteen months of his life - but the
first impression is one of contradiction. Thus, in a
situation in which Nelson turns to Piaget for support,
that support is not transparently forthcoming.
To sum up, it seems to me that, as a theory of lexical
development, the functional core concept hypothesis is
extremely weak. Because of a failure to specify precisely
the manner of interaction between the functional and
static features which can enter into the concepts we end
up with a theory which makes no predictions in the domain
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of lexical development. Once concepts enter the lexicon
and become meanings they can be specified in any of a
number of ways and the emphasis on relational and dynamic
information becomes quite gratuitous. As a theory of
concept development, the proposal is also weak because of
a failure to provide any general definition of the central
theoretical notion, the functional core concept. I would
suggest further that the attention I have given to the
conditions of Chapter 1 has helped to clarify these
conclusions and that this should count as vindication. of
these conditions.
2.4 'Prototypes' and the development of colour terms
The work to be discussed in this section is, with the
exception of 2.4.4, considerably more limited in scope
than that of the previous sections of this chapter, being
concerned with only a small area of lexical development.
In addition, no fully-fledged developmental model exists
which embraces the assumptions we shall examine and so
much of the discussion will be speculative and not tied
to actual proposals. I feel that this is justified because
a considerable body of opinion is moving away from the
97. It should be evident at this point why the evidence
of Bowerman (1975, 1978) should not be damaging for Nelson's
position. Presumably, the only prediction she could make
is that, if a lexical item, W, is overextended at some
points in its history on both functional and static
criteria, then the functional overextensions will occur
first. So far as I know there is no evidence bearing on
this issue.
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view of word-meanings as bundles of features and towards
the view that a representation of a prototype from the
extension of a word has a central role to play in the
specification of what the word means (see fn 38 for
references) and so it will be useful, even at this
preliminary stage, to get some idea of the problems
arising with such a view. Heider (1971a) owes its
inspiration, as does a great deal of other work by the
same author (Heider (1972), Heider and Oliver (1972),
Rosch (1973a, 1973b, 1975b)), to the cross-cultural *
work of Berlin and Kay (1969). Therefore, in 2.4.1 I
shall present a brief summary of their findings. In
2.4.2 I shall describe the experiments of Heider (1971a)
and in 2.4.3 discuss the explanatory status of a theory
which would be consistent with the findings of those
experiments. 2.4.4 will briefly discuss the views
of Griffiths (1976) that this sort of approach can be
extended beyond colour terms to general vocabulary.
2.4.1 Basic colour terms and focal instances
A common assumption among linguists and anthropologists
has been that the colour space represents an ideal
domain for demonstrating that the way in which language
structures reality is essentially arbitrary (see Lyons
(1968, 1977b) for this notion of 'arbitrariness' and
linguistic relativism). Berlin and Kay (1969) claimed
that this assumption was the result of a mistaken emphasis
in research whereby an investigator would focus attention
on the boundaries of colour terms. Having access to
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native speakers of a number of languages, they were able
to show that, if a subject were instructed to indicate
on a colour chart the boundaries of a basic colour term
(see below for this notion), then
(i) there was a good deal of variability within speakers
from one testing session to the next.
(ii) there was a great deal of variability across speakers
of the same language.
(iii) There was no clear pattern of colour boundaries
when data from more than one language were compared,'a
finding consistent with a hypothesis stressing arbitrari¬
ness.
If, on the other hand, the instruction to the subject was
that he should indicate, on the colour chart, the best
example of a colour term, then the authors found that
(i) there was a great deal of consistency within speakers
from one testing session to the next.
(ii) there was a great deal of agreement across speakers
of the same language.
(iii) most importantly, there were significant clusterings
of best examples of colour terms when different languages
were compared.
This means that one can justify talking about a colour
term, RED, existing in other languages so long as it is
clear that RED corresponds to that colour term in the
language in question which has, as its best example,the
best example of the English colour term, red. One is
not thereby committed to identity between the extension
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of that colour term and. the English term, red.
It was a further claim of Berlin and Kay's study that, by
establishing, what they considered, a plausible set of
criteria, it was possible to construct a 'filter' into
which the total colour vocabulary of a language could be
fed and the output of which would be the set of basic
colour terms in that language, a justification for this
being that it would get rid of individual differences in
colour vocabularies which might be contingent on employ¬
ment, interests, etc. This 'filter' includes such conditions
as:
A basic colour term shall be morphologically simple
A basic colour term shall not be hyponym of any other
colour term
A basic colour term shall be 'psychologically salient'
for speakers of the language
and various others. When applied to English this 'filter'
yields a set of 11 basic colour terms: black, white, red.
yellow. green, blue, brown, pink, orange, grey and purple.
The important point now is that these 11 basic colour
terms (with one or two noted exceptions) exhaust the set
of basic colour terms in the languages studied by Berlin
ana Kay, i.e. any language in the sample drew its basic
colour terms from the set, BLACK, WHITE, BED, YELLOW,
GREEN, BLUE, BROWN, PINK, ORANGE, GREY, PURPLE. Further¬
more, Berlin and Kay argue, languages do not draw their
colour terms from this set in a completely random manner.
Rather, there is a partial ordering defined on the set
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From this partial ordering it is easy to construct a set
of propositions which empress universals and which summarise
Berlin and Kay's findings. There is one absolute universal:
All languages possess basic colour terms, BLACK and WHITE
and a set of implicational universals including:
If a language has a basic colour term RED, then it
also has basic colour terms, BLACK ana WHITE, although
not necessarily vice versa.
If a language possesses a basic colour term, BLUE,
then it also has ba&ic colour terms,. BLACK, WHITE,
RED, YELLOW and GREEN, although not necessarily vice
versa.
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and it is straightforward to construct the remaining proposition s.
98. Before leaving this uncritical presentation of Berlin
and Kay's findings it is important to note that their work has
been made the subject of a good deal of discussion casting
doubts on both the substance of their findings and on the
methodology they adopted in producing them. See, for example,
Hickerson (1971), Durbin (1972), McNeill (1972), Collier
(1973). Collier et al. (1976) takes account of some of the
methodological problems and substantially supports the
original conclusions while Kay (1975) takes account of some
of the substantive objections and attempts to integrate them
into a modified partial ordering. Since Heider's work on the
development of colour terms refers to the original hypothesis
and since we are interested in the use she put that hypothesis
to rather than in whether it is correct, I shall pay no
attention to these modifications in what follows.
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2.4.2 Haider's experiments
Heider (1971a) conducted three experiments in her
exploration of the implications of Berlin and Kay's work
for cognitive and lexical development. The first of
these involved the child (from the age range, 2 years,
11 months to 3 years, 10 months) in choosing, from a
small array of colours, one to show to the experimenter
who has her eyes covered. The arrays were constructed
so that each one contained a single focal chromatic
colour which was embedded in a set of colours which '
differed from the focal colour either in brightness or
in saturation. Such arrays were constructed for the eight
chromatic basic colour terms, red, yellow. green, blue.
brown, pink, orange and purple. For the second experiment
children (from the age range, 3 years, 11 months to
4 years 10 months) were asked to match a coloured chip
with one from a set of chips in an array constructed in
such a way that the original chip appears only once in
it. The arrays again included one chromatic focal, colour
and the chips in which this was embedded varied along
either the dimension of brightness or the dimension of
hue. The chip with which the child was presented could
be focal, boundary (falling on the edge of those areas
in the colour space which were innominate in the Berlin
and Kay study) and internominal (falling in the centre
of an innominate area). Matching accuracy, is of course,
the vari ible in which the experimenter is interested.
Neither of these experiments explicitly involves the
child's lexical knowledge but in the third study the
child's task (children ranging in age from 3 years to
4 years 7 months) was to choose from an array of coloured
chips, varying in hue and containing a chip corresponding
to a focal instance of the chromatic basic colour term,
X, in response to the question, 'Which is the X one?' or
the instruction, 'Show me the X one'. As far as adult
usage was concerned, there were a number of chips in each
array which could be appropriately referred to as 'X'.
The results of the series of experiments were quite
4
clear-cut. In the first experiment children showed a
significant tendency to choose focal chips, a typical
result being that, when 3 out of 24 children might have
been expected to choose focal blue by chance (there were
8 chips in each array), in fact 9 children did so. In
the second experiment children were much more accurate
in matching focal colours than either boundary or inter-
nominal colours, there being no significant difference
between this latter pair and, in the final experiment,
many more children chose the focal example of a colour
term, X, in response to 'Show me the X one' than would
have been expected by chance given that there was more
than one adult-correct response in these cases. As a
typical example, 5 chips in the array containing focal
green were judged to be green by adults and, of 27
children, 22 chose one of these thus exhibiting behaviour
which is consistent with them knowing something about the
meaning of green. From these 22 children we would expect
4.40 to choose the focal colour by chance and, in fact,
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12 children chose this chip. This pattern was repeated
throughout the eight chromatic colour terms. What this
research appears to show is that focal colours tend to
control a child's attention (first experiment), are
easier to match (second experiment) and that, once the
children are familiar with a colour term, this colour
term is attached to a focal instance of the colour
rather than having an unstructured extension over the
whole range covered by the colour term in the adult
language. Heider is at pains to argue that it is the
perceptual salience demonstrated in the first two
experiments which accounts for the phenomenon uncovered
in the third experiment, although she adnits that, given
lack of knowledge concerning the child's previous experience
with colour terms, parental tuition, etc., it is im¬
possible to isolate perceptual saliency as the causal
factor.
2.4.5 A tentative model and its status
Whatever the explanation for the development of what
appear to be structured colour categories (see Hosch
(1975a, 1973b) for her work with the Dani of New Guinea
and stronger arguments for perceptual saliency being the
causal factor), the above experiments appear to be
consistent with the following view of the development
99. Interestingly, even if it were the case that parents
in teaching colour terms to their children, tended to
use objects exhibiting focal colours, this itself would
be in need of explanation.
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of that part of the lexicon devoted to colour terms
while, for the reasons pointed out above, they do not
demand this view. Initially the child attaches to each
colour term that he learns a representation of a focal
instance of that colour term (perhaps in the form of a
visual image) vrtiich, to all intents and purposes, counts
as the meaning of the colour term at that stage. Sub¬
sequently he develops additional representations which
enable him to apply the colour term beyond focal instances
and to approximate to the poorly defined boundaries Of
adult usage. During this subsequent development he
retains his representation of the focal instance in the
form of a prototype which, while no longer determining
the extension of the colour term, functions as a cognitive
reference point (see Rosch (1975c) for an explication
of this notion).This is a development which, with
respect to a particular colour term, could be schematised
as:
CT ^^ X > GT < > X+Y
where CT is the colour term in question, X is a represent¬
ation of a focal instance of the colour term and Y
represents whatever additional machinery is necessary to
account for the subsequent extension of CT. Looking at
100. Evidence for the child going through a stage where
the 'prototype' determines the extension of the colour term
is not obviously available. The fact that the children,
in Heider's third experiment, responded at all can be
seen as providing a measure of support since, presumably,
adults in such a situation would be likely to respond with
'Which X one?'
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the relevant section of the lexicon as a whole, we might,
expect, according to this view, that the theorist would
he ahle to isolate two stages in the development of colour
terms which we could represent as in Figure 32.
CT„
CT. < > P.
CT. < > P.
CT2 4 } P2
CT. i >P.i x l
CTi+1 « ^Pi+,+xi+1
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Here the CT^, 1-i-n, are colour terms, the P^, 1-i-m,
are representations of focal instances or prototypes,
the X^, h+1-i-m, are the 'additional machinery' and the
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I'L, m+1-i-n nay either be prototype or representations of
a combination of prototype and. 'additional machinery'.
This general formulation has it that the CT. (h+1-j-i)
are 'extended' beyond the range defined by their prototypes
between t, and t„ and new colour terms, CT ., .... CT ,1 2 rn+1 n
enter the lexicon and, by ^ay either be extended or
restricted to a prototype. With this in mind let us now
consider Conditions 1-4.
The domain of enquiry, D, can be fixed as that part of
I
the child's developing lexicon which deals with colour
terms and the data relevant to an investigation of D
will include the results of Heider's third experiment
described above. It seems to me that, not only Condition 1,
but also Conditionlhave to be passed by in silence on
this occasion. The vagueness of the description of the
general model above males it only too obvious that I
don't have a general theory in mind and, while even the
nature of prototypes is obscure, the references to
'additional machinery' are a transparent cloak for
ignorance.
Despite the inadequacy of the proposal with regard to
Condition 2, it seems that interesting questions arise
in connection with Condition 3. Between t^ and t^ in
Figure 32 there is an increase in the set of coloux terms
the child has in his lexicon, there is an increase in
the set of prototypes (each of CT ^,..., CT^ involve
a prototype which was not present in the lexicon at t.j )
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and an increase in the set of 'extension-fixing mechanisms'
(each of CT^+^,..., CT^ involve one of these for the
first time and., additionally, they may also appear in
CTm+^..., C ). On these grounds, I conclude that Condition
1 01
3 is applicable and that it is satisfied.
The question raised by Condition 4 is clearly difficult
to formulate of the theory as a whole and I would, there¬
fore, like to consider two subsidiary questions which
have their origins in this condition.
1. Restricting ourselves to a single lexical item in the
set, CT^+^ , ..., CT^ v/hy is it that we get the development
we can schematise as:
CT <+-> P > CT P+X
rather than the alternative:
CT <-9 X > CT P+X
2. Restricting ourselves to prototypes, why is it that we
find the development we can schematise as:
[P1 , P2, . .., Pmj ■> [P1 » p2' Pm' Pm+1 * Pnj
rather than the alternative:
[Pm+1 '* * " Pnj * fP1 ' P2' * * '' Pm' Pm+1 » Pn)
101 , Its applicability is, in fact, guaranteed by the
claim that the prototype 'survives' into a stage when it
no longer determines the colour term's extension.
102. Por the sake of completeness we might also consider
a similar question referring to 'extension fixing mechanisms'
but I take this latter notion as too vague to warrant
further discussion.
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Consider the first of these questions. The first
possibility of Condition 4 provides no clues as there
is no obvious logical connection in the theory between
the prototype and the 'extension fixing machinery'. Given
the vagueness of the constructs this is hardly surprising.
The third possibility, however, is more interesting. It
follows from the work of Berlin and Kay that focal colours
enjoy a status in the languages of the world which is
not shared by whatever principles fix the boundaries
of colour terms. It seems likely, although it is not;
obvious without access to a good deal of data, that,
given the correctness of Berlin and Kay's views, it should'
be possible to formulate statements of "he form:
If a colour term, X, in a language, L, has an approximate
boundary, B, then that colour term will have, as its
best example, the focal colour, P. That is to say, one
ought to be able to argue from boundaries to focal inst¬
ances but, of course, the reverse should not be the case.
But the above statement is nothing less than an implicational
universal which has the very form we need in order to
ground the development under discussion linguistically.
Heider, in her attempt to relate the results of her
third experiment to those of the first two, can be seen
as resorting to the second possibility under Condition 4
and, thereby, providing an explanation for the behavioural
facts and for the linguistic facts. It is difficult to
put the argument in a form such that the conditions
developed under this aspect of Condition 4 can be applied,
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but, in outline, the proposal is clear enough. Just
as in lexical structure focal colours enjoy a privileged
status, so it is in visual perception, where Heider's
experiments have demonstrated the extent to which they
control the child's attention and the extent to which
they facilitate the child's performance in a matching
task. It seems likely then, that in a theory of perceptual
development there will be constructs related to focal
colours and, when such a theory exists, it may be possible
to formulate the necessary correspondence rules in a*
satisfactory way. For the moment, though, such suggestions
must remain speculation."'^
Consider now the second question concerning the development
of the set of prototypes. Clearly the partial ordering
argued for by Berlin and Kay can be invoked here to provide
a linguistic grounding for lexical development, ^o do
this depends on finding an order of acquisition of colour
terms (each one initially attached to a focal instance)
103. iTor is it obvious that we would have to stop at this
point, for there might be the equivalent of what Fodor
(1968) has termed a 'phase two explanation' available by
reference to the biological properties of the organism.
The well-known work of deValois and Jacobs (1968) on the
visual system of the macaque monkey has demonstrated
that in a system very similar to that of man there are
specialised cells for processing information concerning
the wavelength of light and that these cells have peaks
of sensitivity which might be related to the properties
of at least the primary focal colours. This is, of course,
some way from a developmental theory of colour vision.
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which matches the partial ordering. Heider is conscious
of the possibilities in this regard but points out that
her study says nothing about the actual order in which
lexical items are acquired. In connection with the inter¬
pretation of her third experiment, she says (452):
The hypothesis behind the third experiment was that
colour names initially become attached (come to
denote) focal areas for children. This hypothesis
could not be tested directly with American children
because their history of colour naming prior to coming
to the experiment was unknown; that is, the kind'of
explicit teaching of colour names a subject had already
received was unknown and the colour of objects that
had been previously used as colour name exemplars
for him was unknown.
This reasoning can be carried over directly to the order
of acquisition of colour terms. Heider feels, however,
that it might still turn out that the Berlin and Kay
partial ordering will be matched by the performance of
the children in the experiments she undertook, an outcome
which, while not establishing that the partial ordering
is reflected in order of acquisition, would, nevertheless,
be consistent with such a claim and lend it plausibility.
Unfortunately this is not what the author found. In her
own words (454):
Neither the saliency order of the focal colours in
Experiment I, the matching accuracy order obtained
from Experiment II, nor the frequency with which focal
colours were chosen to represent the category name in
. Experiment III matched Berlin and Kay's proposed
evolutionary order. Only one measure of the present
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study, the number of subjects who knew each colour
name, did not, with the exception of orange,
contradict the proposed evolutionary order.
Thus, all we can conclude in this respect is that evidence
which it was hoped might be supportive is not forthcoming.
It should be emphasised, though, that it is clear what
the evidence at issue is and this should count to the
positive evaluation of the theory.
By way of general conclusion it seems to me fair to say
that Heider's proposals and the suggestions I have constructed
on the basis of them, while not matching up to Conditions
1 - 4 at all well, deserve to be taken seriously because
of the contact which is established with what is known
about the world's languages and with aspects of visual
perception. Unfortunately, with regard to this contact
with the world's languages, while the available data
are not, strictly speaking, relevant to the question of
acquisition order, they do not give any reason to believe
that this order will match the distributional facts from
the world's languages.
2.4.4 'Prototypes' and general referential vocabulary
Griffiths (1976) is an ambitious attempt to establish
the position that a theory of lexical development employing
some notion of 'prototype' is of more value, when studying
early vocabulary being used referentially, than is a
theory using 'critical features' or 'critical attributes'.
Most of the evidence he cites is not easily given a
developmental interpretation, that is, the fact that it
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might be possible to demonstrate that a child is making
crucial use of a prototype at a certain stage does not
tell us anything about the genesis of that prototype nor
about its subsequent development. There is, however, one
piece of evidence cited by Griffiths which indicates that
he might be prepared to subscribe to the view, to all
intents and purposes, analogous to that discussed in the
previous section, that, when a lexical item is learned,
there is a period where a prototype actually fixes the
extension of that item. Subsequently additional devices,
of an obscure nature, must be developed so that the
extension of the lexical item for the child approximates
to the adult norm. The evidence in question is that
provided by Reich (1976) who claimed that his son's
understanding of shoe, when he first showed any comprehen¬
sion of the word, was restricted to it referring to a
particular pair of shoes in a particular location. Of
course, this is nothing more than an extreme case of
overrestriction and, while it is difficult to demonstrate
the existence of this phenomenon with certainty, it has
achieved a degree of acceptance amongst people working on
early vocabulary growth. Reich's conclusions, cited
approvingly by Griffiths, are that (120):
...the very first word meanings are formed by
associating a sequence of sounds with essentially
everything that is perceptually and functionally
salient about the objects or actions in the environ¬
ment that co-occur with that word.
This would appear to be consistent with a generalised
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model along the lines of Figure 52 where lexical items,
upon entering the lexicon, are associated with prototypes
and later these prototypes are supplemented with additional
machinery for fixing extensions corresponding to those
of the adult.
Such a proposal suffers from the same defects as the
earlier one with respect to Conditions 1 and 2 although,
again, Condition 5 will be satisfied. Extending the
analogy we can ask at least two questions on the basis
*
of considerations of Condition 4.
1 . Restricting ourselves to single lexical items, why is
it that we get the development we can schematise as:
P > P+X
rather than the alternative:
W±w X > W± <r-> P+X
2. Restricting ourselves to prototypes, why is that we
find the development we can schematise as:
[P-l , P2' * *" Pnj * [P1 ' P2* Pm' Pm+1» * * *» Pnj
rather than the alternative:
and of course, this second question, as in the case of
colour terms, reduces to a question about the order of
acquisition of lexical forms.
In 2.4.5 we saw that Heider had a number of bases for
tackling the variant on the first question which was
considered there. Unfortunately, in this case, these
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bases are not available. That is to say that it is not
the case, in general, that there are language-independent
'prototypes', which will, inevitably, form the cores of
semantic categories. It is unrealistic to assume that the
prototype of, say a dwelling-place, is the same for a
British speaker of English as it is for a speaker of
Kpelle or a speaker of Dani assuming, for linguistic
relevance, each of these languages lexicalises this notion./'^
This indicates that prototypes need have no more universal
status than have whatever principles fix extensions., Nor
is it the case that we can resort to a notion of
'psychological salience' in these cases. To this extent
the general proposal lacks the explanatory status of the
more restricted one from the previous section.
But now consider the variant of the second question. This
is concerned with the order of acquisition of lexical
items and depends, for its investigation, upon there
being an attested order of acquistion, and, for its
104. Note, that this point does not cast any doubt on the
validity of the notion of 'prototype'. I am merely
trying to point out that particular prototypes probably
do not have cross-cultural significance. Also, given the
empirical work reported in Rosch (1973a, 1973b), it is
clear that the set of prototypes which do have cross-
cultural significance is not restricted to focal colours.
Rosch comes to similar conclusions in the domain of
simple geometrical shapes and there is no reason to
believe that her findings could not be extended to other
perceptual domains. Similarly, one cannot prejudge the
issue to the extent that I do in the text, with regard to
non-perceptual domains but our intuitions surely favour
relativism here.
satisfactory answer, upon there being facts about the
world's languages or facts about perception in which
the order of acquisition can be grounded. In the previous
section we had the linguistic facts which would have
provided a satisfactory answer but, unfortunately, no
order of acquisition to match them. We would appear to
be in a worse position here but I believe that the beginnings
of at least a partial answer to this question are apparent '
in the work of Rosch and her colleagues on 'basic objects'
which is to be discussed in the next section. Holdihg
this problem in mind, then, I shall immediately proceed
to this discussion.
2.5 Basic objects
Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson and Boyes-Braem (1976) argue
that within a taxonomy of concepts or categories there
may be one level which is privileged in a particularly
interesting way. They say:
...categories within taxonomies of concrete objects
are structured such that there is generally one level
of abstraction at which the most basic category cuts
can be made. In general, the basic level of abstract¬
ion in a taxonomy is the level at which categories
carry the most information, possess the highest cue
validity and are thus the most differentiated from
one another (585).
In 2.5.1 I shall attempt to spell out what is involved
in"a category possessing 'high cue validity' and in
2.5.2 I shall consider the implications that Rosch et al.
see, for lexical development, in these concepts.
2.5.1 'Informativeness1 and 'cue validity'
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We can imagine a taxonomy of categories where each
category has associated with it a number of attributes,
including, perhaps, a category name, in the manner shown
in Figure 33.
°1 °2 °n
(1-j -j J • • •» ) (<^21 ' • • ■' ^2 j ^ ^ ^n1 ' '' ■' -^nk ^
°11 °1m C21 °2p Cn1 ^nq.







Here the Ch (l-i^-n) are categories at the first level in
thetaxonomy and the A^ . are associated attributes or cues.
The C.'. are categories at the second level in the taxonomy
J
and the A. are attributes associated solely with
:lJk:
categories at this level, i.e., they have no role to
play at the more inclusive level. The C. areI jn
categories at the third level and they will involve the
introduction of a new set of attributes, designated as
Aijkl' which I0 exclusive to the third level of the
taxonomy in the sense that they don't have a role to play
at any more inclusive levels. Hote that the attributes
associated with first level categories are also associated
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with second, level categories and that the same is true
for second level attributes and third level attributes.
Obviously such a taxonomy could be extended to any depth.
To take a concrete example we can consider the (partial)
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Kote that the attributes in this taxonomy are not to be
taken as providing sufficient (or even necessary) conditions
for an instance belonging to a category. Rather they
should be seen as referring to characteristics of objects
which provide clues to category membership and, as such,
they can be construed as providing a rough description of
a typical member of a category. The extent to which a
105. This taxonomy is not intended to have any psychological
validity. For properties associated with categories see
the experiments in Rosch et al, (1976)
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category is informative can be equated with, its cue
validity and I now turn to an explication of this latter
notion.
For each of the attributes associated with a category
we can ask about its reliability as a predictor of
category membership. To this end, for each category and
each characteristic attribute, we can compute the ratio
of the probability that an instance belongs to the category
given that it has the attribute, i.e., if we have a




This figure can be referred to as the cue validity of A.






where A^,..., Am are the attributes associated with the
category, C^. This figure will be increased by the
presence of attributes which are strongly associated with
and not with other categories. An increase in the
number of attributes associated with will not, in
itself, necessarily lead to an increase in cue validity
for the category as, for these attributes to be also
associated with other categories, will increase the
denominator in the above summation leading to an overall
decrease in cue validity. To illustrate with the simple
example from Figure 34, assume that we have already
computed Pr (furniture/artefact) as 0.1. Then the cue
validity of the category, Furniture, will be
0.9
Assume further that the categories, Chair and Table,
exhaust the category, Furniture, that the two categories
are equally distributed throughout the superordinate
#
category and that we have the further figures available:
Pr (chair/can be sat on) =0.5
Pr (chair/has four legs) - 0.4
Pr (table/can be eaten from) = 0.7
Then the cue validity of the category, Chair, can be
computed as
0.05 + 0.5 + 0.4
= 0.95 = 0 46
0.95 + 0.5 + 0.6 2.05
and the cue validity of the category, Table, comes out as
0.05 + 0.7
= 0.75 = 0^6
0.95 + 0.3 1 .25
So we see that, despite the fact that two additional
attributes are associated with the category, Chair, as
we move down the taxonomy whereas only one is associated
with the category, Table, the cue validity of Chair is
less thah the cue validity of Table. This is because
the cue associated with Table is a relatively reliable
one. Consider further the cue validity of the category,
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Easy chair, on the assumption that the taxonomy includes
only Easy chair and Kitchen chair subordinate to Chair
and that these two are equally distributed in the super-
ordinate category. Assume that we know that Pr (easy chair/
cushioned) =0.6. The cue validity for this category can
then be calculated as
0.025 + 0.25 + 0.2 + 0.6
= 1.075 = 0.34
0.975 + 0.75 + 0.8 + 0.4 2.925
and this demonstrates that it is not necessarily the case
that, as one moves down a taxonomy, the cue validities
of the categories will increase.
It is clear from the above that two factors are at work
in determining the cue validity of a category: the
number of attributes associated with the category and the
reliability of these attributes. Rosch et al. suggest
that there is, conceptually, a level of 'basic objects'
at which these factors combine to maximise cue validity.
They say (385):
Suppose that basic objects (e.g., chair, car) are at
the most inclusive level (in the taxonomy - RMA) at
which there are attributes common to all or most
members of the category. Then total cue validities
are maximised at that level of abstraction at which
basic objects are categorised. That is, categories
one level more abstract wrill be superordinate cate¬
gories (e.g., furniture, vehicle) whose members share
only a few attributes among each other. Categories
below the basic level will be subordinate categories
(e.g., kitchen chair, snorts car) which are also
bundles of predicate attributes and functions, but
contain many attributes which overlap with other
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categories (for example, kitchen chair shares most
of its attributes with other kinds of chairs).
Of course, in order to demonstrate that cue validity is
maximised at this level it would be necessary to under¬
take much more detailed investigations than those found
in Rosch et al's paper but, certainly, the results of
their experimental studies lend credence to their position.
2.3.2 'Basic objects' in language acquisition
Rosch et al. (1976) studied the vocabulary of Sarah,' one
of the children studied in great depth by Roger Brown
and his team, and categorised her concrete nouns in
Stage I using the notions of 'superordinate', 'basic'
and 'subordinate'. The results were as shown in Figure 35
(p 184) and led Rosch et al. to conclude (425): "basic
level names were essentially the only names used by
Sarah in Stage I".
On the basis of this conclusion, then, we can schematise
the lexical development of the child as:
BL > BL + X
where we are concerned simply with the child's vocabulary,
rather than the meanings he attaches to lexical forms and
where 'BL' denotes the class of basic-level names and 'X'
1 06
covers superordinate and subordinate names. Insofar
106. It is worth mentioning that Rosch et al. found that
subjects were more capable of associating a mental image with
basic level names than with names from other categories.
Insofar as we can associate mental images with prototypes
and prototypes with meanings at the beginnings of lexical
development the relevance of this to the work of Griffiths
discussed in'i 2.4.4 should be obvious.
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CONCRETE NOUNS USED IN STAGE I OF LANGUAGE ACQUISITION
Taxonomic level of word used
Superordinate Basic level Subordinate
Category Tokens Types Tokens Types Tokens Types
Nonbiological
Musical
instrument 0 0 13 6 0 0
Fruit 0 0 7 3 0 0
Tool 0 0 37 13 0 ' 0
Clothing 2 1 91 18 4 1
Furniture 0 0 75 16 1 1
Vehicle 0 0 50 11 3 2
Biological^^
Tree 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fish 19 1 0 0 0 0
Bird 13 1 0 0 0 0
Figure 35. From Rosch et al. (1976, 425).
107. The distinction between biological and nonbiological
categories is motivated by the earlier experiments
reported in Rosch et al. where it became obvious that
adults treated the superordinates, tree, fish and bird
as if they were basic level names with the result that the
biological taxonomies are only of depth 2. Similarly the
categories iised in Table 35 are derivative on the experi¬
mental studies of Rosch et al.
as theoretical machinery is involved here it would appear
that the schematisation satisfies Condition 3 (again I
pass over Conditions 1 and 2)and Condition 4 causes us
to search for reasons for why we find this development
rather than the alternative which can be schematised as:
X ^ BL + X
and an answer to this question will constitute at least
a partial answer to the question we raised at the end
of 2.4.4.108
4
Taking the first possibility under Condition 3, it is
evident that there is nothing logically basic about basic- '
level names and the categories they are associated with.
One could start at the top of a taxonomy and add the more
specific parts or start at the bottom and add the more
general parts and either of these processes is as
intelligible as the one we are confronted with, starting
in the middle and working both ways. The second possibility
is the one on which Rosch et al. lean most heavily and
the greater part of their paper can be seen as an attempt
to establish the primacy of the cognitive categories
corresponding to basic-level names. As far as the
development of these categories is concerned, a series
108. It will not, of course, enable us to say anything
about the order of acquisition of items within the three
gross categories we are considering and it seems to me
that, at that point, the child's individual experience will
become of overriding importance overcoming the influence
of any general theoretical considerations.
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of experiments were conducted showing that children as
young as 3 years were capable of sorting objects into
basic-level categories while it has been known for some
time that children of that age do not exhibit control of
superordinate categories in sorting tasks. It seems,
therefore, that there is an important parallel between
cognitive and linguistic development with, on the one
hand, basic-level concepts preceding superordinate concepts
and, on the other, basic-level names preceding superordinate
names. Unfortunately, for any attempt to ground the
linguistic development in the cognitive development, the
ages of the children involved create difficulties. Sarah,-
th3 slowest of the children studied by Brown in this
respect, left Stage I at about 35 months (see Brown (1973,
80) for details) and this means that she was already
displaying the appropriate linguistic behaviour before
the youngest children in the Rosch et al. study were
indicating that they controlled the relevant concep ts
in the sorting task. It is, of course, quite conceivable
that children considerably younger than 3 years would be
capable of evidencing the control of basic-level
categories through some means other than their language
but, for the moment, it is necessary to conclude that
1 0Q
the reduction has not been entirely successful. ^ The
109. Note that there is no suggestion here that the child
might use his lexical items appropriately before he controls
the relevant concepts. The point is merely that if one
is to exhibit a causal connection between cognitive and
linguistic development then it is necessary to be able
to identify the cognitive competence before the linguistic
competence appears.
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cognitive theory envisaged by Rosch et al. is itself
crucially dependent on the principle that an organism will
establish categories which are maximally informative in
its environment and, while such a principle has fascinating
implications, I shall regard discussion of it as beyond
the scope of this work.
Interestingly there is one further avenue to explore in
connection with this theoretical proposal and this involves
reference to the third possibility under Condition 4- If
there were languages which were impoverished as far as
taxonomic depth is concerned and if, furthermore the levels
in the taxonomy which were absent in such cases were
never the basic levels then we would have a linguistic
grounding for the lexical development. In the final
study of their paper, Rosch et al. investigate American
Sign language with'this point in mind and what they found
was that it was deficient at the superordinate and sub¬
ordinate levels to a much greater extent than it was at
the basic level. American Sign Language could thus be
cited as the first step in an argument towards a linguistic
grounding for the proposals and it remains to be seen
whether there are ' standard' languages which exhibit the
same behaviour (see Berlin, Breedlove and Raven (1973)
for some relevant observations).
'Basic objects' seems to me to an exciting and useful
construct which will almost certainly lead to fresh
insights into cognitive and linguistic growth. The
difficulty at the moment, as with most of the proposals
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in 2,4 is that of specifying the exact nature of the
theory. Clark and Nelson put forward reasonably articulated
theories although close examination demonstrated crucial
inadequacies. It is more difficult with the proposals of
Heider and Griffiths to pin-point inadequacies and, being
optimistic, one might wish to suggest that this is because
such gross inadequacies donot exist. At the same time
I feel that the doubt must be expressed that our failure
to pin-point them is a direct reflex of the fact that the
exact nature of prototypes is never spelled out, that
the way in which a semantic model using prototypes
enables its wearer to successfully refer to an instance
which differs from the prototype is not specified, and
so on. This boils down to the different ways in which
Condition 2 gets handled. For Clark and Nelson it made
sense to consider Condition 2 because they were putting
forward what looked like a general theory, for Heider
and Griffiths it seemed fair to never raise Condition 2.
CHAPTER 3 : THE GRAMMAR WRITERS
In this chapter I shall focus attention on the aspect
of child language which most preoccupied theorists in the
1960's and early 1970's : the child's ability to produce
syntactically structured utterances in an, apparently,
creative fashion. In most cases the emphasis was on
the description of a system which was neutral between
comprehension and production and which was characterised
as the knowledge underlying the relevant abilities *
although, with isolated exceptions such as Shipley, Smith
and Gleitman (1969), the data used in the construction of
such systems were instances of the child's production.
The creativity alluded to above entails the control, by
the child, of some sort of rule-system and, in the period
under consideration, these rule-systems were usually
described using generative grammars. The actual form of
generative grammar employed typically owed something to
one or other version of transformational grammar and,
of course, Chomsky's influence in this regard cannot be
overemphasised. Prom this perspective, then, the child's
developing knowledge of syntax can be represented by a
sequence of grammars, (G^, G• ••» ^n), where the child
is credited with the grammar, G^, as soon as he manifests
behaviour which indicates any grammatical knowledge;
this has usually been taken to be when he first employs
two-word utterances although, if the well-subscribed
view that comprehension precedes production is correct,
then the child may have been in possession of grammatical
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knowledge before this time. In the interests of
general presentation, we can assume that G is a theory
of adult syntactic competence and that ..., G"n_-|
represent grammars at arbitrary sampling points in the
passage from to G . As was pointed out in Chapter 1,
this is not intended to preclude the possibility that
there may be systematically identifiable 'stages' in the
sequence but merely to make it clear that we cannot
pre-judge such an issue. In practice, most people
working in this domain have restricted themselves to* a
small number of points in the sequence, often concentrating
their attention on the earliest stages of syntactic
development.
The sense in which linguistic theory has informed
theorising in this area can be rapidly spelled out. An
adequate linguistic theory, according to the Chomskyan
conception, supplies, among other things, a definition of
the notion, 'possible grammar of a language', and can be
seen as restricting the space of grammars through which
the child has to search in order to arrive at the grammar
of his linguistic environment. The child's'transition
grammars', the guesses he makes as to the grammar of
110. Por arguments that this view may not, in general,
be correct, see R.Clark (1974). It may also be thought
that the mere production of two-word utterances is not,
in itself, sufficient to demonstrate syntactic knowledge
of the sort supposedly captured by a transformational
grammar. This difficult issue will not be pursued further
here.
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his native language as he learns it, then, must he seen
as constrained by the same general theory. The exact
nature of an adequate general linguistic theory has, not
surprisingly, resisted discovery, although a large number
of more or less tentative suggestions in this direction
have been made. Clearly, compliance with a coherent set
of such suggestions on the part of the child-language
theorist will go a long way towards the satisfaction of
Condition 2.
I
It should be pointed out at this stage that Chomsky himself
has never seriously presented his theory as a theory of
language acquisition in the sense in which we are pursuing
an explication of this concept here. This is most obvious
from the idealisation to instantaneous learning which his
position embraces (see Chomsky and Halle (1968) and, for
extensive discussion, Chomsky (1976, pp 119ff)) but
whether this idealisation leads to serious problems for
linguistic theory is distinct from its inappropriacy as
111
a predictor of the course of syntactic development.
The proposals which I shall consider in this chapter are,
perhaps more than any others discussed in this work, out
of date and no longer subscribed to by their authors.
This is irrelevant to my purposes as it could turn out
that such proposals have highly desirable features distinct
from their empirical (in)adequacy and, if they have, it
111 For a discussion of some of the issues involved in this
idealisation and its relationship to linguistic argumentation
see Churma (1975).
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will be instructive to discover them. The topic of 3.1
is McNeill's (1966) early views on grammatical classes
developed within the framework of pivot and open grammars.
We shall see here that McNeill is sensitive to the issue
of discontinuity raised in Chapter 1 and makes an attempt,
albeit unsuccessful, to deal with it. KLima and Bellugi's
earliest work (1966) on the development of the syntax of
negation is discussed in 3.2. Again we shall come across
the problem of discontinuity and see that, in this case,
the authors take no steps towards its resolution. 343
covers sections of the work of Bloom, first presented
in her dissertation, Bloom (1968), and subsequently
published as Bloom (1970), which comprises one of the
first systematic attempts to trace the grammatical develop¬
ment of a number of children through several stages taking
account, in a fairly rigorous fashion, of the linguistic
theorising on which the grammatical formalism adopted
is based. Here we shall encounter several formal problems
and difficulties of interpretation and the question of
the comparison of theories from different stages will
become more involved. Following Bloom to a large extent
is Bowerman (1973) and in 3.4 I shall discuss her attempts
to trace the syntactic development of two Finnish children
using grammars which are constructed roughly in accordance
with the linguistic theory put forward in Chomsky (1965).
Bloom's and Bowerman's work can be seen as the climax
of attempts to produce systematic grammatical statements
covering the child's total syntactic knowledge at a
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particular stage ana the subject-matter of 3.5 is more
restricted. Broun and Hanlon's (1970) attempt to interpret
the derivational theory of complexity in terms of developing
linguistic structures within a restricted syntactic domain
provides one of the most detailed and systematic attempts
to approach explanation in syntactic development and in
this section I shall spell out the logic of this attempt
and evaluate the extent of its success. Brown's (1973)
work on the relative complexity of grammatical morphemes
follows logically from the discussion of 3-5 and, as'3.6
concludes this chapter. While not being wholly concerned
with syntactic development, it shares important methodo¬
logical characteristics with the work of 3.5 and also
provides a convenient bridge to the semantic considerations
of Chapter 4.
Obviously these studies do not exhaust the very large
number of those undertaken on syntactic development in
the period under discussion. I claim that they do
represent a reasonable sample and I would go so far as
to suggest that many other studies in the period can be
seen as having similar successes and failures with
respect to Conditions 1 - 4 as we shall meet in the
following pages. Aspects of the more recent position
that syntactic development is crucially intertwined with
semantic development adopted by such authors as
Schlesinger (1971, 1974, 1975) and Antinucci and Parisi
(1973, 1975) will be considered in Chapter 4.
3.1 McNeill on grammatical classes
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The characteristics of pivot and open grammars and the
extent to which McNeill manipulated the concept in adopting
original proposals of Braine (1963), Brown and Fraser
(1963) and Miller and Ervin (1964) and synthesising them
into a reasonably well-defined theoretical position are
too well-known to merit more than the briefest statement
here (for detailed treatment and criticism, see Park
(1970), Bowerman (1973), Brown (1973) and many other
places). According to the proposal, at the beginnings of
syntactic development, it is possible to define, on
distributional grounds, two, or sometimes three, grammatical
classes. If the distributional analysis yields two such
classes, they are referred to as the pivot class and the
open class and, if three classes emerge, they are referred
to as the first-position pivot class, the second-position
pivot class and the open class. Distributional criteria
and frequency criteria come together such that the
classes have the characteristics shown in Figure 36
(restricting ourselves from now on to the situation in
which there are only two classes and assuming that all
pivots are first-position pivots). (see p 195 for
Figure 36)
These distributional facts can be summarised, in formal
terms, by saying that, at the stage in'question, at time
t.j, the child has a grammatical competence which recognises
two grammatical categories other than Sentence which can
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Pivots Ooen class words
Occur frequently in a
corpus (some arbitrary
criterion of frequency
has to be fixed)
Occur infrequently in a
corpus
Always occur in first
position in two-word
utterances
Occur in variable position
in two-word utterances
Fever occur as single-
word utterances
Sometimes occur as single-
word utterances
Never occur in con¬
struction with another
pivot
Sometimes occur in con¬
struction with another open-
class word
Figure 56
be referred to as ,P' and '0' and which are organised
in a grammar having the rules of Figure 37 (ignoring how
lexical items are handled).
From our point of view, the most important remark
concerning a grammar such as this is to do with lexical
membership of the categories, P and 0. They are claimed
to be typically heterogeneous with respect to the adult
set of grammatical categories, i.e., in general, it is
not the case that there is an adult grammatical category,
X, such that X can, even intuitively, be identified
with P or 0.







to postulate a different grammar to characterise the
child's syntactic knowledge and we might expect that such
a grammar, while being related to the grammar at t^ will
begin to resemble an adult grammar to a greater extent.
As far as grammatical categories are concerned, this
expectation might be realised by us being able to credit
the child with one or more grammatical categories which
can, intuitively, be identified with those comprising
the adult set. As a hypothetical example we can imagine




(P *) + 0'
(Adj) + 0"
r *> r \
I 0' + 0"
0" 0'
V J V. J
V J
Figure 38
This grammar could be seen as formalising the observations
that a class of morphemes which can intuitively be identified
with the adult category, Adj(ective), now has privileged
distributional properties - it can only appear before a
subclass of the original open class, a subclass referred
to here as 0" - and, therefore, is assigned category
status in the grammar, that a modified pivot class, P',
which will not contain any adjectives can only provide
the first member of a two-member construction just as at
t^, that members of ?' are restricted to the extent that
they can only occur in construction with members of 0',
a modified, open class, and that members of 0' and 0"
can occur freely together as well as occurring alone.
This developmental process, or something like it, will
continue until the child possesses the adult grammar and,
in particular, utilises the full set of adult grammatical
categories, S, HP, VP, Det, H, etc., where x*e can assume
that this set is supplied by an appropriate linguistic
theory,
In general terms, then, what we have is a developmental
sequence of grammars, (G^, G^, ..., &n)> where G^ is a
pivot and open grammar as in Figure 37, G^ is a modified
pivot and open grammar which, in the hypothetical case of
Figure 38, recognises a class of adjectives and Gn is
a grammar of adult English. It is a sequence such as
this against which I wish to test Conditions 1 - 4.
Considering first Condition 1, McNeill and others working
within the framework of transformational grammar have
always been explicit on the point that they are attempting
to characterise the child's syntactic competence and are
not producing a model which will predict what the child
will say on a particular occasion nor predict what he is
capkble of understanding. There is thus no sense in
which there is a domain, D, in the child's behaviour in
which the theory makes predictions and the version of
Condition 1 discussed in Chapter 1 entails failure for
the proposal. However, this is nothing new and obviously
the brief discussion of Chapter 2 can be seen as applicable
here too, although such discussion hardly contributes
to a deepening of our understanding of the problems. For
small children the immediate problem is whether one can
make sense of some proposed grammar as a theory of
syntactic knowledge and not whether the concept of syntactic
knowledge itself makes sense in the context of psychological
explanations. For the sake of further discussion, I
assume that this less urgent question can be answered
affirmatively along the lines of the inconclusive dis-
1 1 2
cussion in Chapter 2. ,
Turning to Condition 2, one's first impression is that,
in this domain, we find some of the more sophisticated
attempts to interpret linguistic theorising in a develop¬
mental context and, indeed, McNeill says at the outset
of his 1966 paper (p.15):
112, It is worth pointing out that there are at least
two ways of construing theories of linguistic performance
neither of which has been the concern of those people
who have bothered themselves with writing grammars (but
see remarks below in connection with aspects of the work
of both Bloom and Bowerman). Linguistic performance can
be identified with a native-speaker's 'real' abilities
and the move from competence to performance of this type
would be mediated, principally, by the imposition of short-
term memory constraints and plan execution constraints.
Aii alternative is to identify the domain of a theory of
linguistic performance with what people actually say and
do, and this will involve reference to contextual and
sociological variables which are not necessary in charact¬
erising 'real' abilities. Note that the first type of
performance theory is no nearer satisfying Condition 1
than is a competence theory.
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The intention of this paper is to examine (the
intersection of linguistic theory and empirical
studies of language acquisition - RMA) in an effort
to interpret empirical studies in the light of linguistic
theory. The aim is to develop a theory of language
acquisition that will be consistent with linguistic
theory and will cover the facts of acquisition as
they are now known.
To what extent can we see the sequence of grammars,
(G-^ , •••* G-p) f as being constructed in accordance with
the general principles of some theory of language structure?
To approach this question we can cite a relevant passage
from Chomsky (1965), a work with which McNeill was
familiar, and which can be seen as hazarding suggestions
as to the contents of a general linguistic theory. Chomsky
says (pp. 28 - 9):
Traditional universal grammar was also a theory of
substantive universals... /~It_J advanced the position
that certain fixed syntactic categories (Noun, Verb,
etc.) can be found in the syntactic representations
of the sentences of any language and that these
provide the general underlying syntactic structure
of each language....Consider the proposal that the
syntactic component of a grammar must contain
transformational rules (these being operations of a
higWy special kind) mapping semantically inter¬
preted deep-structures into phonetically interpreted
surface structures....
According to this view, and it must be emphasised that
Chomsky is, to a large extent, being speculative, we can
hope to find a universal inventory of grammatical categories
and certain formal constraints on rule-types in the
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general linguistic theory.
, the pivot and open grammar, uses the formalism of
phrase-structure rules and, although it doesn't contain
any transformational rules, it could he viewed formally
as a transformational grammar of a degenerate sort. That
such a view is not totally implausible can be seen from
considerations of the logical structure of the theory
(cf. Chapter 1 and fn 115 below) but this is not the
aspect of the theory that I xdLsh to concentrate on here.
As far as the inventory of grammatical categories is
concerned, has a strange look, recognising the categor¬
ies, S, P and 0, which, with the exception of S, are
foreign to the grammar of adult English and, so far as
113I know, to the grammar of any human language. v Similar
remarks can be made in connection with Gg except that
tnere we find a move towards the adult set of categories
via the introduction of the category of adjectives. There¬
fore, we can conclude that, within the developing set of
grammatical categories, we have a serious discontintuity:
113. John Lyons has pointed out to me that there may be
some connection between 0 and P and either "full" and "empty"
words of the Chinese grammatical tradition or "content"
and "function" words as understood by such scholars as
Fries (1952). It seems to me that, while this connection
may be plausible in some respects, there are instances of
forms identified as pivots which would be ascribed to the
class of full words or content words in either of the above
usages. See Bowerman (1973) for examples and discussion.
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the child "begins with grammatical categories, P and 0,
subsequently dropping them to take over the set of adult
grammatical categories, going through stages where he
uses other categories which are also heterogeneous with
respect to adult categories and equally alien to the
grammars of the world's languages, e.g., P', 0', 0" in G
As pointed out in Chapter 1, such a discontintuity does
not necessarily amount to a demonstration of incorrectness '
but it does deserve discussion and argument. McNeill
does not argue for the discontinuity but, significantly,
claims that what we have is an apparent discontinuity
■which analysis will reveal as quite benign. His analysis
of this issue (later abandoned on empirical grounds) is
■well-known. Briefly, he claims that, while it is true
that the categories, P and 0, are heterogeneous with
regard to the adult grammatical categories (at least
a subset of which is assumed to be provided by the
general theory of grammar), nevertheless, they honour
those categories generically. What this amounts to is a
claim that there is no pair of morphemes, X and Y, such
that X and Y belong to the same adult grammatical category,
X belongs to P and Y belongs to 0. Another way of putting
this, which should be interpreted informally but which is
useful for the point at issue, is that, if we regard the
category labels as class-names denoting the set of morph¬
emes which fall in the class, then we can assert the
identity es
P = X1 u X2 U . . . HI
0 = Xl+1 u ...
where the X. (1-j-n) are a subset of the set of adult
3
grammatical categories. This view would be supported by
the hypothetical development we are considering from
t^ to ±2 where the pivot class at t^ would simply lose
the class of adjectives at t^. Obviously, if develop¬
ment does proceed along these lines, McNeill has solved
the discontinuity problem by showing that, in effect,
the discontinuity does not exist. The alien categories,
4
P and 0, just are our familiar categories in disguise
and what is important from my point of view is to see this
analysis as inspired by an implicit recognition of the
necessity to satisfy Condition 2.
For the sake of completeness we may quickly consider
McNeill's proposals with regard to Conditions 3 and 4.
He presents, as an instance of development within the set


















All that is important from the point of view of Condition
3 is that there is a gradual increase in the number of
grammatical classes from t^ to t^ and from to t^ and
this might lead us to think that Condition 3 is satisfied.
But, because of the modification of the original pivot
class, this conclusion is not justified. It is not the
case that we get the categories, Articles and Dem, added
to the category, , in the transition from t^ to t^ but
rather that these categories are introduced along with
another new category, an-d disappears from the'
grammar so, unless we have some independent way of
evaluating the complexity of the set, ^Articles, Bern, P^J ,
against the set, j , we are forced tc conclude that
Condition 3 is not applicable. Given this, only the
second possibility in Condition 4- is a real one for
nroviding an answer to the question as to why we find
the development we can schematise as
^Articles, Dem, P^J ^jArticles, Dem, Adj, Poss, P^J
rather than the development we can schematise as
Adj, Poss, P|. J > ^Articles, Dem, Adj, Poss, P^J
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with regard to the transition from t2 to h. But no
attempt is made by McNeill to ground the development of
grammatical classes in some theory regarded as more
basic and it is unclear, if we consider the case in
question, what such a grounding could conceivably look
114. Because of the indeterminacy of P^ in Figure 39 no
such question can be formulated with respect to the
transition from t^ to
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like. Certainly it would be extraordinary if one could
find cognitive or perceptual reasons for why the child
controls the categories, Articles and Dem, before he
11 5
controls the categories, Ad j and Poss.
In conclusion we can say that the most interesting aspect
of McNeill's proposals arise in connection with Condition
2 and it is apparent that satisfaction of the condition,
perhaps implicitly recognised, can be seen as motivating
theoretical claims.
3.2 Sarly views on the syntax of negation
Klima and Bellugi (1966) is the first systematic attempt
to investigate the development of the expression of
1 1 &
negation in English. It is explicitly modest in aims
i
115. At this point it can be noted that, if we are concerned
with the transition from degenerate (i.e., no transforma¬
tions) transformational grammars to 'proper* transforma¬
tional grammars, as McNeill's theory demands, we shall
find logical theory-internal reasons for the development
proceeding in this direction. In the text I concentrate
on grammatical categories in isolation as this leads to
an interesting analysis in terms of my conditions, and
a system integrating formal and substantive aspects of
syntax is not presented in detail in McNeill (1966).
116. This treatment was subsequently extended and deepened
by one of the authors (Bellugi (1967, 1968)) but these
developments will not concern me here. KLima and
Bellugi's paper also contains a section devoted to the
development of question forms which interacts with the
section on negation. However, ignoring this section as I
shall does not prejudice evaluation in the sense we are
concerned with here.
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and restricted to considerations of form, entirely
leaving aside questions of meaning and the interaction of
form and meaning. As far as their aims are concerned,
KLima and Bellugi have this to say (p 191):
It should he understood that when we write rules for
the child grammar it is .just a rough attempt to give
substance to our feeling about, and general obser¬
vations demonstrating, the regularity in the syntax
of the child's speech (my emphasis - RMA).
and,as for the neglect of semantic considerations:
We want to emphasise here that we are not dealing with
the expression of semantic concepts on the part of
the child, or of basic grammatical notions like
subject function and transitivity; rather we are
concerned with the way he handles lower-level syntactic
phenomena like position, permutability and the like
(ibid).
Given these qualifications, it is questionable whether
Klima and Bellugi's proposals deserve to be considered
as serious explanatory theories and it is unclear that
any psycho?ogical domain is being investigated. Never¬
theless, a consideration of their work does point to a
number of difficulties within a relatively simple frame¬
work which will prove useful as an introduction to similar
difficulties which we shall meet within more complex
frameworks later in this chapter.
The authors claim to discern three stages in the develop-
117
ment of the syntactic expression of negation. Typical
117. The data on which the generalisations are based came
from Roger Brown's longitudinal project.
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of the data produced at Stage 1 are the utterance-forms,
No...wine finger, more...no. No singing song and Not a
teddy bear. The generalisation which emerges from
these data is that there are no sentence-internal negative
elements nor are there any auxiliary verbs. To formalise
this generalisation the child can be credited with a








which is interpreted as that part of the child's grammar
which is implemented in explaining the syntactic patterns
found in the child's negative utterances.
At Stage 2 a more complex picture emerges which is
evidenced by the following sample of utterance forms:
I can't catch you, you can't dance. I don't want it.
No pinch me. This a radiator no. Don't bite me yet. That
not '0'. that blue, that no mummy. As well as finding
utterances which exemplify the patterns found at Stage 1,
we now also find sentence-internal negative elements
which may take the form of a simple negative such as no
or not or may be a negated auxiliary verb. An important
118. Obviously this grammar could be complicated by indicating
the optionality of the negative elements and expanding
the constituent, Nucleus, but this is hardly necessary
for the present discussion.
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point for Klima and Bellugi is that, at Stage 2, there
are no occurrences in their corpus of non-negative
auxiliary verbs. In summarising these facts, they say
(pp. 194 - 5):
Let us begin with a basic structure something like:
S -t> Nominal - (Auxne&) -
Predicate /
Main verb J
... This first rule can be related to the shape of





Vneg ~yXie,s restricted to non¬
progressive verbs
where the particular selection of the negative is
determined by the Main Verb with don't and can't
restricted to occurrence before instances of non¬
progressive main verbs.
All of thus is reasonably clear and the last rule could
easily be converted to a context-sensitive phrase-structure
rule if we are allowed reference to a subcategory of verbs,
say V^ro® or ynon~ProS> These rules, along with the rule
from Singe 1,, comprise the relevant part of the child' s
grammar at Stage 2.
finally, at Stage 3, we find utterances like Paul can't
have on a, You didn't eat supper with us, Donna won't let
go, That was not me, It's not cold. He not taking the
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walls down. Don't touch the fish. I not see you any more
and, in addition, auxiliaries now occur unnegated. These
observations are seen as implying the conclusion (p.197):
...so we can now begin with a basic structure like:
-)[Predicate
S Nominal - Aux
Main verb
and suggest such rules as follows:






where be is restricted to predicate and progressive
and is optional, can and do to non-progressive main
verbs.
Trans formations
I. Optional be deletion
NP - be
II. Do deletion
do - V \ V
The details of much of this need not concern us. What
we assume, perhaps contrary to Klima and Bellugi's
intention (cf. above), is that the three grammar-fragments
illustrated in Figure 40 and in the two passages cited
from the original, are to be interpreted as theories of
a domain D, the child's syntactic"knowledge, where that
knowledge is restricted to negative structures, i.e., we
have a sequence of grammar fragments, (G^ , G^, G^), which
can be analysed in terms of Conditions 1 - 4.
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Condition 1 deserves the usual qualification except that,
on this occasion, they should perhaps be emphasised to
an even greater extent because of Klima and Bellugi's
own reservations as to what they are involved in.
Condition 2 is, as it was in 3.1, perhaps the most
interesting. The theories we are considering are presented
in the form of grammars and again the linguistic influence
is clearly Chomsky's although KLima's (1964) pioneeering
work on the syntax of negation in English supplies many
4
of the more detailed concepts. Rather than treating the
grammars holistically we consider different aspects of
the grammars in turn and so, concentrating on rule-types,
the sequence, (C^, G^), appears to satisfy the minimal
requirements that all rules are either phrase-structure
rules (or translatable into equivalents which are) or
transformational rules. To the advantage of the proposals
is the observation that the transformational rules which
occur in G^, while deletion rules, do not fail to satisfy
the recovcrability of deletions condition on such rules.
This condition, first formulated in Chomsky (1965) and
subsequently extensively discussed, allows for the deletion
of specified lexical material and in both I and II of
G^ this is what we find (cf., in this respect, remarks
made in connection with deletion rules formulated by
Bloom and by Bowerman which are discussed in subsequent
sections of this chapter). Turning to grammatical categories
however, things' are not so clear-cut. The inventories
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of grammatical categories used by the sequence of grammars
is as follows:
G.^ : Sentence, Nucleus
G2 : Sentence, Nucleus, Nominal, Auxneg, Predicate,
Main Verb, Neg, V^e®
G~ : Sentence, Nominal, Aux, Predicate, Main Verb,
T, Vaux. Neg. 9
Now the trouble with these categories is that, with one
or two exceptions, they are not categories which are
systematically and consistently used in any of the general
4
theories of grammar to which Klima and Bellugi owe their
allegiance. This is particularly true for Nucleus, Auxnes,
and Vne®. What this amounts to is the undesirable consequence
that Klima and Bellugi must subscribe to one or more
discontinuities in the set of grammatical categories as the
child learns the system of negation. McNeill, encountering
a similar situation, attempted to argue the problem away.
Klima and Bellugi neither do this nor mahe any attempt
to insulate their analyses against this sort of point. We
can see the problem arising in a particular case for the
restricted section of development which they deal with.
There we have the grammatical category, Nucleus, being
119
utilised in G^ and G^ only to be dropped in G^ and.
119. It is unclear, for G^, whether the category, Nucleus,
is supposed to survive or not. Klima and Bellugi never
mention it but there are utterance-forms in their sample
which were used to justify its use in G^ and G^, e.g.,
No, I don't have a book. No. it isn't, the obvious differ¬
ence between these and the earlier 'Nucleus containing'
structures being that, in these, the putative Nucleus
itself contains a negative element.
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furthermore, dropped in a completely unrevealing way. If
it were to "be dropped in a revealing way this could involve
it being split into two or more categories as Mctieill
suggested for the categories, P and 0. Similarly the
category, Auine°, appears at and has disappeared in G^.
It appears that we can conclude, with some justification,
that the KLima and Bellugi analysis of the development
of negation fails Condition 2 with respect to the
inventories of grammatical categories employed at the
various stages. Given this, there is little point in
pushing the analysis further to see how it matches up
against Conditions 3 and 4. However, it is worth pointing .
out that in the aspect in which it satisfies Condition 2,
with regard to rule-types, it also satisfies Condition 3
(although not, of course, with respect to particular rules)
and this satisfaction of Condition 3 can be grounded in
the structure of the general theory of transformational
grammar.
This section then has important similarities to the previous
one. It is interesting that, in both sections, we have
found it possible to apply Condition 2 in a fairly detailed
and serious way whereas this was only true to a limited
extent in Chapter 2. Even so the application of Condition
2 has led to the posing of serious questions for the
theories under consideration and the cynic will probably
assume that problems of a similar magnitude would arise
for models of lexical development if we had well-
developed theories of the lexicon and the semantic information
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it contains to which we could refer them. This centrality
of Condition 2 will accompany us through much of this
chapter.
3.3 Bloom's grammars
Lois Bloom's work (1968, 1970) represents the first attempt
to write complete grammars for a number of children and
to trace the detailed developments of these grammars.
It can also be seen as containing the first attempt to
codify children's utterances in terms of the context* in
which they occur according to an argued scheme of
categorisation and to integrate the results of this into
a developmental syntactic theory which relates to the then
current views on syntactic structure.
Bloom presents a total of five complete grammars for
different stages in the development of the three children
she studied, one for Kathryn, two for G-ia and two for
Brie. Obviously, from the point of view of the present
enterprise the one grammar for Kathryn is of no con¬
sequence as no developmental conditions car be tested
1 20
against it. Accordingly, 3.3.1 is devoted to a
discussion of Gia's grammars and 3.3.2 to those presented
120. Conceivably the one grammar for Kathryn could be
compared to the grammars from the other children and,
in fact, Bloom indulges in informal comparisons of this
kind. It requires an assumption of commonality across
the children to be feasible and I have taken the view that
comparison of within-child grammars provides quite enough
material to begin to see the advantages and weaknesses
of the general approach.
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for Erie. All page references in this section are to
Bloom (1968).
3,3.1 'The syntactic development of Gia
The sample on which Gia's first grammar was based was
collected when the child was 19 months and 1 week old with
an MLU of 1.12 morphemes. The grammar contains phrase-















j+quantifierj more, ' nother
Figure 41
(adapted from Bloom,p 165)
A few clarificatory comments are in order in connection
with the relationship between this grammar and the
framework developed in Chapter 2 of Chomsky (1965).
The phrase-structure rule is straightforward enough but
the lexicon feature rules contain a number of peculiarities,
(i) is a simple subcategorisation rule but (ii) violates
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the condition that only lexical categories appear on the
left-hand side of such rules. Chomsky (1965) contains
a discussion of this restriction arguing that "it may be
a bit too severe"(p.11 2), and it is not insignificant
that already we come up against one of the less well-
understood aspects of the general theory. (iii) is also
a subcategorisation rule and does have a lexical category
as its left-hand side but the right-hand side suggests
that not being able to follow a particular morpheme,
hi. is an inherent feature of verbs but no rule of this
sort, mentioning a particular lexical item, figures in
the theory Chomsky develops. (iv) is again a subcategor- '
isation rule of the type found in (i) except that, in
this case, it doesn't subcategorise. To be told that the
syntactic category Q (= quantifier) has the feature,
l+quantifier is not to be told anything although syntactic
features of this sort may be necessary as part of a larger
enterprise within a theory achieving lexical insertion
via matching of features. Finally, the last rule, (v),
seems to be an attempt to incorporate an aspect of
lexical insertion into this component of the grammar, a
move which, again is at variance with the general theory.
Along with these rules goes a lexicon which has the
entries shown schematically in Figure 42 among others.
baby [+h] Gia [+1T, +animate]
bag [+h] away [+vb]
fly [+N, 4-animate] go + ^ Fart
Figure 42 Adapted from Bloom, p 437
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It is difficult to see exactly how this lexicon inter¬
acts with the other parts of the grammar hut two points
are transparent:
(a) that there is no reason why the quantifiers should
be given their privileged status within the lexical feature
rules rather than appearing in the lexicon with simple
entries of the form:
more +quantifier
(b) that the verb, go, will never be inserted into a phrase-
marker as it requires the presence of a following Part
(= Particle) which is not introduced in the phrase-
structure component of the grammar.
As far as points such as these are concerned, it is perhaps
best to leave the last word with the author who, when
presenting her first lexicon for the grammar she wrote
for Kathryn, says (p.431):
The form in which the lexicons are presented may be
considered unorthodox, but there does not appear to
be a concensus regarding the form for lexical entries
in a dictionary. Moreover, the form of the lexicon
is not the issue; attention has been given to the
children's use of words - in syntactic contexts and
in isolation.
It would be possible to agree with the sentiments expressed
in this passage regarding a lack of an accepted view
of the lexicon and still demand a more cogent treatment
than we are presented with. These, by no means trivial,
problems aside, what are the characteristics of the first
G-ia grammar?
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The phrase-structure component of the grammar, given the
absence of any recursive rules, generates only a finite
number of structures. There were, in the corpus, instances
of 3 +N, 3 +V, Q+N, Q+VB, H+N, Hi +N, and H+V. There
were no occurrences of Hi +V and this is accounted for
by (iii) above. In cases of H+N constructions the first
N could usually be categorised as an animate noun and
(ii) accounts for this. Only a small number of utterances
in the corpus are outside the scope of the grammar and
the mysterious reference to particles in the lexicon1 is,
to some extent, explained by discussion of occurrences
of verbs with particles.
The second sample on which a grammar was based was
collected from G-ia when she was 20 months and 2 weeks
old and the MLU for the sample was 1.54 morphemes. The
second grammar consists of a phrase-structure component,
lexicon feature rules and a transformational component
as shown in Figure 43. (see p. 217)
Again before proceeding further, some comments are in
order. The phrase-structure rules of Figure 43 are
unobjectionable but the lexicon feature rules and
the transformational rules have several worrying aspects.
As for the former, similar remarks apply to (i) - (vi)
as have already been made for lexicon feature rules in
Gia's first grammar. This leaves (vii) and it is
difficult to make any sense of this as Bloom offers no




1. S1 > N+(Q) + i^>
2. S2 > Hi +N
3. VP > VB+HP
4. NP » (s) + (N)+N
lexicon Feature Rules
i. N j+H, +animatej
ii. [+animatej > + j^ VbJ
iii. Q ^ j+quantifier]
iv. [^-quantifier] > more
v. VB 7- {+Vb]
vi. [+VB] f ± J" HP]
>4/. ] . - &__]vii. 0 > +
Transformational Rules
(1) "^placement (optional)
S.D. : away + X
S.C. : x1 - xp \ Xp - x^
(2) ^reduction (obligatory)
S.D. : ££ - X - Y - Z, where X, Y, Z,
are category symbols
s.c. r — x1 — xp y /■ f — Xp — xj,
where O-i^j—3
(3) ta/Placement (optional)
S.D. : X - VP, where X may be Q or null
S.C. : x^ - x2 \ 3 — x1 - x2
Figure 43. From Bloom pp185 - 6
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to be intelligible at all, it must assume that '5' is
either a syntactic category or a complex symbol and it
is self-evidenfly neither of these. What seems to be the
most likely interpretation of the facts leading to the
formulation of (vii) is that we find /a/ and also / da/
in free variation with it, except that /da/ is never
found following a quantifier. But is this sort of
information appropriately represented in this component
of the grammar? Not in any grammatical, framework with
which I am familiar and one can only conclude that (vii),
in that form, is fundamentally misconcieved.
The transformational rules also contain some mysteries,
(1) is a permutation rule designed exclusively to make
sure that away can occur in both sentence-initial and
sentence-final position. Permutation transformations are
deemed undesirable in the theoretical literature since
Postal (1964) because of the absurdities they lead to in
derived constituent structure and so the rule would have
to be recast as an amalgam of deletion and adjunction
to accord with the canons of the theory. What implications
this might have for derived constituent structure, one
can only wonder at. Much more interesting is the case
of (2), the reduction transformation (see also discussion
below of Bowerman's employment of similar devices). The
motivation for the reduction transformation is that,
with a small number of exceptions, Gia's utterances were
restricted in length to two morphemes yet there was
evidence, on the basis of adults' interpretation of what
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the child was 'meaning'f that she controlled structures
which could only be clearly expressed in utterances which
were three morphemes long. Briefly, the corpus of 1015
utterances, containing 451 two or more morphemes in
length, included 15 interpretable as subject-verb strings,
25 interpretable as subject-object strings and 38 inter¬
pretable as verb-object strings. These interpretations
are reflected in the theory of the child's syntactic
competence by crediting her with the phrase-structure
rules, 1 and 3, on p 217 which allow the construction of






which can be associated, by well-known principles, with
trees like that in Figure 45 from which the functional
notions, 'sabject-of', 'main-verb of and 'direct object-of
1 21





121. This is not exactly true given the left-most N in these
structures as Chomsky's definition of 'subject-of refers
to HP but, in the face of the other difficulties we are
discussing, this seems a trifling objection.
The reduction transformation is then seen as operating
on structures of this kind and getting rid of one of the
categories while maintaining, in the theory of the child's
competence, a level of representation at which it makes
sense to credit her with these functional notions. The
trouble is that, from the point of view of the general
theory, the reduction transformation is not a possible
transformational rule violating, as it does, the condition
of recoverability of deletions. Informally, this condition
states that material deleted by a transformational rhle
must either be specified lexical material (cf. the discussion
of Klima and Bellugi's Do-deletion rule above) or that the'
deleted material leaves a copy behind and is thus
1 22
recoverable. Whether the condition is one which a
linguistic theory of the sort assumed in this discussion
must insist on in the final analysis is not a question
to be settled here. All I vish to point out is that, in
embracing a rule which blatantly violated this important
condition, Bloom calls into question her interpretation
of the theoretical literature on which she is supposedly
basing her acquisition model. Of course, it could be
argued that the necessity of reduction transformations in
acquisition studies should lead to a modification of the
122. Failure to satisfy the condition permits the general
linguistic theory to make available grammars which generate
all recursively enumerable languages and this was viewed
as an intolerable laxity in the general theory by Chomsky
(see Pebers and Ritchie (1971) for much more extended
discussion and Sampson (1973, 1975) questioning the sub¬
stance of the debate).
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general theory but Bloom nowhere suggests this and, since
she doesn't attempt to present a different general theory
from which her grammars can be seen as derived, I can only
conclude that she has no such intention in mind. This
leaves (3) for discussion and, so far as I can make out,
this is a permissable format for a transformational rule
merely involving the adjunction of new material on the
left of a category node. It would be possible to ask
questions with regard to the intended derived constituent
structure, (e.g., is the a intended to be part of thfe Q
when it is present and part of the VP when it isn't?) but
enough has been said already to cast some doubt on the
status of the transformational component of the second
1 23Gia grammar.
The grammar accounts for almost all of the utterances
in the second Gia corpus, exceptions being a number of
three-term strings and some N+1T constructions with
interpretations which were not consistent with any of the
structures available from the grammar. With this success
in mind we can now turn to consideration of Conditions
1 - 4 with regard to the sequence of grammars, (G^ ,G^).
Condition 1 presents exactly the same problems as it
123. It seems to me that the importance of the above remarks
cannot be over-emphasised. The theoretical machinery
being adopted cannot be manipulated at will and still
inspire confidence and whatever plausibility Bloom's
suggestions get by virtue of their allegiance to the
standard theory must be vigorously disputed.
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always has and the usual qualifications have to be made
concerning its satisfaction. One additional comment
which is relevant to the immediate proposal is that,
if G^ and &G2 are intended to be theories of the child's
syntactic knowledge, then it might be more appropriate
to remove the reduction transformation from them and
include it or some analogue in a theory of linguistic
performance, where it could be interpreted in terms of
planning constraints or some similar notion. This
would, of course, have the additional advantage of *
circumventing the questions raised in connection with the
1 24
formal status of the reduction transformation.
Condition 2 again seems to be the most interesting one
and details of it have been discussed already. Whether
one agrees with the theory or not, Chomsky (1965) puts
forward a coherent set of views on the nature of general
linguistic theory including speculations on the identity
of syntactic categories and the types of rules to be
found in grammars and so, adopting the strategy of
isolating components of the grammars, consider first
syntactic categories. Bloom's proposals are on firmer
ground than Klima and Bellugi's discussed in the previous
section. Gia's development in this regard can be
represented by the two inventories of syntactic categories:
GG1 : S, N, Q, VB
GG2 : S1t S2, IT, Q, EP, VP, N, VB
124. for remarks along these lines, see Schaerlabkens
(1973) and, for more detailed comments, section 3.4. below.
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and, with the exception of the reference to two sentence-
types in »S2> these inventories are impeccable. The
remaining categories are all to be found in respectable
theoretical proposals and would probably be on most lists
1 25
of universal syntactic categories. Again, in the case
of syntactic features, there seems to be little to take
exception to, apart from some of the obscurity already
discussed, and we have the following inventories for the
two grammars;
: +animate, +quantifier (and, presumably, altnough
Bloom doesn't mention it, +VB)
Gq-2: +animate, +quantifier, +VB
In addition, the two grammars use the following sets of
contextual features:
: + N, + Hi
&Q2: ± VB, + HP, + /d/ , +Q
and, as has already been made clear, problems arise here
because included are feature-types which it is difficult
to see having a place in any general theory of grammar.
I refer here, particularly, to the types exemplified by
+ Hi and + /d/ which surely go beyond the bounds
of what Chomsky had in mind for a set of contextual
features. In general, however, embracing a principle of
charity, we might be tempted to conclude that, such
aberrations aside, and are constructed in accord¬
ance with the general principles of Chomsky (1965) at
125. It is worth noting here that the necessity for a
category, VP has been questioned by, e.g. Lakoff and Ross
(1967).
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least- as far as syntactic categories and syntactic
features are concerned.
What now of syntactic rules? The position here is much
less encouraging. There are three rule-types to consider:
phrase-structure rules, lexicon feature rules and
transformational rules, ho problems arise from the first
type, rules of the second type are very heterogeneous with
no clear principles being evident in their construction
and serious questions have been raised in connection with
I
the examples of the third type employed in the grammars.
We therefore conclude that, as far as rule-types are
concerned, G^ and Gri0 are not constructed in accordance
with the general principles of Chomsky (1965) nor, so far
as I can see, in accordance with any other set of well-
articulated principles. The impression one gets from a
close examination of the rules is that they are purely
ad hoc and motivated principally by a desire to account
for as large a portion of the data as possible while
paying lip-service to the familiar theoretical notions.
Given this damning diagnosis, it is perhaps, unnecessary
to consider Conditions 3 and 4 in detail. It is, however,
interesting, in the light of what has just been said above,
that, in comparing G^ and G"q_2» Bloom feels that she can
provide an affirmative answer as far as satisfaction of
Condition 3 is concerned. She says (p.187):
The Gia II grammar is more complex than the Gia I
grammar and reflects syntactic maturity in a number of
important aspects - although the grammars are also
similar in a number of important ways.
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It should be apparent that, given the failure to adhere
to any clear theoretical framework, this is more a statement
of faith than a reasoned conclusion and the extent to
which this is true can be seen by again considering the
grammars in terms of their different components. We find
that Condition 3 is satisfied in just those cases where
departure from general theory isn't radical.
So, consider again sets of syntactic categories. There
is a simple increase in the membership of this set from
G-£.j to with the exception of the replacement of the
unitary category, S, by the two categories, and S^,
which is not vital to the proposals. Nor do the syntactic
features present any problem as membership of this set
remains static between G^ and Gbut, predictably, the
contextual features are a complete mess. G^ employs
more of these than G^ but any hopes we might have of
comparing the two sets beyond this gross numerical measure
founder on the peculiarities of the items involved. The
kindest conclusion we can draw is that Condition 3 does
not apply. As far as rule-types are concerned, we can
diagnose satisfaction of Condition 3 as G^ contains what
are called 'transformational rules' and G^ doesn't and
I suspect that it would be possible to make similar
claims with respect to the particular sets of phrase-
structure rules, although Bloom doesn't present her grammars
in a way which makes this easy to see.
To explore this matter a little further, consider the
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possibility of replacing rule 1, in the phrase-structure
component of G^, with something like:
(ji) + O)
and adding to the grammar the rules:
2' HP > N
31 VP > V
removing (iii) from the lexicon feature rules. If \te
then amalgamate rules 1 and 2 from the phrase-structure
component of G^, we get:
fh + (Q) +
1" S >
[Hi + N
However (1"), like 1 in the original G^* doesn't allow
^or the possibility of utterance-initial more which does
occur in the corpus and so, better would be:
Hi + N
k J
which is now simply 1' above with the addition of the
option for the generation of structures of the form,
I+Q+MPorN+Q+ VP, i.e., 1"' can be seen as additively
more complex than 1 '. It seems to me that a similar case
could be made for the relationship between 2' and 3', on
the one hand, and 3 and 4 from G^* on the other, but
Bloom djesn't present enough data to make consideration
of these possibilities worthwhile. All we are justified
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in concluding, therefore, is that, with regard to
particular phrase-structure rules, the case for increasing
complexity between G^ and G^2 is clearly established.
The lexicon feature rules only allow us to say that there
are more of them in G^2 "than in G^ but the relationship
between the two sets is not an additive one and, finally,
I
Condition 3 can only be applied in an empty fashion to the




In those respects in which Condition 3 is satisfied do
we have a grounding as specified in Condition 4? As we
have seen, Condition 3 is satisfied for syntactic cate¬
gories and for syntactic rule-types and for the former of
these we are concerned with the question as to why we
find the development schematised as
[s, N, Q, VB] > fs, h, Q, VB} U [hp, VP/
rather than the development schematised as
{hp, Vp] > [s, N, Q, VB} U {nP,Vp}
continuing to ignore differences between and S^. Condition
4 can be seen as partially satisfied via certain notional
reflections on the status of the syntactic categories and
we might want to go so far as to call this a partial
logical grounding. Thus, we can argue that the category,
MP, presupposes the category, N, within the theoretical
vocabulary and similarly for the relationship between VP
and V. This relationship is not a symmetrical one - a
system including members of V without members of VP would
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be intelligible - and, therefore, we can say that there
are theory-internal reasons for why N precedes UP and V,
VP developmentally. Such reasoning is not, of course,
available for other pairs of categories in the inventories
hence the reference here to 'partial' grounding.
Again we have a positive answer to the question raised
by Condition 4 in connection with rule-types because,
as has been spelled out already, transformational rules
assume the presence of phrase-structure rules in the
theory and, therefore, the latter should appear develop-
-j
mentally before the former.
In both cases then where Condition 3 is satisfied we can
see at least an outline to an answer to the problem posed
by Condition 4. The fact remains, however, that Condition 3
is not satisfied in general and, more importantly,
Condition 2 is also severely strained this being seen
as the source of all the other problems. As far as the
development of G-ia is concerned, the grammars Bloom presents
have about the same status as the partial descriptions
of stages put forward by Klima and Bellugi - they are
crucially weak in detail, although the broad outline
appears to embrace strict adherence to established linguistic
theories.
126. Similar claims for the order of appearance of lexical
feature rules relative to transformational rules cannot be
substantiated as a theory in which rules introducing
features followed the application of transformational
rules would be intelligible.
3.3.2 The syntactic development of Eric
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The fir,"it sample collected from Eric when he was 19 months
and 1 week old produced only 19 utterances which were
more than one morpheme long. As Bloom says (p.204):
A 'grammar' of Eric's language at this point would
be presumptuous - the data were meagre.
At the time of the collection of the second sample Eric
was 20 months and 2 weeks old and 87 from a total of 490
intelligible utterances were more than one morpheme long.
The MLU for the sample was 1.19 morphemes and the grammar
Bloom proposes is a simple phrase-structure grammar having







Figure 46. From Bloom p.218
This grammar generates a finite number of structures,
Pivot, Pivot + F, Pivot + a + f, VB, 3 + VB, VB + F,
VB + a + f, B + VB + f, a + VB + 0 + f, f and a + F 127
and operates in conjunction with a lexicon which, among








Figure 47. Adapted from Bloom p443
127.A minor point is that the grammar allows the generation
of the empty string as a sentence. This was also the case
for and some notational device like linked parentheses
is therefore necessary.
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There are peculiarities about this lexicon. Hot least of
these is that no lexical feature rules appear in G^ (shown
in Figure 46) and such rules are obviously necessary if
the lexicon is to function at all. The entry for turn is
confusing in that it not only refers to a contextual
feature which is not introduced by a lexical rule but also
assumes, in that contextual feature, a syntactic category,
Part, which is nowhere introduced in the categorial part
of the grammar (cf. similar remarks above in connection
with G^). Finally, the lexicon does not provide any
means for inserting lexical material under the Pivot node
in the generated structures. In order to be consistent
Bloom should use a syntactic feature, +Pivot, and
have entries in the lexicon of the form:
In short, the meshing of the rules of the grammar and the
lexicon leaves a great deal to be desired even in such a
simple grammar as this. Only a small number of utterances
in the corpus are not accounted for by the gramman. Among
these are N+H constructions, two occurrences of the Pivot,
'nother. with non-noun forms and the two occurrences of
attributive constructions.
The third sample from Eric was collected when he was 22
monthc^old and it had an MLU of 1.42 morphemes. Bloom
suggests two alternatives for the phrase-structure












(Pivot) + (IT), where Pivot is /a/,





^ + (a) + U
4 (Q) + If
Pi£ure_48. From Bloom pp.244-5
Of these alternatives, Bloom says (pp.245 - 6):
...(B) consisted of collapsing the and rules
in (A).,.with a feature representation which specifies:
(i) Pivot > no, there (is), /a/
(ii) /a/ > "I"/ VB
(iii) Q } more
(iv) no + MP > no + Q + N
Finally, there was some evidence for the necessity of a
reduction transformation of the type we have already met
in G-q.2* "^° accounf for the negative sentences in which
the negative element had direct effect on an intervening
constituent" (p.248). The form of the reduction rule
Bloom suggests is:
Aeluction (°blisat°ry) S.D.:
S.C.: - x2 x. /
X - Y
the function of the rule being to delete one of two
constituents which occurc with either of the negative
elements, no or no more.
There is much that is strange about G-^ but, to clear
familiar ground first, we can note that exactly the same
objections apply to the reduction transformation above as
applied to the rule with a similar function in ^n
the case of G^ "^^ie constructions leading to the formul¬
ation of the rule were only marginally productive anyway
but the repetition of the folly deserves repeated emphasis
Consider now the non-transformational aspects of what we
might refer to as and The versions
of phrase-structure rules differ crucially in that A
credits Eric with three sentence types all of which are
linearly structured whereas B credits him with a modicum
of hierarchical structure.
Taking A first and noting that it apparently does not
operate wi+h a "feature representation", we can see that
each of its three rules are well-formed phrase-structure
rules except that the qualification on the expansion of
3^ is quite out of place here and should be handled in
a lexicon. There are odd things like the fact that I, it
and no are generated directly without being assigned to
a syntactic category which must result in a non-uniform
treatment of lexical insertion but this is not something
which calls into question the formal status of the rules.
It is,of course, something which renders obscure any
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comparison between this sort of grammar and that developed
in Chomsky (1965) where an attempt is made to develop
a coherent framework for lexical insertion.
Turning to B, the situation is much more obscure because,
while each of the phrase-structure rules is formally correct,
the "feature representation" is of indeterminate status.
Note first that it is not a set of lexicon feature rules
like those we have already met in G^ and G^. those
grammars there was at least a semblance of the type of
*
rules linguists have talked about when introducing syntactic
features. In however, that semblance has completely
disappeared. Yet (i) - (iv) are referred to as a "feature
representation". Rule (i) is an old-fashioned rule of
lexical insertion as found in Chomsky (1957) and the same
is true of (iii). (iv) is a context-sensitive phrase-
structure rule and properly belongs in the phrase-structure
component of the grammar except that the phrase-structure
rules of will never produce the relevant lexical
context for this rule to operate. This leaves (ii) which
appears to involve the contextually specified re-writing
of a phonological form (or is it a lexical item?) as a
specific lexical item. Needless to say such monstrosities
had no place in the linguistic theories from which Bloom
was drawing her inspiration and, in summary, it is difficult
to believe that the author had any clear intentions in
mind when suggesting G^^-g^ as a serious grammar for Eric
at this stage. One is forced to the conclusion that
accounting for the data at whatever cost is the prime
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motivating force behind, this grammar.
Can we consider satisfaction of Conditions 1 - 4 in this
rather unrevealing framework? There are two putative




and, again, it is useful to isolate components of the
grammars and consider syntactic categories, syntactic
rule-types and particular rules as different aspects of
the proposals.
Consider first syntactic categories with regard to Condition
2. employs the set of categories, |s, Pivot, VB, IIJ
and employs the set S^, VB, II, PivotJ .
With the exception of Pivot and the subscripted S1s these
are all respectable syntactic categories. The subscripted
S's are clearly not essential to the proposals and the
category, Pivot, and possibilities for dealing with it
have already been discussed at length in 3.1. Gv3(g)
uses the set of categories, • , S^, Pivot, HP, VP, H,VB,Q^
and similar remarks apply here as for Bn short
for syntactic categories, we may safely assume that Condition 2
can be satisfied.
Eor rude-types, we have already seen some of the problems
arid there is little point in repeating them here. Suffice
it to say that is no"t constructed, insofar as it is
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possible to understand its construction, to accord with,
the general principles of any theory. In particular, the
rules in the "feature representation" are a pastiche of
formal devices with no theory informing them. ^3(A)' ^y
largely ignoring questions of lexical insertion, remains
immune from such strictures and, at this point, I shall
drop further consideration of Gj,^g\<in interests of
economy of presentation. Enough should have been said
to persuade all but the most demanding reader that it
does not deserve to be taken seriously. *
There is nothing to be said about Condition 3 with respect
to either syntactic categories or rule-types. There is
no development in either of these regards between G^ an<^-
^E3(A)' Restricting attention to particular phrase-structure
rules though yields more interesting possibilities. The
single rule of can be expanded according to the usual
conventions to give the list of rules in figure 49.
(a) S -—> Pivot
(b) 3 -—> Pivot + N
(c) rtO -—9 Pivot + a + IT
(a) s - ^ VB
(e) s - i ^ + VB
(f) s - » VB + N
(g) 3 > VB + e + JST
(h) S - f 6 + VB + IT
(i) S - » 0 + VB + a + IT
(j) S - > IT
(k) s - > 0 + IT
Figure 49.
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Those in if we ignore differences "between ,
and S^, can be expanded as in Figure 50.
(a') 3 -—f VB
(b') S - > a + VB
(c' ) S -—> I + VB
(d») S -—> VB 4 it
(e1) 3 - 3 VB 4 B
(f) S - > VB + a 4 B
(g1) S - > e + VB 4 it
(b«) S - > s 4 VB 4 B
<if) S - » a+ VB 4 D -h B
(3') s - > I 4 VB 4 it
(k«) s - * I + VB 4 B
(lf) s - > I 4 VB 4 3 4 B
(m») s - 1 Pivot
(n') s - ;> B
(o' ) s - » Pivot 4 B
(p') s - > B 4 VB
(qf) s - > lap 4 VB
(r«) s - > no
Figure 50^^
Bloom's own comparison between these two sets of rules is
instructive (p.243):
The two rules, and 3^ (expanded here as (a1) - (o')
- RMA) differ from the earlier Eric II phrase-structure
...only in the specification of "I" as an alternant
of /b/ in sentence subject position and the inclusion
of "it" as a direct object alternant. The rule
128. I ignore here the fact that the same structure can
be generated in different ways in the original grammar,
e.g., VB strings can come either from a rewriting of
or a rewriting of S^, which is justified once the distinc¬
tion between the S's is removed.
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generating (expanded here as (p') - (r') - RMA.)
was innovative and, even though only marginally
productive, it represented an important developmental
difference in structure between the texts at Eric II
and III,
The claim is clear and true. The rules in Figure 50 which
don't appear in Figure 49 are (c')f (d'), (g')f (jT), (k'),
(1'), (p'), (q') and (r'). Of these, (p*), (q') and (r')
are quite new, (c'), (k1) and (lt) are covered by the first
of Bloom's claims, (d') and (g') are covered by the second
J
and (3') is covered by a combination of the two. Unfortunately
for the neatness of the claim, there are two rules present
in Figure 49 which do not appear in Figure 50: (c) and
(k). (k) can be generated by expanding the Pivot category
in (o') as /a/, a possibility which is permitted and so,
perhaps, we should be prepared to admit that, these
exceptions aside (and, as they involve the rather marg:Lnal
element, /^/, they are not central exceptions), there is
a case for straightforward additive complexity and satis¬
faction of Condition 3 as far as particular phrase-structure
rules are concerned. This could be interpreted in the
context of the view that there is a core of rules which
the child learns first and subsequently adds to as he
learns the adult grammar, although it is not clear that
Bloom would subscribe to such a view (cf. brief discussion
in Chapter 1).
If we car take additive complexity as demonstrated we
can go on and ask whether Condition 4 is also satisfied
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in this restricted part of the total proposal. The
position we are in is that we have two rule-sets, say
and R^, and we know that = R^ + X, i.e., we have devel¬
opment which we can schematise as:
R.j } R.j + X
and satisfaction of Condition 4 requires that we produce
a reason for why we find this rather than the alternative
X > R1 + X
There are no clear logical reasons for why the rules*in
X should enter the child's grammar after the rules in R^.
All the rules we are concerned with expand the symbol 'S'
and so there is no question of intrinsic ordering which
might form the basis for a positive answer to the question
on theory-internal grounds. Similarly, recourse to
statistical facts about the distribution of rules in the
world's languages won't get us very far. The facts are
simply not known but, even if they were, there is no
a priori reason to believe that they would throw light
on the development we are interested in. In fact, there
is an a priori reason for believing that they wouldn't,
since the rules in R^ use the syntactic category, Pivot,
unlike the rules in X, and this category has not played
a large part in the syntactic analyses of the world's
languages as has already been pointed out. Finally, there
is no more basic theory to which the development can be
referred. It would be possible to make vague pronounce¬
ments concerning the rules involving negative elements,
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(a1) and (r')> relating these to the 'cognitive difficulty'
of negation hut these pronouncements would remain vague
because of the lack of a cognitive theory to base them on,
because of the lack of comparable cognitive categories
to which to relate the rules in thus making a cognitive
comparison possible and because of the restricted set of
rules in X which involve negation, i.e., we would still
be left with several rules in X unexplained.
Summarising, we can say that the grammars Bloom presents
for Brie are no better, when considered as embodying a
developmental theory, than those she discusses for Gda.
Again there are serious formal problems relating to the
satisfaction of Condition 2. If we ignore these, as it
is possible to do by restricting attention to those areas
of the grammars where they don't arise, we find that
Condition 3 is applicable and is satisfied in a potentially
interesting way with regard to the transition from G^ "^°
G1?3(b). Unfortunately, though, no attempt is made by the
author to satisfy Condition 4 and it appears that either
this condition cannot be satisfied or that, at present,
the direction of its satisfaction is so vague as to be
worthless.
3.4 Bowerman's grammars of Finnish
Bowerman (1973), working within essentially the same
tradition as Bloom, presents a total of four grammars for
children at different stages in the acquisition of Finnish.
These grammars are, on the whole, more thoughtfully
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constructed than those we have examined in the previous
section but, unfortunately, only two of them can be
used for my purpose. This is because one of them is
explicitly constructed using a different theoretical frame¬
work, taking as a basis Fillmore (1968) and adopting certain
1 29
modifications. This is the grammar constructed for the
child, Seppo, at MLU 1.42, and, although we have a grammar
for Seppo when his MLU had risen to 1.81 it is constructed •
with reference to Chomsky (1965) and there is no suggestion
from Bowerman that the child moves from a case-grammhr to
using a grammar of the more familiar kind. If such a
suggestion were made we would have a developmental theory
but it would involve an obvious discontinuity and the
starting point of any analysis would be to examine the
justification for this. A second grammar, that constructed
for the child, Rina, when her MLU was 1.83 is the only
grammar for this child discussed by Bowerman and, there¬
fore, unless we are going to indulge in cross-child analysis,
we are unable to test this against developmental conditions.
We are left, then, with the two grammars for Seppo which
are constructed with reference to Chomsky (1965) and
these two grammars are considered to constitute theories
of Seppo's syntactic competence at MLU 1.42 and at MLU 1.81-
129. It might be pointed out that Bowerman was interested
in comparing the merits of case-grammar and the standard
theory according to quite different criteria to those
pursued here. Her work represents one of the most detailed
and careful attempts to apply the concepts of transform¬
ational generative grammar in the sphere of language
development.
In 3.4.1 I shall present and discuss the first of these
grammars, G^, in 3.4.2 I shall focus on the second, G^*
and in 3.4.3 I shall consider the status of the sequence,
(Gg1 , G-^) as a developmental theory.
3.4.1 The grammar for Seooo at MLU, 1.42
This grammar has, like those of Bloom's, a number of
components. In fact, as far as labels are concerned,
the components are identical to components appearing in
earlier grammars: there are phrase-structure rules, lexicon
feature rules, transformational rules and a lexicon. On
the whole, though, these components are more carefully
constructed and the problem of lexical insertion is
discussed in some detail. Gg^ is shown overleaf as Figure 52.
We can consider each of the sets of rules in turn for
formal coherence but, for completeness, we might mention
that the lexicon which is intended to function with these




Figure 51. Adapted from Bowerman pp.244-5
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Phrase-structure rules
1. 31 * (MjjN)









1 . N > j+LT, +animate]
2. ^-animateJ )• ^vehicle]
3. jVanimate] ■> jJ-V , -N" J
4. {^-animate, -vehicle] > _ V, - n]
5. V > [+V, + (N)]
6. Ad j } t+Mj]
7. Proloc » ]+ProlocJ
8. QhProloc) > tuossa. 'there'
Transformational rules
1 . T ... : optional
reordering -
(a) Placement of nois. 'away', and kiinni. 'closed'
S.D.: (£218 4 x(kiinniJ
S.G. : x^ - x2 x2 - x.j
(b) Placement of prolocative
S.D.: N + Proloc
S.C. : x^ - x2 x2 - x 1
2. T , , . :optional
vero deletion
S.D.: N + V + N
S.C. : x.j - x2 - x^ 3 x^ - x^
Figure 32. From Bowerman, pp 84-5
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The phrase-structure rules are all formally correct and
the only point worth remarking on is the use of linked
parentheses in the first rule to ensure selection of at
least one of the elements on the right of the rule, a
de-vice which has already been mentioned in connection
with Bloom's grammars.
The lexical feature rules are not so straightforward.. That
Bowerman is familiar with the relevant parts of Chomsky
(1965) is apparent when she says (pp.77 - 8):
These rules rewrite lexical category symbols like II
and V as complex symbols (C3), which are sets of
specified syntactic features. These syntactic features
include:
1 . A feature representing the lexical category which
dominates the c3, such as [+hj or C+t],
2. A context-sensitive feature specifying the local
category frame of the CS to the limits of the node
that dominates it, such as, for a noun, |~+Det
(occurs after a determiner), or, for a verb, [+ Npj
(takes a direct object). This is called strict
subcategorisation.
3. For noun OS's only, context-free inherent syntactic
features such as [VanimateJ or [-animatej, [+humanj or
Q-humanj.
4. For verb and adjective OS's, context-sensitive
feature frames, called selection restrictions, which
specify the inherent features of nouns with which the
C3 can occur in construction such as Qh IIP. +animate|
(takes as direct object a noun phrase containing a
noun marked positively for animacy).
Although this discussion enumerates types of features
rather than types of rules, there is no serious misrepresentation
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and we might expect that each of the lexical feature
rules would fall clearly into one of the relevant types.
Taking the rules in turn, (1) is a context-free sub-
categorisation rule as is (2). (3), however, is of more
doubtful status. It cannot be interpreted as a strict
subcategorisation rule as such rules only operate on
lexical categories (cf. the first line of the passage
cited above), nor as the statement of a selection restriction
for the same reason. Therefore, it too must be viewed
as a subcategorisation rule adding inhez*ent features4 to
any complex symbol specified as j+animate]. But it is
a fact about the rules in Chomsky (1965) that the
categorisation rules adding inherent features do not
subcategorise with respect to syntactic environment;
they are more 'semantic' in their reference (cf. the
examples cited by Bowerman under 3. ) I have been unable
to find a statement which explicitly outlaws rules such
as (3) but these considerations should be seen as providing
grounds for unease. Similar remarks apply to (4) where,
again, its function is transparent but the extent to which
it fits into any of the established rule-types is open to
question. (5) is not easy to interpret for different
reasons. It says that verbs may be classified as Q+ w] ,
i.e., they may occur before a noun or in final position
or as i.e. they may not occur before a noma
nor in final position. But this is not what Bowerman
wants as there is a class of verbs which, while not
appearing before a noun, does appear in final position and
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no verbs, so far as I can see from inspection of the
relevant lexicon, in the category, (IT)J. What
Bowerman should have done is resort to Chomsky's 'cover
symbol', CS, and incorporate a rule along the lines of
fN
v ■> CS/ u
resulting in verbs being subcategorised as either [+—N]
or Entries using the feature,
could then appear in the lexicon for those verbs which
occur in both environments and others using the feature,
+
, could appear for those which only occur in
final position. The rule we end up with is then a strict
subcategorisation rule (except that the reference to the
boundary symbol can be seen as violating the phrasal nodes
condition) and I shall assume that this is the status
intended for (5). (6) and (7) are included just to make
the lexicon work and don't subcategorise at all (cf. earlier
discussion of similar examples in Bloom's grammars) and,
finally, no reason is given for why (8) is a lexicon
feature rule rather than having the insertion of tuossa
proceed from the lexicon via a lexical entry along the
lines of
tuossa 'there' {j-Prolocj
Overall the lexical feature rules, whilst being less
obviously ad hoc than those of Bloom's grammars, show a
lack of theoretical precision in one or two places and
this might lead us to suspect the cogency of this part
of the grammars.
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The transformational rules in are subject to much the
same sort of criticism as has already been levelled at
Bloom. Briefly, (1 ) is a permutation transformation in
both of its parts. As such it leads to absurd derived
constituent structures. (2), a deletion rule, violates
the condition of recoverability of deletions just as did
Bloom's rules with comparable function. Bowerman's
reduction transformation is more specific than Bloom's,
mentioning the deleted constituent, V, but this has no
effect on the formal objection. That Bowerman is atfare
of a certain tension in including rules of this sort in
a model of the child's syntactic competence is revealed
when she says, after a lengthy discussion of the motivation
for this transforation (p. 102):
The optional verb deletion transformation! of the
grammars written for Seppo and Rina are regarded as
specifications of performance variables which were
imuortant enough to warrant representation in the
grammars. (my emphasis - RMA)
As she has just taken the view that grammars are theories
of the child's competence, nothing could be a firmer
indicator of Bowerman's uncertainty as to her domain
1 30
of enquiry.
Overall then, our efforts to interpret Gg^ reveal it as
weak in essentially the same respects as were the grammars
for Gia and Eric although not to the same extent. The
phrase-structure component is impeccable but lack of a
130. For more extensive discussion, see Atkinson (1975)
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firm theoretical foundation lurks in the lexical feature
rules while the transformational rules, although clear
as far as their functions are concerned, are formally
dubious. The problem of derived constituent structure,
surely of some importance in theories of a developing
syntactic competence, is never raised.
3.4.2 The grammar for Serpo at MLU 1.81
The second 'standard theory' grammar for Seppo, Gg9, has
the same set of components as we have already met although
each of them is somewhat larger than in any of the grammars
we have considered so far. The grammar appears as Figure 53,
(see pp 248 - 9)
Once more there is nothing exceptionable about the phrase-
structure rules from a formal point of view and similar
remarks to those directed at the lexical feature rules in
Gg.j can be made for that component of Par"ti°ular»
(1), (3), (4) and (5) are straightforward context-free
subcategox'isation rules but (2) and (6), while probably
having to be construed as of the same type, subcategorise
in terms of syntactic context and are thus subject to the
same reservations as were expressed for (3) and (4) in
the lexical feature component of G-g-j . (7) is a hybrid
including aspects of context-free categorisation,
(V —> [+VJ ), aspects of strict subcategorisation
(V > j~+ (HP)J , and note again the problem of
the optional IIP which can be overcome in the way outlined































5. Proloc > [f-Proloc, +directional]
6. [[directional] > [-MP ]]
7. V » [+V, ± (MP), + [animate,-vehicle]
8. [+.
[direct ionalQj












1 . T , . :optionalreordering ^
(a) Reversal of prolocative and UP
S.D.: NP + Proloc
S.C.: x1 - x2 3 Xo - X1
(b) Fronting of adverb or prolocative
S.D. : X + Y + Y Where X and Y mayvrroiocj be 1Jp or null^ but
at least one must
not be null
S.C. : x1 - x2 - Xj - x^ ^ x4 ~ X1 x2 ~ z-
(c) Reversal of verb and direct object, locative
or adverb





Where X may be IIP, Adv
Y or null, and Y may be
Adv or null
4 Xgj X^ X1 - :2 X4
(d) Reversal of subject and verb
S.D.: X + NP + V + Y Where X and Y may be
Proloc or null
S.C.: x 1 x2 - x? - x4 * x. x^ - x2 ^4
2. T.verb deletion
S.D.: N + V
:optional
-■ ][looj
S.C.: x1 - x2 - x^ * x, -
pp.248 & 249. Figure 53. From Bowerman pp.121-2
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(V > I + -animate, -vehicle , + +directionaly .
(8) appears to be a selectional restriction formalising
the observation that a verb which may or may not appear
in final position may or may not have an animate direct
object. In Chomsky's framework selectional restrictions
operate on lexical categories and, to this extent, (8)
is curious. If the suggestion is adopted for the sub-
categorisation of Y via the CS notation, the optionality
of iTP in the input to the rule would be removed to the
benefit of the rule's intelligibility. (9) and (10) are
included to make the lexicon work but no reason is provided
as to why (11) and (12) are included rather than having
additional 'subcategorisation' rules of the form:
as this would, at least, make for a unified treatment of
lexical insertion.
The transformational rules too appear to have exactly the
same problems associated with them as we found for . All
parts of (1 ) involve permutation and lead to absurd derived
constituent structures and one could also question some
of the conditions which are attached to the rules which
might be seen as inconsistent with a restrictive theory




recoverability of deletions as we have already seen.
The conclusions we reach then are, in all essential respects,
identical to those emerging from our discussion of GS1*
The phrase-structure component does not involve any problems,
there are difficulties of interpretation with the lexical
feature rules and associated lexicon but these might not
be insuperable and the transformational rules violate
important constraints on rules of this type. We now
consider some of the implications of these conclusions
for (Ggi, considered as a developmental theory.
5.4.5 Bowerman's grammars and explanatory adequacy
The domain of enquiry, D, is again the child's syntactic
competence and I shall assume that it makes sense to talk
about a psychological model of this competence and that
grammars may be deemed explanatory in this context.
The above discussion of the details of and G^ can be
seen as an attempt to investigate Condition 2 and while
there is a certain amount of attention paid to the parent
general theory in Bowerman's theorising, there is still
a fair amount of neglect of fundamental issues. I assume
that this requires no further elaboration and that the
degree of divergence from-the conditions laid down by
the general theory is not so severe, at least in certain
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respects, to make it impossible to move on to Condition 5.
Bowerman's own statement on the relationship between the
two Seppo grammars would lead us to expect that satisfaction
of Condition 3 is going to be relatively easy to achieve.
She says (p.132):
Provisions of the early grammar for Seppo remain the
backbone of the later grammar. Most changes in Seppo's
speech were combinations and elaborations of existing
patterns.... The second grammar provides for the
generation of a few constructions which are qualitat¬
ively new, not just elaborations of pre-existing#patterns.
Both of these aspects of development, elaboration of
existing patterns and qualitatively new constructions, can
be seen as involving additional elements and to investigate
the validity of these claims it will be convenient to
consider Condition 3 in connection with different aspects
of the grammar in turn.
Consider first the inventories of syntactic categories
employed in G-g^ and f°rEier uses the set,
, Sg, M, VP, Adj, /, Loc, ProlocJ
131. Another possible justification for moving on would
be that the divergences from the general theory infect
both Gg.j and Cg2 in the same way and that, therefore,
we should see both of them as constructed in accordance
with some slightly different general theory. This
justification is made more plausible by Bowerman's treat¬
ment of lexical insertion which doesn't accord in detail
with either of the possibilities suggested in Chomsky (1965).
Unfortunately, in connection with the other areas of
divergence discussed above, she provides no such explicit
statement.
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and the latter, the set,
, S^, S„, Wh-loc, UP, V, R, Adj, VP, Predicate,Loc,Adv,
M, Proloc?
Comparison of these two sets is easy if we do away with
the distinctions "between the differently subscripted S's.
Failure to do this will require that we consider the two
S's of the first set being replaced by three new S's in
the second set, say S^, S^ and S^, as a cursory inspection
reveals that S^ and S^ in G^ are not notionally equivalent
to S^ and S^ in Cg2» ^his will immediately entail that
Condition 3 is not applicable. A version of Condition 4
could be formulated from this conclusion and, if interested,
the reader can easily investigate this avenue. I shall
assume, though, that the set of categories in G^ is an
additive expansion of the set in G^ and formulate a
version of Condition 4 accordingly. Referring to the two
sets of categories as C^and C^, we can, on this assumption,
assert the identity:
Cp = Ci U jwh-loc, UP, Predicate, Advj
and we can schematise the child's categorial development
as:
C1 > C1 + X
■where X denotes the set, [wh-loc, IIP, Predicate, AdvJ
We can approach the sets of syntactic features in exactly
the same way distinguishing, in order to keep the
presentation manageable, between inherent and contextual
features. The set of inherent syntactic features
appearing in G^ is ^animate, +vehiclej (excluding those
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features which correspond directly to syntactic categories)
and the corresponding set in G-g^ {+animate, +vehicle,
+pronoun, +directionalj. Obviously, referring to the
inherent features appearing in Gg^ hy IF^ (i = 1,2) we
have the identity:
IF^ = IF-j U j^+pronoun, +directionalj
and the child's development, in this respect, can be
schematised as:
IF1 > IF.1 + X
where X denotes the set, j^+pronoun, +directionalJ . So
again we have a positive conclusion. With respect to the
set of inherent syntactic features, Condition 3 is satis¬
fied additively by the sequence, (G^ ,
For contextual features, the situation is not so clear-
cut. Restricting ourselves just to those mentioning
lexical categories, we find that G-g^ uses the set
f+V , +N , + V, + N, + (W)] ,
and Gg2 uses the set
|± jjrj . +NP + (NP)| . ^ ^2 i think it is fair
to say that there is no clear additive relationship between
these two sets and the most serious discrepancy is that,
whereas in the first set there is a feature subcategorising
items as to whether they occur post-verbally or not, there
is no identical, or even similar, feature in the second
132. Obviously the make-up of these sets will be altered
considerably if the suggestions mooted above for the
subcategorisation of V are implemented. I shall not pursue
such possibilities here.
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set. Condition 5, therefore, does not apply and again,
while it would "be possible to formulate a version of
Condition 4 for investigation on this basis, I shall not
attempt this in the subsequent discussion.
There remains one set of features which have not been
mentioned, those which are used in the formulation of
selection restrictions, and, as none of these appear in
while a small number do in Ggg, it is clear that,
with regard to them, Condition 3 is satisfied. However,
since no version of Condition 4 can be constructed in
this connection, I shall not discuss these features further.
There is one further aspect of the development which should
be briefly mentioned and that concerns the development,
not of particular features, but of feature-types. Referring
to the type of contextual features as CF and the type of
features used in selectional. restrictions as SF, we can
see that uses the set of feature-types, £lF, CfJ and
Ggg uses the extended set, £ IP, CF, SfJ. Therefore, if
the set of feature-types in G„. is FT. (i = 1,2), we canQl 1
assert the identity:
FT2 = FT1 U [SFJ
and this aspect of development can be schematised as:
FT1 > FT1 + X
where X denotes the set, £sf|. We conclude that, with
respect to the set of feature-types appearing in the
grammars, the sequence, (Gg^ , satisfies Condition 3
additively, Overall, as far as substantive aspects of
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the grammars are concerned, (Gg-| , ^oe!3 well against
Condition 3 with only contextual features providing problems
for a straightforward additive interpretation of develop¬
ment. Me now turn to rule-types and rules and see
whether it attains a similar degree of success there.
For rule-types there doesn't appear to be any interesting
development in the sequence. It might be suggested that,
within the set of lexicon feature rules, a new type emerges,
viz., selectional restrictions, but this would be to say
nothing more than has already been pointed out with respect
to feature-types. It is also the case that the elementary
operations involved in the transformational rules remain
the same in the two grammars and we find no transformations
using adjunction and/or substitution of new material
which might lead us to investigate a change in transformational
rule-type. So, we consider Condition 3 with respect to
sets of particular rules.
Consider the sets of phrase-structure rules from G^ and
Gq2» order to have a clear picture it is necessary to
expand the rules following the usual notational conventions
and the rules of G^ expand as in Figure 54 {ignoring the
differences between subscripted S's in the original).
Expansion of the phrase-structure rules in Gg2 yields the
set shown in Figure 55 (For Figures 54 and 55 see p.257.)
Of the rules occurring in Figure 54, 1.4, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8,
1.11 and 1.12 also appear in Figure 55 but the remainder
1.1 S F
1.2 s ->
1 .3 s F
1 .4 s F
1.5 s F
1 .6 M F
1 .7 M F
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don't. This means that we cannot view the phrase-
structure rules in Figure 55 as a simple additive extension
of the rules in Figure 54. Nevertheless, for most of the
rules which cause problems, it is possible to see their
effects being achieved by a sequence of rules in Figure 55
and, in this sense, we may regard these rules as having
a derivative status in the second grammar. Thus, if we
consider the rule, 1.2, what this rule does is generate
strings consisting of single nouns and assign them to
the category, S. The same effect is achieved, in thfe
second set of rules, by the sequence of rules, 2.6 and
2.21, which has the additional effect of assigning the
noun to the category of NP. It seems to me not to do
too much injustice to our intuitions of additive complexity
to say that the sequence of rules, 2.6 and 2.21, can be
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seen as including the rule, 1.2, and also adding to it.
Note that, in this case, the addition in question,
revolving around the introduction of the category, KP,
has already been raised in our discussion of developments
in the set of syntactic categories. Similar arguments
can be used in other cases. 1.3 can be seen as included
in 2.6 and 2.22, 1.5 in 2.8 and 2.21, 1.9 in 2.11 and 2.21
133. This may be rendered more convincing by considering
the "is a" relation defined on phrase-structure trees.
Corresponding to every phrase-structure rule of the form,
XAY XBY, there is, in an appropriately constructed
tree, a string, B, and a node, A, such that B is an A.
1.2 guarantees that, in cases, N is an S and so does the
sequence of rules, 2.6 and 2.21.
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and 1.10 and in 2.9 and 2.20. In each of these cases, the
sequence of rules in Gg2 introduces additional structure,
when compared to the single rules from , involving
either of the categories, NP or Predicate, and, of course,
both of these are introductions into the set of categories
used in Gg2 when this is compared with the set used in G^.
A problem still remains and that is the position of the
rule, 1.1, which, in no sense, exists in Gg2' see31s
that, in this case, we have to assume that the child
completely abandons the rule rather than using it as a
*
basis for later development and, while such an assumption
is intelligible, it would be instructive to see it discussed
Obviously this fact, in itself, entails that Condition 3
is not applicable to this aspect of the development but
I shall ignore 1.1, accept the equivalence of single rules
in Gg^ with sequences of rules in Gg2 as outlined above
and conclude that the sets of phrase-structure rules, PS^
in Gg^ and PS^ in Ggg* satisfy Condition 3 and that we
have:
PS2 = PS1 U {2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.11, 2.12,
2.13, 2.14, 2.15, 2.16, 2.17, 2.18}
and that we have development which can be schematised as:
PS1 7- PS1 + X
where X denotes the set of phrase structure rules, [2.1, 2.2
2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.11, 2.12, 2.13, 2.14, 2.15, 2.16, 2.17, 2.1
The lexicon feature rules require less lengthy discussion.
Taking the rules in Gg^ in turn, (1) is preserved, as far
as its function is concerned, by (1 ) and (3) from Gg2;
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(2) remains as (4) in but there is no place in the
later grammar for anything resembling either (3) or (4)
and it is impossible to see their function as being
distributed between a set of new rules; (5) resembles (7)
in G-g2 in important respects and the latter can plausibly
be regarded as an elaboration of the former (we note again
here the substitution of HP for N which we have met in the
phrase-structure rules); (6) survives as(9), (7) is expanded
into (5) in an obvious way and, finally, (8) perishes but,
since it was never clear why it was construed as a lexical
feature rule to begin with, this shouldn't be regarded
as crucial. The main difficulties for an additive notion
of complexity reside in the effective disappearance of
(3) and (4) from and, because of this, we conclude
that Condition 3 does not apply to these sets of rules.
This leaves the transformational rules of which there are
two in Gg^, the first of which has two parts. (1(a))
seems to disappear entirely in Ggg (this is, perhaps,
hardly surprising given its totally ad hoc nature).
Concentrating on its function, for pois, this could be seen
as being taken over by (1(c)) in Ggg which reverses the
order of a verb (in this case, pois) and a following noun,
but, unfortunately for this tactic, kiinni is not even
classified syntactically in the lexicon for Gg£ and so
can never enter into a structure which will be input
to one of the transformations and, thus, it is impossible
to see (1(c)) in Ggg as an extension of (1(a)) in G^.
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(1(b)) of Gg.j can be seen as growing into (1(a)) of G-g^,
the only modification here being the by now familiar one
of MP replacing M in the structural description of the rule.
Finally, (2) of Gg^ is obviously related to (2) of G^,
the latter comprising an extension of the former by way
of loosening the specification of its structural analysis
to allow the possibility of locatives in the third term.
If we ignore the first of these three rules, we can
conclude that the two sets of transformational rules
satisfy Condition 3 additively but, of course, whethfer
we are entitled to ignore this rule is open to question.
If it is included then Condition 3 does not apply and this
will lead to a different formulation of Condition 4 to that
briefly considered below.
I shall now consider Condition 4 for a small number of
i *54»
examples which have satisfied Condition 3. Consider
first syntactic categories. Condition 4 requires that
we demand a reason for why we find the development
schematised as:
C1 > C1 + X
rather than the alternative:
X > c1 + X
134. Some components of the overall theory will only be
mentioned briefly without analysis. Similarly, for those
components of the theory to which Condition 3 did not apply,
while it would be possible to consider Condition 4, I
shall not do so. The essentially negative conclusions
reached with regard to Condition 4 in the text are readily
extehable to these other cases.
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where denotes the set of categories, [ S, M, IT, VP,
Adj, V, Loc, Proloc j , and X denotes the set of categories
Wh-loc, IIP, Predicate, Adv] . For a number of pairs
of categories we have the basis for a logical explanation.
So, as noted in connection with Bloom's grammars, it can
be maintained that the phrasal category, IIP, presupposes,
within the theory, its head category, IT, and thus we have
an explanation for why IT preceded UP into the set of
categories manipulated by the child. One could speculate
along rather different lines for the relationship beVween
V and Adv where the latter category only makes notional
sense within a system embracing the former category and
along still different lines for the categories, Wh-loc
and loc, arguing that the more specific category requires
acquaintance with the general category. However, there
is little point in pushing such speculations too far as,
in general, no logical basis for the development is
apparent. Why, for example, should Predicate follow M
in the development of the set of categories? It is diffi¬
cult to conceive of the theory which would have this follow
from its own structural make-up. ITor is much hope attached
to an examination of the syntactic categories of the
world's languages. To my knowledge no reasonably well-
attested universals, absolute or implicational could be
brought to bear on the sets of categories we are scrutinising.
It is easy to see what such universal statements would be
like, e.g. 'All languages have a grammatical category, M
but not all languages have a grammatical category, Predicate',
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or, 'If a language has a grammatical category, M, then it
has a grammatical category, Predicate' hut, as well as
being unattested, such statements are unlikely. This
leaves the second possibility of Condition 4, that there
might be some more basic theory to which we can reduce
the linguistic development, but such a theory does not
readily suggest itself. In particular, if we consider
cognition and continue to focus on the same pair of
categories, I know of no claim that those properties of
objects ihiich are usually encoded by attributives arfe
cognised earlier than those properties which are normally
1 55
encoded by predicates. Note that several, claims of
this sort would have to be made and substantiated before
we began to take the possibility of a reduction of this
grammatical phenomenon seriously. We are led to the
conclusion, therefore, that, with regard to the development
of syntactic categories, the sequence ^8?) fails
satisfy Condition 4. A similar conclusion can rapidly
reached with respect to inherent syntactic features.
■ feature-types, we require a reason for why we find the
development schematised as:
FT1 > FT1 + X
155. In fact, what evidence is available would tend to
support the opposite prediction as children are known to
be more interested in action and change than static
attributes and it is the former of these which are
normally encoded by grammatical Predicates (cf. Nelson's
theory discussed in Chapter 2).
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rather than the alternative:
X ) PT1 + X
where denotes the set of feature-types, {iP, CP J , and
X denotes the set of feature-types, jsp]. There is a
partial answer to this built in to the logical structure
of the theory as the type of selectional features, SP,
depends for its cogency on the prior introduction of
inherent features, i.e., the type of selectional features
can be seen as theoretically presupposing the type of
inherent features and development which included the *
schema:
SP > SP + IP
would be quite impossible in this sort of theory. Unfort¬
unately, there is no comparable reason for why the type
of contextual features should have precedence over the
type of selectional features. Thus, this aspect of
syntactic development is only partially grounded in the
logic of the theory, Uor does it seem plausible to suppose
that either facts concerning the distribution of feature-
tj/pes in the world's languages or reference to some more
basic theory will be particularly useful in this connection.
Restricting attention to the development of syntactic
feature-types, the sequence (G^ , tails to satisfy
Condition 4 in a general way, although there are logical
grounds for partial satisfaction.
The sets of phrase-structure rules in the two grammars
give rise to the question as to why we find the development
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schematised as:
PS1 f PS1 + X
rather than the alternative:
X > PS1 + X
where PS^ denotes the set of rules, 1.2 - 1.12, from p 257
and X has the same reference as it does on p258. Again
no totally satisfactory answer is forthcoming in terms
of the framework we are working with. The logical approach
demands that we investigate the intrinsic ordering of the
rules in X when compared with the rules in PS^ , ana/ although
some of the rules in X do depend on rules in PS^ for
their intelligibility (e.g., 2.12 - 2.17 are intrinsically'
orlered with respect to 1.4 and 1.5). this is not generally
the case (e.g., 2.1 - 2.5 in X are not intrinsically
ordered with respect to any of the rules in PS^). So,
again we have partial satjsfaction of Condition 4 on
logical, theory-internal grounds and, again, there is little
point in turning to the other clauses of Condition 4 in
the hope of enlightenment. Statistical facts are unknown
but probably useless, and while it would be possible to
refer to a theory of cognition in making piecemeal
observations to the effect that rules introducing negative
and questioning elements appear in X but not in PS^,
such observations would be piecemeal, they would not
constitute a systematic attempt to relate the terms of
the linguistic theory to those of a cognitive theory and,
inevitably, many aspects of the development would be
omitted from such speculation.
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Finally, consider the transformational rules. Why is it
that we get the development schematised as:
T1 ^ T1 + X
rather than the alternative schematised as:
X > T1 + X
where denotes the set of two transformational rules,
(1(b)) and (2), from Gg.j (we continue to ignore (1(a)))and
X denotes the set of rules, ^(1(b), 1(c) and 1(d))J , from
Ggg? In this case we have no basis for answering the
question. The five rules are devoid of any intrinsic
ordering relationships between them, given that they are
not well-formed examples of transformational rules, we
are not going to find them cropping up in theories of
the world's languages and the nature of a more basic, e.g.
cognitive, theory to which they could be related defies
imagination. With respect to the sets of transformational
rules appearing in the grammars, the sequence, (G^ , G^),
fails to satisfy Condition 4.
It seems reasonable to conclude that overall Bowerman's
theory of Seppo's syntactic development falls down crucially
on Condition 4. We have seen that the sequence, (Gg^, Gg^)
does quite well on Condition 3 and that a much greater
effort is made to pay attention to general theory, and
hence Condition 2, than was the case in Bloom's work.
There are still serious grounds for misgiving in connection
with Condition 2, particularly concerning the transformational
componexit of the grammars, but what the failure to approach
Condition 4 means is that, even if we have a theory which
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works in a reasonably satisfactory way and gets complicated
as the child gets complicated, we are completely in the
dark as to why it works. It is a theory which, in terms
of the notions being explored here, fails to be explanatorily
adequate.
3.5 Derivational complexity and the acquisition of
transformations.
Brown and Hanlon (1970) is a piece of research which, on
the face of it, is concerned with a direct investigation
of Condition 3 within the domain of syntactic competence.
However, closer examination reveals that the "theoretical
proposals the authors adopt are not as fully interpretable,
with regard to this condition as might originally be
thought.
In their own terms they are interpreting the derivational
theory of complexity, put forward and manipulated in
experimental psycholinguistics, in a developmental sphere.
At its crudest this theory claims that the more grammatical
'operations' that are involved in the generation of a
sentence in a grammar, the more complex that sentence
will be psychologically. Psychological complexity, typically,
is indexed by some measure like time to respond with the
truth-value of a generic sentence, time to respond in
a sentence content-picture content matching task, ability
to remember a sentence verbatim, etc. (for an exhaustive
survey of the work in this area, see Podor, iJever and
Garrett (1974)). In this crude form the derivational
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theory of complexity requires the assumption that each
grammatical 'operation' contributes equally to
psychological complexity in order to give rise to
experimental predictions. This assumption has not been
an attractive one for psycholinguists. Because of this,
a more refined version of the theory, the version investi¬
gated by Broun and Hanlon, has been developed which may
be referred to as the derivational theory of cumulative
complexity according to which, a sentence, , is predicted
to be psychologically more complex than a sentence,
if the generation of in the grammar requires all the
operations employed in the derivation of S2 plus some
additional ones. This can, of course, be compared to
our discussion of simplicity in Chapter 1 which gravitated
towards the additive notion of simplicity because ire had
no way of weighing the relative simplicity of distinct
theoretical entities against each other.
Brown and Hanlon are concerned with eight sentence-types
which are listed in Figure 56.
1 . SAAD - We had a ball
2. Q - Did we have a ball?
3. N - We didn't have a ball
4. Tr - We did
5. HQ - Didn't we have a ball?
6. TrQ — Did we? (also used in positive
tag questions)
7. TrN - We didn't
8. TrlTQ - Didn' t. we? (also used in negative
tag questions)
Figure 56 Adapted from Brown and Hanlon, pp.18 - 19.
SAAB is simple, active, affirmative declarative, 'Q' is
question, 'N' is negative and 'Tr' is truncated.
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In connection with these sentence-types and positive and
negative tag questions, the authors formulate a set of
transformational rules, which, while not identical to
those found in any linguistic treatment of the sentences,
explicitly indicates allegiance to such works as Klima
(1964), Katz and Postal (1964) and Chomsky (1965). ho
particular set of phrase-structure rules is assumed and
the seven transformational rules are:
TI. Tag-question formation (optional)
Til. Predicate truncation schema (optional)
Till. Preverbal placement of neg (obligatory)
TIV. Question transformation (obligatory)
TV. Affixation (obligatory)
TVT, Do-support (obligatory)
TVII. Negative contraction (optional)
The reader is referred to p.22 of Brown and Hanlon's
article for a detailed presentation of each of these
rules. In introducing them, they say (p.21):
We...offer / these rules as_7 a set of imperfect
rules based on what we have learned from what has
been written and on what we have been able to work
out on our own.
156. Brown and Hanlon recognise that their formulation
of this rule violates the condition of recoverability of
deletions and this is why it is dubbed 'schema'. The
implications of this for the status of the set of formal
operations, TI - TVII are obvious. For recent views
that this sort of process is best handled in a different
component of a linguistic theory - a discourse grammar -
see, e.g. Sag (1976), Williams (1977).
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and a word or two of amplification is in order with respect
to their status. TI has two parts "both of which are
essentially copying rules with one "being responsible for
the generation of negative tags and the other with
positive tags. As well as copying the original sentence,
the rules introduce a feature, [+pro] , to the subject HP
in the new portion and, if a main verb is present, it is
deleted in the tag. Til has already been mentioned in
fn. 136 but I might also point out that its optional
status is problematic given that it contains a term'in
the structural analysis of the rule, Pro, which has the
function of triggering the operation of the rule. Till
is a version of the familiar rule of Hag-placement but
the formulation leaves open the question as to exactly
how the neg is adjoined to the right of the auxiliary
1 37
constituent. TIT is intended to be a version of
subject-auxiliary inversion but is odd in that the term,
Q, should not survive on the right-hand side of the rule
as this amounts to letting it appear in terminal strings
unless, of course, a later rule is going to delete it.
TV is based on the well-known rule of affix-hopping,
identical in most respects to the version formulated
137. The formulation of all the rules leaves open questions
of derived constituent structure. Perhaps this is
understandable for a topic which was so badly neglected
by a large number of transformational linguists but it is
difficult to talk about the rules representing 1 structural
knowledge' unless we take it seriously.
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in Chomsky (1957), except that the -en suffix of perfect
aspect is missing from the structural analysis of the
1 98
rule. The rule of Do-support is the well-known one
and, finally, TVII, the rule of negative contraction,
while clear enough in function, doesn't give us any
reason for why it should work. What the rule does is
move a negative element out of one term of the structural
analysis and adjoin it to the right of the Tense morpheme
hut there is no indication in this process that the
negative will thereby be contracted. Presumably the#
answer lies in the morphophonemic rules but Brown and
Hanlon don't formulate any of these and so the reader
is left very mu^h in the dark. TI - TVII thus contain
some obscurity but, putting this on one side for the moment,
what can we say 6f the role they play in the eight sentence
types plus positive and negative tags? The authors
suggest that the transformations involved in the generation
of each sentence-type are as shown in Figure 57.
(For Figure 57 see p 272)
From these analyses it is possible to derive a number
of predictions concerning relative psychological complexity
in accordance with the derivational theory of cumulative
138. It is a general feature of these rules that perfect
aspect is neglected. Thus TI - TIV should each have an
option for have in their structural analyses and Brown
and Hanlon don't discuss why this doesn't appear.
SAAD We had a ball
Q Did we have a "ball?
IT We didn't have a ball
Tr We did
NQ Didn't we have a ball?
TrN We didn't
TrQ Did we?
Tag We didn't have a ball.
did we?
TrNQ Didn't we?






Till, TIV, TVI, TVII
Til, Till, TVI, TVII
Til, TIV, TVI
•TI, Till, TIV, TVI (twice)
TVII
Til, Till, TIV, TVI,#TVII
TI, Till, TIV, TV, TVI, TVII
Figure 57
1 39
complexity. The psychblogical measure investigated is
the age at which the children show sufficient evidence to
credit them with control of the grammatical knowledge
involved in each of the sentence-types and the claim is,
139. Strictly speaking, SAAD's cannot enter into these
predictions as they involve TV, and none of the others,
with the exception of NTag's, do. Brown and Hanlon's
discussion of TV and its interaction with TVI is confusing.
They say (p23): "Z TVI_/ is not applied in the derivation
of SAAD sentences, hut is applied in Q, N, and Tr sentences
whenever the only auxiliary is "tense". So TVI is a
rule which is added to the child's grammar with Q, N, and
Tr. Nevertheless, it does not strictly operate so as
to make one sentence more complex, cumulatively, than
another, because, whenever it is not applied, TV must be."
There is nothing here to suggest that SAAD's and other
sentence types can be cumulatively compared.
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to take a particular example, that TrRQ sentences will
be acquired later than IT sentences because, in their
grammatical derivation, they involve every rule involved
in the latter sentence-type plus some additional ones,
in this case, Til and TIV. These predictions are spectac¬
ularly confirmed by an analysis of the data collected from
the three children in Roger Brown's longitudinal sthdy.
19 predictions are made for each child and, of 57 individual
predictions, 47 are confirmed, 6 cannot be evaluated and
1 AO
only 4 go in the wrong direction. ' ,
Before assessing the general significance of these results
in terms of the framework of Chapter 1, it is necessary
to remark on one additional point concerning the correlation
of psychological and derivational complexity, a point
which Brown and Hanlon are aware of. If we consider some
pairs of sentences in the list of Figure 56, not only do
they differ with regard to their transformational derivations
but also with regard to the structures which are input
140. Actually these figures are somewhat inflated as all
the predictions are not independent. If, say, one predicts
correctly that SAAB sentences will appear before IT sentences
and that IT sentences will appear before RQ sentences, one
can hardly cite an independent correct prediction that
SAAD sentences will appear before RQ sentences. Taking
account of this, there are only 36 independent individual
predictions of which 26 are confirmed. Removing SAAD
sentences from the predictions as fn.139 urges reduces
this still further to 27 predictions of which 17 are
confirmed. As usual, the extent of empirical support
for the theory is not my main concern.
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to the transformational rules. Thus, comparing SAAD
sentences with Q sentences, it is not simply the case
that SAAD sentences only involve the application of TV
whereas Q sentences involve the application of TIV and
TVI. In addition, a Q sentence has a Q-morpheme generated
as part of the structure which is input tdx the trans¬
formational rules and it is implausible to argue that this
doesn't contribute to the overall psychological complexity
of Q sentences, particularly as it is semantically
significant. But, if this is so, we are on very unsure
ground if we try to identify the increased psychological
complexity of Q sentences with complications in sets of
transformational rules - the complexity could reside
in one or both of two aspects of the derivation (at least)
and we have no way of identifying which.
We must try to cast Brown and Hanlon's proposals into
a form which makes them amenable to analysis in terms
of Conditions 1 - 4. Ignoring much of the above criticism,
their views can be seen as imposing a partial ordering
on the eight sentence-types as shown in Figure 58
Figure 58
and what this amounts to is a constraint on the possible
orders of acquisition of sentence-types such that the
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ordering:
(SAAB, Q, IT, Tr, TrQ, NQ, TrF, TrlTQ)
is possible, whereas the ordering:
(SAAD, Q, N, TrQ, Tr, NQ, TrlT, TrlTQ)
is not. The theory which is to explain this is one
which assumes a domain of enquiry, D, the child's syntactic
knowledge, and that the possession of syntactic knowledge
can be explicated in terms of the child controlling, in
some sense, transformational rules. It is sets of trans¬
formational rules which comprise the (partial)theories
in which we are interested. Under all possible orders
of acquisition of the sentence-types, SAAB sentences are
acquired first. SAAB sentences require the operation of
only one transformational rule, TV, and so we can say
that there is a time, t^, at which the transformational
component of the child's grammar contains only the rule,
TV. Next, however, the child may acquire any of the
sentence-types, Q, IT, and Tr and, depending on which he
does acquire, he begins to use the transformational rules,
TIV, and TVI (for Q), Till, TVI,and TVII (for II), or
Til and TVI (for Tr). But, of course, these possibilities
exhaust the set of transformations under discussion except
1 41
for TI. So, all we can conclude is that there is a
time, at which the child not only utilises TV but also
141. Brown and Hanlon, commenting on similarities in the
structural analyses of transformations involved in the
generation of Q,II and Tr sentences, point out, reinforcing
the point in the text, that these three sentence-types
are learned at about the same time.
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Til, Till, TIV, TVI and TYII (I omit any further discussion
of TI) and we have development which we can schematise
as:
The reason we get this rather unexciting outcome is that
the three sentence-types Q, R and Tr are not ordered
relative to each other in the partial ordering and that,
in their derivations, they use the full set of transform-
developmental theory against which we can test our
conditions.
Ignoring Condition 1, Condition 2 has already been discussed
in some detail above. Although several difficulties of
detail were alluded to there, the only urgent question to
my mind surrounds Til and its violation of the condition
of recoverability of deletions. TIY, as presented, looks
like a permutation transformation but, generally, there
appears to ce a somewhat closer adherence to standard
practice than in the previous instances we have discussed.
Condition 3, the one which first impressions suggested
might prove very interesting, is satisfied in a rather
unexciting fashion as the above schema demonstrates.
What about Condition 4? The question it raises is whether
we are provided with any reason as to why we find the
development schematised as:
t
ations under discussion. Unexciting or not, we have a
m
_L ■> T. + X
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rather than the alternative:
X T1 + X
where denotes the set of transformational rules, TV^,
and X denotes the set of transformational rules, {.Til, Till,
TIV, TVI and TVIl}. Turning immed.iately to questions of
intrinsic ordering, we can see that TV is intrinsically
ordered before TVII but that it is ordered after Til, Till
ana TIV, while not interacting with TVI. In a ca.se such
as this the dubious value of claiming that the theory is
even partially grounded in the structure of the grammatical
theory is quite apparent. Nor do either of the other
two possibilities for grounding the theory seem to have
anything to offer. Once more the facts about the distri¬
bution of rules in the world's languages are not known
but it seems likely, and in cases where particular lexical
items are mentioned, it is certain, th^t the rules, TII-TVII
are specific to English and, therefore, the question of
their distribution in the languages of the world simply
does not arise. Nor does there appear to be any plausible
cognitive or perceptual reason for why TV should appear
first in the grammars of the children.
The conclusion is clear that Brown and Hanlcn*-s theory
concerning the development of a restricted set of
sentence-types, interpreted as a theory of the successive
acquisition of transformational rules, while, perhaps,
satisfying Conditions 1 - 3 in a more or less convincing
fashion, fails totally to satisfy Condition 4. As far as
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the theory is concerned, it would be equally plausible
for the child to learn most of the transformations in X
before learning TV. The theory is thus judged to be
lacking in explanatory adequacy.
5.6 Fourteen grammatical morphemes
The logic underlying the study investigated in the previous
section has been extended by Brown, in the second half of
his monumental work on the early stages of language
acquisition, to the development of fourteen grammatical
morphemes, paying particular attention to the order of
acquisition within the set and to possible determinants
of this order. Cumulative complexity occupies a central
place throughout the discussion (see Brown (1973, pp.289ff)).
The fourteen morphemes investigated are: the present
progressive inflection, the regular past tense morpheme,
the irregular past tense morpheme, the regular third person
singular present indicative morpheme, the irregular third
person singular present indicative morpheme, the regular
plural inflection, the possessive morpheme, the pre¬
position, in, the preposition, on, the 'article morpheme'
(a notion which does not distinguish the indefinite from
the definite article), the uncontracted copula, the contracted
copula, the uncontracted auxiliary and the contracted
auxiliary. The constitution of this list and the arguments
for splitting up some categories while leaving others intact
will not concern us here (see Brown, pp. 300 - 313, for
details). Given a criterion for acquisition whereby a
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morpheme is deemed, to be acquired when, it appears in SOfe
or more of obligatory contexts, Brown, averaging rankings
over three children, produced the summary of order of
acquisition shown in Figure 59 and considered three possible
determinants of this order: frequency of the morphemes
in parental speech, semantic complexity of the morphemes
and grammatical complexity of the morphemes, and it
seems fair here to assume that a. demonstration that one
of these is positively correlated with the order of acquis¬
ition would amount to at least a partial theory of *
morphological/grammatical development in this restricted
area.
Morpheme Average Bank
1. Present progressive 2.5-5
2-5. in. on 2.50
4. Plural 5.00
5. Past irregular 6.00
6. Possessive 6.55
7. Uncontractible copula 6.50
8. Articles 7.00
9. Past regular 9.00
10. Third person regular 9.66
11 . Third person irregular 10.85
12. Uncontractible auxiliary 11.66
15. Contractible copula 12,66
14. Contractible auxiliary 14.00
Figure 59 From Brown, p 517
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Prom the outset, it should be pointed out that Brown,
quite sensibly, construes complexity, both syntactic and
semantic, cumulatively, although, ox course, in this case
the elements which are contributing to the complexity of
an item are not exclusively transformational rules as was
the situation in 3.5.■ This, necessarily, restricts the
scope of this investigation and, in the analysis that
follows, I am anxious that the scope should not be restricted
in this way. It will be seen that Brown's considerations
of cumulative complexity emerge as special cases in the
treatment I shall give. The important thing to be clear
about is that many of the suggestions I shall discuss
are not Brown's but represent the sort of claim that
someone, adopting either the semantic or syntactic proposals
developed by Brown, would have to adopt if they were to
argue that those proposals provide full explanations of
the order of acquisition in Figure 59. Brown explicitly
refuses to speculate along these lines on a number of
occasions.
Of the three possible determinants of acquisition order,
I shall consider only semantic complexity (in 3.6.1)
and syntactic complexity (in 3.6.2). Frequency in parental
speech was demonstrably not a determinant of this order
but, even if it had been, it would have been difficult
to construct a theoretical statement around it that would
be amenable to analysis in terms of the conditions of
Chapter 1. Of the other two both were reasonably successful
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within the limited terms of reference set by Brown and
are, therefore, considered as developmental theories in
1 42
this domain.
3,6,1 Semantic complexity as a determinant of acquisition
order
The nature of the semantic theory Brown resorts to is
obscure. It appears to consist of little more than'a set
of notional semantic categories which play a loose role
in characterising the meanings of the morphemes. Within
the full set of morphemes, there are four pairs which
don't involve any semantic contrast; regular past and
irregular past, uncontractible copula and contractible
copula, third person regular and third person irregular,
and uncontractible auxiliary and contractible auxiliary.
Taking the view that the acquisition of one member of
each of these pairs should signal the acquisition of the
relevant semantic notions which are vital to both members
of the pair, we reduce the number of morphemes in the
developmental order to ten with each of the pairs above
being represented by the morpheme which is acquired
1 Apt
earlier as in Figure 60
142. Strictly speaking, consideration of semantic complexity
should await discussion until Chapter 4-but, as the logic
of the argument for semantic complexity is Identical to
that for syntactic complexity, I prefer to see it treated
here and as providing something of a bridge between this
chapter and the next one.
143. This reduction immediately indicates that semantic
complexity cannot be the sole determinant of acquisition










9. Third person regular
10. Uncontractible auxiliary
Figure 60
For each of these ten morphemes, Brown provides a discussion
of their semantics in notional terms, essentially trying
to isolate the dimensions of meaning which they encode.
These discussions lead to Figure 61 where each morpheme
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10. Uncontractible auxiliary
















144. for fn. 144 see p. 282a.
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144, Some remarks are in order to assist interpretation
here. The child's usage is taken as the yardstick against
which the various dimensions are matched and the entries
we have in the 'Meaning' column should "be taken as based
on this usage and not on adult usage. So, for example,
as well as signifying 'earlierness' the past tense
morpheme can be used in English to indicate 'hypotheticalness'
or some such when it is used in conditional clauses.
However, there were no conditional clauses in the speech
of the children at this time, and so this aspect of the
past tense morpheme's meaning was not credited to the
child. Eor the present progressive morpheme there was
clear evidence that the child intended to refer to the
temporary duration of events but no clear evidence that
he controlled a semantic distinction between processes
and states, although this additional possibility could
not be ruled out. In, on, Plural and possessive are
self-explanatory. For the uncontractible copula the claim
is that it encodes number (redundantly this being marked
in almost all cases in the subject of the sentence) and
'earlierness' because there is a contrast between the present
and past tense forms of the copula. Therefore, appropriate
use of the copula presupposes acquaintance with these two
semantic dimensions. Drawing heavily on the work of
Karttunen (e.g. (1968)) and Maratsos (1976), Brown
suggests that the children's use of articles demands that
they be credited with knowledge of the specific-non-specific
dimension and, finally, the entries for third person
regular and uncontractible auxiliary can be analysed and
justified in the same way as for the uncontractible
copula.
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Development in this domain of grammatical morphemes can
therefore be seen, partially, at any rate, as involving
the successive acquisition and combination of semantic
dimensions (cf. Clark's proposals in Chapter 2). We can
represent this development as a nine-stage process - not
ten because in and on occupy the same position in the
ranking - as shown in Figure 62. (see p.284)
The development is now in a form to which Conditions 1 - 4
can apply where we, presumably, regard the domain of
enquiry, D, as being fixed as something like the semantic
knowledge (in the form of a partial lexicon) which makes
the child's production and comprehension of the fourteen
grammatical morphemes possible and this imprecise
characterisation is all we can offer towards satisfaction
of Condition 1.
Condition 2, not surprisingly as we return to the domain
of semantics, is not satisfied in any clear way. ¥e sire
not provided with anything like a theory of possible
semantic dimensions which could be seen as informing the
child's progress from to T^. Nevertheless, because of
the extremely simple relationship between the successive
theories in the sequence, it is possible to compare them
and investigate the satisfaction of Condition 3.
A moment's inspection reveals that Condition 3 is satisfied
over the whole sequence as each T^ contains everything
contained in each (2-i-9) and, in addition, something
else. The exact nature of what is added in the transition
284















Past irregular - Earlierness
Hh
Uncontractible auxiliary - Temporary duration, lumber,
Earl iemess
Bigure 62 ^^
145. Note that here I have ignored the possibility of in¬
cluding Process-state as a semantic dimension as it has no
bearing on subsequent discussion. It should be pointed out
that the reason a stage-type theory like this can be con¬
structed in this case whereas it couldn't for cumulative
transformational complexity in 3.5 is that Brown does supply
the order of acquisition for the grammatical morphemes averaged
across the children whereas Brown and Hanlon didn't do this
for the sentence-types they were interested in.
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varies. It may, as in the transitions from to T^,
from T„ to T~, from T~ to T„, from I. to Tr- and from2 5 5 4 4 5
Tg to Trj, involve a new semantic dimension. On the other
hand, it may simply involve the combination of semantic
dimensions which already have some status in the system,
in a novel way. This latter possibility is demonstrated
by the transitions from T^ to Tg, from T^ to Tg and from
Tg to Tg. We can expect Condition 4 to be approached
differently under these two sets of circumstances.
4
Consider, then, those transitions which introduce a new
combination of semantic dimensions already present in the
system. In each case, referring to the combination by Y
and to the semantic dimensions found in the theory previous
to that in which the combination first appears by X,
Condition 4 leads us to ask whether there is any reason
for finding the development which we can schematise as:
X > X + Y
rather than the alternative:
Y > X + Y
Taking a particular example, for the transition from T^
to Tg, X denotes the set of semantic dimensions, [Temporary
duration, Containment, Support, Number, Earlierness,
PossessionJ , and Y denotes the set, [Number + Earliernessj.
It might be thought that this progression could be grounded
in the logic of the theory but this is not so because,
while it is true that for the child to use the combination
of semantic dimensions, Number + Earlierness, he must, in
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some sense, be acquainted with each of the components,
it doesn't follow that he needs to have put those components
to use singly in his semantic system. Nevertheless, with
the additional assumption that the child must use dimensions
singly "before he uses them in combination, the transition
from Tp. to Tr could be seen as grounded in the logic of
d °
the theory and it is significant that it is this sort of
case which lends itself to analysis in terms of cumulative
semantic complexity. Because of this, Brown feels able
to conclude that the fact that the Uncontractible copula
follows Plural and Past irregular in the acquisition order
is determined by semantic complexity. Much the same
goes for the transition from Tg to Tg where it is
necessary to assume that the child can only use combinations
of three dimensions after he has used combinations of
two but the transition from to Tg is rather more
problematic. In terms of the above schematisation, what
we have is that X denotes the set of dimensions and
dimension combinations, ^Temporary duration, Containment,
Support, Number, Earlierness, Possession, Number +
Earlierness, Specific-non-specific J and Y denotes the set,
£Number + Earliernessj. Now, of course, Y is a subset of
X and there is nothing in the logic of the theory to
explain why one morpheme involving this combination of
semantic dimensions should be acquired later than another
morpheme involving exactly the same combination, a fact
which Brown is well aware of and which arises anyway in
connection with the reduction of the original list of
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fourteen morphemes to ten.
Consider next those transitions where it is the addition
of a new semantic dimension which is crucial rather than
a novel combination of previously acquired dimensions.
On whether the theory has any explanatory status in this
regard, Brown is pessimistic. He says (p.421):
There is no general theory of semantic complexity that ■
makes it possible to assign complexity values to the
seven independent unitary meanings J_ Temporary
duration, Containment, Support, Number, Earlierness,
Possession, Specific-non-specific - RIIA_7. It is my
impression that Specific-non-specific is the most
complex of these, in some sense or other, and so perhaps
the fact that it is the last of the meanings to be
acquired is an indication that semantic complexity is
a determinant of acquisition order. Without a theory
of complexity, however, which predicts the difficulty
of the Sppcific-non-specific meaning, no real import¬
ance attaches to this result, (my emphasis - RMA)
We can see exactly what would be involved in diluting
Brown's pessimism if we consider the transition from T^
to T^ in connection with the satisfaction of Condition 4.
We are required to produce a reason for why we should
get the development schematised as:
(Temporary duration) > [Temporary duration, Contain¬
ment, Support/
rather than the alternative:
(Containment, Support] } [Temporary duration,
Containment, Supportj
There is nothing in the notional theory of semantics
Brown adopts to provide such a reason. If there were,
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this would he an answer to Brown's plea for a theory of
semantic complexity, but, whereas some sort of theory-
internal justification appears to be the only type he
considers, in the scheme I am using there acre two others.
Unfortunately, however, there is no reason to believe
that pursuit of either of them would be rewarding in our
current state of ignorance. As far as examining different
languages for the different dimensions is concerned, this
could have interesting consequences (cf. Brown's own
remarks on the absence of an article system in Japanese,
a property shared with many other languages) but, in
the absence of relevant data from many more sources, it
is pointless to speculate further. An attempt to ground
the theory in a more basic theory could also lead us to
formulate interesting questions but, again, we lack the
more basic theory and there is no reason to believe that,
were it available, a reduction would have the desired
146
consequences.
In conclusion, it appears that the semantic analysis
offered by Brown fares best with Condition 3 and struggles
against the requirements of Condition 4. This is almost
certainly related to the fact that the proposals do not
have their origins in some general theory of semantic
146. One only has to speculate on the transition from T^
to T0 to appreciate the problem. This leads us to
speculate on the nature of cognitive or perceptual reasons
for the child acquiring the semantic dimension of Temporary
duration before he acquires those of Containment and
Support.
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structure and, until such a theory is available in a form
usable by child-language theorists, it is difficult
to be optimistic about success in this domain,
3.6.2 Grammatical complexity as a determinant of
acquisition order
Brown takes as his reference grammar the theory presented
in Jacobs and Rosenbaum (1968) and the fact that this
grammatical framework is no longer widely accepted in
detail has no bearing on the value of the present t
investigation. All that is important from my perspective
is that it does represent a more or less coherent set of
views on language structure and on the sort of formal
device available to the grammarian. For each of the
fourteen morphemes, Brown exhibits the various features
and rules which are directly involved with that morpheme
in the Jacobs and Rosenbaum framework, embellishing the
framework where he believes he is justified in doing so.
The result is a rather complex tabulation in which features,
rules, etc. are mentioned as instances of feature-types,
rule-types, etc. Figure 63 contains a sample of entries
from this tabulation, (see p 290)
While the notation and ideas expressed in Figure 63 will
be intelligible enough to anyone familiar with Jacobs
ana Rosenbaum's work or Brown's adaptation of it, it is
quite likely to contain several mysteries for readers
meeting it for the first time and so I shall briefly
discuss one or two of the entries. Consider first the



























Progress affixT Progressive segmentT
Figure63.AdaptedfromBrown,p3/^-5.
+affix+copula/-s-zi /2(-m-r)
Auxiliary IncorporationT Auxiliary agreementT r\. VLc
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fairly simple case of the present progressive. In the
Jacobs and Rosenbaum grammar the feature (+progressive]> ,
is introduced by a segment structure rule which operates
on a segment already specified as . Hence the entry
under 'segment structure features' in the figure. The
relative unacceptability of some verbs with progressive
aspect is treated as a grammatical fact and, to this end,
it is suggested that verbals (adjectives and verbs) should
be subcategorised via a feature, +action. On this issue
4
Brown says:
It is to be presumed that when a verb (+V.> )
segment has acquired the feature <(+progressive)> then
only those verbs may be substituted for it....that
are marked <^+action)> . In fact, Jacobs and Rosenbaum
do not provide an explicit mechanism for accomp¬
lishing this effect, and this is one point in which
their representation of progressive aspect is sketchy
(p.349).
Here then is the explanation for the entry in the 'lexical
features' column: these features are, in some sense,
presupposed by the correct use of progressive aspect.
Whether they might not have other antecedent roles to play
in the child's developing grammar is a point Brown doesn't
discuss. A transformation, the progressive affix
transformation, introduces a segment following the verbal
with the features, <\+affix)> and ^progressive^ , which
is ultimately spelled out as the progressive morpheme,»ing.
Thus we have the entry in the 'transformations'column
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and. also in the 'features introduced by transformation'
1 47
column. ' The progressive inflection undergoes no alio-
morphic variation.
Now consider a rather more complicated example, that of the
third person regular morpheme. The choice of a third
person form of the verb must be determined by the choice
of a third person subject. Thus, in a well-formed sentence,
the subject noun will have in its lexical entry a feature
corresponding to third person represented here as +III,
Note that this differs from the entries in the second column
in that it is regarded as an inherent feature of certain
nouns in the lexicon and not as an optional development of
a category node. The choice and form of the morpheme also
depend on the number of the subject. In the Jacobs and
Rosenbaum framework this number will be specified by means
of a segment structure rule which adds <+singular> or
147. It is not entirely clear why <+progressive) should not
also be entered in this latter column as Brown sees the
transformation as relating the two structures:
^ S and S
BP NP VP
f li \
N VB N VB
Adam eat Adam eat^ N(+affix>
<(+N) <(+YB) <C+N} <+VB) ^progressive)
-common) <^-rV)> (-common) <^-V}
(^-progressive) ^-progressive)
(adapted from Brown, pp.548, 350)
where the feature, (+progressive) , has been introduced
by the rule in exactly the same way as the feature (+affix^.
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<^-singular^ to noun segments. Hence the presence ox these
feature values in the 'segment structure features' column.
An additional determinant of the form of the morpheme ; •
is Tense and a segment structure rule introduces <(+present/
or <j-present) into the Aux category so these feature values
are also entered in this column. As far as the transformat¬
ional rules are concerned, when there is an auxiliary
verb, a transformation is needed.to copy number and person
features from the subject noun onto the auxiliary. This
is the Auxiliary agreement transformation. When no such
auxiliary is present, a different transformation, the
verbal agreement transformation, must copy this same
1 ^3-8
information onto the main verb segment. ' Finally, it is
necessary to introduce a segment with the feature, <h-affix)>
to the right of the verb which is eventually spelled out
as the appropriate inflection. This also is achieved by
a transformation, the Verb suffix transformation, and
these three rules constitute the entry under 'Transformations'
in Figure 63. We have already mentioned the introduction
of the <(-faffix^ segment which is entered in the 'features
introduced by transformation' column and the last point
is that the fact that there is regular allomorphic variation
is taken as contributing to overall grammatical complexity
and the allomorphs are entered in the figure accordingly.
148. In fact, this information is copied from the auxiliary
segment where it ended up as a result of the Auxiliary
agreement transformation and this copying is made contingent
on the absence of the feature, <+copula).
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I hope that this abbreviated discussion cf two examples
will enable the uninitiated reader to sample something of
the flavour of this approach to grammatical description
without necessarily grasping all the details of the analyses.
These details are not crucial to following the subsequent
. 149
discussion.
Just as we did for the case of semantic complexity we can
consider Brown's analysis as suggesting a developmental
theory in which there are a number of stages; in this
case, given that the arguments for uniting the regular and
irregular variants no longer obtain and given that the
possessive morpheme is not included, we end up with twelve
stages, T.j -T.jp, and in each T^ (2£i—12) the morphemes
in along with the new morpheme(s) characterising this
stage will be listed along with their grammatical properties.
The most manageable way in which this can be considered
is to isolate types of grammatical information as has
already been done in 3.3 and 3.4. So, for example, if
we consider only the transformations involved in the
appropriate use of the morphemes, we can investigate a
theory which has the structure shown in Figure 64.
Figure 64 presents the theory in a form to which Conditions
1 - 4 are applicable and, noting the usual remarks for
Condition 1 contingent on us defining the domain of
149. It should be pointed out that Brown felt unable to
complete a set of entries for the possessive morpheme.
Henceforth, the possessive morpheme will not be included
in my analyses.
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investigation, D, as something like the grammatical aspect
of the child's lexical knowledge which enables him to use
and understand a particular set of morphemes appropriately,
we can see that Condition 2 is satisfied to the extent
that we regard Jacobs and Rosenbaum's theory as embodying
a general theory of grammar. I shall assume "that it does
embody such a theory and that, therefore, Condition 2 is
satisfied.
Condition 3 also appears to be satisfied for most transitions.
*
What characterises the move from Qh to (1—i—11 ) is
usually the introduction of either new transformational
rules or new combinations of such rules and this was
exactly the situation ive found in our investigation of
semantic complexity. It fails to be true in just two
cases: the transition from to Tg, involving the intro¬
duction of articles and the Article 1 where the latter
has already been used in combination with other trans¬
formations in the transition from to and the transition
from Tg to T0, involving die introduction of third person
irregular and requiring a cumulatively simpler combination
of transformations than the transition from to T0. AsI o
far as the first of these observations is concerned, it
has to be pointed out that the Article T does not play a
part in the formation of plurals as such but merely handles
co-occurrence restrictions between particular articles
and singular and plural forms of the noun. As articles
have not reached the criterion for acauisition in 51, we
can assume that the Article T was not Involved in the
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grammar of plurals at this stage and that its inclusion
in Figure 64, while appropriate from the point of view of
the adult model, is not justified by the child's usage.
For the transition from Tg to Tg, Brown has this to say (p.358):
Jacobs and Rosenbaum note that for irregular verbs
like has and does the verb suffix transformation
must be blocked ... In the table (= Figure 63 - RMA)
I have used the lexical feature, +irregular to
mark the existence of the problem but it must be
understood that the representation of irregulars
is incomplete.
So,arguably, although we have what appears to be the intro¬
duction of some simplified transformational machineryat Tg,
it might be the case that this is compensated by the intro¬
duction of the lexical feature, +irregular , and whatever
else proves to be necessary in the grammar of irregular
verbs, in other parts of the grammar. Such a suggestion
amounts to a claim that Condition 3 is not applicable to
the sequence of theories, (Tg , Tg), where Tg and T^ are
theories involving all the grammatical information relevant
to the morphemes and could be seen as an argument against
the strategy adopted here of isolating components of the
grammar for separate discussion. The upshot of this is
that, in principle, there may be avenues to explore in
answer to the charge that the transitions from Tg to T^
and from Tg to Tg fail to satisfy Condition 3 and, on this
basis, let us assume that, in general, Condition 3 is
satisfied by the sequence (T^, ^12^*
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What of Condition 4? An exhaustive survey of the diffi¬
culties arising from attempts to satisfy this condition
for each of the transitions would be time-consuming and
not lead to conclusions distinct from the ones we are now
familiar with in this chapter. If we had cases which
could be treated in terms of cumulative transformational
complexity, we would appear to have the beginnings of
a logical grounding for the sequence if we are prepared
to subscribe to additional assumptions concerning the
child's ability to use n transformational operations only
after he has used n-1 such operations, etc. We have such
1 50
cases but they are few and far between and for most
pairs of theories in the sequence we have to seek an alter¬
native. Consider a simple case. The transition from T^
to T^ can be schematised, as far as transformational rules
are concerned, as:
(Progressive affix fj > (Progressive affix T,
Preposition segment TJ
and'we are to provide a reason for why we find this
rather than the alternative:
(Preposition segment Tj > (Progressive affix T
Preposition segment Tj
In this case, there is nothing in the logic of the
grammatical theory to provide an answer; the Preposition
segment T is not, in any sense, a complication or
elaboration of the Progressive affix T. Hor is it possible
150. The pairs of theories which are related in this way
are, T. and T.T. and T.T and T„ and and T0.1 10'1 12'4 ' I 8
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to discern any ordering relationship between the two
transformations which could constitute an alternative
logical grounding. Pacts concerning the distribution of
such rules in the languages of the world are unlikely to
be useful so, again, this leaves us with the task of
grounding the theory in some other, regarded as more basic.
But no such theory suggests itself. Thinking loosely of
cognition and formal operations, both of the transformations
in question involve the creation and insertion in a string
of new material. Formally, there is no tangible difference
between them and certainly not the sort of difference
which would lead us to claim that one is cognitively more
demanding than the other. We can safely conclude, then,
that the transition from to T^ fails to satisfy Condition 4
and the same goes for other transitions in the sequence
forcing the view on us that the whole sequence is not
grounded and cannot be considered an adequate developmental
theory.
One immediate response to this conclusion would be to
insist that the tactic of isolating components is mis¬
leading and that, whatever the difficulties, one should
attempt to take account of development in each of the
1 51
components simultaneously. The difficulties of this
151. We should note that Brown himself, when comparing stages
feels obliged to restrict himself to one sort of theoretical
construct and, in fact, only considers transformations
from the point of view of cumulative complexity. To the
extent that development in other areas of the grammar might
invalidate the attempted comparisons in the test, they will
also invalidate Brown's own procedures.
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procedure have already been discussed in Chapter 1 and
we would inevitably end up with sequences of theories to
which Condition 3 was not applicable and versions of
Condition 4 which, when possible to work with at all,
would fare as badly as the example just considered. A
partial move in this direction is, of course, to restrict
our attention to some grammatical construct other than
transformations and to consider sequences of theories for
such a construct. For lexical features such a series would
begin as in Figure 65 and for segment structure features
as in Figure 66.
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in - on - +on +in
etc.
-c- £J52Figure 66
152. As Brown points out, such a sequence will, in all
relevant respects, parallel the sequence of Figure 62.
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We might find that, at just those points where it appears
that Condition 3 is not satisfied for the sequence of
sets of transformational rules, it is satisfied for
another construct enabling us to conclude that it is
inapplicable to the full theories but, without going in -
to details, I think it should be apparent that such sequences
will fare no better with Condition 4 than that already -
considered.
Overall then it seems that both the semantic and syntactic
*
approaches fail to satisfy Condition 4 and the latter is
particularly wholehearted in its failure. This is a
conclusion which has characterised the analyses of this
chapter and one which will be focussed on again in the
next one.
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CHAPTER 4 : LAHGUAG-E ACQUISITION MP COGNITIVE DBVBLOPilENT
This chapter differs in structure from the two previous
ones. The position to be discussed is that which claims
that some, or even all, aspects of linguistic development
can only be understood and explained in terms of an
antecedently given theory of cognitive development, a
position which has come to be widely accepted in the last
few years but which lacks critical analysis. Depending on
whether one holds that it is only a restricted set of
*
linguistic abilities which are explainable in this way or
whether one believes that general cognitive development
infects the whole gamut of linguistic competences, one
could be regarded as adopting weak or strong forms of the
hypothesis that 'thought' precedes and, in some sense,
determines language structure.
Obviously an investigation of this issue amounts to an
analysis of one aspect of Condition 4 from Chapter 1
and part of the first section of this chapter is devoted
to expanding the relevant part of this condition. Conditions
1 - 3 will not concern us at all here. 4,1 examines two
further general problems. The first of these, and relatively
unimportant, is the extent to which the relationship
between language and cognition can be made definitional
by regarding it as a matter of stipulation that any sort
of linguistic activity is also a cognitive activity and
the second concerns the elaboration of a number of positions
which can be taken on this relationship, once we admit
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that the definitional approach removes a number of
interesting questions from the arena of discussion.
4,2 concentrates on arguments which focus on one or
another aspect of semantic development whereas 4,3 considers
attempts to reduce developmental syntactic phenomena to
a general cognitive base. The study of 'strategies' in
language development, both as an instrument in learning
and as a mechanism of comprehension, forms the subject-
matter of 4.4 and, finally, in 4.5, I examine the structure
of the arguments in Cromer (1974) for autonomous linguistic
development. In selecting studies and analyses for
discussion I have necessarily been very selective. The
literature in this area is vast and expanding but, to
my knowledge, there are no existing proposals which fare
spectacularly better against the criteria I develop
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than the ones which are explicitly considered. Of
course, even if there are, the point of this chapter will
not be lost as it may provide us with a framework for
investigating why such proposals are more convincing
than others.
153. I should point out here that some of the work discussed
in Chapter 2, particularly that of Kelson, would repay
examination in the terms developed below. However, I
have already said enough for the reader to discern the
outline of a fuller analysis. Similarly some of the
work analysed in Chapter 6 strives to make contact with
cognitive development and my decisions to treat things
in the order found here is, to some extent, to facilitate
organisation but also to take account of emphases in the
original work.
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4.1 Language ana cognition: general considerations
In this section I examine three general problems. 4.1.1
considers the definitional approach to the relationship
between linguistic and cognitive development, 4.1.2
enumerates a number of distinct positions on the issue
of this relationship, comparing them informally to some
of Chomsky's (1974) views on the interaction of a theory
of language and a system of 'common-sense understanding',
and 4.1.3 develops a refined version of the relevant part
*
of Condition 4 which is referred to in this Chapter as
the Reduction Condition.
4.1.1 The definitional position
It is possible to insist that the relationship between
language development and cognitive development is
uninteresting because, by definition, any sort of linguistic
activity is a cognitive activity and any sort of linguistic
structure to which psychological reality is imputed is
also a cognitive structure. There is little point in
arguing with definitions, but it seems to me that to adopt
this stance is to rule out of court a number of very
interesting questions. As a particular example, consider
the formal nature of the rules (of different types)
employed in a transformational grammar and discussed, to
some extent, in Chapter 3. Assume that it makes sense to
credit the child with such a grammar at some stage in
his syntactic development. Then., when presented with
the question as to whether the rules of the grammar could
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be related to the child's general cognitive development,
a proponent of the definitional position has to respond
that the answer is positive, but uninteresting; and
exactly the same response would be forthcoming, no matter
what the domain of linguistic enquiry. Clearly there
is nothing contradictory about this position and we shall
see in 4.4.2 below that such an eminent theorist as
Slobin can be seen as adopting it, albeit implicitly.
But, with the grammar example still in mind, consider the
following question: is it the case that the formal *
structure of the various rule-types used in a sample
grammar are found in other cognitive domains? For
transformational rules it could be claimed, and has been,
somewhat tentatively, by Chomsky (1968), that "the formal
properties which characterise them are not found in
any other domain of human or animal cognition. Such a
claim is refuted by indicating a domain in which a similar
formal device is necessary to explain the organism's
behaviour, knowledge, etc. (cf, the work of Clowes (1969)
on visual perception which could be seen as an investigation
of this very problem among other things). The claim and
its possible refutation are surely clear and interesting,
and I intend, in what follows, to regard as a non-cognitive
linguistic construct any such construct which is not
identifiable in a cognitive domain other than language.
This is not to claim that such constructs exist and,
indeed, it is the burden of this chapter to investigate
opinions on this matter, but it is to claim that, understood
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in these terms, issues concerning the relationship between
language development and cognitive development cannot
be reduced to vacuity defiritionally.
4.1.2 A spectrum of -positions
This general issue raises again the question of the
precise identity of the domain of enquiry in a language
acquisition study (cf. Chapter 1). Earlier discussion
enumerated a number of such domains and recognition of
this multiplicity immediately indicates that we should be
suspicious of the suggestion that language dewelotiment
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can be explained by reference to cognitive development. "
What could such a suggestion amount to? It might mectn a
number of things and the strongest position that it would
be possible to adopt would insist that all aspects of
language development require such reference for under¬
standing and explanation. Whether anyone has subscribed
to this rather extreme position is not a matter to be
settled here, for it is apparent that alternatives exist
which still offer a central role to cognitive development
in explaining language acquisition.
Referring to a set of domains of linguistic investigation,
each of which we regard as reasonably delimited, as
r -) 155
|D.| , H t ..., DJ, we can imagine that theories have
154. I assume that such a suggestion is not made by some¬
one subscribing to the 'definitional' position of 4.1.1
155. Strictly speaking, for the purposes of this chapter,
the theories should be developmental but the point can
equally well be made in a non-developmental context.
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been constructed in each of these domains and that these
theories have, not necessarily disjoint, sets of formal
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properties, ..., P^. Thus P^ is the set of
formal properties associated with theories in (1-i-n).
Then it may be the case that some or all of the properties
in the sets, P^ (1-i-n), can be identified with properties
associated with theories in other domains of non-linguistic
cognitive development and this may be the case in a number
of ways each one leading to slightly different formulations
of the relationship between linguistic and cognitive*
development. For example, we might find that all the
members of a particular set of properties, say P., were
J
identified in theories of the non-linguistic cognitive
domain, D . In such a case we would be in a position to7 x -
investigate the explanatory value of development in D
x
for our understanding of development in the linguistic
domain, D., and a positive outcome to such an investigation
would lead to the conclusion that linguistic development
in D. could be explained by reference to cognitive develop-
D
ment in D . On the other hand, we might find that onlyX
a subset of a particular P. can be identified in the non-
D
linguistic domain, D (and, for simplicity, that those
156. To simplify the presentation here I concentrate on
formal properties of theories rather than on their sub¬
stantive terms.. As an example, we could consider theories
of the lexicon which have the formal property, 'contains
binary features' or theories of grammatical knowledge
with the property, 'contains structure-dependent rules'.
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members of P. not found in theories in D are also not
J x
found in any other domain of non-linguistic cognitive
activity). In this case too we would proceed to
investigate the explanatory value of development in D for
our understanding of development in the linguistic domain
D., but now a positive outcome would not lead us to conclude
that linguistic development in D. is explained by reference
J
to cognitive development in D but only that it is -partiallyX
explained in these terms. We are left with the residue
of properties in our theories of D. which have not bden
3
identified in any non-linguistic domain and, at this stage
of the enquiry, we would be forced to conclude that they
constituted autonomous aspects of language development.
Remarks along similar lines can be found in Chomsky's
recent speculations, although within a different frame¬
work and a different context (see Chomsky (1974, 1976)).
In these publications Chomsky discusses the "thesis of
independence of grammar" and the "thesis of autonomy of
formal grammar". The first of these is concerned with
the possibility of there being an interaction between
the speaker's knowledge of his language and his system
of 1 common-sense understanding' such that the latter may
serve as an explanatory basis for the former, and the
second with the possibility of there being a similar
interaction between the speaker's knowledge of linguistic
form and his semantic knowledge. It is in connection
with the latter that Chomsky makes his clearest statement
when he says (1974,pp.15 - 16):
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Suppose that among the primitive notions of linguistic
theory we can distinguish some that are "semantic"
and others that are "formal". Thus we might take such
notions as "synonymous", "significant", "denotes",
"satisfies", "refers to concrete objects", to be core
notions of semantics, let us say, primitive in our
linguistic theory: while the primitives of phonetic
theory...may be taken to be formal notions. Given
a bifurcation of the primitive notions into "formal"
and "semantic" we can ask, for each defined concept,
whether terms of one or the other category appear
in its definition. There are then purely formal
concepts. We may refer to the theory concerning# just
these as "the theory of linguistic form". We might
discover that this theory - which excludes the core
notions of semantics - is virtually null, or quite
uninteresting. Or, at the other extreme, we might
find that it includes an interesting concept of
"grammar" and "structure", perhaps all linguistic
levels apart from semantic representation.
The latter possibility is referred to by Chomsky as the
"absolute autonomy thesis" and is contrasted with the
"parameterized autonomy thesis" which represents something
between the two extremes pointed to in the cited passage.
Clearly, a similar distinction can be made for the inter¬
action between systems of linguistic knowledge and systems
of 'common-sense understanding' and it seems to me that
it is not implausible to regard the above discussion of
the possible relationships between linguistic and cognitive
development as entailing the same sort of spectrum of
positions. Thus, consider again the possibility of
theories in the linguistic domain, D., involving formal
3
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properties, Pip,..., P- . It may be the case thatJ ' J
none of these properties can be identified in any non-
linguistic cognitive domain and, in this situation, we
could talk of the "absolute autonomy of development
in D. with respect to cognitive development". Alternatively,
we may discover that a subset of [P-j-j » ^i2' ^jm}
can be identified in theories of the non-linguistic domain
D , in which case we could talk of the "narameterizedx'
autonomy of development in D. with respect to cognitive
D
development". Finally, it might be the case that thl full
set of properties in P. could be identified in theories
in D , in which case we would speak of the "absolute
1 57
dependence of development in D. on cognitive development".
«J
Taking the discussion one step further we can now consider
the full set of domains, £d,| , D^r Pn] * again, a
set of possibilities emerges. It may be that development
157. Both of these latter positions assume that additional
conditions still to be investigated are satisfied to justify
the assertion of total or partial dependence. One fur¬
ther possibility which could be mentioned but which seems
to be sufficiently remote from serious investigation at
the moment as to not warrant further discussion is that
whereby some properties in the set, lp31- PJ2 V*
are identified in the non-linguistic domain, D , while
others are identified in theories of the distinct non-
linguistic domain, D . Perhaps it would be justified,
at this stage, to assume that cognitive development is
monolithic once language development is excluded and so
simply avoid this sort of possibility.
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in each of D|, D^, ..., is absolutely dependent on
cognitive development, that development in each of them
is dependent on cognitive development but that, in some
cases, this dependence is only partial, that development
in some of them is totally dependent while development
in others is totally independent of cognitive development
and so on. Only for the first possibility would vie be
justified in asserting that language development depends
1 58
on cognitive development without qualification.
#
4.1.5 The Reduction Condition
This section is concerned with revision and extension of
the second clause of Condition 4 (p 48). I shall not be
concerned with any domain outside the child's activity
and, for the purposes of this chapter, the "other sphere
of the child's activity" is the sphere of general cognitive
development. The relevant part of Chapter 1 leading up
to the statement of Condition 4 laid the groundwork for
some of what follows.
The situation we are to consider is one in which we have
a sequence of theories, (L^ , L^ ..., )» i*1 some
domain of language development, D, and a sequence of
158. As an example, consider the possibility that syntactic
knowledge is, to some extent, independent of cognitive
development whereas the development of speech acts or
'communicative competence' is totally dependent on such
development. The only thing to be clear about is that
there is no conflict in this hypothetical state of affairs.
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theories, (C^, C^, ..., Cm), which constitutes an adequate
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theory of cognitive development. ^ Furthermore, we know
the temporal ordering across the two sequences as well
as within the sequences, i.e., we can collapse the two
4. -4. 160
sequences to give one composite sequence.
Having obtained a collapsed sequence of the sort described
what can we demand of this sequence if we are to claim
that the cognitive development explains the linguistic
development? Already discussed in Chapter 1 is the
0
requirement that there must be some significant relationship
159. It is not my task here to investigate what may be
involved in this notion but I would anticipate that
something along the lines of the discussion in Chapter 1
would be relevant.
160. I shall assume that such a collapsed sequence is a
total ordering but nothing hangs on this assumption. If
we were to allow cognitive and linguistic theories to
appear 'simultaneously' in the ordering, it would only
complicate some of the subsequent definitions while not
materially affecting the arguments. Hote that no one-one
correspondence between theories in the two sequences is
entailed by this procedure and I leave open the possibility
that in a collapsed sequence we shall find adjacent
linguistic theories and adjacent cognitive theories. This
is merely a reflection of the fact that we are not entitled
to prejudge the issue of the number of theories of either
type and the most conservative strategy assumes that the
stages on which our theories are based are quite arbitrary
and a function of the methodology of the individual studies,
time available, etc. As pointed out in Chapter 1, this
is not to deny the possibility of there being a particular




between the substantive terms and formal properties of
1 6 1
the two sequences of theories. Some of the linguistic
theories we have considered and some of those still to
be considered have very poorly developed formal structures
but, while we can hope that such a situation will change,
this fact in itself is immaterial to the task at hand.
I now claim that, in order for the cognitive theory to
be explanatory in the domain of linguistic development
under investigation, it must be the case that:
(1) the substantive terms, of the linguistic theory
can be translated into substantive terms of the
cognitive theory
and:
(2) the formal properties of the linguistic theory
must be identifiable in the cognitive theory
So, as an example, we can imagine a developmental theory
of syntax which consists of a sequence of grammars util¬
ising a set of grammatical categories and a set of rule-
types. If there is to be the sort of relationship we
require between a cognitive theory and this theory of
syntactic development, then it must be the case that:
(i) each of the grammatical categories can be trans¬
lated Into some substantive term of the cognitive
theory (e.g., HP is translated as 'Entity', ¥1 is
translated as 'Action', where 'Entity' and 'Action'
are theoretical terms in the cognitive theory in
question)
161. I am assuming here that the distinction between




(ii) each formal property corresponding to each rule-
type must he identifiable in the cognitive theory
(e.g., if the linguistic theory includes phrase-
structure rules, then formal operations building
hierarchical structures must exist in the cognitive
theory; if the linguistic theory includes trans¬
formational rules, then the cognitive theory must
embrace processes which are structure-dependent
in the required sense.
Similarly, if our linguistic theory is concerned with the
development of the lexicon and uses binary semantic
features, then, in order for the cognitive theory to be
viable as a provider of an explanation, it must be the
case that:
(i) for each of the features used in the linguistic
theory (which I take to be the substantive aspects
of such a theory), there is a translation into
some term of the cognitive theory (e.g. +object
is translated as 'Entity', +animate is trans¬
lated as 'Animacy' where 'Entity' and 'Animacy'
are theoretical terms in the cognitive theory in
question).
and:
(ii)each formal property in the linguistic theory (in
this case we would appear to have only the two
properties of binary categorisation and set-
formation) can be identified in the cognitive
theory.
Clearly, while this much is necessary if the theories are
to be related in the required way, it is not sufficient
and the reader will have noted that (1) and (2) take no
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account of the ordering relations in the collapsed
sequence. Imagine, then, that we have some linguistic
theory from the sequence, 31, which uses substantive
terms, S, and which has formal properties, P. Assume
further that the translations of the substantive terms
required by (1 ) can be located in the sequence of cognitive
theories, (C^ , C^, ..., C.), and that (C^, C^, ..., C..)
also manifests the formal properties required by satis¬
faction of (2). Finally, assume that for all k (k<g),
it is not the case that the sequence, (C^, C^, ...,
contains all the relevant translations and the required
properties, i.e., (C., C?, ..., C.) is the first sub-
sequence of cognitive theories from the full sequence,
(C^ , C^, ..., C^), beginning with the first theory in
the sequence, which contains all the structure relevant
to 31. If we are to maintain that the cognitive theory
explains the linguistic development, then It is apparent
that C . must precede 31 in the collapsed sequence. If
this were not the case, we would have the beginnings of
an argument for the linguistic development explaining
aspects of cognitive development, namely those which did
not appear in the cognitive theories until after 1^ in
the collapsed sequence. So we can now formulate a third
condition:
(3) The translations of substantive terms and formal
properties required by satisfaction of (1 ) and (2)
must appear in the sequence of cognitive theories
before they are required by a linguistic theory.
316
To illustrate, imagine that we have the collapsed sequence,
(C.j , C2, L.j , C^, 12, C^, L^), where C^,C2, and are
cognitive theories and , l2and are linguistic theories
in the specified domain, D, Then, in order for the cognitive
theory to have the necessary relationship with the linguistic
theory, the substantive terms of L. must be translatable
into substantive terms of the subsequence, (C^, C2),
and the formal properties of must be identifiable in
this subsequence, the substantive terms of 12 must be
translatable into substantive terms in the subsequenpe,
(C.j , C2, C^), with its formal properties being identifiable
in this subsequence and the substantive terms of.1^ must
be translatable into the substantive terms of the whole
cognitive sequence, (C^, C2, C^, C^), which must also
manifest l^'s formal properties. This formulation leaves
open the possibility that the 'new' terms and properties
of a linguistic theory are already translatable or
identifiable in a sequence of cognitive theories which does
not include the cognitive theory immediately preceding
the linguistic theory in the collapsed sequence. This
appears to be entirely correct for the reasons discussed
in Chapter 1 and no stronger necessary condition can be
imposed (but cf. below).
To give a moie concrete example, we can revert to syntactic
development, conceived of in terms of transformational
grammars. Assume that we have the collapsed sequence,
(C^, 1^, C2, L2), where and 12 are grammars and and
C2 are theories of cognitive development. Assume further
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that L.j is a phrase-structure grammar and contains
also transformational rules. Finally, assume that
contains operations which construct hierarchical structures
and that contains structure-dependent operations. Then,
restricting our attention to formal properties, the
condition under discussion is satisfied and the view that
the cognitive development explains the linguistic
development is consistent with such a sequence. If, under
the same assumptions, we had obtained the sequence,
(C^ , 1,^2, L.j), the condition would not have been satis¬
fied and the claim that cognitive development explained
*1 C-\ o
syntactic development would be falsified. Just as
for the first sequence considered in this paragraph, so
for the sequence, (C^, C^, Iu , L2), and the sequence,
^2*^1 * "^1 ' -^2^' although these latter two do not exhibit
the degree of 'cohesion' that we find in the first sequence
(cf. below).
So far, then, we have three conditions on the reduction,
one concerning translatability of substantive terms, a
second concerning identifiability of formal properties
and a third referring to the sequencing of the theories
of different types. It appears that these are the only
necessary conditions we can impose and what they amount
to, if satisfied, is a demonstration that the relevant
162. The fact that this developmental sequence would be
ruled out anyway on the grounds that we could hardly have
a grammar with transformations without a previous stage
of a phrase-structure grammar is beside the point in the
present context.
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cognitive development precedes the linguistic development
under consideration. But such a demonstration does not
explain the linguistic development. For such an explanation
we need to see some causal link between the cognitive
and linguistic spheres and nothing we have said so far
precludes them from developing independently. In particular,
terms and formal properties may enter the cognitive and
linguistic theories in quite different orders and, as
was argued in Chapter 1 , it is impossible to rule this out
by a necessary condition, i.e., it might be the case -that
there is a causal relationship between cognitive and
linguistic development without there being any strict
similarities between the orders of appearance of cognitive
and related linguistic constructs. Nevertheless, we
could increase the plausibility of the claim if certain
farther conditions were met and it is the purpose of
the last part of this section to introduce two such
conditions.
Consider first a collapsed sequence which satisfies the
conditions (1) - (3). The satisfaction of (1) and (2)
entails the existence of a mapping, F$ from the primitives
(substantive and formal) of the linguistic theory to those
of the cognitive theory such that, for substantive terms,
F is the translation mapping required by satisfaction of
(1) and, for formal properties, F is the identity mapping.
The sets of primitives in both sequences of theories,
(1^, L2, ..., L ) and (C^, 0^, ..., Cm), can be seen
as partially ordered "by the total-orderings on the sets
of theories (cf. fn. 160) and we can enquire as to whether
F preserves the partial ordering of the linguistic primitives
in the cognitive primitives, i.e., we can consider whether
entails PCX^)—P(X^) where ' € ' is the partial
ordering induced on the linguistic primitives "by the total
ordering on the set of linguistic theories, '—' is the
corresponding partial ordering for the cognitive primitives
and X^ and X^ denote primitives (substantive or formal)
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of the linguistic theory. If this condition is satis¬
fied we shall say that the two theories are order-
isomorphic and refer to this as a 'desirability condition'•
on the reduction, the satisfaction of which contributes
to the plausibility of the view that cognitive develop¬
ment explains language development in D (for a plea for
order-isomorphism, see fn. 58 in Chapter 2),
As a further possibility, consider the collapsed sequence,
(C.j , 1^ , C2, L2, ..., Cn, Ln) where each is a sub¬
sequence (possibly containing only one member) of cognitive
theories and each 3h is a subsequence (possibly containing
only one member) of linguistic theories. If we assume
that the sequence of (subsequences of) linguistic theories,
(L^, L2, Ln), satisfies Conditions 1 - 3 of Chapter 1,
it follows that for every pair, (L^, ), in "the
sequence the latter member will contain 'new' constructs
163. In other words, we are enquiring as to whether the
two sets of primitives enter the sequences in the same
order.
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when compared with the former member either of the same
type or of a different type. Let us refer to these 'new'
items in as N^+.j . We also assume that the sequence
(of subsequences) of cognitive theories, (C^ , C2, C^)
satisfies a set of conditions on explanatory theories of
cognitive development and, in particular, that it will
164-
satisfy some analogue of Condition 3. So, for every
pair, (C^, from the sequence, G^+-j will contain
•new' items when compared to C.. Let us refer to these
as IL.. Low recall that we require the substantive* terms
of L^ ^ to be translatable into substantive terms in the
sequence, (C^, C2, ..., C^+^) and that the formal properties
of should be identifiable in this sequence. Some
of the substantive terms and formal properties in L^+^
will be the 'new' ones, i.e., L^+.j, and we can ask where
in the sequence, (C^ , C2, ..., C^ .), we find the
translations of substantive terms in and the formal
properties in 11for the first time. An interesting
state of affairs ensues if these constructs first appear
in Ch+.j , i.e., if they are members of I'L ^. According
to this state of affairs, the sequence of C's and L's
is arranged in such a way that each innovation in the
164. Strictly speaking rather than satisfying Condition 3
we merely require that sequences don't violate it by
permitting theories to become simpler as the sequence
progresses. However, as a moment's reflection shows,
both possibilities, satisfaction or failure to violate,
involve the introduction of 'new' material in the sense
required by the argument.
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linguistic theory is Immediately preceded by the
1 65
appropriate innovation in the cognitive theory.
As a concrete example, we can consider again the collapsed
sequence, (C^, C^, L2)> where the sequence, (1^, L^),
is a developmental theory of syntax with a phrase-
structure grammar and a grammar including transformational
operations. is a cognitive theory including operations
for forming hierarchical structures and contains
additional structure-dependent operations. The innovation
in the sequence, (1^, I^), is the implementation of*
transformational rules and this is exactly paralleled by
the innovatory aspect of when compared to , the
appearance of structure-dependent operations. In a case
such as this I shall say that the theories are intermeshed
and see this as a further 'desirability condition' on
the reduction.
To see a simple example in which theories are not inter¬
meshed we can consider the collapsed sequence, (C^,1^,0^,12)
where, again, the sequence, (L^, ), is a developmental
theory of syntax with the properties it had in the previous
example. In this case, however, assume that the structure-
dependent rules in are restricted to those involving
the elementary operation of adjunction, that contains
operations for forming hierarchical structures and
structure-dependent operations restricted to adjunction
165. Of course, in addition, there may be a large number
of innovations in the cognitive theory which will be of
no concern to the linguistic theory.
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and that C2 contains everything in plus deletion
operations. Then the innovative aspects of over
include the introduction of adjunction rules and, as is
necessary to satisfy the earlier conditions, the formal
operation corresponding to adjunction is identifiable in
the sequence, (C^ , However, what is innovative in
the transition from to 1^ cannot be .identified with
what is innovative in the transition from to as
this latter involves the introduction of deletion operations
which are unknown to both and In this case, "there¬
fore, we would not be justified in concluding that the
two theories are intermeshed although the possibility
remains open that, with more stages sampled, they will
be order-isomorphic. In fact it is easy to see that
two theories being intermeshed is a special case of their
being order-isomorphic and, if theories of cognitive
development and language development in D are related in
this way, we should be strongly tempted to see cognition
as determining the progress of language development in
D, with each innovation in cognitive development making
available new concepts or new formalisms to the linguistic
system and with the linguistic system taking up its
options immediately.
I come finally to the statement of the revised second
clause of Condition 4 which, since it is the only condition




Given a theory T (= (L^ , L^, ..., I»n)) in the domain of
language development, D, then T is an explanatory theory
in D just in case Conditions 1 - 3 of Chapter 1 are
satisfied (assuming Condition 3 is applicable^0), and,
in addition, the relationship of simplicity obtaining
between 31 and (l-i-n~1 ) can be related to a theory
of cognitive development such that the following conditions
obtain:
(1) for all substantive terms appearing in the sequence
of linguistic theories it is possible to provide a
translation into the substantive terms of the cognitive
»
theory.
(2) for all formal properties appearing in the sequence
of linguistic theories it is possible to identify them in
the sequence of cognitive theories.
(3) given satisfaction of (1) and (2), it must be possible
to collapse the two sequences of theories such that, for
each substantive term in the linguistic theories, its
translation (as required by (1)) appears in the collapsed
sequence before the term itself appears and, for each
formal property in the linguistic theories, that formal
property must occur in a cognitive theory before it occurs
in a linguistic theory.
166. What follows in this formulation is neutral between
whether Condition 3 is satisfied or inapplicable (cf.
similar remarks in Chapter 1 )
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Failure to satisfy (1 ) or (2) indicates the inadequacy
of an attempted reduction whereas satisfaction of (1) and
(2) coupled with failure to satisfy (3) amounts to a
refutation of the view that cognitive development explains
linguistic development in D.
If in addition,
(4) the two theories are order-isomorphic
or, as a special case of (4),
(5) the two theories are intermeshed ,
this will count as additional support for the reduction,
contributing to its plausibility. However, nothing can
"be concluded from failure to satisfy either (4) or (5).
I now wish to attempt to apply this extended condition to
some of the best-known arguments for the dependence of
aspects of linguistic development on cognitive development.
4,2 Arguments from semantic development
In this section I shall discuss a number of studies which
have concentrated on aspects of the child's semantic
development. The main difference between these studies
and those discussed in Chapter 2 is that whereas the
latter focussed on the acquisition of lexical items and
their meanings, we are concerned here more with the struc¬
tural expression of meaning via syntax. This is not
strictly true in 4.2.6, although even there the emphasis
is on the use of single lexical items to encode complex
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propositions rather than on what we might refer to as
the 'referential meaning' of these items.
It is necessary to clear up a general point before
commencing any analysis. As far as the necessary cond¬
itions in the Reduction Condition are concerned, it is
clear that they are satisfied quite vacuously by any
theory of semantic development at least with regard to
the substantive terms in such a theory. Thus, if a
particular semantic analysis credits a child with a formally
simple meaning, M, then it is apparent that the child
must also control the concept 'corresponding to' M and
that he must control this concept before he expresses
it linguistically. Therefore M will be translatable into
some substantive term of a cognitive theory (satisfying (1))
and, furthermore, this substantive term will appear in
a collapsed sequence of cognitive and linguistic theories
before M (satisfying (3)). It follows, then, that any
discussion in this area, to avoid trivialising the issues,
must focus on formal aspects of semantic development
(e.g., modes of combination of simple meanings to form
complex meanings) or on satisfaction of the desirability
conditions, (4) and (5). There is, however, one further
issue which will emerge in what follows and that is that,
although we can be assured of the existence of a concept
corresponding to a meaning and that there is little point
in making an issue of this, the existence of the cognitive
theory in which the concept is a substantive term is not
guaranteed.
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Two possible misunderstandings may arise at this point.
The above view does not commit me to the identity of
systems of concepts and semantic categories, although
I must accept that the set of semantic categories is
a subset of the set of concepts available to the child at
any one time. This seems to me quite uncontroversial.
The second point is that it is possible for a child "to use
a linguistic expression or structure without controlling
the appropriate meaning (and hence concept) and the door
is still open for language to have some effect on *
conceptualisation if one wished to argue in this direction
(see Carter (1975) for a restricted argument of this type).
The child's linguistic expressions are not an infallible
guide to his set of concepts. But, if an investigator
is prepared to credit a child with a certain meaning no
matter how it is expressed - the child's meaning for the
expression - then he must also be prepared to credit
him with the corresponding concept.
In 4.2,1 I shall briefly consider McNamara's (1972)
influential paper arguing that most of its content is
irrelevant to the considerations of this chapter. 4.2.2 -
4.2.4 examine a set of arguments which have been constructed
by Cromer (1974) using findings of Brown and his
associates (4.2.2), Bloom's work on the development of
negation (4.2.3) and Cromer's own research on the acquis¬
ition of temporal reference (4.2.4). The structure of the
arguments in each of these sections is very similar.
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4.2.5 analyses the argument in a recent paper "by Antinucci
and Miller (1976) and 4.2.6 briefly considers relevant
sections of Greenfield and Smith (1976). Finally, in
4.2.7, I shall examine some of the work of Sinclair-de-
Zwart (for additional and largely unrelated comments on
her research, see 4.3.1), that with the most obvious
semantic relevance, and discuss what is a rather different
type of argument to what we shall meet in the rest of the
section.
#
4.2.1 McNamara's views on meaning, syntax and cognition
McNamara (1972) made a "big impression in the child
language field and is often cited as one of the seminal
papers on the topic of this chapter. Yet, on close
inspection, its relevant content is remarkably slight
despite the author's summary which says (p.11):
All that is needed for my position is that the
development of those basic cognitive structures to
which I referred should -precede the development of
the corresponding linguistic structures, (my emphasis-
RMA)
Such a statement would seem to indicate that Mchamara
has explicitly discussed the three necessary clauses of
the Reduction Condition for a range of linguistic phenomena
but this is mere fancy. The body of his paper is devoted
to a plausible argument that the child, in learning some
aspects of syntax, must have access to semantic information
which he can use to provide a foothold on what is other¬
wise an apparently impossible task. But this is quite
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consistent with the view that syntax, conceived of as a
formalisation of knowledge or as a set of procedures
for converting meanings into forms, is largely independent
of semantics and that, correspondingly, syntactic develop¬
ment is autonomous of cognitive development. To show
other-wise it is necessary to consider the properties of
particular syntactic theories and attempt to satisfy
(1 ) - (3) of the Reduction Condition hut nowhere does
McRamara attempt to do this.
J
An exception to the above analysis might be thought to
exist in McRe.mara1 s discussion of vocabulary development
where he makes, among others, the following two points:
(i) names for entities are learned before names for
certain attributes
and:
(ii) names for varying attributes are learned before
names for permanent attributes.
As far as the first of these is concerned, McKamara
says (p.4):
It is obvious that an infant has the capacity to
distinguish from the rest of the physical environment
an object which his mother draws to his attention
and names. It seems clear too that in such circum¬
stances he adopts the strategy of taking the word
he hears as a name for the object as a whole rather
than as a subset of its properties, or for its position,
ox- weight, or worth, or anything else.
This could have at least two interpretations of present
concern. The first of these has it that the child, at
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the stage in question, possesses a strategy along the
lines of:
Apply names to objects rather than attributes
which, for some reason, McNamara wishes to refer to as
a cognitive strategy. Clearly, however, it is a linguistic
strategy given that it manipulates the linguistic concept
'name', and it is not possible to see it as a particular
example of a more general cognitive (non-linguistic)
strategy. The second interpretation credits the child
with a cognitive category, 'Entity', at the stage in,
question and assumes that only later does he develop the
cognitive category, 'Attribute'. This may be plausible
and could be seen as providing a basis for the child
learning the syntactic distinction between Ilouns and
Adjectives but one looks in vain for a clear statement of
the cognitive theory which would make it moi-e than plausible.
An exactly parallel argument can be constructed for the
second point above, in connection with which McEamara
says (p.4):
If there is a differential set in small children to
attend to varying states and activities rather than
unvarying attributes, we need look no further for an
explanation for the order in which the corresponding
terms are learned.
Again we may be being asked to credit the child with a
strategy for language learning but, if so, it is patently
linguistic, or we may be faced with the suggestion that
the child controls a cognitive category, 'Varying attribute',
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before he controls a cognitive category, 'Unvarying
attribute' or 'State', a suggestion which, while plausible,
requires to be backed up with some firm cognitive evidence
1 67
before we can subscribe to it wholeheartedly.
In both cases we are concerned with what are essentially
semantic distinctions within the linguistic system and so
in both cases there is no real issue about the existence
of the relevant concepts before the child encodes them in
language. But there is an issue concerning the clear
articulation of these concepts within a cognitive theory
and McNamara goes no way towards resolving this issue.
4.2.2 Gromer on Brown
The second major section of Cromer (1974) is entitled
'Cognitive effects on grammar' and carries most of the
1 68
weight of his arguments in favour of the Cognition Hypothesis.
One of the arguments he uses draws on the work of Brown
167. These speculations can, of course, be related to thosea. 77 f
of Nelson discussed in Chapter 2.
168. The first section of his article bearing the title
'Cognitive effects on babbling and first words' defies
any reasonable analysis in the terms of this chapter.
Despite the title, it seems to me to be concerned with
semantic development and no relationship with any cognitive
theory is even pretended. Also several readings of
Cromer's article have failed to provide any succinct
statement of the content of the Cognition Hypothesis but
it seems clear that it amounts,at least, to a claim for
the truth of the three necessary clauses of the Reduction
Condition.
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and his associates and is concerned with the earliest
verbal inflections used by children. It boils down
to the fact that the 'standard' meaning associated with
each of these inflections can be identified, in the speech
of the child, before he marks any of these meanings formally,
such identification transparently involving the method
of 'rich' interpretation, whereby the investigator, by
taking account of context of utterance, attempts to get
at the child's intended meaning." Cromer summarises the
observations thus (p. 210): #
Srown noted that for all three children the verb
was initially in an unmarked form, i.e., it did not
have any inflectional endings. Nevertheless, such a
verb was understood by the parents in one of four
ways, depending not only on the utterance itself but
on the situational context in which the utterance
occurred. One of these was the imperative, as in
'Get book' .- A second meaning which was communicated
at this stage was reference to the past, as, for
example, in 'Book drop' where the book had just
dropped. A third meaning ascribed to the child was
that of intention or prediction, as in 'Mommy read'
in a context where Mommy was about to read to the
child. Finally there was the expression of present
temporary duration as in 'fish swim' where the
context would call for an adult utterance using a
progressive such as 'The fish is swimming'.
When we align this set of findings with the fact that the
children in Brown'§ study subsequently began to mark
distinctions in the verb and that the first distinctions
so marked were exactly those encoding the meanings with
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which the child is credited before he indulges in any
1 69
formal marking, we can construct an argument having
1 70
the following structure. There is a stage of development
at which it is necessary to credit the child with grammatical
devices which end up being realised as past-tense allo-
morphs, semi-auxiliaries, catenatives, progressive
inflections and please. Although no particular linguistic
theory is referred to, I shall assume that the child is
to be credited with the possession of a set of abstract
morphemes or syntactic categories, Past, Modal, Progressive)
and Imp(erative) at this stage. In addition, there is
a stage of cognitive development, evidenced by the child's'
earlier linguistic behaviour, at which he has a notion of
Pastness, Prediction, Intentionality, Ongoingness,
Temporariness arid Ordering (in the sense of imposing
obligation). Finally, there is the third claim that the
relevant stage of cognitive development precedes the
169. Of course, these are not all marked by inflections
and Brown refers to the emergence cf catenative verbs to
mark intentionality, etc. and of please to co-occur with
imperative interpretations of unmarked verbs.
170. At this point the reader may wonder whether it is
more appropriate to talk of syntactic or semantic develop¬
ment in this connection. Cromer urges the former but this
view can be countered by the observation that there is
a one-one correspondence between grammatical devices and
meanings at this stage, So, for example, the simple
past inflection is not used to express hypotheticalness
in conditional clauses as it is rn the adult language.
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related stage of linguistic development. So, we have a
collapsed sequence,(C,L.), where C contains, as sub¬
stantive terms, Pastness, Prediction, etc., and L contains,
as substantive terms, Past, Modal, etc. and a translation
from the substantive terms of 1 to the substantive terms
of C mapping Past to Pastness, Modal to Prediction and
Intentionality, etc. hot surprisingly, (1) and (3) of
the Reduction Condition are satisfied and (2) is not
applicable but the identity of C, beyond the fact that
it contains those 'notions' listed above, must be a source
of worry. It would be comforting if there were an existing
cognitive theory making available the appropriate cognitive,
categories to the child at the appropriate age and if
the categories were ascribed to the child on the basis of
something other than linguistic evidence. Without this
sort of basis, I am left convinced of the correctness of
the claim but unexcited by it, for note that questions
of order-isomorphism do not arise. Although the grammatical
devices realised as inflections are the first of their
kind to appear in linguistic development, no similar
claim can be made for the corresponding concepts in the
cognitive theory,i.e., there is no guarantee that cognitive
theories earlier than C do not contain concepts which
correspond to grammatical devices which only appear in
linguistic theories subsequent to L and this is entirely
due to the ad hocness of C. Additionally, no order-
relationships exist within the set of cognitive categories,
although we do know from Brown (1973) that children acquire
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progressive inflections "before past-tense inflections
(cf. Chapter 3) and we can speculate that the cognitive
categories, Ongoingness and Temporariness (corresponding
to Prog(ressive)) are acquired "before Pastness (correspond¬
ing to Past) but there is no a priori reason to accept this
and certainly no cognitive theory with which I am familiar
to render it plausible.
A similar argument concerns the spatial prepositions, in
and on, and their use to encode spatial notions. Before
children use the prepositions in this way they give
evidence that they intend to talk about spatial relation¬
ships and we can conclude that there is a stage at which
the child controls the relevant cognitive categories of
Inness and Onness which precedes the linguistic stage at
which he gives evidence of controlling the category,
Spatial Preposition. Parallel remarks can be made with
regard to the acquisition of the possessive inflection
and its anticipation by the "concept of possession" (p.213).
In the case of prepositions, Cromer clearly feels that the
work of Paris! and Antinucci (1970) can provide the sort
of systematic basis he needs, particularly since it
attempts to explicitly relate its findings to Piaget's
views on the development of spatial concepts (Piaget and
Inhelder (1948)). Unfortunately, as Cromer points, out,
the Parisi and Antinucci study was not longitudinal and,
therefore, can at best be suggestive for the sort of
issue we are concerned with here.
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An argument with a different structure concerns the first
syntactically-structured utterances of the child and
their relationship to the Piagetian notion of sensori¬
motor intelligence. Cromer uses this aspect of Brown's
work as the "basis of an argument for independent linguistic
development, (see 4.5) hut it can also he seen as relevant
to the concerns of the present section. Brown (1973,
pp.236-9) claims that the vast majority of the early
sentences of the child can he seen as expressing the
semantic relationships contained in two, partially over¬
lapping, taxonomies. These are:













and Brown says of them (p.236):
The Stage I meanings have proved to have some
generality in a sampling of child speech studies,
and I do feel tempted to hypothesise universality.
But not innateness. Not innateness because, although
I have not worked out the relation in any detail, it
is my impression that the first meanings are an
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extension of the kind of intelligence that Jean Piaget
calls sensori-motor. (my emphasis - RMA.)
Brown could be seen here as assuming that there is a
substantive issue concerning semantic development and
cognitive development and, of course, the response
is that it is transparent that before the child can encode
the semantic notion of nomination, he must have some
conception of an object which can be nominated, before
he can encode the relationship of entity and location,
he must have some concept of an object and some concept
of a location, etc. We should be perfectly clear that
the relations listed above are semantic and that, at this •
stage in his work, Brown is not remotely concerned with
how these relations are expressed in different languages.
He says (p.239):
...let me make it clear that this section concerns
meanings and not grammatical relations... The formal
relations which express semantic relations are pecul¬
iarly linguistic, and I see nothing quite like them
in sensori-motor intelligence.
Thus we have a collapsed sequence, (Cg^l^), where
is the cognitive theory at the end of the sensori-motor
period in Piagetian theory and 1^ is a linguistic theory
of the set of meanings linguistically encodable by the
child at Stage I. What is novel about this sequence
is that Cgjyj. is substantial and, if the translation and
identification required by the necessary clauses of the
Reduction Condition can be carried through we would
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appear to have a finding of some importance. But, as
Broun admits, he himself has not considered these questions
in detail and, although there are instances where the
mapping is self-evident (e.g., 'object1 in the linguistic
theory may be translated as 'Entity' in the cognitive
theory), there are several others where this is not so.
What, for example, in the theory of sensori-motor
intelligence would correspond to the semantic distinction
between Nomination and Notice? This is not to suggest
that Brown's optimism is ill-founded but merely to jfoint
out that a good deal of analysis and argument is still
necessary. Similarly, there are no easy answers to the
question of order-isomorphism although we would appear to
be justified in assuming that Cg^ and are not inter-
meshed to any interesting extent. In order to begin
investigating this question we would have to consider
any ordering which exists between the semantic relations
in lj and compare this with ordering in the corresponding
elements of Cg^.
4.2.3 Cromer on Bloom
The development of negation is another area which Cromer
sees as fertile for evidence in favour of the Cognition
Hypothesis. Drawing on the work of Bloom (1968), he
reiterates her conclusion that, when a notional set of
distinctions is made, dividing negative utterances into
those which express Non-existence, Rejection or Denial,
it transpires that these 'negative concepts' are encoded
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syntactically in a "fairly constant developmental order"
(p.214) with Non-existence being the first category to
be syntactically expressed followed by Rejection with
Denial bringing up the rear (for work which indicates
more caution here, see lord (1974)). The nature of the
claim here is far from clear as far as the relationship
between linguistic and cognitive development is concerned.
It would appear necessary that it include at least the
following propositions:
(i) in the grammar which the child is acquiring/ there
must exist syntactic objects of some sort corres¬
ponding to the semantic/cognitive distinctions
between Ron-existence, Rejection and Denial,
which play a part in the syntactic generation of
sentences which are interpreted as expressing
one or other of these semantic/cognitive notions.
(ii)there must be a cognitive theory which recognises
the substantive terms corresponding to Ron-
existence, Rejection and Denial.
(iii) it must be the case that the child passes through
a stage where he can be seen as controlling the
relevant cognitive categories before he utilises
them in his syntax.
So far as I can make sense of these propositions, the first
two are false. 'Ron-existence', 'Rejection' and 'Denial'
are not substantive terms in any syntactic theory with
which I am familiar, nor is it the case that there is
a syntactic theory recognising substantive terms which
339
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are obviously relatable to these. J Non-existence, as
a cognitive category, may be seen as having a role to play
in Piagetian theory. In particular, it may be seen to
be in opposition to a cognitive category of Existence
which might be fundamental in the development of object
permanence, but the same is not true of Denial and
Rejection. To my knowledge, terms relatable to these do
not play a role in any theory of cognitive development. As.
far as the third proposition is concerned, we can follow
the lead of the previous section and turn to the child's
negative utterances before they are syntactically complex
and examine whether it is possible to categorise them in
terms of the notional distinctions. If we can, we would
have an argument for a collapsed developmental sequence,
(C, L.j , L^, L^), where C is a cognitive theory involving
the three cognitive categories and , L2 and are
linguistic theories employing successively the syntactic
devices corresponding to the three categories (but see
the above comments).
Now it is not clear that Bloom has any such argument in
mind. She reports a stage before negation is syntactically
171. John Lyons has suggested to me that by broadening the
notion of 'syntactic object' to include sentence types we
could contemplate a correlation between declarative and
imperative/desiderative sentences on the one hand and
non-existence and rejection on the other. In addition,
he has pointed out that some languages e.g., Turkish
distinguish denial from non-existence in terms of the negative
used. Cf. also McNeill and McNeill (1970) on the develop¬
ment of negation in a Japanese- speaking child.
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expressed, in which "Eric produced the isolated utter¬
ance no 13 times" (1968, pp.316 -17) but has to conclude
that "its interpreatation was indeterminate more often
than not" (p.318). At the next stage she sampled there
were already instances of syntactic negation expressing
Nonexistence and Rejection (the latter is regarded as
only marginally productive) and, along with this, there
are a number of single-word utterances interpretable as
expressing both of these notions. But from this it
would appear that, as soon as we are justified in assigning
the semantic/cognitive categories to the child, on the
basis of his non-syntactic negatives, we also find them
being syntactically expressed and, therefore, even given
the implausible assumptions we are starting from, the sort
1 72
of argument we are looking for cannot be readily constructed,
In conclusion, I feel that if Cromex' is arguing that
before the child can mean Non-existence, Rejection and
Denial he must have corresponding concepts, then he is
172, Prom this brief dxscussion of Eric's negation there
appears to be the possibility that the cognitive category
of Denial only emerges after the syntactic expression of
Nonexistence and Rejection giving a collapsed sequence
of the form, (C^, 0^, L^), where includes the
substantive cognitive terms, Non-existence and Rejection
L.| includes the linguistic or, more properly, grammatical
'reflex' of Non-existence, L^ the 'reflex' of Rejection,
0^ contains the substantive cognitive term, Denial, and
1^ contains the grammatical 'reflex' of this. Such a
sequence would be partially intermeshed but we cannot
have much confidence in it given the discussion in the
text.
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successful, but that this is hardly surprising. If,
however, he is insisting that there is an established order
of cognitive development within this set of categories
which is reflected in syntactic development, then he
has failed to establish his point. The fact that the
cognitive/semantic categories which Bloom postulates are
not always transparently applicable to her data - a fact
which concerns Cromer - can only contribute further to
our unease.
4
4.2.4 Cromer on Cromer
The final battery of evidence presented by Cromer in his
section on 'grammar' refers principally to his own work
(1968) on the development of various sorts of temporal
reference and time concepts. He puts forward arguments
from several related areas, the first being concerned
with the expression of the order of events in time. The
sentences he is interested in each contain two verbs which
have distinct temporal references. So we can compare,
for example,
Can I put it on his chest so it be a button
(future) (later future)
in which the linear order of the sentence preserves the
1 73
temporal order of the events referred to by the verbs
with
D'you know the lights went off
(present) (past)
173. These are Cromer's judgements and whether one agrees
with them or not doesn't affect the structure of his argument.
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in which the order of events referred to by the verbs is
reversed in the linear order of the sentence. With this
distinction in mind, Cromer says (pp.218 - 19):
At the earliest stages almost all utterances with
relations between two points in time preserved the
occurring order of events, and it was not until after
four years in Adam and four years two months in Sarah
that the children began to reverse these relations
occasionally.... the ability to reverse the order
of events in time did not arise with new linguistic
forms such as the acquisition of particular conjunctions
...Most of the reversals use linguistic forms which
were available to the child at an earlier age.
What can this mean in terms of our present framework? There
appear to be at least two interpretations and the first
of these requires a number of dubious assumptions. Re¬
calling that Cromer is discussing cognitive effects on
grammar we could assume:
(i) there are grammatical devices which are instrumental
in reversing the order of mention in sentences
away from the order in which the events referred
r
to occu^ed.
(ii) there is a cognitive theory employing a substantive
term somehow corresponding to this notion of
reversibility.
(iii) we have evidence for the child going through a
stage where he controls that cognitive substantive
before he acquires the grammatical devices of (i).
Now (i) is highly questionable. English grammar has no
brief for taking account of the actual order in which
events occurred and so a device which is sensitive to this
order can hardly be part of English grammar. With this
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first assumption gone it makes little sense to pursue
the rest, although it is clear that the Piagetian notion
of 'reversibility' might be useful in elucidating (ii)
and (iii).
More profitable is the second interpretation which notes
that there is a stage at which the child possesses all
the necessary formal devices to compose utterances which
reverse the temporal order of events in their order of
mention of these events. At this stage, nevertheless,
the child does not compose such sentences. Therefore,
in order to explain the time-lag between the child's
acquisition of the relevant formal apparatus and his using
these devices to express reversals, we have to postulate
an intervening cognitive stage where the child learns
something about reversibility. Talking in terms of
sequences, this becomes an argument for a collapsed
sequence, (L^, C, I^), but a question immediately arises
concerning the identity of the L's. They can hardly be
grammars as Cromer admits that there is no significant
grammatical difference in the forms available to the
child at the two postulated stages. So we are left with
theories which cannot be identified with any recognisable
linguistic theory, and the observation that contains
some device to ensure reversibility whereas 1^ lacks such
a device. C, intervening between the two linguistic
theories, contains some correlate of this device which
can be invoked to explain its genesis. But all this is
impossibly vague and no independent evidence is adduced
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for the intervention of C. It is merely proposed as an
explanation for the lag in linguistic expression; such
proposals can hardly be seen as adding to our understanding.
Another type of evidence comes from the acquisition of
hypotheticals. Cromer says (p.220):
Hypothetical and counter-factual statements ... require
complex cognitive abilities which include the ability
to refer to 'possibilities' as well as the ability
to change one's vantage point in a time sequence.
J
and the argument he constructs around this observation is
of the sort considered in the second interpretation above.
At a certain stage the child controls the various linguist!c
devices necessary for the expression of possibility and
hypotheticalness this being supported by the presence of
such utterances as Maybe that's my daddy. In case you're
hungry I got grain. See if the flowers would like to
watch me at that stage. However, these utterances do
not themselves express possibility or hypotheticalness.
Rather, when the child uses them, he is "asking for a
determination of facts or conditions, the nature of which
is unclear to him" (221). Accepting this interpretation,
we now note a later stage at which the child does express
possibility and hypotheticalness using grammatical devices
from the earlier stage and, in order to explain the lag,
postulate a cognitive stage intervening between the two
linguistic stages. Again we have a collapsed sequence,
(L^, C, Lg), and again it is apparent that the L's
cannot be grammars as the same formal devices are used
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in as were used in . In this case though, unlike
in the case of reversals, there does appear to be a
plausible candidate as a referent for the L's; they must
be theories of the sets of meanings available to the
child where these sets of 'meanings* are exactly those
which are capable of linguistic expression. And now we
can see that the necessary clauses of the Reduction
Condition are immediately satisfied. Of course the child
cannot express the meaning of 'possibility' or the meaning
of 'hypotheticalness' until he has acquired the related
concepts of possibility and hypotheticalness and the
only substantive question concerns the status of the
intervening stage, C, and, in particular, its place in
a theory of cognitive development. Unfortunately, as
before, no independent evidence is cited for its existence.
A third argument concerns ths notion of 'relevance' and
its connection with the use of the Perfect in English.
Taking it for granted that some such notion is involved
in the appropriate use of the Perfect (see Palmer (1965))
and without committing ourselves as to the exact nature
of this involvement, we can consider Cromer's argument
in detail. The important observations are that the
Perfect was very rare in the speech of the children
studied by Cromer, only appearing marginally productive
174. Obviously there is no reason for this to be true over
the whole range of syntax but we can, for this argument,
restrict D to the sub-domain of syntax involved with
the expression of possibility, hypotheticalness, etc.
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at 4ir years. Nevertheless, the children possessed all
the substantive and formal features necessary for the
production of Perfects at a much earlier age, i.e., they
used have as an auxiliary, they used some participle forms
and, by their use of be-ing in Progressives, they indicated
that they controlled a version of Affix-hopping. Just
as in the case of hypotheticals, the gap between the
acquisition of the formal devices and their use in the
production of Perfect sentences is explained by postulating
a cognitive stage, C, at which some concept of Relevance
emerges, i.e., we again have a collapsed sequence,
(L^, C, Lp). It is apparent in this case too that the
L's must be construed as theories of the sets of meanings
1 75
available to the child and capable of linguistic expression
175. It might be thought that these L's could be regarded
as grammars as l£ will contain at least one rule not
appearing in : the generalisation of affix-hopping to
apply to the -en of have-en. There are two points which
must be considered in this connection. The first is that,
according to Cromer's own emphasis, nothing has changed
as far as the grammatical system is concerned. Secondly,
and more importantly, if we treat the L's as grammars,
admitting that does have features not found in L^,
it is a consequence that the collapsed sequence will1not
satisfy the necessary clauses of the Reduction Condition.
To see this we only have to note that the vital cognitive
notion in C is Relevance and we would expect this to be
a translation of some new substantive term in Ju^. But
it is easy to see that no such substantive term exists; all
we have is the generalisation of Affix-hopping to apply to
-en and, by no stretch of the imagination, is it possible
to see this as translatable into Relevance.
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and, on the assumption that the notion of 'relevance'
is involved in the semantics of Perfect sentences, we
can say that 1^ differs from in employing the semantic
substantive term, Relevance^ and, while this is acceptable
enough, it hardly excites the imagination. As far as
the intermediate cognitive stage is concerned, Cromer is
on slightly stronger ground than in the previous two
examples. This is because he can refer to the children's
use of certain forms, before they used Perfects,which
seemed to involve the notion of Relevance. So Adam t
produced utterances such as Hey, what else you bring the
pyjamas for?. How come you didn't bring your car today?.
This one is the mostest tight you ever saw, all of which
appear to involve this notion and Sarah, who produced
no Perfects in the samples examined by Cromer, nevertheless,
at about 4y years began to use now and yet to relate
past events to the present. To the extent that this
evidence exists, the cognitive stage, C, has that much
more plausibility but it would be reassuring to have
independent non-linguistic evidence for C and assimilation
of C into a theory of cognitive development.
The final temporal category introduced into the discussion
by Cromer is that of 'timelessness'. The logic of the
argument is identical to that just considerd so there
is little point in going into it in detail. Briefly, the
syntactic devices used in the expression of timeless
generics or habituals (e.g., I save dem, I keen falling
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down) are very simple, involving the use of the simple
present form of the main verb. Long before the age of
4 years the children studied were using simple present
forms, but not to make habitual statements, an ability
they only acquired at about 4 years. Therefore, to explain
the lag between the acquisition of the formal devices
and their utilisation in the expression of habituals,
Cromer postulates a cognitive stage, C, in a sequence
(L.j , C, L2), where the L's have to be seen as linguistically
encodable meanings and the claim becomes that the child
must control the cognitive category of Timelessness, the
essential aspect of C, before he can make habitual state¬
ments. finally, as was the case for hypotheticals, but
unlike Perfects, there is no independent evidence for the
existence of C.
Taken together it is probably true that these four
arguments point to a cognitive change in the child's
conception of time and related notions round about 4
years. But, until they are integrated into a wider
cognitive framework they can hardly be seen as contri-
r
buting to our understand ing except at a vejy superficial
level.
4.2.3 Antinucci and Miller on the development of temporal
reference
An analysis of Antinucci and Miller (1976) is included
here for two reasons. On the one hand, it is a recent
study and we might expect it to take account of any
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advances with, respect to argumentation in this broad
area of enquiry and, on the other, being concerned with
temporal reference, it will provide some perspective for
the arguments of Cromer just discussed.
The authors begin with a statement of intent (p.168):
In what follows, we will try to argue that a correct
understanding of the child's first past-tense forms
and their gradual development cannot be attained
unless we place them in relation to their cognitive
prerequisites. We will see that the meaning the child
i
encodes in his wast forms is strictly based on his
construction of the cognitive dimension of time,
(my emphasis - RMA.)
and already we see a familiar fallacy. How else could it
be other than that the child's intention to communicate
particular meanings follows on his conceptualisation of
notions related to those meanings? We can, however,
hope that the more substantial issue of order-isomorphism
is approached within the domain of cognition and the
semantics of time.
Of the two common Italian past-tense forms, the imperfetto
and the passato prossimo, the latter appears from the
beginning of data collection (children in the study were
aged 1 ;6 - 2;5) except that the auxiliary (corresponding
"k° have or be) is not present and the participle forms
of transitive verbs were marked for agreement in number
and gender with the direct object of the verb, a situation
which only obtains in Italian when the direct object is
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a pronoun. By way of explanation of this fact, Antinucci
and Miller offer (p.172):
The agreement of the past participle with the object
signals that the children are focussing on the result
of the event described by the verb. They seem to
have assigned a function of ATTRIBUTION to the past
participle. In other words, the children treat the
past participle as an adjective...
This suggestion is combined with a semantic analysis of
the verbs which the children used in their past-tense
forms, which recognises three reasonably self-explanatory
classes: STATE verbs, CHANGE OE STATE verbs and ACTIVITY
verbs and the generalisation which emerges is that (p.174):
Stative verbs and activity verbs, i.e., those verbs
which describe an event without an end result.are
never used in the past tense in the children's speech,
although they do occur in the present tense. (my
emphasis - RMA)
This generalisation is shown to receive some cross-
linguistic support from an analysis of the verbal forms
produced by one of Brown's subjects, Eve, which reveals
that STATE verbs and ACTIVITY verbs were never inflected
for past tense at a stage when CHANGE OE STATE verbs did
carry the past tense inflection.
The moves to explain these facts in terms of cognitive
development now follow. The only past tense forms used
by children are those which refer to events which resulted
in changes in the present state of affairs. Thus John
broke the doll is related to the state of affairs
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represented by the doll is broken which is usually
supposed to obtain at the time of the past tense utter-
176
ance. John ran down the street, using an ACTIVITY
verb is not, or, at least, not an intimately, related to
some existing state of affairs, e.g., that which would
be referred to as John is down the street, for CHANGE
OF STATE verbs (p.183):
...the past event (process)■and the present moment
(end-state) are related not simply by an abstract
temporal relation but by a more concrete effectual
relation. This concrete link is exactly what enables
the child to represent the past event once he has
access to the present end-state.
Thus we have an intuitive sense in which past reference
involving CHANGE OE STATE verbs might be regarded as more
simple than past reference involving the other verbal
categories and the relationship of this intuitive analysis
to cognitive development is developed in the following
way (p.185):
As Pxaget has emphasised (1954, 1971) the construction
of the temporal dimension has its roots in the practical
co-ordination of sensori-motor schemata, in which the
first is preparatory to the second or the second is
the result of the first. Therefore, it seems reasonable
176. Note that this is not necessary as witnessed by
the non-contradictoriness of John broke the doll but now
its fixed and what is being exploited here is not a
linguistic fact concerning the semantics of the verb
break but probabilistic knowledge about the world. See
Chomsky (1976), Pulman (1977) for extensive discussion.
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that the child is first able to represent and encode
past events only in those situations in which this
concrete, practical co-ordination is present. This
offers the child a support which leads him from the
present, observable state of an object to the repres¬
entation of the preceding event involving the object.
It is not entirely clear how we are to construe this in
1 77
terms of our current framework. What we appear to
have is a claim that when the domain of investigation is
the 'semantics of pastness', there is a stage, before the
stage where 'past' means something like 'before the lime
of utterance' at which 'past' has a more restricted mean¬
ing. Compare, in this connection, Antinucci and Miller's
statement that (p.183):
The meaning of the child's past tense is at this point
rather limited. He is able to encode a past event, but
only if it results in a present state, looking at
this fact from a linguistic point of view, we could
say that the past 'tense' has more of an aspectual
than a temporal value.
Exactly how we should gloss this more restricted 'aspectuaL'
value is far from obvious but let us refer to it as 'a'.
Then the claim embodied in the passage cited above which
refers to Piaget seems to be that there is a collapsed
177. One thing which seems clear is that there is a good
deal of antagonism between this claim and Cromer's
discussion of Perfects which could be taken as implying
that the endurance of a state of affairs resulting from
a past event into the present encounters the notion of
Ptelevance. This possibility will not be pursued here.
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sequence of cognitive and linguistic theories,
(C, X, L, Y), where the latter are concerned with the
semantics of 'pastness', where C is the cognitive stage
referred to in the cited passage, L is the linguistic stage
where 'past' means 'a' and X and Y are each sequences
of cognitive and linguistic theories (they may of course
be empty sequences or they may contain a mixture of the
two theory-types). It seems to me that such a sequence
fails to satisfy the necessary clauses of the Reduction
Condition as there is no transparent translation froM
the substantive term 'a' of the linguistic theory into a
substantive term of C. Certainly 'concreteness' can be
seen as a concept characteristic of both theories but
this is merely an intuitive observation and can hardly
warrant being called 'explanation'. Taking this one
step further, we might expect that, if the child's first
references to past events are somehow rooted in the
co-ordination of his own action schemata, then those
references will be to changes of state which he himself
has initiated. But a quick survey of the data presented
by Antinucci and Miller gives no indication that this is
so. We find such examples as B arrivato il cane ('The
dog arrived') and Che ha mangiato tutti i pulcini ('That
ate all the chicks'). It could be, of course, that at an
earlier stage there was a consistent bias towards encoding
of past events only involving the child's own initiated
changes of state and it may be that this suggestion is
an illegitmate extension of the authors' position. It
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is, however, a fairly concrete and tangible inter¬
pretation and, it seems to me, necessary, if the proposal
is to be rescued from destructive vagueness.
Contrary to what the above suggests, let us assume that
the necessary conditions on reduction are satisfied. Is
there more we can say? At this point the lack of any
information concerning the constituency of X and Y in
the sequence becomes crucial. It might be suggested that
we have the beginnings of order-isomorphism with the
*
'first' cognitive theory being matched up with the 'first'
linguistic theory but, without more details about the
developing cognition and the way in which it can be
related to the developing tense and aspect system, it is
difficult to see such a suggestion as having much content.
It thus appears that, in connection with the child's
first reference to past events in English and Italian,
Antinucci and Miller's attempt to reduce the phenomena
to cognitive development is not particularly helpful.
This is not to say that The phenomena are uninteresting,
nor to say that such a reduction is impossible in principle,
but merely to make clear that the introduction of Piaget's
theorising does little to elucidate the intuitive semantic
description in terms of verb types.
A second problem discussed by Antinucci and Miller In
this paper which has implications for the above discussion
is the subsequent emergence of reference to past events
encoded by STATE verbs and ACTIVITY verbs. The first
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thing they note is that, when this sort of reference
appears, the child uses the imperfect tense and not the
pest form involving a participle. An examination of the
contexts in which these early uses of the imperfect
occurred indicated that mearly all of them appeared in
•stories' (p186):
The examples of story-telling share an interesting
characteristic. The child is not narrating a past
event, and in most cases is not even narrating a
story that someone previously told him. The child
4
is inventing a story at the moment ... These examples
show that the first uses of the imperfect do not mark
a past event at all.
The attempt to relate this fact to cognitive development
is more straightforward than in the case of CHANGE OP
STATE verbs and the participial past (pp.186 - 7):
Our claim with respect to the child's linguistic
development is that the first instances of the imper¬
fect form mark linguistically the cognitive distinction
of pretend world vs. real world. The ability to make
this distinction, as Piaget shows, is more complex,
and later to develop than the ability to take account
of physical transformation (which, we have argued, is
the basis for the use of the participial form).
This may explain why the imperfect forms appear later.
Here the argument is clear. There is a cognitive stage,
C, which includes the substantive terms, REAL and HOH-
REA1 and a linguistic stage, 1, which contains the
linguistic substantive terms, 'present' and 'past'. In
addition, we have the collapsed sequence, (X, C, Y, L, Z),
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where X, Y and Z may be empty or may contain a mixture
of cognitive and linguistic theories and the reduction
of the linguistic development to the cognitive development
is achieved via the translation:
•present' » REAL
•past' > NON-REAL
along with the fact that C precedes L in the collapsed
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sequence. With this account, the earlier treatment of
the participial past becomes somewhat more convincing
as we now have a collapsed sequence, (C^, X, C^, Y, 1^ , Z, I^)
where X, Y and Z are as above, C^ is the cognitive stage
containing the translation, whatever it is, of the
substantive term 'a' from 1^, contains the substantive
terms, REAL and NON-REAL, and L^ contains the substantive
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terms, 'present' and 'past'. This sequence, apart
from the difficulties in translation from 1^ to , appears
to satisfy the necessary clauses of the Reduction Condition
178. Note that the translation is obviously too simple as
it stands because the past forms occurring with CHANGE OP
STATE verbs are not taken account of and they do not involve
only NON-REAL. Also the prohibition of present tense
forms being used in imaginative verbal play appears
■unjustified but I shall ignore such complications for the
sake of the argument.
179. I have assumed that this is a more appropriate sequence
than (C.j , X, L1 , Y, C^, Z, L£) as the cognitive distinction
between REAL and NON-REAL is seen as a property of the
mature sensori-motor intelligence and, as such, would
precede any linguistic reference to past events.
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and, insofar as its structure is specified, to
manifest order-isomorphism.
Antinucci and Miller's argument concludes with some
observations on subsequent uses of the imperfect in 'non-
actual' contexts which are used to substantiate their
claim that 'non-actual' is the core meaning of 'past'.
These are interesting suggestions and, as a semantic
hypothesis, the thesis of the paper is cogent and probably
correct. The fact remains, however, that it doesn't provide
evidence for the reduction of linguistic phenomena to
their cognitive counterparts except in the uninteresting
sense that the cognitive system must provide the concepts
before linguistic encoding can take place. The possibility
that we have the beginnings of order-isomorphism, a
possibility which renders the issue much more substantive,
is worthy of fuller investigation.
4.2.6 Greenfield and Smith on cognition and the function
of one-word utterances
Greenfield and Smith (1976) begin their relevant discussion
with an explicit prediction of order-isomorphism between
the semantic and cognitive domains (p.169):
We would expect that semantic development of one-
word utterances should occur in the same sequence as
the requisite non-verbal cognitive development, but
would lag behind it.
Here 'requisite' encompasses the first two of our necessary
clauses, 'lag', the third, and 'same sequence' commits the
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authors to order-isomorphism. To investigate their
prediction they cite a number of phenomena from semantic
development and, in each case, present some evidence from
prior cognitive development which can be seen as supporting
the isomorphism.
Their first argument revolves around the claim that the
child's one word utterances encode change of state before
they encode process, e.g., down typically preced.es dance
or eat. This is related to some unpublished work by
Mundy-Castle and Anglin showing that infants will
anticipate a change of position of an object with a direct
eye movement before they will follow an interpolated
trajectory. The former is assimilated to the semantic
notion of change of state and the latter to process and,
while this is plausible enough, it remains the case that
we still lack a cognitive theory in which analogues of
change of state and process are defined as theoretical
terms.
A further observation is that one-word utterances using
'predicates', the interpretation of which only demands
one place to be filled, precede those requiring two or
more places to be supplied by the interpreter. This is
related to the observation that, for example, infants
will act on an object before they place an object in a
location, The authors say (p.171):
... action development, as it relates to object
manipulation, parallels development of the expression
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of semantic functions involving two objects, but
precedes it in time.
It is not too difficult to imagine these ideas being
related to properties of Piagetian schemata which could
be seen as substantive terms in a theory of cognitive
development although Greenfield and Smith are not explicit
in their commitment to this interpretation.
The fact that in sensori-motor development the child moves
from a stage of treating a barrier between himself and
a goal as a goal in itself to one in which he will remove
the barrier to reach his original goal is claimed to
parallel the emergence of one-word utterances which name,
for example, the intended recipient of the goal of an
action, as when a child reaches for an object and utters
the name of the person he intends to give the object to.
Here the relationship with cognitive theory is less clear
and remains at an intuitive level but it is probably fair
to say that, with their explicit attempts to relate
linguistic development and aspects of non-linguistic
cognitive development paying attention to order, Greenfield
and Smith come nearer than anyone we have discussed so far
to satisfying the Reduction Condition in an interesting
180
way. There remains the doubt they themselves do notA
articulate a theoretical position on cognitive development
to put at the foundation of their arguments and, to some
180. There are a number of further examples cited by
Greenfield and Smith but the above will give some idea
of the quality of their work.
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extent, the impression is created of piecemeal sniping
at the problem, sometimes referring to visual scanning,
sometimes to spontaneous action and sometimes to problem
solving. Such doubts can only be allayed by future research.
4.2.7 Sinclair-De-Zwart. language and conservation
Cromer resurfaces in this last section of 4.2 in connection
with his use, to support the Cognition Hypothesis, of an
experimental study by Sinclair-de-Zwart (1969). In this
study a group of children were tested on a standard *
Piagetian conservation task and, on the basis of the
results, divided into conservers, non-conservers and those •
at an intermediate stage. Each of these groups was then
tested on a set of verbal tasks involving vocabulary which
was considered relevant to the cognitive processes under¬
lying the ability to conserve. This vocabulary includes
comparatives, differentiated terms (e.g., the use of
dimension-specific adjectives like thick and thin as
opposed to non-specific adjectives like big and small)
and structures involving conjunctions of properties such
as longer and narrower, shorter but fatter. These tests
investigated both comprehension and production and the
outcome was that, as far as comprehension was concerned,
there was no significant difference between the groups
of children whereas there were such differences on the
production tasks. Briefly, the conservers were much more
ready to use the vocabulary and constructions mentioned
above than were the non-conservers. Now, as Cromer points
361
out, this fact in itself does no more than establish
a correlation between certain cognitive abilities and
1 81
related linguistic skills and the next part of the
experiment investigated the question of a causal relation¬
ship between the two sets of abilities by attempting to
teach the non-conservers the vocabulary and structures
most relevant for conservation. Depending on the linguistic
elements, Sinclair-de-Zwart experienced varying degrees
of difficulty in teaching, but the vital conclusion of
the experiment was that, of those children who did success¬
fully acquire and use the vocabulary and structures, only
10^ advanced on the conservation task. Similar conclusions
were reached by Holland and Palermo (1975). What is the
exact significance of these conclusions for the relation¬
ship between linguistic and cognitive development? It
is evident that such studa es show that the relevant linguistic
development is not a sufficient condition for the related
cognitive development and this could be seen as a refutation
of a strong form of linguistic determinism. But such a
refutation is not an argument for the Cognition Hypothesis.
Sinclair-de-Zwart has not demonstrated that a collapsed
sequence of the form, (Ly, Cq), does not obtain where Ly
is a semantic theory for the stage of linguistic develop¬
ment at which the child produces and comprehends that
181. Given the success of the non-conservers on the
comprehension tasks, it is tempting to say that their poor
showing on the production tasks represents a rather super¬
ficial linguistic disability, i.e. one would hardly be
justified in concluding that the children didn't know the
significance of the relevant expressions.
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vocabulary and those structures considered most relevant
to conservation and Cq is the cognitive theory corresponding
to operational thinking. She has demonstrated that Cq
does not follow immediately on Ly and this would seem to
suggest a certain autonomy for the development of Cq
from Ly.
It is readily apparent that, if she has not demonstrated
that the sequence, (By, Cq), does not obtain, then she
has certainly not demonstrated that the sequence, (Cq, By),
does obtain. Obviously, if it did, it would constitute
evidence for the Cognition Hypothesis and for the reduction
of the acquisition of comparatives, differentiated
vocabulary, etc. to a prior cognitive development. But
things are even worse for the proposed reduction because
it seems that what Sinclair-de-Zwart has succeeded in
doing is teaching some children enough to credit them with
the linguistic theory, By, while admitting that they do
not control the cognitive theory, Cq. Thus, while the
strong form of determinism mentioned above claiming that
cognitive development follows immediately on and is
directly determined by linguistic development is refuted
by this study, the argument does nothing for the plausibility
of the Cognition Hypothesis. This discussion, of course,
presupposes that questions concerning translatability of
substantive terms and identification of formal properties
could be answered affirmatively.
4.3 Arguments from syntactic development
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In 4.2 we have seen that arguments from semantic develop¬
ment have to struggle for significance in the terms of
this chapter. However, there is every reason to believe
that this will not be the case with arguments whose point
of departure is syntactic development. While formal
properties must assume some cognitive organisation, it
is far from obvious that this organisation will extend
beyond the linguistic domain and we can anticipate that
4
satisfaction of the necessary clauses in the Heduction
Condition will be non-trivial. 4.3.1 will consider a
set of arguments advanced by Sinclair (1971) and 4.3.2
will take up a study by Greenfield, Nelson and Saltzman
(1972) both of which can be interpreted in this light.
4.3.1 Sinclair on formal grammar
Sinclair (1971) notes several formal properties of
grammar. These include concatenation, categorization in
the formation of syntactic categories, functional notions
such as 'subject-of and 'direct object-of, and
recursiveness, For each of these she points "to an aspect
of sensori-motor development which can be seen as accounting
for it. Thus, concatenation is related to the child's
ability to order things temporally and spatially, categor¬
ization to classification by sets of action schemas,
functional notions to the ability to relate objects and
actions and recursion to the ability to embeu. one schema
inside another.
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It is clear from this that Sinclair is concerned with
syntactic development and, furthermore, that she is
happy to conceive of this development in terms of formal
grammars. The various linguistic properties she focusses
on have all been most clearly articulated within the
transformationalist approach to syntax and so it seems
reasonable to construe the linguistic theories she is
assuming in terms of a sequence of grammars, (G\j, G^, G^),
employing concatenation as a basic formal operation,
including category symbols, e.g., HP, YP, containing the
sort of device which makes possible the definitions
of functional notions and containing recursive rules.
Sinclair's claim can be seen as involving a theory of
cognitive development, (C^, C^, G^), such that the
necessary clauses of the Reduction Condition are satisfied
by the collapsed sequence, (C^, C2, —, Cm, , ..., G ),
or abbreviating sequences of cognitive and linguistic
theories in an obvious way, by the two-term sequence,
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(C, G). To what extent is this claim true? To evaluate
this we need to consider each aspect of the claim
separately against each of the necessary clauses.
Consider first, then, the relationship between the child's
182. The assumption that all the cognitive theories precede
the grammars seems to be justified by the norms which
are usually cited for the end of the sensori—motor period
and the acquisition of the grammatical structures manifesting
the properties in question. However, nothing of import¬
ance follows from this assumption.
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ability to order things and the presence of a concatenation
operation in the linguistic theories. It seems fair to
say that an analogue of this formal operation must
reside in a cognitive system which makes possible the sort
of ordering phenomena to which Sinclair refers. It
follows, therefore, that (2) of the Reduction Condition
is satisfied with respect to the formal property of
concatenation. For formal properties , the satisfaction
of (1 ) does not arise and, if we go along with Piaget.-'s
and Sinclair's views on the achievements of the sensori¬
motor period, then the relevant formal property turns up
in C before it does so in G- thus satisfying (3). The
first of the claims does well.
Consider the second claim. This concerns the relation¬
ship between the child's ability to classify in action and
the presence, in the linguistic theories, of syntactic
categories, particularly RP and VP. These latter are, of
course, substantive terms in the linguistic theories and
so it is satisfaction of (1) rather than (2) in the
Reduction Condition that we look to. In order to satisfy
(1 ) we need to specify a translation of RP and TP into
substantive terms of the cognitive theory, C. It is not
clear that we are provided with anything like such a
translation by Sinclair's exposition. What seems to be
necessary is the provision of a cognitive basis for the
notional concepts of 'thingness' and 'doing' traditionally
seen as forming the core of categories such as RP and TP.
But, while classification in action can lead the child
to form categories, it is not apparent that they are of
the level of generality required here, .lather, we end
up with particular categories of objects (which fit into
a certain schema) and categories of action (which can
apply to paricular objects), but it is difficult to see
how the further level of abstraction required to arrive
at 'thingness' and 'doing' is achieved. This is not to
say that it is impossible within the Piagetian framework
but we must be clear about the programmatic nature of
Sinclair's remarks in this connection. Cromer (1974),
in a discussion of Sinclair's paper, is perhaps aware of
thus deficiency when he chooses to back up her analysis
with a statement made by Lyons (1966), the essential part
of which is (p.131):
By the time the child arrives at the age of eighteen
months or so, he is already in possession of the
ability to distinguish 'things' and 'properties' in
the 'situations' in which he is learning and uses
language,
Lyons here is concerned more directly with the issue at
hand than is Sinclair, but he provides no independent
cognitive evidence on the ontogenesis of 'thingness' and
'propertyness' and so his remarks too remain programmatic.
Thus, it seems that (1) is not satisfied convincingly by
Sinclair's argument and, therefore, strictly speaking,
the question of the satisfaction of (3) does not arise.
The argument concerning functional notions is weak. The
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grammatical relations, 'subject-of' and 'object-of',
depend for their definitions on both formal and substantive
aspects of linguistic theory. The formal aspects include
concatenation and dominance and the substantive aspects
involve reference to such categories as HP, VP and S.
Relevant to this we are offered the ability to relate
objects and actions which clearly presupposes some notion
of 'thingness' and some notion of 'doing' but we can't
get much further than this. In particular, there Is
nothing in the ability to relate actions and objects* to
correspond to the category, S, and, in addition, there
is nothing in this ability with which we can identify the ■
formal property of dominance. Again, I do not wish to
suggest that definitions cannot be produced in the spirit
of Sinclair's analysis which would meet this sort of
objection. The important point is that Sinclair's
suggestion as it stands lacks rigour and precision and
forces us to the conclusion that neither (1) nor (2) is
satisfied by this aspect of the argument, both of them
being relevant. In this situation, (3) cannot seriously
be raised.
Finally, consider recursiveness. The claim is that the
formal property of recursion which is necessary in the
sequence of linguistic thoeries, G, can be identified
in the sequence of cognitive theories, C, via the
observation that the child can embed action schemas inside
one another. But it is important to note that this sort
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of embedding, in itself, does not qualify as recursion,
unless it is related to a theory which makes precise the
idea of a process applying to its own output. In G this
is achieved by invoking a recursive rule or a sequence
of rules the output of which can be input to the sequence
again. So, there must be a level of abstraction in the
cognitive theory at which it makes sense to talk about
embedding an object of a certain kind in itself. Talk
of embedding one action schema inside another does not
necessarily satisfy this requirement and would appeal* to
have more to do with such linguistic notions as 'hierarchical
structure' and 'dominance' than recursiveness. Presumably,
no major revision would be necessary in the cognitive
framework to ensure recursiveness and so I shall assume
that (2) can be satisfied for this property. (3) is then
also satisfied by way of the observation that the formal
property of recursion is identifiable in C before it
appears in G.
Summarising, then, in Pigure 67.
Condition Condition Condition
(1) (2) (3)
Concatenation NR + +
HP and VP - NR DNA
Functional grammatical - - DNA
relations
Recursion NR + +
'+' = 'satisfies', = 'fails to satisfy', 'NR' = 'not
relevant', 'DNA' = 'does not apply'.
Figure 67
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This is not a startlingly impressive result and we have
to conclude that Sinclair's attempt to reduce grammatical
development to cognitive development fails in important
respects.^ ^
4.3.2 Grammatical constructions in claying with cups
Greenfield, Nelson and Saltzman (1972) attempt to establish
parallels between a certain kind of non-linguistic
cognitive behaviour and formal aspects of grammatical
structure. They say (p.291): *
Systematic observation of American children from
11 to 36 months of age playing with seriated nesting
183. There are two further negative remarks which could
be developed. The first is that we have only been cor^erned
with a small subset of both substantive and formal aspects
of the linguistic theories presupposed by the investigation
and, even if the reduction were successful with regard to
the categories and properties considered here, this would
still leave a large residue of linguistic constructs
untouched. The exact constitution of this residue would,
of course, depend upon the linguistic theory being mani¬
pulated but it is safe to say that no linguistic theory
is exhausted by the terms and properties in figure 67.
The second point is that there is no question of the
cognitive and linguistic theories being order-isomorphic
or intermeshed because, of the unstructured nature of the
collapsed sequence. The stronger of these two conditions
would not be satisfied by virtue of the cognitive develop¬
ment being complete in the relevant respects before the
linguistic development gets started but it is an inter¬
esting question (not investigated, to my knowledge) as to
whether any parallels can be drawn between the orderings
within C and G.
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cups tested the existence of a developmental sequence
of rule-bound, that is, consistent strategies for
combining the cups. A related objective was to
investigate the question of formal homology between
strategies for cup construction and certain grammatical
constructions.
Briefly, the procedure adopted by the experimenters was
to present the child subject with a set of nesting beakers
in one of two configurations manipulating the initial
conditions by, for example, handing the child the smallest
cup. The effects of the different configurations and"
initial conditions are not relevant to the discussion which
follows. Three identifiable strategies used by the children
in playing with the beakers were isolated. Strategy 1,
or the Pairing Method, involved placing one cup in or
on a second cup and this strategy yields one or more
pairs of cups. Strategy 2- or the Pot Method, involves
placing two or more cups in or on another cup resulting
in a structure of three or more cups which, when ordered
by size, is referred to as a 'pile'.
STRATEGY 2 STRATEGY 3
POT METHOO
, e Q& 0
s,SP „ <fbe
0£
..E. E hH " ©
3U8ASSEM3L* M£ f f00
STEP ,3^6=0
STEP Z 8l3 = G
or
STEP i e efS = 0
STEP Z "0^ = Q
1
P
Fig. 68 Fig. 69.
From Greenfield, Nelson and Saltzman (1972, p.295).
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Figure 68 shows the two alternatives for an application
of the Pot Method to a set of three cups. Strategy 3,
or the Subassembly method, involves the movement of
previously constructed structures as units into or onto
other cups or structures and Figure 69 shows two
alternatives for an application of the Subassembly Method
to a set of three cups.
Most children in the study had a dominant strategy and the
authors conclude (pp.297 - 8):
#
The consistency with which a single strategy is
employed by a given child demonstrates that these
strategies function as internal "rules" governing
the child's play over a range of concrete situations
... the term "rule" seems preferable to the term
"habit" because the dominant strategy manifests itself
in the child's very first approach to the task in 56
out of 64 cases.
The development of the strategies with age is summarised
in Figure 70.
STRATEGY 1
< \ STRATEGY 2
\ 1 STRATEGY 3
age in months
Figure 70. From Greenfield, Nelson and Saltzman (1972,
p. 298).
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Figure 71. From Greenfield, Nelson and Saltzman (1972,
P.303).
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From this it is evident that the majority of the youngest
children have Strategy 1 as their dominant strategy, that
Strategy 2 reaches its peak in the children aged 20 -
24 months and that the oldest children in the study use
Strategy 3 the most, with three out of eight 36-month
184-
olds having it as their dominant strategy.
Turning to the relationship between this developmental
sequence and the development of linguistic abilities,
Greenfield et al. represent their views as in Figure 71,
(p.371 a and, by way of explanation of the entries in the
table, they say (pp.303 - 4):
Each time one cup acts upon another to form a structure
there is a relation of actor-action-acted upon, a
relation most simply realised in sentence structure
as subject-verb-object. In this conception, cups
are the units equivalent to noun phrases in a sentence.
Thus, in Strategy 1, ...the basic strategy can be
represented as j_ in Fig.71 .J . The equivalent
sentence in the middle line of the figure is one
possible illustration of the action relations of the
top line, along with the grammatical relations of an
analogous sentence on the bottom line ... Strategy 2
... comprises multiple actor-action-acted upon
sequences, each involving a different acting cup ...
A convention governing the parallels between language
and' action presented £~ in Fig. 71 _7 is that
grammatical relations must annear in the same temporal
order as the corresponding action relations ... in
184. Greenfield et al. continue (p.299):
At 36 months of age, seven out of eight children used
this strategy am least once/ This proportion is in
sharp contrast to the 11 -month old children who never
achieved the Subassembly strategy.
373
Strategy 3, the Subassembly Method ... the first cup
that is acted upon (b) becomes the actor in relation
to cup c, just as the first object in the sentence
becomes the subject of the following clause. (my
emphasis - RMA)
What the claim amounts to, then, seems to be that, if we
are interested in the development of a set of saatence-
types, then we can translate the substantive terms that
we use in describing that set of sentence-types into terms
which are used in the theory of the child's strategies for
manipulating cups, thus satisfying (1) of the Reduction
Condition. More fully, we have the three sentence-types
which we may refer to as Simple, Conjunction and Object
Relative. These may be described, using the terminology
of Figure 71 as:
Simple: Subject - Verb - Object
Conjunction: Subject - Verb - Object - and - Subject -
Verb - Object
Object Relative: Subject - Verb - Object $ Subject -
Verb - Object.
and, of the substantive terms here, Subject translates
into Agent, Verb translates into Action and Object
translates into Acted upon. We now meet the additional.
argument (p.304):
We have seen that the cup strategies develop in ...
sequence, but do the corresponding sentence-types
follow the same developmental order? Certainly simple
sentences appear first. One source of evidence on
the relative ordering of the other two types of
grammatical construction is provided by data from two
of the children participating in Brown's longitudinal
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study of speech development. The conjunction of two
sentences by and was frequent in the corpus of both
children before relative clauses were a regular
feature of their speech.
Therefore, we have a claim that the three relevant linguistic
stages marked by the introduction of a new sentence-type
from the above set are, at least, order-isomorphic with
three relevant non-linguistic stages and the argument




Nevertheless, there is a basic weakness in it. Greenfield
et al. suggest that, rather than seeing the cup-manipulative
ability as causing the emergence of grammatical structures
in the order in which they appear, it would be more
realistic to consider "a single competence underlying
certain forms of action and grammar" (p.308) and this
possibility leads them to claim that "evidence as to the
universality of the action forms is desirable" (ibid).
Preliminary work on Tzotzil speakers is reported which
provides supporting evidence, but to appreciate the
problem which now arises it is necessary to be aware that
the sentence-types considered not only employ substantive
terms but also have formal properties and so, as well as
asking for satisfaction of (1) of the Reduction Condition,
185. Without more detailed information it is impossible
to say that the sequence is to any degree intermeshed
giving us, say, a collapsed sequence of the form,
(C.j , L.j , C2, I»2> C^, hj), but there is nothing in the age
norms presented by Greenfield et al. to rule out this
possibility.
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we can. also look to satisfaction of (2). What are the formal
properties in question?. If the substantive terms, subject,
verb and object are being used in anything like their
standard sense, one thing entailed immediately Is a
measure of hierarchical structuring in the sentence-types.
So, traditionally, in the structure of the simple sentence-
type the verb and the object would be taken as comprising
a higher order unit, the verb phrase. Is there any indie- .
ation that, in the action sequences with the cups, the
Action and the Acted upon have some sort of integrity not
possessed by, say, the Actor and the Action? The answer
appears to be negative and, indeed, there is no a priori
reason for expecting an affirmative answer. The Object
Relative sentence type involves an embedded structure and
the question we must ask in connection with this is
whether there is any evidence that the child's action
sequences, when he uses the Subassembly Method, recognise
the placement of cup b in cup c as somehow subordinate
to the placement of cup a in cup c which is the result
of the overall action sequence. Again, it appears that
the answer is negative and it becomes apparent that there
is essentially only linear structure involved in the
action sequences with which the child manipulates the cups.
Thus, hierarchisation and its particular case, subordination,
are not available in these action sequences.
This might be taken as merely demonstrating that the
reduction is partial (cf. the discussion in A.1.2) but
even within the limits imposed by linear structure there
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are serious problems. Recall that action sequences are
supposed to be universal and the emphasised part of the
passage cited on pp.372 - 3 above. It follows that,
whatever the language being learned by the child, his
simple sentences should manifest the order, subject-verb-
object. But, of course, there are now numerous recorded
instances of children using a dominant word-order which
186
is distinct from SVO. Thus, to mention just two
examples, Gvozdev's Zhenya used SOY before switching to
the most common word order of SVO in Russian and Seppo, ,
one of the children studied by Bowerman (1973), used
SOY more frequently than the dominant SVO when acquiring
Finnish. For these two children, then, the parallel
between the structure of action sequences and grammatical
structures breaks down. Obviously, the temporal sequencing
of events involving the manipulation of cups is inflexible.
If you're going to put cup a inside cup b you have to
pick up cup a, move it and place it in cup b; there is
no way in which you can move it firstJ
In summary, it seems to" me that, so long as one attends
to very simplistic ideas about sentence structure, the
analysis of G-reenfield et al, has a certain plausibility.
However, syntactic structure is not simply linear and, as
coon as we begin to take account of constituency relations
in even simple sentences, it proves impossible to identify
any parallel for them in the action sequences. Even as
186. It is remarkable that Tzotzil, a YOS language, should
be cited in this respect since one would expect at least
some Tzotzil children to use this dominant word-order.
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far as linear structure is concerned, there remains an
important problem, given the supposed universality of the
action sequences. At best, Greenfield et al. have effected
a partial reduction of linguistic phenomena to a type of
non-linguistic development.
In my view, the arguments considered in this section are
interesting principally in the extent to which they reveal
the vast gap between what we know about syntactic structure
and the fragment of this which has even been tentatively
explored in terms of cognitive development. The successes
have not been spectacular so far, and certainly anyone
wishing to tackle the problem of a total reduction of
grammatical development to cognitive development should
not underestimate the task.
4.4 Strategies in language development
In two very influential papers, Bever (1970) and Slobin
(1973) introduced and attempted to systematise a set of
observations on language development by reference to
'strategies' of one sort or another and, since then, such
strategies have come to play an increasingly important
role in language acquisition research (for a recent
review, see Cromer (1976)). In the case of Bever, strategies
were seen as important principally in The perception of
sentences and formed part of a mapping from 'external'
1 87to 'internal' forms. His attention to the development
187. In this role, they were opposed to grammatical trans¬
formations. For development and summary of Bever's position,
see Bever (1974, 1975), Fodor, Bever and Garrett (1974)
and for effective criticism of some of Bever's suggestions
Grosu (1975).
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of such, strategies was limited hut a few suggestions
were made. Slobin's speculations were presented in a
developmental framework and, for him, the notion of
'strategy' seemed somewhat wider than for Bever, accommo¬
dating Bever-like processes hut also including what we
might regard as 'heuristics for language learning' which
govern the course of a child's learning rather than his
perceptions as he learns. Both authors view their
proposals as intimately connected with cognitive develop¬
ment and the extent to which they are justified in this
regard is considered in this section. Bever's ideas
are briefly discussed in 4.4.1 and Slobin's theorising
is the subject-matter of 4.4.2.
4.4.1 Bever on the cognitive basis of linguistic structures
Bever's theorising need not detain us long since it has
received its fullest application outside the develop¬
mental sphere, from our point of view all that is import¬
ant is his discussion of the reliance of children, at
certain stages of their linguistic development, on
behavioural strategies rather than linguistic rules in
their comprehension of sentences. He produces evidence
that children operate with the following strategies at
different stages and claims that, whereas for the adult
such strategies are heuristics, which can be abandoned
in favour of knowledge of linguistic rules if the
circumstances demand it, for the child they can be seen
as completely determining his behaviour on certain tasks:
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Strategy B: The first N. ..V...(N) clause is the main
clause unless the verb is marked as
subordinate
Strategy C: Constituents are functionally related
internally according to semantic constraints
Strategy D: Any HVN sequence within a potential
internal unit in the surface-structure
corresponds to actor-action-object
(Labelling of the strategies follows Bever (1970))
Although Bever is not explicit in this respect he seems
to want to consider the possibility that these strategies
are a reflection of general cognitive capacities and he
says (p. 312):
Just as certain linguistic structures may be 'innate'
and some learned, certain perceptual strategies may
be basic to all perceptual processes, and some derived
from linguistic experience.
It is the first of these possibilities which concerns us
here and, unfortunately, Bever gives no clue to what
role B, C and D might play in other perceptual processes.
This is hardly surprising since inspection of them shows
that they are exactly the sort of process we might expect
to be induced on the basis of linguistic experience and
so come under the second possibility in the passage cited
above. As they stand, they are obviously specific to
language and there is no readily available translation
to make them applicable in the domain of, say, visual
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perception. So, for the few examples which are argued
to have a developmental role, there is no case established
for their relationship to cognitive or perceptual
development and, even if the notion of 'perceptual strategy'
plays a role in language acquisition, nothing has been
said to show that such strategies extend beyond the
perception of language. Of course, the general notion of
'perceptual strategy' is poorly defined, as Bever would
readily admit, but until it is elucidated there is
189
little room for constructive speculation. f
4.4.2 Slobin and cognitive prerequisites for grammar
Slobin (1973) can be seen as adopting the definitional
position on the relationship between linguistic and
cognitive development discussed in 4.1.1. He says
(pp.175 - 6):
Every normal human child constructs for himself the
grammar of his native language. It is the task of
developmental psycholinguistics to describe and attempt
to explain the intricate phenomena which lie beneath
this simple statement. These underlying phenomena
are essentially cognitive. In order for the child
188. Bever's attempts to draw parallels between linguistic
strategies and general perceptual strategies in later
sections of his article are confounded by a profusion of
counter-examples(see G-rosu (1975) for details). Also,
none of these later strategies are examined in a develop¬
mental context.
189. I might also mention that, although B, C and D are
developmentally ordered, no corresponding order is suggested
for general perceptual principles for obvious reasons.
to construct a grammar: (1) he must be able to
cognize the physical and social events which are
encoded in language, and (2) he must be able to
process, organize and store linguistic information.
That is, the cognitive prerequisites for the develop¬
ment of grammar relate to both the meanings and the
forms of utterances. (first emphasis mine, others
in original - RMA)
As suggested in 4.1.1 this view seems to remove an
interesting set of questions from the arena of discussion.
We can agree with Slobin that the phenomena are "essentially
*
cognitive" but still ask whether we can identify 'similar'
phenomena in non-linguistic domains of cognition. As
we shall see, Slobin himself is not consistent in adopting
this definitional stance.
His argument is launched by asking whether it is possible
to "trace out a universal course of linguistic development
on the basis of what we know about the universal course
of cognitive development" (p.180), and he presents the
following summary of data in support of a positive answer
to the question (p.180):
The earliest grammatical markers to appear in child
speech seem to express the most basic notions available
to the child mind. Por example, in languages which
provide a vocative inflection, this is typically
one of the earliest grammatical markers to emerge in
child speech ... One of the earliest semantic relations
to be formally marked in child speech is that of verb-
object. In order languages like Pnglish, this relation
is narked early by consistent word-order. In languages
which provide an inflection for marking the object
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of action (accusative) this is typically an extremely
early inflection to emerge - often the first. In
luo the first inflections are subject and object
affixes on verbs ... In every language for which
relevant data are available, there is an early form
of negation in which a negative particle is affixed
to a simple sentence. In languages as diverse as
English, Arabic, Czech, Latvian, Japanese and Samoan,
early yes-no questions are formed by rising intonation.
All of this is true and well backed-up by research findings
but what exactly does it show?. It would appear to
demand that there is a ranking of 'concepts' in some
cognitive theory such that each of the linguistic phenomena
mentioned in the above passage can be translated into a
'concept' which is relatively early in the ranking. But,
to my knowledge, no cognitive theory with properties
amenable to treatment in these terms exists and it is not
a priori clear why 'vocative', 'verb-object' ana 'negation'
(presumably among others) should comprise the "most basic
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notions available to the child mind". It seems to
me that citing data in the fashion in which Slobin does
190. Note that I am not suggesting that the child can
use, say, the vocative inflection meaningfully and
correctly before he has the relevant concept of an
addressee to be communicated with or whatever. Such a
suggestion would clearly be false, as pointed out in
4.2. But its converse is rather uninteresting in itself
and only becomes more interesting when it is embedded
in a theory of cognitive development which will enable
the child language theorist to make predictions about
the course of grammatical development.
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here adds nothing to the substance of the debate.
The more substantial aspects of Slobin's paper develop
from his discussion of the -work of Mikes and Vlahovic
with children being brought up bilingually in Hungarian
and Serbo-Croatian focussing on their acquisition of the
locative systems in the two languages (see Mikes (19'67)).
The two systems are acquired at different rates and this
cannot be explained by reference to the content of locative
utterances since this content is assumed to be identical
whichever language is being spoken. However, the system
of expression (or, according to some usages, the grammar)
of Serbo-Croatian locatives is considerably more complex
than that of Hungarian locatives and the organization of
these two systems is seen by Slobin as a cognitive task
(adopting the definitional stance again) although, as I
191. Interestingly, at this point, Slobin makes remarks
which would seem to indicate that he is not a definitionalist
(p.-181): ... although one can talk about order of acquisi¬
tion in terms of semantic or cognitive complexity,
there is clearly a point at which formal linguistic
complexity also plays a role.
The observations which lead to this remark concern
Bowerman's work on yes/no questions in Hinnxsh and Omar's
work on Arabic plurals. The most interesting way to look
at these findings from my point of view is discussed at
length in 4.5. Whether Slobin is adopting a definitional
stance or not is, to all intents and purposes, not
interesting for my aims here. Both the definitional stance
and the position adopted in the passage above beg the most
interesting questions and it is largely the purpose of
this chapter to raise those questions for the phenomena
Slobin is concerned with.
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argue in 4.5, it is perhaps more rewarding to view this
as an empirical question awaiting further research in
linguistic and other cognitive domains. Of more immediate
interest is the fact that differential complexity of
•expression-system' is not the only variable which Slobin
identifies in the two languages. He points out that the
Hungarian locative is consistently expressed by noun
suffixes and a considerable amount of evidence is amassed
to indicate the facilitatory effect, for acquisition, of
coding locative notions by suffixes (rather than by *
1Q2 -
prepositions or prefixes). This leads Slobin to
postulate a developmental universal (p.191):
Universal: Post-verbal and post-nominal locative markers are
acquired earlier than pre-verbal and ore-nominal
1 93
markers.
and, because it is extremely unlikely that the universal
is limited to the expression of locatives, he goes on to
192. Serbo-Croatian uses a combination of suffixes and
prepositions and the suffixes are the part of the locative
system which is learned first.
193. It is worth noting that this universal must embrace
an 'other things being equal' clause. To see this, it
is easy to imagine a language marking locatives both pre-
and post-nominally with the pre-nominal marking being
absolutely regular but the post-nominal marking being
phonologically conditioned in complex ways. Then,
although it remains an empirical question, it seems to me
that Slobin's universal might meet an exception. With
an 'other things being equal' clause this wouldn't count
as an exception but, conceivably, the domain of applicatica
of the universal would be reduced to zero.
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propose a principle with which the child approaches
language learning (p.191):
OPERATING- PRINCIPLE A : Pay attention to the ends of
words
It is the status of this principle which deserves fairly
detailed discussion. First, it appears that the domain
of enquiry from which it emerges is something like
'strategies and heuristics Which will help in the learning '
of language' rather than 'strategies and heuristics for
the perception of particular utterances', i.e., such/
strategies have, as their rationale, a theory of the
language being acquired and not an understanding of a
particular utterance, although they will inevitably
contribute to such understanding. This interpretation
seems to be confirmed by Slobin's reference to the
"information-processing devices used and developed by
children to understand speech and to construct grammars"
(p.187. my emphasis - RMA). Presumably, as the child
develops, the set of operating principles he has available
changes and, when the langaage system is acquired fully
(if it ever is), operating principles will cease to
function. In this light they are best seen as part of a
mechanism, M, fundamental to understanding the child's
progression towards language mastery (see Chapters 1
and 7 for inadequate discussion).
Can any close relative of Operating Principle A be seen
at work in other cognitive domains? Obviously, as it is
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a
worded, A is^ purely linguistic device referring as it does
to "the ends of words"; but it is perhaps possible to see
it as an instance of a more general cognitive principle
which we could phrase as follows:
In any temporally ordered sequence of events pay
attention to the most recent ones
and this could be seen as related to a 'last in - first-
out' view of short-term memory. That Slobin wishes'the
principle to be extended within the linguistic domain is
apparent from some of the examples he uses which require
attention not to-the ends df words but to the ends of
4. 194sentences.
Whether or not there is support for the general cognitive
principle in the form suggested above or in some related
form is not what concerns me here. The important point
is that the question can be raised in an intelligible form
and we can begin to get a grip on the sort of evidence
which would argue for or against it. Slobin seems to
assume that A itself is cognitive but such an assumption
buries the interesting questions.
Operating Principle A presupposes that the phonological
194. Of course, this may raise a difficulty for the
principle as, within any linguistic utterance, there are
a number of domains of temporally ordered sequences of
events, e.g., syllables, morphemes, words, phrases and
sentences. To see these domains being manipulated in
an experimental context with adults, see Savin and Bever
(1970), Poss and Swinney (1973), McNeill and Lindig (1974).
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form of words can be modified and Slobin offers some
evidence that children approach language learning equipped
with (p.192):
OPERATING PRINCIPLE B : the phonological forms of
words can be systematically
modified.
Just like A, B, as it stands, is restricted to linguistic
phenomena, but the issue arises as to whether it can be
regarded as an instance of a general cognitive principle,
and what suggests itself is the principle that invariants
will tolerate a certain amount of variation, a principle
which can be seen as -underlying all instances of
generalisation and as involved in the constancies of
visual perception. It is far from clear that the matter
can be interestingly pursued at this level of generality
but, again, I am content merely to raise it.
Slobin introduces a section of his paper entitled 'Constraints
on Linguistic Performance' with (p.195):
By and large, the language processing variables to
be discussed below are determined by the fact that
human language is produced and received in rapid
temporal sequence ... The sorts of processing variables
considered here are therefore closely linked to
general perceptual and performance-programming principles.
This makes the subject-matter sound very much like that
discussed by Bever, but Slobin goes on (p.195):
The constraints on linguistic performance are both
short-term and long-term. The short-term have to do
with the ongoing use of speech, and the long-term
38'8
with the storage and organization of the linguistic
system,
and the second category here sounds more like what we
have already been considering - heuristics which the
child brings to language learning - than it does like
heuristics for sentence perception. The extent to which
this distinction is clear in Slobin's own presentation
is something to which I shall return below. As far as
short-term constraints are concerned, he makes his
position clear when he says (p.196): *
... the short-term limitations under which children
operate ... are universal human limitations on
sentence processing, and they are based on general
perceptual and information-processing principles.
Prom this general standpoint , another operating principle
is introduced (p.157):
OPERATING PRINCIPLE C: Pay attention to the order of
words and morphemes
Is this, a short-term strategy or a long-term heuristic
vital to the child's eventual grasp of the language?
Slobin's discussion fails to provide an answer, but
the answer required appears to be 'both', i.e., it will
clearly facilitate the child's learning of (most) languages
if he assumes that the order of the morphemes in the
rtterances he hears is significant and it will also
facilitate his comprehension of particular utterances.
However it should be taken, can we make sense of the view
that it is based on "general perceptual and information-
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processing principles"? Obviously, as it stands, it is
restricted in its application to linguistic materials,
mentioning such linguistic constructs as "words" and
"morphemes" but it would be possible to see it as an
instance of a general principle of the form:
Pay attention to the order of events or to the order
of items which are presented serially and regard it
as significant
If a serious argument were to be constructed along these
lines, we would need to see this general strategy b^ing
accommodated to a cognitive theory and appearing in
cognitive development before it showed up as a linguistic
strategy and, while such a situation seems plausible, it
is apparent that much more discussion will be necessary
before the matter can be regarded as closed.
The next operating principle we are asked to consider is
one which is admitted by Slobin to have ambiguous status
with regard to the short-term - long-term distinction,
(p.199).
OPERATING PRINCIPLE D : Avoid interruption or re¬
arrangement of linguistic units
Slobin claims that (p.199):
A number of strategies can be related to this principle -
both strategies for speech perception [_ i.e., short-
term constraints - RMA_7 and strategies for the
formation and use of rules of production /"i.e., long-
term constraints - RITA J.
A considerable amount of evidence concerning inversion
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and permutation is cited in support of the strategy "but
its empirical status is not what concerns me. As stated,
D is restricted to linguistic phenomena as it mentions
"linguistic units" but it can be seen as an instance of
a general principle used most productively by Gestalt
psychologists and, interestingly, cited by Fodor and
Bever (1965) in their first experiments involving the
location of a click superimposed on linguistic materials: ■
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Perceptual units will tend to resist interruption
4
The obvious next step is to investigate the ontogenesis
of the general principle in contrast to D and, if it is
prior to it, we shall have a situation which is consistent
with the linguistic principle being determined, by the
general cognitive principle.
A fifth operating principle also appears to have ambiguous
status (p.202):
OPERATING PRINCIPLE E : Underlying semantic relations
should be marked overtly and
clearly
In a sense, this could be interpreted as a heuristic
which the child brings to language learning: assume that
there will be some clear correlation between semantic
relations and their realisation in syntactic form. In
another sense, it can be seen as the source of predictions
195. This principle has an immediate corollary:
Any perceptual event which interrupts a perceptual
unit will contribute to the complexity of the per¬
ception in a disproportionate manner.
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of difficulty in sentence processing: to the extent that
semantic relations are not clearly marked, a sentence
will he difficult to understand. That Slobin either has
both these interpretations in mind or is unclear of the
distinction between them is apparent from the evidence
he cites in support of the principle. This includes
evidence for (p.202):
Universal E1: A child will begin to mark a semantic
notion earlier if its morphological realisation is
more salient perceptually (ceteris paribus)
which is most straightforwardly interpreted as the result
of a strategy which the child brings to language learning
as well as evidence for (p.203):
Universal E5: It is easier to understand a complex
sentence in which optionally deletable material
appears in its full form
which is best interpreted in terms of strategies for
sentence-perception.
Whatever the possibilities of confusion here, we can
again ask whether E is an instance of a more general
cognitive principle and, in this case, it is difficult
to begin to conceptualise such a strategy. As it stands,
the reference to "underlying semantic relations" and
"marking" involves linguistic terms and there are no
obvious non-linguistic cognitive correlates for them. Of
the operating principles we have considered so far, then,
E would appear to be the strongest candidate for being
1 96
autonomous of any general cognitive factors.
196. It is to be emphasised that Slobin provides no
discussion in this connection.
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The phenomenon of overregularization is the topic addressed
by the next operating principle (p.205):
OPERATING PRINCIPLE F : Avoid exceptions
This is unambiguously involved in language learning rather
than in sentence perception and, so far as I know, the
possibility of exceptions and irregularities contributing
to the difficulty of sentence perception has not been
explored. F could be an instance of a general cognitive
principle of the form:
*
Make the widest possible generalisations avoiding
peculiarities
but one of the problems with a principle such as this is
that it doesn't have a great deal of evidence in its
favour. Most relevant in this respect is perhaps the
work of Brown (1958) and Rosch et al. (1976) discussed
in some detail in Chapter 2 and which ^an be seen as
indicating that maximisation is not the sole determinant
of semantic categories. It would be hazardous to speculate
further at the moment until we have a much tighten form¬
ulation of the principle itself and any possible related
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cognitive strategy.
The final operating principle discussed by Slobin takes
197. It is also unclear how such a blanket strategy can
deal with the learning of irregular forms before regular
forms as discussed in Chapter 1 unless F itself is to be
fitted into a developmental sequence of strategies of
which an earlier member is:
Treat everything as an exception
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account of the fact that "errors within choice of functor
are always within the.* given functor class" (p.206), and
the "numerous examples in the cross-linguistic data of
the principle that rules relating to semantically defined
classes take precedence over rules relating to formally
defined classes, and that purely arbitrary rules are
exceptionally difficult to master" (ibid).
OPERATING PRINCIPLE G : the use of grammatical markers
should make semantic sense
Again, G looks more likely to be of use in learning the
language than in understanding sentences and I am aware
of no studies indicating that arbitrariness in grammatical
form contributes to perceptual complexity in a dis-
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proportionate way. But the relationship of this
strategy to cognition is difficult to be clear on. As
phrased, it refers to "grammatical markers" and "semantic
sense" which are linguistic terms and, although, if we
consider the introduction of arbitrary distractors or
variable realisations of properties into concept formation
tasks or problem solving situations, we would find them
contributing to task complexity, this is not the same
thing as saying that we can identify a cognitive strategy
198. It is easy enough to imagine how such studies might
commence. Por example, we could contemplate investigating,
for a language with non-natural gender, whether noun
phrases with arbitrary gender contributed to difficulties




in development of which G- is an instance.
In summary of Slobin's often unclear position, it seems
to me fair to make the following points:
(1) He appears, at times, to take a definitional, and,
therefore (for me), uninteresting stance on the relation¬
ship between linguistic and cognitive development.
(2) At other times he indicates that systems of linguistic
expression can sometimes be seen as autonomous of
cognitive development.
4
(3) Regarding content of linguistic utterances, Slobin
appears to fall into the trap of believing that there is
a substantive issue concerning the existence of corres¬
ponding concepts. The issue only becomes substantive
when we have a cognitive theory and a linguistic theory
which are explicitly related and, perhaps, intermeshed or
order-isomorphic. For the examples Slobin cites, these
theories are conspicuously absent.
199. Notice that if we were to suggest something like:
Variation is significant
with its corollary
Non-significant variation contributes to complexity
this would be in conflict with some of the suggestions I
have made earlier in connection with strategies for
dealing with constancies. To try to avoid this conflict
by suggesting that the child has some general strategy
of the form:
Some variation is significant
is to merely restate the problem. What we are interested
in is exactly which variation is significant and how the
child knows or learns that it is.
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(4) For systems of expression (mappings from content
to form), Slobin says nothing of the formal properties
which appear to give rise to complexity nor of the
possibility of identifying these same formal properties
in non-linguistic cognitive domains, i.e., the interesting
questions are simply not raised.
(5) There are some problems concerning the precise status
of the operating principles: are they heuristics for
language learning or for sentence perception or both?
Slobin is sometimes not clear on this issue perhaps not
seeing the distinction as a clear one which needs to be
drawn.
(6) As far as the relationships between the operating
principles and general cognitive strategies is concerned,
Slobin fails to provide the theoretical account we are
entitled to expect. This could be because he feels that
the relationship is self-evidnet but, as I hope to have
demonstrated, there are certain cases where this is not
so. Where it is possible to speculate intelligently
about the identity of general cognitive strategies, it
seems that Slobin might be correct but the matter deserves
to be investigated in more detail than has been possible
here.
(7) ho ordering relationships are established between the
operating principles and their cognitive analogues when
these latter exist.
4.5 Cromer on autonomous linguistic development
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In 4.2.'i I "briefly discussed Cromer's use of Brown's
views on the relationship between sensori-motor intelli¬
gence and Stage I speech to support the Cognition Hypothesis.
Picking up a similar discussion in Brown (1970), Cromer
says (1974, p.236):
... the possession of sensori-motor intelligence, would
still not explain the expression of that intelligence
in language. That early grammar expresses the mean¬
ings which sensori-motor intelligence makes possible
does not in itself solve the mystery of how these
meanings are conveyed by a grammar.
This is absolutely true and raises a clear issue. If
we have a theory of the meanings available to the Stage I
child and we also have a way of representing the form of
Stage I speech, then we ought to be able to work out a
mapping between the two. 200 However we conceive of this
mapping, it will have, one would assume, substantive and
formal aspects and we can examine what we know about the
development of the child in other cognitive domains
searching for translations of the substantive terms and
identical formal properties. It seems to me that, at this
stage, there is virtually nothing we can say with regard
to this problem. On the one hand, the theory relating the
set of meanings to the child's forms is, as far as precise
formulation is concerned, virtually non-existent (see
Schlesinger (1971, 1974) for proposals which indicate
200. I don't wish to commit myself to this being a grammar
in the Chomskyan sense.
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the validity of this claim). On the other hand, our
knowledge of the formal properties and relations with
which it is necessary to credit the child in order to
explain his developing abilities in other cognitive
domains is rudimentary, to say the least. In particular,
it seems nonsensical to restrict ourselves to the Piagetian
theory of cognitive development at the expense of, say,
theories of visual or auditory perception.
Cromer assumes an answer to the question of the linguistic
independence of the system of expression without even
raising the issue of exactly what other domains of child
behaviour and child knowledge should be considered
relevant. The fact that organisms other than humans also
possess the set of meanings associated with sensori¬
motor intelligence has no bearing on this argument. Brown
and Cromer point out that, although the chimpanzee Washoe
shows evidence to suggest that she manipulates these
meanings, she does not appear to control a system for
their consistent expression. But this could be related
to differences in other aspects of Washoe's information-
processing capacities when compared to a human infant.
Just as she lacks the system of expression with its
properties, ..., P^, so also she may lack the
system X which also has the properties, P^, P2, Pn-
The human infant controls both a system of expression and
the system X and the fact that X is a non-linguistic
system indicates that the development of the linguistic
system of expression need not be autonomous of development
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in another cognitive domain (we weald he tempted to
believe that it was not if X showed up before the linguistic
201
system of expression). Therefore, nothing can be
concluded from the case of Washoe on these issues. Of
course, the system X is hypothetical and perhaps the
best course is to assume that the system of expression
is autonomous until evidence comes along to show that it
is not - this seems to be the position Chomsky has preferred
202
throughout his writings (but cf. fn. 200).
4
Cromer considers a number of additional arguments for
the independent development of language, none of them
very convincing. The first concerns negation and the
central fact on which the argument hangs is that, given
Bloom's (1968) three-way distinction of Non-existence,
Rejection and Denial, the syntactic expression of each of
these categoiies changes, becoming more complex, as the
child develops. Cromer says (p.239):
If to express the meaning of non-existence, the child
comes to use more ard more complex techniques over
time, these new structures cannot be being acquired
due to advances in 'meaning'.
201. We could infer on this basis that the set of prop¬
erties, P^ , Pg, ..., Pn, are characteristic of cognitive
systems which are unique to man, but, of course, this is
an independent issue from the autonomy of any aspect
of language development. For the former we heed to make
cross-species comparisons but, for the latter, we can
restrict our attention to humans.
202. see p. 398a.
398a
202. Two further remarks can he made in this connection.
The first is that it seems to me that, if the sort of
expression-system which has been envisaged by child language
theorists for the early stages of language development
is made precise, then the sorts of formal properties
they manifest will be identifiable in non-linguistic
information processing systems. The second point is that
the sort of property Chomsky seems to have in mind when
he discusses this sort of argument has become more and
more abstract throughout his writings (cf. structure
dependence of rules with, say, the specified subject
constraint (Chomsky (1973)) and, certainly jn the case
of some of the properties he has investigated recently it
is difficult to imagine them having any role to play
outside the linguistic system. Further to this second
point we should note again that it is not clear that
Chomsky is concerned with systems of expression in the
sense in which this phrase is being used here, but with
grammars which are theories of the native speaker-hearer's
competence and which only relate to the expression system
in an indirect way. It would be quite possible that the
system of grammar, as envisaged by Chomsky and his assoc¬
iates, should have properties which make it independent
of any non-linguistic cognitive system while the system
of expression should share all its properties with such
systems. Whether child language theorists have been
concerned with studying the development of Chomskyan
grammars or of expression systems is of course a difficult
question, briefly mentioned in Chapter 3.
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But the assumption here that there is no change in meaning
is surely to take the status of Non-existence, Rejection
and Denial as semantic categories too literally. To see
this, compare a selection of Eric's utterances, categorised
as expressing Non-existence, from his Stage II with a
a selection of his utterances expressing the 'same'
semantic category from Stage V.
Stage II: no more juice, no more noise, no more
Stage V : no more ball, no more bridge, oh no fire engine.
you no bring choo choo train. I no reach it.
I didn't do it. I didn't crying
In the second list there are some sentences which are
identical in structure to those on the first list but, of
course, they are not relevant to an evaluation of Cromer's
claim. Of the other sentences on the second list, how is
it possible to say that, as far as their negativity is
concerned, they do not differ in meaning from the sentences
on the first list? It is not, and this amounts to a
criticism of Bloom's semantic categories which are no
more than broad notional sets, and fairly misleading ones
at that. So it is not the case, contrary to Cromer's
assertion, that there is a clear syntactic development in
the expression of a single unchanging semantic category.
But suppose for a moment that he is correct. Nothing would
follow from this until the 'new' formal principles (and,
perhaps, substantive terms) involved in the more complex
system of expression are spelled out in detail. Then we
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would "be in a position to investigate whether these
formal principles are already used in some non-linguistic
cognitive domain. As things stand, Cromer's assertien
has no more support than any of the imaginable
alternatives.
A similar argument draws on the work of Bellugi and
concerns the development of the child's abilities to refer
to himself (see Bellugi-Klima (1969), Bellugi (1971)).
Cromer's summary is admirably clear (pp.241 - 2):
At the earliest stage, the child used his own name




Like Adam book shelf
Pick Adam up
In the second stage, he began to substitute the pronoun
'I' for his name if it occurred in the first position
in the sentence, and occasionally produced both
together:
I like drink it
I making coffee
I Adam driving
I Adam do that
And at the same time he was substituting 'me' for
his name if it occurred other than in the first
position in the sentence (with the exception of




Why laughing at me?
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But it also produced a regular pattern of errors:
Why me spilled it?
What me doing?
At the third stage, the rules changed and the child
now produced 11' if his name served a nominative
function in the sentence, and he produced 'me1 if
it served an object function in the sentence:
That what I do
Can I nut them on when I go outside?
You watch me be busy
You want me help you?
That is, the child's pronouns no longer depended on
sentence position but on grammatical function. *
With regard to this sequence, Cromer continues (p.242):
...the developments are not solely based on meaning
or reference. Throughout, the meaning remained the
same-reference to self.
But this is fallacious. Certainly when the child says
That what I do he is referring to himself and is using
the pronoun, I, to do so. But this is not to say that
I, in the child's semantic system, has the same meaning
as the child's own name at that stage (or at an earlier
stage). This is to confuse meaning with reference among
other things and,indeed, an identical argument could be
constructed from adult usage with absurd consequences.
Putting this aside, assume that, for the forms, Adam. I
and me, it makes sense to talk about their meaning being
some constant 'reference to self'. Then we can suggest
that the child must operate with 'rules'at the three
stages in question which we can represent in the following
way:
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(all references to self are Adam)
'reference to self ^ Adam
(first position references to self are I or
I Adam, all other references to self are me)
If'reference to self' is in an initial position,
then
'reference to self' > I or I Adam
Otherwise
'reference to self' ^ me
(nominative reference to self are I, objective
references to self are me)
If 'reference to self is nominative, then
'reference to self 7> I
If 'reference to self is objective, then
'reference to self ^ me
These 'rules' are not intended to be taken very seriously
but they do begin to make apparent the development of the
child's system in formal terms. So,it is clear that the
child's rule at Stage 1 is context-free while the rules
from Stages 2 and 3 are context-sensitive (only an impress¬
ionistic comparison with rewrite systems is intended by
the use of these terms). Similarly the context which the
rules at Stage 2 use is that provided by the linear
structure of the sentence whereas, at Stage 3, it seems
that reference must be made to hierarchical structure
although the use of the term 'nominative' is not explained.
Prom this we might conclude that the rules in the second





rewrite rules and that the rules at Stage 3 are reminis¬
cent of transformational rules. All of this could be
quite accidental and is anyway incidental to the main
point which is that the rules should have some identifiable
formal properties which we can then search for in non-
linguistic domains of development. If we can identify
such properties in a non-linguistic domain X and, further¬
more, show that the development in X precedes the develop¬
ment in the system of pronominal reference, then we
shall have the beginnings of a reduction where Cromer
is saying there isn't one. Nothing is gained by prejudging
the issue.
The final set of arguments presented by Cromer is also
used by Slobin and concern the relatively late appearance
in some languages of the appropriate linguistic encodings
for particular semantic contents when this is compared
with the appearance of encodings of the same content in
other languages. So, although it has often been reported
that children acquiring English ask their first yes/no
questions using rising intonation, Finnish children do
not ask yes/no questions when they are at an otherwise
comparable stage of development (see Bowerman (1973) for
details). The explanation offered is that Finnish lacks
a simple intonational device for forming yes/no questions
(but cf. Sauvageot (1949)) having resort to a relatively
complex operation involving a moved question particle.
Note that, in this case, since it is claimed that Finnish
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children simply do not ask yes/no questions, i.e., there
is no direct evidence that they control the relevant
meanings, the claim that the late development of yes/no
questions in Finnish is explicable in terms of the complexity
of the mapping from meanings to forms is on somewhat
weaker ground than in other examples. A second example
concerns the acquisition of plurals in Arabic and the
vital observation is that children's acquisition of the
Arabic plural system is not complete by the age of fifteen.
This is put down to the severe irregularities which are
203encountered in this system. The final, and best-
known, example comes from Slobin's interpretation of
Mikes's work (see 4.4.2 for a brief description).
In each of these three cases Cromer is claiming that there
is something peculiarly linguistic about the development
but, again, we can only conclude that ,he is prejudging
the issue in a clumsy fashion. So long as it is only the
semantic system which can interact with the cognitive
system he would seem to be correct. But no plausible
reason is advanced for restricting the enquiry in this
way and it is much more interesting not to do so. So,
for the case of the Finnish yes/no question, it would be
203. Presumably, in this study (Omar (1970)) which I have
not seen there was evidence that the children were intend¬
ing to communicate about collections of objects, etc.
even when they did not get the right form and, to this
extent, we have a slightly different case to the Finnish
yes/no questions.
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necessary, before the relevant issue can be precisely
formulated, to have a detailed statement as to exactly
what formal properties are central to this tiny area of
Finnish grammar. Given such a statement, we would be in
a position to investigate other cognitive domains looking
for just these properties. If we can identify them in
such a domain and if, furthermore, it transpires that they
are manifest in that domain before they appear in the
linguistic domain, then we x-rould have the beginnings of
a reduction. Similar remarks can be made for each ot the
other two cases mentioned above. One can imagine the
discovery of a collapsed sequence, (C^,
where is a cognitive theory with formal properties,
P,, P0, ..., P. L. is an expression system (or grammar)I ki in <
with P., P0, ...P and that the nroperties, P., P„, ..., P1'k7'm 1 1 1 2 7 m
are not sufficient to handle the complexities of, say,
the Serbo-Croatian locative system, C^ is a. cognitive theory
with formal properties, P., ..., P , P and 19 is anI m n <—
expression system with P^, ..., P^, ..., P^, and P^, ...,
Pm, ..., are sufficient to handle the complexities of
the Serbo-Croatian locative system. Such a sequence would
be intermeshed and provide us with the strongest reason
for believing that the system of linguistic expression
depends crucially on an antecedently developed cognitive
system. It is, of course, a purely hypothetical example
and awaits the formulation of the various linguistic
propertiis to merit serious investigation. It is, however,
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easy enough to imagine and it seems to me that something
which is so easy to imagine cannot he ruled out on a
priori grounds. If Cromer has thought about these issues
at all this is exactly what he appears to do.
Cromer concludes (p.245):
We can see then, that cognitive development and
linguistic development do not necessarily proceed
together ... cognition can make certain understandings
available, but there may be linguistic constraints.
The arguments which he has presented on these issues* are
either self-evidently valid or fallacious. Other authors
considered in this chapter do somewhat better but the
overall impression is that so far there has been a
remarkable lack of awareness of the complexities involved
in demonstrating dependence or independence of linguistic
development when compared to cognitive development.
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CHAPTER 5 : PHONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
In this chapter I return to the procedure followed in
Chapters 2 and 3 of evaluating proposals against Conditions
1 - 4 of Chapter 1. The domain under investigation is
the child's ability to produce the forms of words and,
because there has been a good deal of unclarity with
regard to methodology in this area, I wish to leave open
the question as to whether this involves confusing a
number of abilities or not. The suggestion that it might
4
arises if one takes the view that the child's ability to
reneat word forms is not identical with his ability to
produce such forms spontaneously in his natural speech.
One of the studies to be discussed below (Smith (1973))
had resort to techniques which could lead to confusion
of these abilities and, from what we know about the
child's ability to imitate syntactically structured
strings when compared with his spontaneous production
of such strings, we might expect serious problems to
arise here (see, for example, Praser, Bellugi and Brown
(1963), Slobin and Welsh (1973)).204
Somewhat neglected during the 1960's, phonological
204. In connection with this, Smith says (p.9):
... I do not think that this elicitation is in any
way misleading. Typically, a sound or contrast he
[_ the child under study - RMA_7 was able to repeat
after me, he would be able to produce spontaneously
a few days or at most a few weeks later.
For a more pessimistic view, see Kornfeld (1971).
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development has received a great deal of attention in the
last few years. However, a great many of the studies
which have been conducted in this period have either been
limited in scope, focussing on the acquisition of a
restricted set of sound segments (e.g., Macken (1975)),
oratheoretical in emphasis concentrating on detailed
description of the 'facts' of phonological development
(see, particularly, Ferguson and Farwell (1975), Ferguson ■
(1976)). Without wishing to deny the interest and value
of such studies it should be apparent that they do n»t
lend themselves to the sort of analysis I am undertaking
here to the same extent as do the global theoretical
treatments such as Jakobson (1968) and Smith (1975).
Largely for this reason this chapter has only two sections
with 5.1 being devoted to a discussion of the status of
Jakobson's theory of phonological development and 5.2
examining aspects of Smith's detailed study of his own
son. It is worth pointing out that the general mode
of theorising which each of these scholars employs can
be seen asrepresentitive of a large number of other works.
\
So, in the case of Jakobson, we -can consider the studies
of, e.g., Velton (1945), Shvachkin (1948), G-arnica (1971,
1975), as falling in the same tradition and, although
these authors were led to substantively different conclus¬
ions to Jakobson, I think that it is fair to say that, with
regard to explaining and justifying their conclusions,
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they were accepting a similar framework. Similarly
for Smith, we can consider such works as Ingram (1971),
Moskowitz (1970), Stampe (1969) and Berman (1977) as
having similar emphases and adopting similar frameworks
for the resolution of problems but Smith's discussion is
by far the most detailed with which I am familiar. It
is not clear that Smith as phonologist should be aligned
with the natural phonology of Stampe but there do appear to
be obvious correspondences between their views on phono¬
logical development and, in this context, Smith cites
20 S
Stampe approvingly in a number of places.
5.1 Jakobson and the laws of universal solidarity
Jakobson (1968) conceives of phonological development in
terms of the acquisition of a succession of oppositions
later viewed in terms of the acquisition of distinctive
features (see Jakobson and Halle (1956)). The first such
opposition to be acquired is that between a consonantal
sound and a vocalic sound, this contrast providing the
foundation for the syllable. It is important to realise
205. Of course, as far as the last two studies mentioned
here are concerned, they were concerned with the child's
phonological perception rather than production and there¬
fore identity of domain of investigation throughout this
set of studies cannot be assumed. The relationship between
production and perception has been the subject of some
discussion recently but will not concern me in this
chapter (see especially Eornfeld (1971), Edwards (1974)).
206. see p. 409a.
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206, In a useful review article Ferguson and Garnica
(1975) discuss behaviourist theories of phonological
development owing"most to Mowrer (1960) and theories
emphasising the role of prosodic features in development
most ably represented by Waterson (1970, 1971) as well
as the views analysed in this chapter, I have chosen to
neglect both of these positions on the grounds that
there is no formulation of them which leads to interesting
discussion within my framework. It is worth mentioning
that in an introductory discussion of 'requirements for
a theory of phonological development ' Ferguson and
Garnica say (p.155):
[_ a theory of phonological development_7 must account
for the development of all the characteristics of
an adult phonology as specified by a given phonological
theory. It must account for known facts of phono¬
logical development that are not included in the
characterization of adult phonology by existing
theories. It must be consistent with a broader
theory of language development and be relatable to
theories of other aspects of child development. It
should make principled predictions that can be
empirically verified.
The relationship between some of these conditions and
some of mine is obvious but, disappointingly, Ferguson
and Garnica fail to systematically evaluate the theories
they review.
410
that it is oppositions which are "being acquired and not
sounds as such. So, although Jakobson suggests that the
first -vocalic sound is usually a wide vowel and the
first consonantal sound usually a bilabial, nothing follows
against his position if these suggestions are not confirmed
as it is merely the contrast which is at issue. With
the first syntagmatic opposition established Jakobson
takes up the development of paradigmatic oppositions
within the consonantal system saying (p.48):
The first consonantal opposition is that of nasal*
and oral stop (e.g., mama - papa). which is followed
by the opposition of labials and dentals (e.g., papa -
tata and mama - nana). These two oppositions form
the miminal consonantal system of the languages of
the world.
In fact Jakobson is more explicit than his own position
demands here, in that there is no necessity that the
first consonantal opposition should be an opposition of
stop consonants - any contrast between a nasal and oral
consonant will serve to carry the basic opposition.
From a developmental point of view the picture is abund¬
antly clear. We have three stages which we can represent,
concentrating exclusively on consonantal development and
207
indulging in some transparent notation, as in Figure 72.
207. As far as possible I have attempted to confine myself
to the content of Jakobson (1968) in what follows and no
systematic way of representing the various oppositions is
put forward there. My use of feature notation should be
seen merely as an attempt to encode the intuitive statements
Jakobson provides and not as being derivative on any
general theory, (cf.below for further discussion).
Figure 72
A similar course of development is suggested in the
vocalic system with the first stages involving the
acquisition of a width contrast followed by either a
place contrast restricted to narrow vowels or a further





In connection with the content of Figure 73, Jakobson
says (p.4-9):
Each of these two processes leads to a system of
three vowels, which is the minimal vocalic system
presented by the languages of the world.
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and. subsequent development in both the consonantal and
vocalic systems is related to the Laws of Solidarity
which are characteristic of synchronic descriptions of
the phonological structures of the world's languages.
Thus we find (p.51):
The acquisition of fricatives presupposes the
acquisition of stops in child language; and in the
linguistic systems of the world the former cannot
exist unless the latter exist as well.
and (p.55): ,
The acquisition of back consonants presupposes in the
linguistic development of the child the acquisition
of front consonants, i.e., labials and dentals ...
The existence of back consonants in the languages of
the world presupposes accordingly the existence .
of front consonants.
^oth of the above 'solidarities' are irreversible, i.e.,
the presence of stops in a language does not require the
presence of fricatives nor does the presence of front
consonants require the presence of back consonants. As
a third example Jakobson suggests (pp. 55-6):
A so-called half-stop consonant (or affricate) which
functions as an opposition to the corresponding stop
consonant in phonemic systems, is acquired by the child
only after the fricative of the same series ...
Similarly, the opposicion of a stop and an affricate
in the languages of the world implies the presence
of a fricative of the same series ... The number
of such affricates in a phonemic system is therefore
never greater, and is generally less, than the
number of fricatives.
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Similar claims are made concerning further developments
in the vocalic system (pp. 56 - 7):
An opposition of two vowels of the same degree of
aperture is not acquired "by the child as long as a
corresponding vocalic opposition of a narrower degree
of aperture is lacking ... A differentiation of rounded
vowels according to degree of aperture cannot arise
in child language as long as the same opposition
is lacking for the unrounded vowels ... Rounded
palatal vowels ... arise in child language only
after the corresponding primary vowels...
all of these facts being related to the distribution of
vocalic oppositions in the world's languages.
According to this view then, we can conceive of phono¬
logical development in terms of successive stages where
each stage recognises a set of oppositions. Concentrating
on the consonantal system, we can represent this theory
as an ordered sequence of sets of oppositions
(S1, S2, S^, ..., Sn_1, Sn) where , S2 and are as
in Figure 72 and various constraints are imposed on the
rest of the sequence by the facts cited by Jakobson.
Thus assume that contains the necessary oppositions to
enable definition of the category 'Stop' and that S.
contains the necessary oppositions to enable definition
OAO
of the category 'Fricative'. Then Jakobson is claiming
that i"^. Similarly, assume that contains the necessary
oppositions for the category of 'Front consonant' to be
208. It is not clear from Jakobson (1968) exactly what
oppositions are involved in such definitions.
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defined and that contains the necessary oppositions
for the category of 'Back consonant' to be defined. The
209
claim is that k^l.
We are now in a position to begin to evaluate Jakobson's
proposals against Conditions 1 - 4 of Chapter 1. For
Condition 1 we are in a familiar position. Jakobson
makes a number of remarks concerning the typical 'sub¬
stitutions ' found in child language before relevant
oppositions are learned (see p.52, p.54 and other places)
but does not propose a detailed theory of such substitutions.
Without such a theory we cannot formulate conditionals
of the form 'If the child intends to say X, then he
says Y' where X denotes a word-form and Y denotes the
child's version of this form. We should note further
that even such conditionals, involving reference to
209. Jakobson, of course, extends his considerations to
accommodate relatively late acquisitions saying (pp.58-9):
Oppositions which occur in the languages of the world
comparatively rarely are among the latest phonological
acquisitions of the child. Thus the geographical
distribution of nasal vowels is relatively limited,
and accordingly, these phonemes appear, in French
and Polish children only after all the remaining
vowels have been acquired .., The Czech r, a sibilant
opposition to r, is one of the rarest phonemes that
occur in language, and hardly any other phoneme of
their native language presents such major and persis¬
tent difficulties to Czech children.
So we also have constraints of the same general sort
imposed on the mature end of the sequence.
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intention in their antecedents, fall far short of pre¬
dicting behaviour.
Condition 2 requires that each of the sets of oppositions
be constructed in accordance with some general theory.
This general theory will, presumably, consist of the
specification of some finite set of phonological opp¬
ositions out of which each language (and each child)
selects a subset and that there do exist theories of
just this nature can only lend credence to tnis aspect
210
of the proposal. This leads me to the conclusion
that Condition 2 is satisfied (cf. in this connection
the situation here with that discussed in Chapter 2
where we were very much in the dark as far as general
theories of semantic features were concerned.
Condition 3 is obviously satisfied in a very straight¬
forward fashion. As the child develops he simply adds
to his inventory of oppositions and so each stage of
development will be additively more complex than the
preceding one.
It is when we turn to Condition 4 that the most interesting
210. Here the delay in translating Kindersorache (Jakobson
(1941)) takes on some significance and it is difficult to
account
read Jakobson (1968) without taking^of Jakobson, Kant
and Halle (1952) and Jakobson and Halle (1956). Thus,
while the text under consideration does not contain a
general theory of the required type, such a theory was
not far from being developed.
aspects of Jakobson's proposals become apparent. Recall
that what Condition 4 demands in a situation in which
Condition 3 is satisfied is an answer to the following
question : given that we have aasequence of theories
(f^, T^) satisfying Conditions 1 - 3 why do we find the
development schematised as X —> X + Y rather than the
development schematised as Y —> X + Y? In the case of
the theory under consideration weecan see X and Y as
denoting sets of oppositions and we can test Condition 4
against a number of transitions. *
Jakobson's views impose only a partial ordering on the
full sequence of sets of contrasts and analysis of the
whole sequence would be extremely complicated. I shall
therefore restrict attention to the consonantal sub¬




In Figure 74 , T2 and are as in figure 72,
recognises just those oppositions which allow the category
'Stop' to be defined and fm+n does the same thing for the
category 'Fricative'. Obviously further sequences could
be considerdd for other aspects of consonantal and vocalic
development described by Jakobson.
Consider then the transition from to Condition 4
asks why we find (T^, 1^) rather than the sequence:
—>+nasal
where such a sequence might be proposed if the child
first produced a systematic distinction between nasal
and non-nasal sounds and only later distinguished consonants
from vowels. The problem is somewhat clouded here by the
special role played by the syllable in Jakobson's theory
and it could well be that he would wish to deny the
possibility of a nasal/non-nasal opposition without
prior recognition of the syllable in 'which the opposition
could be realised. However, there are no immediately
compelling reasons for going along with this and it seems
to me that the fairest conclusion is that this aspect of
the development is not logically grounded. Furthermore,
at this stage in the argument, there is no reason to
believe that we could relate the development to some
sequence in a more basic theory, say a theory of perception
or a theory of cognition (but cf. below) and so the
second possibility of grounding the development doesn't
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appear to "be very promising. Given the earlier discussion
we might expect to find an adequate grounding for the
developmental facts in generalisations about the world's
languages but, in this case, the expectation is confounded
precisely because all the world's languages are asserted
to utilise the two oppositions in question, +nasal and
+consonantal. So it makes no sense to talk about the
distributional facts assigning some sort of priority to
+consonantal and it appears that, with regard to this
transition, Condition 4 is not satisfied. *
Almost identical considerations apply to the transition






and produce a reason for why we do not find it. We can
suggest that +labial necessarily follows +consonantal
because of what these theoretical terms are assumed to
denote but no similar considerations can be brought to
bear on the priority of +nasal over +labial. It would
make perfect sense in terms of the theory so far discussed
to discover the developmental sequence:




would be ruled out on logical theory-internal grounds.
We have a partial logical grounding but again no suggestion
of a more basic theory in which to ground the develop¬
ment and, because all the languages of the world are
assumed to use all three contrasts, no possibility of
grounding the development in distributional facts. *
Imagine now a fourth member of the sequence, T^, where
the next opposition appears; call It +Z. Do we have an






We would expect to find at least a partial logical
grounding for this hypothetical transition from T^ to T^
but, this time, we are also able to ground the sequence
in distributional facts about the world's languages. At
least this is the impression given by Jakobson when he
talks about minimal consonantal systems (p.48):
These two oppositions (nasal v. oral and labial v.
dental) form the minimal consonantal system of the
languages of the world. These are the only oppositions
that cannot be lacking anywhere, provided that there
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is no mechanical deformity of the speech apparatus.
Thus the claim, to be distinguished from the claim that
there exists a language with just the minimal set of
consonantal oppositions, is that, whatever the identity
of Z, there will he some language which does not utilise
Z in its phonological structure. This can he phrased
as a unilateral implicational universal:
If L utilises phonological opposition +Z then it
also utilises the set of contrasts, +consonantal,
+nasal and +labial.
t
The existence of a language using this set of contrasts
hut not the opposition +Z is necessary if the universal
is not to he strengthened to a bilateral one hut,
unfortunately, Jakobson neither tells us what Z is nor
does he provide the sort of data necessary to substantiate
the claims of universality and non-universality.
Similar reasoning can he applied to the transitions
involving the introduction of +X and +Y in figure 74 and,
if we take it that reference to +X is essential to the
definition of 'Stop' and reference to +Y essential to the
definition of 'fricative', then we have, as a consequence
of the irreversible law of Solidarity relating stops and
fricatives, the unilateral implicational universal:
If L utilises the phonological opposition +Y then it
will also utilise the phonological opposition +X
although not necessarily vice versa.
Again the identity of X and Y is not explicit in Jakohson's
system hut if we concentrate on the defined categories
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of 'Stop* and 'Fricative' some evidence is provided for
the relevant Law of Solidarity (pp.52 - 3):
Hence there are no languages without stops, whereas
P.Schmidt cites a number of Australian, Tasmaniam,
Melonesian, Polynesian, African and South American
languages in which fricatives are completely unknown,
In Kara-Kalpak and in Tamil, to cite additional
examples from another continent, there is no
autonomous category of fricatives; stops and fricatives
appear as combinatory variants of the same phoneme -
the first as basic variants, the others as variants
conditioned by the environment. In Tamil, e.g.,#
stops become fricatives after a vowel.
Thus, returning to our original sequence in Figure 74,
we can see the extent to which it satisfies Condition 4
and it is easy to see how similar sequences could be
discussed in the same way. The parallelism between this
sort of explanation and that met in Chapter 2 in connection
with Heider's work on the acquisition of colour vocabulary
should also be apparent and, moreover, just as there we
seemed to have the beginnings of a deeper explanation in
terms of human visual physiology, so here Jakobson is not
content to leave the explanation at the level we have
now reached but feels the need to go on and produce
a more fundamental explanation - an explanation which
will tell us why the facts of language acquistion and
211
the Laws of Solidarity are the way they are. He says:
211. I refer back to Chapter 1 for some discussion as to
why I believe that even at this stage Jakobson has achieved
a certain level of explanation.
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These laws can be explained, however, only by con¬
sidering and demonstrating their inner necessity.
All attempts at atomistic interpretation, which
necessarily explain only one aspect or a single
phenomenon and are therefore never comprehensive,
are clearly inadequate. Thus, the phonologicalto
laws of child language are not^be mechanically sep¬
arated from the corresponding evidence of the languages
of the world and of aphasia, and the appearance of
single sounds must not be treated in isolated fashion
without regard for their place in the sound system.
Taking this unity of a number of fields as a basis for
rejecting certain traditional notions on the ontogeny of
early speech sounds utilising either the phenomenon of
sucking or that of visual prominence, Jakobson goes on
to search for a demonstration of 'inner necessity*. The
principle he invokes is the principle of maximal contrast
and this principle is applied to the successive oppositions
mastered by the child. Taking first the opposition
between consonant and vowel, Jakobson points out (p.69)
Prom the motor point of view, these two fundamental
classes of speech sounds are contrasted x/ith each
other as closure and opening. The optimal opening is
achieved in the xni.de a - vowel, while among the
stop consonants it is the labial sounds xnhich obstruct
the entire oral cavity. One might postulate that
just this most simple and maximal contrast is qualified
to inaugurate the distinction between the vocalic and
consonantal systems at the threshold of child language,
and in fact this hypothesis is confirmed by experience.
There are two points being made here. The first is that
the contrast between consonant and vowel is the optimal
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application of the principle of maximal contrast and
the second is that it follows from that principle that the
'core member' of the class of consonants will be a bi-
21 2
labial.
For the acquisition of the next contrast in the consonant
system, +nasal, we must consider the general configurations
of the oral and nasal cavities. The distinction between
an oral and nasal consonant can be represented as a
distinction between a single obstructed cavity and a
single obstructed cavity together with an open subsidiary
cavity. Jakobson says (p.71): "this synthesis follows
naturally the contrast consonant"vowel." What he seems
to have in mind is that a contrast between an entity
which we can represent as X and another entity which we
can represent as X+Y where Y differs from X along sig¬
nificant dimensions is a particularly obvious one and will
be picked up by the principle of maximal contrast. To
212. Two further points could be made here. The first
is that reference to a general principle of maximal
contrast cannot readily be accommodated to the models of
explanation so far considered and this is because such
principles find their proper place in the specifications
of mechanisms for moving from one theory to another rather
than in the substance of the theories themselves although,
of course, such mechanisms might have implications of a
substantial nature. Compare in this regard the discussions
in 2.5 and 4.4 and Chapter 7. The second point concerns
the obvious similarity between the notion of 'core member'
and prototype in 2.4 - 2.5. In this connection, see
the discussion of canonical phonetic forms in, e.g.,
Daniloff and Hammarberg (1973).
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appreciate some of the force behind this argument we need
to take account of Jakobson's discussion of the relatively
late appearance of nasalised vowels. On this matter
he says (p.71):
... a nasal vowel, which opposes a double open cavity
to the simple open caVity of the oral vowel and thereby
simply increases the vowel quality, is a much more
complicated and much less opposing entity.
Here an entity which we can represent as X is opposed
to an entity which we can represent as X+X' where X and Xr
do not differ along certain significant dimensions. The
contrast between X and Y is seen as more apparent than
the contrast between X and X' and, therefore, the opposition
+nasal in the consonantal system is a better representitive
of the principle of maximum contrast than is the same
opposition in the vocalic system. Although the intuitive
force of the argument is clear enough it is difficult
to avoid the feeling that there is a lack of precise
specification of what is being contrasted in the operation
213
of the principle.
213. To the same point it should be added that Jakobson
makes the further observation that ejective and glottalized
consonants involving double obstructions are learned
relatively late just like nasal vowels, i.e., within the
class of consonants we have a contrast between an entity
we can represent as Y and another entity we can represent
as Y+Y' where Y and Y' do not differ along certain
significant dimensions. The contrast between Y and Y'
is not as apparent as the contrast between X and Y leading
to the prediction that it will be learned late. Where
additional precision is necessary is clearly in the
reference to 'significant dimensions'.
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Some perspective on the above discussion is provided "by
Jakobson's discussion of the next consonantal opposition,
that between labial and dental consonants. He introduces
the idea of two psychophysical dimensions which are
referred to as chromatism and light-dark and claims that
among vowels, a is the most chromatic and least affected
by the light-dark axis. Vowels generally have chromatism
as their "specific phenomenal feature" whereas consonants,
which are not susceptible to analysis in terms of
chromatism, have light-dark as their primary axis of*
classification. Along this axis labials are dark when
compared to dentals, and, according to the psychophysical
principles Jakobson was following, the direction of darkness
is the direction of increase along the light-dark axis
just like the direction towards chromatism is the direction
of increase along the chromatic axis. Therefore, just as
a is the optimal vowel representing a maximum along one
of the two fundamental dimensions, so the bilabial
consonants are the optimal consonants representing a
maximum along the other fundamental dimension.
There is much that is obscure in this account but the
general direction seems clear enough. There are two
primary acoustic dimensions along which speech sounds
can be classified and the child's first achievement is
to make the corresponding opposition. This is related
to the view that (p.75):
The first opposition to appear - that of the two
basic phonological classes - could therefore be
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justified on the grounds that it is a more elementary
problem to percieve the distinctions between one class
of perceptions and another than to perceive those
within one and the same class of perceptions.
A general principle of discrimination learning is invoked
to explain the identity of the first phonological opposi¬
tion. Then, given a classification in terms of the two
primary dimensions, it is assumed that distinctions
between entities which occupy the end points of the
dimensions will be acquired before distinctions between
214 *entities which occupy medial points. Thus, within
the class of consonants, a distinction is made between
labial consonants (maximal darkness)and dental consonants
(minimal darkness) and within the class of vowels between
wide vowels (maximum chromatism) and narrow vowels (minimum
chromatism)^ ^
Further speculations concern the role of palatovelars in
the consonantal system. Among consonants they possess
minimum achromatism and therefore they (p.80) "Hold a
214. The relationship between this suggestion and the
phenomenon of transfer along a continuum in discrimination
learning is clear here, (see, e.g., Lawrence (1952)).
What Jakobson is achieving is some measure of explanatory
adequacy within the universal core of phonological
oppositions (cf.above) although, in order to explain
the ontogenetic primacy of the oral-nasal opposition,
further assumptions are necessary.
215. These distinctions are, of course, later discussed
in terms of the features grave-acute and compact -diffuse
(Jakobson, Fant and Halle (1952)).
427
place in the consonant system similar to that of the
wide vowels within the vocalic system". Two facts follow
from this : 1) that palatovelars do not represent an
end point on any primary classificatory dimension and,
therefore, by the principles discussed above, we might
expect them to be acquired after labials and dentals;
2) having vocalic qualities they are less susceptible
to analysis along the light-dark axis and, therefore,
we might expect languages which have both a class of
palatal consonants and a class of velar consonants to be
relatively rare. Both of these expectations are confirmed.
It seems to me that one cannot but be impressed at the
degree of concern shown by Jakobson with problems of
explanation. While it cannot be claimed that he has
given the principle of maximal contrast sufficient content
to answer all our queries, it obviously has intuitive
appeal and enables Jakobson, albeit tentatively, to
J
relate phonological development to what he takes to be a
fundamental axiom of human learning. Such sophistication
becomes all the more impressive when we contrast it with
the lack of concern we have already come across in
numerous cases and when we also take account of the
original date of Jakobson's work.
<=!.? Smith pnri phonological rule systems
Smith (1973) is one of the first studies to systematically
use the theoretical apparatus- of generative phonology in
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a developmental context. Although it is difficult to
find any statement in Jakobson's work to this effect it
would appear that, on his view, the relationship between
the adult phonological system and the child's system could
be represented by a set of simple substitution rules of
the form X —> Y where X and Y represent speech sounds
and where Y requires oppositions only available to the
child whereas X may go beyond this set (cf. brief discussion
of Condition 1 in 5.1). We can see such substitution
rules merely as descriptive of the relationship between
the two systems but, more interestingly, we can credit
the child with some acquaintance with the rule, a move
which allows the child access to the adult phonological
form. Smith's favoured theoretical position assumes that
the child does have access to the adult fom and goes on
to claim that the sorts of rules which must mediate
between such forms and what the child actually produces
are a good deal more complicated than simple substitutions.
The assumption itself has been repeatedly questioned by
e.g.,Kornfeld (1971), Kornfeld and Goehl (1974), Waterson
(1971) and it will not be my purpose to review this dispute.
Suffice it to say that the evidence on both sides is fair
from compelling and hardly makes sufficient reference to
perception phenomena of the type investigated by Shvachkin
(1948), Garnica (1970, 1973) which itself is subject to
a number of methodological considerations (see, e.g.,
Dodd (1975), Barton (1976)). Smith's own evidence in
favour of adopting the assumption amounts to informal
observations of his child's comprehension and the fact
that developments in the child's phonological system
appear more intelligible if the assumption is made (see
also Stamps (1969, p.447)).
Smith considers two views on the child's developing
phonological system and, in fact, only the first of these
assumes that the child always controls an adult phono¬
logical representation of a word,,. This view additionally
has it that a set of realis ation rules operates on this
phonological representation converting it into a form
identical (up to allophonic variation) to what the child
produces. The realisation rules are cast in the frame¬
work of generative phonology as developed in Chomsky and
Halle (1968). The second approach assumes that the
child's knowledge of sound structure is more or less
directly revealed by his own productions and treats his
phonological system as an independent construct with no
direct dependence on the adult system. The theory
based on this approach consists of a traditional phoneme
inventory and a set of morpheme-structure conditions
following Stanley (1967). These two alternatives will be
discussed in 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 respectively.
For theories of both types Smith considers a total of no
fewer than 29 developmental stages which are defined in
terms of there having been a significant change in the
system from one stage to the next. Obviously this means
that we are provided with two sequences of theories
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each containing 29 theories and, in principle, we could
investigate each of the transitions in the manner of
earlier chapters. This would "be a lengthy and often
tedious process and so I shall confine myself to discussion
of just the first two theories in each sequence and
make some general remarks with respect to the remainder
of the sequences.




We consider the sequence (T^, T2) where T^ contains a
phonological representation of each of the words in the
child's vocabulary at Stage 1 plus the set of ordered
realization rules as in Figure 75. (see p.431 if.)
These rules accept as input the surface phonological form
of any word and as output specify the child's production
of that word up to allophonic variation. They account
for 97/£ of the child' s vocabulary at Stage 1 .
In there are some changes in the set of rules as well
as some additions to the phonological forms which the
child has available. Several of the rules survive in
unmodified form. These are 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13,
15, 16, 19, 22, 25 and 26 from Figure 75.Of the remainder
1
only one, 5, disappears in T2 and of this Smith says (p.56):
[_ Rule 5_7, nasalising a continuant consonant after
a nasal in the same syllable had apparently disappeared
by Stage 2, but as it was of such marginal status
originally it is hard to be sure if the forms occurr¬
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Figure 75. (adapted from Smith (1973), pp. 22-31)
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So, putting rule 5 aside, we can assume that no rule
1 2
completely disappears in the transition from to T,,.
I now consider in turn each of the remaining rules and
the changes they underwent. For rule 2 two things
happened. It became restricted to apply only in final
environments and it became optional. So in t!, we have:
(2*) [+consJ 0 / p-nasalj
+voiced
and Smith describes this change as rule 2 being "complicated
*
to apply only in final position at stage 2" ((p.54) -
my emphasis - RMA.).
For rule 3 a change was necessitated entirely by the
change in rule 2 and amounted to treating rule 3 as a









-ant / /f"+syll ~|\I -stress ) J+lat]
1 2
and Smith says (p.55): "I accordingly complicate R3 to
become the transformational rule [_ 3'_7 " (&y emphasis - FlIA.)
I have already mentioned the possible disappearance of
rule 5 and the next rule to be affected in the transition
is rule 10 which, in fact, is added to by a new rule
deleting /j/ before a velar consonant preceded by a round
vowel. This rule can be represented as in 10A:
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(1 OA) +cor
—> 0 / +round -cor-cons +syll -ant
Although. Smith makes no statement on this it is difficult
to see the introduction of a new rule as anything other
than a complication.
Consider now rule 12, which in t| has the function of
making a nasal occurring in an unstressed syllable
alveolar. In it only applies to velar nasals and no








Referring back to the discussion of changes in rule 2 it
would seem that, in order to be consistent, Smith must
treat this modification of rule 12 as a complication as
it involves a more precise specification of one of Ihe
terms although, again, he makes no comment in this respect.
Rule 14 deleting unstressed initial syllables has become
1
optional in T^ and at this point there is nothing to say
about it.
Rule 17 "harmonising a post-vocalic non-nasal coronal
consonant to a preceding velar was restricted at Stage 2
to apply only to continuants" (p.74). Thus the new version







which again, by the same token as has been applied to
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rule 2 and rule 12, will have to he regarded as a complic¬
ation, as the last part of the conditioning environment
is more precisely specified than in 17.
The third part of the horrendous rule 18 becomes optional
1
in T^ and, because of the fragmentary nature of the data
leading to this conclusion, I shall say no more about
this rule.
The discussion of rule 20 is interesting (pp. 85-6):
/"Rule 207 , converting labial continuants to*|w|,
underwent a putative simplification at Stage 2
which generalised the process to /l/ as well.
Thus, while we have:
slipper —> biba (*wibe)
at stage 1, we have:
sleep —> wi:p (*bi:p)
at stage 2. In fact, the da^ta are too limited at
this early period for one to^confident that this
reflects accurately what is going on. It seems
probable that stage 1 sliuuer and rubber-band
( —> [bAbdbxn]) are remnants of a 1proto-stage'
before the appearance of |w| at all; and accord¬
ingly that slipper should be characterised as a
restructured exception, and rule 20 have the form





What appears to be a simplification involving the dropping
of part of the specification of the input to the rule is
argued against by the author himself.
Rule 21 which deletes post-consonantal alveolar consonants
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must be modified to:
(21') [VcoronalJ 0 / +cons-nasal
involving a more precise specification of the conditioning
environment. In addition the rule becomes optional after
non-nasals. To the first of these modifications Smith,
consistently with earlier remarks, says that rule 21
"must be complicated at Stage 2" (p.87).
Similar remarks apply to the development of rule 23 which
*




and rule 24 actually splits into two rules at Stage 2 to
take account of the appearance for the first time of [~]










Smith says (p.89): "The development of Rule R24, making
non-sonorants also non-strident, non-continuant, non-
affricated and non-lateral was first complicated by the
appearance of jj&] and j]fJ ..."
Finally, and following from the already discussed develop¬
ment of rule 2, it is necessary to state restrictions on
nasal-consonant clusters once they appear and this is
achieved by another new rule having the form:
+anterior
+nasal
and again, the most natural alternative is to see the
introduction of a completely new rule as involving a
complication of the overall system.
1 1
Consider now the sequence (T^, T^) from the point of view
of Conditions 1 - 4. Smith's approach with its explicit
emphasis on processes of realisation fares better than
*
Jakobson's against Condition 1. It does not, of itself,
predict behaviour in the specified domain but, for any
word form, the theory makes clear predictions as to the
child's pronunciations of that word form at various
stages in his development should he decide to use it.
Condition 2 appears to be satisfied in a fairly straight¬
forward manner, Chomsky and Halle (1968) providing the
216
framework which Smith follows conscientiously throughout.
One serious point which should be raised here is not
concerned with the use of the formalism but with the domain
of the theory and what appears to be a remarkable co¬
incidence in the appropriate theories for distinct domains.
216; Smith appears to use the formalism in a rather
cavalier and unconstrained fashion at times, resorting
to optionality, conditions on rules, transformational
rules, etc, as and when it suits him. I am aware of no
detailed discussion of constraints on rules within the
SPE framework to compare with such discussion in syntax.
(27) j+consj —> |+coronalJ /
In Chomsky and Halle (1968) we are presented with a model
of the adult speaker-hearer's phonological competence
which includes underlying phonological forms, surface
phonological forms and rules, in the format employed by
Smith, for relating forms at the two levels. Most of
these rules are motivated by consideration of alternations
• • • •' i. '
in vocabulary which a child of the age of the child in
Smith's study does not produce. For Smith, it is only his
postulated underlying forms (= the adult surface forms)
which comprise the child's phonological competence and
the realisation rules are best interpreted as constraints
on the child's performance. There is no underlying
phonological level in the sense of Chomsky and Halle for
Smith's child and, therefore, no need for rules, as part
of the child's phonological competence, relating the two
levels of phonological representation. That this is a
fair summary of Smith's position is revealed by his
statement that (p.133):
It-: is of fundamental importance to know whether the
adult surface forms represent the competence of the
child in any real sense, or whether the child's
output mirrors his perception of the adult system,
and the realisation rules are thus merely an
artifact ... (my emphasis - RMA)
and (ibid):
... it seems clear that the first position is
correct: namely the child's competence* is a close
reflection of the adult form he hears and that his
deviant output is the result of the operation of a
set of psychologically valid realisation rules.
The footnote to this passage indicated by reads:
At least in so far as the lexical representation of
items is concerned. I am not claiming that the
child shares all the adult phonological rules as well.
<
. : ' .
Indeed, Smith is not claiming this because he is not
claiming that the child possesses any phonological rules
in the sense of Chomsky and Halle at this stage in his
development. So now we can clearly see a peculiar
asymmetry between the model of the child and the model
of the adult emerging from these considerations. We#




















The problem that immediately arises concerns the identifi¬
cation of the formal theory of realisation rules with the
formal theory of phonological rules. It is apparent that
these two rule-types have quite distinct domains, the latter
being part of a competence theory and the former part of
a performance theory, and there is no a priori reason for
believing that the same formal properties should charact¬
erise both of them. Of course, there is no reason to "
believe that they must be distinct either but it might not
\ 217
be thought remarkable if this turned out to be the c^se.
Moving on to Condition. 3, as we have seen above, Smith
1 1
appears to see the transition from T^ to as one involv¬
ing complication of the theory. There are at least three
senses of 'complexity' which might be worth investigating
here. The first simply involves reference to the number
of phonological forms available to the child at a particular
stage and would claim that this number is larger at
Stage 2 than at Stage 1. It is not clear that such a
217. We would appear to have a somewhat analogous situation
in syntax/semantics with regard to the interplay between
perceptual strategies and 'grammatical' rules, the important
difference being that there is no suggestion that perceptual
strategies are theoretical constructs of the same type
as are linguistic rules (for an attempt to identify the
two, see Lakoff and Thompson (1975)). This preliminary
conclusion holds despite the fact that perceptual strategies
have so far not been stated with sufficient precision
for their formal comparison to linguistic rules to be
particularly meaningful.
notion is appropriately investigated within a theory of
phonological development, and Smith provides no detailed
statement on lexicon sizes but examination of the
appendices to his book indicates that new items were
recorded for the first time at Stage 2. In a sense this
comparison is not very meaningful as, in principle, Smith
theory assumes that the child is capable of attempting
to produce any form and makes a prediction as to what
such an attempt will sound like. This qualification also
applies to the second sense in which T^ may be deemed
1
more complex than T^ which involves reference to the
sets of features utilised in the theories. One might
expect that certain features which the child begins to
manipulate at Tg are not part of his phonological
competence at Stage 1 but this possibility is precluded
by the above consideration which makes the full set of
adult features available to the child and also by
reference to the data Smith collected according to which
there are no features absent at Stage 1 which begin to
be used at Stage 2.
The third sense of complexity is by far the most inter¬
esting and concerns the complexity of the rule systems.
Of the changes in the realisation rules between T^ and
•i
Tg we have seen that only one appears to lead to simplifi
cation and Smith himself argues that this is probably
due to Inadequate sampling. All of the others involve
either the further specification of the domain of a rule,
the introduction of new rules or a change whereby an
442
originally obligatory rule becomes optional. Although
it is not the case that we can talk about all these in
terms of a simple notion of additive complexity whereby
1 1
new rules are introduced at leaving everything in
intact, there nevertheless appears to be a complication
of statement involved in every case and this appears to
govern the author's use of 'complication'. Some support
1 1
for the view that the transition from to so conceived
is in line with Smith's preconceptions is to be found in
the opening paragraphs of his book where he says (p.'I ):
What I expected to find was a constantly developing
and interacting competence and performance unique
to the child, moving steadily from a more idiosyncratic
and simple system to one which was more complex and
more closely isomorphic with the system of the
adult language....
All of this appears to be perfectly consistent and could
1 1
lead us to conclude that the transition from T^ to T^
satisfies Condition 3, albeit only in an intuitive
fashion, but it . is at this point that we must take
a wider view and introduce consideration of later
11 1
transitions in the sequence (T^ , T^, ..., ^29^* ^ Stage
29 only a handful of realisation rules have survived at
all. In fact, of the original set of 26 rules only rule 3
(in modified form), rule 12, rule 23 (in modified form)
and rule 24 (in modified form) remain at the final stage.
They have been joined by four new rules introduced at
various points between Stage 1 and Stage 29 but each of
these rules has perished by the final stage and so we can
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see that it is only by the arbitrary decision to con¬
centrate on the first transition in the sequence that we
succeed in satisfying Condition 3. It looks as if virtually
any other of the transitions will fail in this respect.
This conclusion is anticipated by Smith despite the
predisposition already referred to when he says (p.52):
These data were then analysed as changes in the sets
of rules characterised above [_ the set of realisation
rules at Stage 1 and the set of rules credited to
the child at Stage 1 on the assumption that he has
his own system_7: the conditions and rules of his
own system becoming, in general, more complex;
the set of realisation rules becoming in general
more simple.
and again in fn,2 to p.133:
P.Seuren (personal communication) has suggested
the name of 'incompetence rules' for the realisation
rules ... as they constitute a kind of filtering
device for the child's competence, and have gradually
to be unlearned as the child approximates more and
more closely to the adult language (my emphasis - RMA).
This provides us with a new and not totally unexpected
slant on how theories should meet Condition 3. This is
going to depend entirely on how the theory is inter¬
preted - as an ability or, in general, something positive,
or as a constraint on an ability. So far I have assumed
that Smith is attempting to explain the genesis of a
positive ability but it now becomes apparent that he is
characterising constraints on that ability, constraints
which we might expect to become fewer and more simply
?1 R
described as the child gets older.
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We can now formulate a different version of Condition 3
to take account of theories which are to be interpreted
in this negative fashion.
CONDITION 3'
Given a theory T in the domain of language development D
where T is to be interpreted in terms of constraints on
knowledge or ability in D and T amounts to a sequence of
*
theories (T^, T^, ..., T^), then T is an explanatory
theory in D only if T^+^ is simpler than T^ (l-inn-1)
The various problems surrounding the notion of simplicity
when used in this way as raised in Chapter 1 will, of
course,appear again here.
11 1
In general the sequence (T^, T2, ^29) satisfy
Condition 3' in an intuitive way. It will only do so
in general because of the exceptions like the transition
1 1
from T.j to T2 which, as we have seen, if anything satisfied
Condition 3. It will only do so in an intuitive way
because no simple notion of additive complexity is applic¬
able to the sets of rules Smith is discussing except where
218. It is at this point that Smith makes contact with
Stampe's views on natural processes. The latter assumes
that such processes constitute part of the child's innate
linguistic endowment and may be modified by suppression
(that is, unlearned), restriction or ordering all of which




What then of Condition 4? Obviously the version we have
in Chapter 1 is not going to be applicable as that version
was geared to Condition 3. Furthermore, because we
don't have any clear notion of complexity it is going to
be rather messy to apply in whatever version we formulate.
Nevertheless, if only for the sake of completeness, it
is worth formulating a condition to go with Condition 3'
which is analogous to Condition 4. So:
4
CONDITION 4'
Given a theory T (= (T^, T^, ..., Tn)) in the domain of
language development D where T is to be interpreted in
terms of constraints on knowledge or ability in D, then
T is an explanatory theory in D only if Conditions 1, 2
and 3' are satisfied and, in addition, for all i, 1-i-n-1,
the relationship of simplicity between T^ and can
be related to either
(i) logical relationships in the form of the theories
and 1 j_+i . In this case we shall say that the theory
is logically grounded. Or
(ii) a theory of development in some other sphere of the
organism's activity, T', which is also interpreted in
terms of constraints. In this case we shall say that the
theory is grounded in T'. Or
(iii) a theory of generalisations concerning the world's
languages. In this case we shall say that the theory is
linguistically grounded.
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Examples of proposals to which these considerations apply
are difficult to come by but one loosely formulated one
concerns the relationship between sentence structure and
constraints on the capacity of short-term memory. It is
appropriate to construe the use of reduction transformations
in this light (see the discussion in Chapter 3) where we
can relate, albeit informally, an aspect of a sentence
production model to general constraints on information
processing which are relaxed as the child gets older.
Bever's views on the development of perceptual and *
probabalistic strategies (Bever (1970), Maratsos (1974),
Strohner and Nelson (1974)) can also be interpreted in
this light although the picture is complicated by the
claim that such strategies are not totally abandoned in
adulthood. An example closer to the theme of this
chapter would be Jakobson's remarks on the dissolution
of language in patients who have suffered some brain
trauma, where a simplification in the language system can
be interpreted by reference to the Laws of Solidarity
and ultimately to the psychophysical dimensions discussed
in 5.1.
It is easy enough to imagine a phonological theory of
constraints of the type Smith puts forward which would
satisfy Condition 4'. So, for example, we could consider
the function of constraints, as Smith subsequently does
in his book, in terms of the achievement of cluster
simplification, consonant harmony, systemic simplification,
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etc. and we could attempt to discover the distribution of
phonological structures which are marked with respect to
these features throughout the world's languages, i.e., those
which permit consonant clusters of different degrees of
complexity, those which tolerate high levels of consonant
disharmony, etc. A successful correlation between the dis¬
tribution of the structures in the world's languages and
the order of relaxation of the relevant constraints would
amount to grounding Smith's proposals linguistically in
much the same way as Jakobson's were grounded. Similarly,
one might hope to be able to discover physiological
properties of the developing organism which could be
related to the order of relaxation of the constraints
leading to the theory being grounded in a more basic
theory of motor development (see Kent (1976) for recent
work on the: child's control of the temporal aspects of
speech production). Of course, none of this has been
done but, in principle, the way ahead is clear.
As for the theory under discussion, we are led to the ■
conclusion that Smith's proposals, while satisfying
some of our conditions, notably Condition 2 and, to some
extent, Condition 3', fails to satisfy Condition 4' and,
for this reason, fails to achieve explanatory adequacy.
5.2.2 A sequence which assumes that the child's -phonology
is idiosyncratic
The alternative considered by Smxth comprises theories
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which have two components: a phoneme inventory and a
set of morpheme-structure conditions (as well as low-
level phonetic rules to take account of allophonic variation
which were also necessary in the first approach). The
2
consonantal phoneme inventory from T^ is as in Figure 77.
Matrix of A's consonant phonemes at Stage 1
b d S m n 0 w 1
consonantal + , + + + + + + +
*
syl 1 a hie
coronal - + - - + - - +
anterior + + - + + - + +
nasal - - - + + + - -
continuant - - — — — — + +
Figure 77 (from Smith (1973, p.45))
2
In addition, T^ contains an inventory of vocalic phonemes
and a set of 10 unordered morpheme-structure conditions
as in Figure 78, In connection with these, Smith says(p,47):
Conditions MS1 and MS2 are canonical or 'positive'
conditions (see Stanley (1967); MS3 - MS7 are
sequential;.-and conditions MS8 - MS10 ... are
segmental; i.e., they merely specify redundancies
in the matrix.
For this approach I shall not consider any particular
? ? O
transition in the sequence (1-j, ..., ^29^ ^e4ail
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All morphemes must be of the form characterised by MS1 or MS2:
MS1 44 ( [-syllabic] ) [+syllabic] ( [+syllabicj ) ( [[-syllabic]
L+syllabic] )*( [[-syllabic] )44
or, equivalently, 44 {CV)*(C)44






















where either:* = (? = *=?
or: 44?) and (*^<0
4~4~C ) [-continuant] /
C > [Icoronal] / Y -coronal
-anterior





C 4 [-coronal] /









Where X 4 /n /
[+coronal] 4 j+anterior[
Jj-nasal] > [^continuant]
PIS10 [+continuantj > [j-anterior]
Fignre 78. Prom Smith (1975,pp.47 - 50)
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but simply restrict myself to some general remarks. In
2 2
the development from to T29 there is scope for complic¬
ations of a sort which were impossible under the first
approach: an increase in the phonemes controlled by the
child and a concomitant increase in the set of distinctive
features. So we find, for example, that by Stage 8 the
child has added to his phoneme inventory the phonemes
/p, t, k, f, r/ and is using the distinctive feature'
+voiced. By Stage 20 he has further added the phonemes
/dz, ts, m, n, 1, h/ and is using the feature +strident.
As far as the rules are concerned, there is also a tendency
towards complication, although it is impossible to quantify
this in any satisfactory way. By Stage 29 of the original
10 morpheme structure conditions only MS1 (in modified
form), MS7 (in modified form), MS8 (in modified form),
MS9 (in modified form) and MS10 (in modified form having
actually disappeared at one stage) still survive. This
is countered by the emergence, between Stage 1 and Stage 29,
of 12 new morpheme structure conditions of which 9 are still
operative at Stage 29. As we have already seen Smith regards
the development, when viewed in this light, as moving from
the simple to the complex but the notion of complexity
we can invoke remains at an intuitive level.
As far as satisfaction of Conditions 1 - 4 is concerned,
we can tentatively draw the following conclusions.
Condition 1 raises more problems than it did for the
first approach as viewing the child's development as
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idiosyncratic does not lead to detailed predictions of
his rendition of completely new adult forms. Condition 2
is satisfied hy reference to a traditional phonemic
theory coupled with a theory of distinctive features
and a general account of morpheme structure conditions.
It is with respect to Condition 3 that the two approaches
most clearly diverge, with the first approach requiring
a formulation of Condition 3' hut this second approach
apparently satisfying Condition 3 at an intuitive level.
With regard to phoneme inventories and distinctive *
features the position is a little less opaque with simple
additive notions being applicable; the more the sequence
progresses the more phonemes we find and the more distinc¬
tive features are necessary to distinguish them. One
unfortunate consequence of this is that the child appears,
at some stages, to make phonemic distinctions not used
by the adult (see Smith, pp.120 - 22 for details) and,
therefore, he will have to 'unlearn' such distinctions
at some later stage leading to an overall simplification
in the phonemic inventory (this seems to be in the spirit
of the proposals of Kornfeld (1971)) although such a stage
does not appear in the development charted by Smith. Clearly,
further argument would be necessary to make such a position
attractive. Such a problem does not arise for the set
of distinctive features and, for this set, we could look
to the satisfaction of Condition 4. Unfortunately the
question is not raised by Smith and there is little point
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in building further on the speculative nature of much of
this discussion.
Summarising the main points of this chapter, it seems
to me important to emphasise the contributions of Jakobson
and the extent to which he showed a sophistication with
regard to questions of explanatoriness which is quite
uncharacteristic of workers in language development. Smith's
work is stimulating and has led to some clarification
concerning the positive and negative interpretations of
theories and the corresponding differences in conditions
which they might be expected to meet. At the same time,
its meticulous detail means that it is an extremely long
job to analyse it in depth, and, most importantly, no
attention is given to the satisfaction of a modified
21 9
version of Condition 4. I might add that Smith himself
sees virtues in the approach of 5.2.1 to capture
219. In general, in developmental phonology we might
expect the 'more basic' theories of Condition 4 to be
theories of motor development or perceptual development
rather than conceptual development. One recent study
suggesting that this need not always be the case is
Schwartz and Folger (1977) where it is argued that the
reduction in variability of forms noted after the child
passes the '50-word stage' can be attributed to his
'abilities to represent stable rule systems, a representation
which is only possible at the end of the sensori-motor
period. This is an interesting suggestion but, as the
authors point out, there are alternative explanations
which must be seen as equally plausible at the moment.
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generalisations in development which, are highly significant
and which I have not touched on here at all. These
virtues are much more closely related to the linguist's
notion of explanation and its relationship to 'significant
generalisations' (see Hurford, (1977) for extensive
analysis) and, it seems to me, can be considered independently
220
of the conditions discussed here.
220. I would not like to be interpreted as insisting
that such considerations are necessarily raised in an
independent framework but they raise so many problems
within linguistics itself that it would have complicated
the current work enormously to attempt to accommodate them.
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CHAPTER 6 : THE ACQUISITION OP SPEECH ACTS AKD CONVERSATION
SKILLS
In this chapter I shall deal with a somewhat disparate
set of topics which have in common that they focus not
or formal and structural aspects of language development
but rather aspects which are rooted in the fact that
language has, as one of its primary functions, the property
of being used to communicate in a shared context. We shall
also meet the additional point that the formal and struc-
*
tural aspects of language can be understood by paying
attention to its communicative and interactive properties.
As problems in the domain of formal syntax have become
more formidable (cf. Chapter 5 for some discussion)
this 'functional' area has received an increasing amount
of attention in the last few years, yet no common theoret¬
ical framework has emerged and this contributes to the
uneven subject matter of the chapter. In particular,
I feel that everything remains to be demonstrated as far
as finding a basis for syntax in communication is concerned
and that most proponents of this view have grossly under¬
estimated the complexity of the structures which need to
221
be provided with a communicative base, taking the fact
that the functions which language serves appear to be
continuous from a non-^structured 'holophrastic' period
221 . Cf. similar remarks in connection with a cognitive
basis for structures in 4.3. See Ervin-Tripp (1977)
for a recent review of conversation and syntax with very
tentative conclusions.
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to a structured syntactic period as demonstrative of the
correctness of the position. Clearly it is not. It
is perfectly consistent to recognise continuity in the
development of a functionally defined system without
insisting that the functions play any explanatory role
for the genesis of structures which eventually come to
serve them; consistent but not necessarily correct and it
seems to me that stronger arguments than have been put
forward so far will be necessary before this issue can
be resolved. #
The chapter falls into six sections each one discussing
work which is roughly within the area just delimited and
submitting it to the sort of analysis with which we .are
222
by now familiar. 6.1 is devoted to the work of Dore
(1974, 1975) manipulating the concept of 'primitive
speech act' and subscribing to the view that the study
of such acts is a necessary precursor to an understanding
of the genesis of structure. 6.2 considers the less far-
ranging work of Gruber (1975) which, nevertheless, has
some interesting properties and which can be related to
some of my own work (Atkinson (1974, forthcoming)) which
is examined in 6.3. To some extent extending my work
and developing an independent framework is the work of
Keenan and her associates (see, particularly, Eeenan
and Schieffelin (1976)) and a discussion of this is the
subject matter of 6.4. Bruner is the scholar who has
222. One very notable omission is Bates (1976) to which I
did not have access in time to include here.
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attempted to identify the basis of a theory of speech-
acts and language structure in pre-linguistic routines of
interaction and play and this attempt will be scrutinised
in detail in 6,5. The final section, 6.6, will be devoted
to a discussion of the very influential work of Halliday
(1975, 1975) which, taking a functional stance on meanings,
attempts to provide an explanation for the development
of structure which is grounded in facts which are outside
the individual psychology of the child; facts which
reside in the socio-cultural framework in which the language
being learned by the child is embedded.
6,1 Pore and primitive speech acts.
Dore (1974, 1975) argues for the value of the notion of
'primitive speech act' in understanding aspects of early
language development. Beginning from the idea of 'speech
act' emerging from the work of Searle (1969, 1975a, 1975b)
but having its origins in the insights of Austin (1962),
Dore makes the reasonable enough claim that a child
eventually acquires a repertoire of speech acts and that,
therefore, "it is appropriate to ask how he acquires this
repertoire" (1974, p.544). Our expectations following
a remark like this are that we shall be presented with a
developmental theory of speech acts and to some extent
this expectation is fulfilled. In his 1974 paper, while
not presenting his conclusions in a developmental context,
it is possible to interpret some of Dore's findings as
embodying a developmental hypothesis and in his 1975
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paper he does talk at length about the relationship
between early aspects of speech act development and sub¬
sequent sentential structures. I shall take these aspects
of his work in turn in 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 below.
6,1,1 The first speech acts
The adult notion of 'speech act' is not the appropriate
tool for studying early child language. The reason
advanced for this is that the typical speech act studied
by Searle has, as subcomponents, acts of referring and.
predicating and these involve at least two linguistic
forms. The child at the beginning of language learning,
while a producer of speech acts, does not produce utter¬
ances more than one word in length and, therefore, we
are never in a position to identify acts of referring
°23
and predicating in the same child utterance.To solve
this problem Dore coins the notion of primitive speech
act which he introduces in the following terms (1974,p345):
A primitive speech act ... is defined as an utter¬
ance, consisting formally of a single word or a
single prosodic pattern, which [_ here the text has
'with' - RMA_7 functions to convey the child's
intention before he acquires sentences. The single
word is either a rudimentary referring expression
such as the names of people, objects or events, or
a specifically expressive work like "hi", "by-bye",
223. It is not clear that anything in Searle's framework
precludes the possibility of illocutionary acts without
associated propositional acts (see 6.3 below for relevant
discussion).
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or "nighty-night". The utterance of a prosodic
pattern counts as a PSA if (1 ) it contains a
consistent prosodic feature produced without the
segmental phonemes of a word, and (2) it communicates
the child's intention. Prosodic patterns, with or
without lexical content, convey the primitive force
of the PSA.
Dore then proposes four observational criteria which are
to be taken account of in deciding the identity of PSA's.
These are: (1) the child's utterances; (2) his nonlinguistic
behaviour, e.g., gestures and facial expressions; (3) the
4
adult's response, both verbal and non-verbal; and (4) the
relevant, salient aspects of the context of utterance,
such as objects attended to, location of objects and
people. Applying these criteria to the data he had
from two children yielded, for Dore, eight PSA's which
he relates to the four observational criteria as in
Figure 78 overleaf.
The first thing to note in connection with this tabulation
is that Dore is not applying his own definition of a PSA
consistently. On the list in Figure 78 there are three
entries which seem to be quite neutral as far as the
child's intentions are concerned (cf. the role of intention
in Searle's theorising adapted largely from Grice (1957)
and Strawson (1964)). Thus, for the PSA of Labelling the
child apparently has no audience-directed intention and
so, as far as Searle's theory of speech acts and Dore's
definition of PSA are concerned, Labelling wculd not








orevent;d es notaddressult; doesnotawait response
Mostoften none; occasional repetitionof child'sutter¬ ance
Salientfeature focussedonby child;nohange insituation
Repeating Answering
Wordr prosodic pattern Word
Attendstoadult utterancebefore hisutterance; maynotaddress adult;doesnot awaitresponse Attendstoadult utterancesbefor hisutterance; addressesult
Mostoften none; occasional repetitionof child's utterance Awaitsch ld response;after childutterance mostoften acknowledges response;may thenp rform action
Utterancefocussed on;nochangei situation Utterancefocussed on;nocha gei situationunless child'sresponse promptsadult reaction
Requesting(action)
Wordr marked prosodic pattern
AttendstobjectPerform
orevent;actio addressesult; awaitsresponse; mostoftenperforms signalling gesture








Word (with marked prosodic contour) Word
Addressesadult; awaitsresponse; mayakegesture regardingobject Addressesadult byuttering adult'sname loudly;awaits response Attendstoadult orbject
Protesting
Wordr marked prosodic contour
Attendstoadult; addressesult; resistsordenies adult'sction
Practicing
Wordr prosodic pattern
Attendsto objectrev nt; doesnotaddre s adult;norawait response Figure79.rom
Adult1sRelevant responsecontextual features Uttersa responseHochangein situation Respondsby attendingto childor answeringchild Returnsa greeting utteranceBeforechild's utteranceadultis somedi tanceaway; adult'sorientation typicallychanges Speechventis initiatedorterminated Adultinitiates speechev ntby performingan actionthe childdoesnot like NoresponseAdult'sactionis completedrhild preventsaction Noapparentspec ofcontextisrelevan toutterance (1974,p346).
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(forthcoming) makes a similar point when he notes that
Dore fails to distinguish between communicative acts and
informative acts where only the former presupposes an
audience-directed intention on the part of the performer
of the act. Thus, the constituency of the set of PSA's
is not on the firmest foundation and Dore admits another
possible source of indeterminacy when he says (p.347):
The set is not meant to be exhaustive - a study
of other children might well yield PSA types
which our children did not perform. Also, in a
finer analysis, one might wish to distinguish
between, say, different kinds of labelling (for
example, labelling an action vs. labelling an
object) in which case a different set of PSA's
would emerge.
To construe Dore as endorsing a developmental hypothesis
we have to indulge in a certain amount of speculation.
We fix D as the domain of speech acts the child is capable
of performing and from what we have seen so far we can
safely conclude that Dore sees theories in D as invent¬
ories of PSA's. Figure 79 is based on the development
of two children and we refer to the set of speech acts in
224
this inventory as S^. Wow it surely makes sense to
assume that a developmental sequence exists and that S^
is just one among several inventories of speech acts which,
224. The two children in Dore's study were not quite
identical with regard to their speech act inventories;
the child M did not produce any instances of Calling and
the child J did not provide any instances of Protesting
except by using non-conventional forms. Dore does not
suggest that any developmental sequence is involved here.
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when considered together, constitute a sequence,
(S^, S^, S^, ..., S^). Clearly this much is true
to the extent that the child eventually tecomes an adult
and then has available the full set of adult speech acts
which, incidentally, will include most, if not all, of
the PSA's from (note such explicit performatives as
I request that, I repeat that, etc.). This indicates
that we have at least a sequence of the form (S^, S^)
where S^ refers to the full inventory of adult speech
acts. How does such a sequence match up to condition^ 1-4?
The detailed prediction of behaviour hardly seems to be
an issue here as the sets of speech acts are closely tied
to the child's intentions rather than to the form of his
utterances and so, unless we have a paradigm of psychological
explanation which embraces intentions, there seems little
else to say. Of course, this is not a new conclusion
but it is particularly apparent in this case.
Condition 2 requires that the inventories of speech acts
in the sequence be constructed in accordance with some
general theoretical considerations. The only sensible
interpretation for this is that there should be a finite
set of possible speech acts from which, at each stage in
his development, the child is using a subset. The
difficulties is specifying such a set were first made
clear by Austin who claimed to have found several hundred
verbs which had a performative use and each of which could
be seen as entailing the existence of a distinct speech
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act. As different languages and different cultures are
considered such a list would need to he extended and it
seems unlikely that a once and for all exhaustive list
could he produced. It might, nevertheless, he possible
to develop a theory of speech act types suggesting
general properties each set of which will characterise
large classes of speech-acts and which will he independent
of cultural differences. Searle (1975a, 1975h) can be
seen as making some preliminary suggestions along these
lines but nothing similar is considered by Dore. We*have
seen that hfe considers the set of PSA's abstracted from
his data as somewhat indeterminate and certainly not
exhaustive. A tighter coding procedure with regard to
the four observational criteria or, possibly, the
employment of different criteria could lead to different
inventories and no guide-1.ines are provided for choosing
between such alternatives.
Condition 3 can only be considered in a hypothetical way
since we are not provided with a developmental sequence
but, as already noted, the existence of an adult stage
can guarantee us a minimal developmental theory. It
seems fair to say, with regard to the sequence (S^, S^)
that, with the exception of Practicing, which anyway
does not properly count as a speech-act, all the child
PSA's listed by Dore survive, as speech acts in the adult
model. In addition a large number of speech acts not
included in S^ appear in S^, e.g. promising, threatening,
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advising, and so it seems safe to conclude that there is
a simple additive relationship between and S^. For
the sake of argument let us assume that Condition 3 is
satisfied in this straightforward sense for the whole
sequence (S^, S2, Sn=S^). Then Condition 4 would
require an answer to the question: given two inventories,
and S^.+.| , such that = S.. + X, why do we find the
sequence schematised as S. —> S. + X rather than the
sequence schematised as X —> S. + X?
t)
4
The hopes of providing a logical grounding for the sequence
are remote, as Dore's PSA's are unanalysed units with no
logical relationships holding between them (cf. in this
connection the proposals of G-ruber, Atkinson and Keenan
analysed in detail below). Reference to languages of the
world would appear to be a promising route to investigate..
Although, as pointed out above, there is almost certainly
a good deal of variation in the languages of the world as
far as their total inventories of speech acts are con¬
cerned, it seems equally likely that there is a functional
core to the world's languages consisting of a set of
speech acts which can be performed in any language (cf.
Jakobson's minimal consonantal and vocalic systems
described in 5.1). In particular, it is difficult to
imagine a language which does not enable its speakers to
assert, to question and to command whereas it does mot
stretch the imagination to consider a language in which
it is impossible to sentence, to find (guilty or not
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opjr
guilty), etc. An immediate prediction from such a
state of affairs would be that the functional core will
be learned first and we might even hope to discover
principles akin to the Laws of Solidarity operating
outside the functional core. Again it would be possible
to interpret Searle's recent work as taking the first
steps along this direction where he is not only producing
definitions of categories of speech acts but also giving
some indication of what the paradigmatic member of each
category would be. Unfortunately, from Dore's point*of
view, all of this is speculation. Even if it could be
realised in a satisfactory way we would still be left
with the problem - the same one as Jakobson had - of
predicting order of development within the functional
core, but the nearest Dore comes to even raising such
possibilities is when he reproduces some claims of Slobin
(1971) that "Everywhere language consists of utterances
performing a universal set of communicative functions
(such as asserting, denying, requesting, ordering and so
forth) ..." (p.502) but it should be clear by now that
225. Bennett (197.6) makes exactly the same point in a
critique of Chomsky's view that the 'primary' function of
language is not communication. It seems necessary to
distinguish between a particular linguistic act and a
language in this dispute and, while Chomsky has argued
that communicative intention is not a necessary concomitant
of every linguistic act, this does not show that such
a notion is not central in the definition of a language.
much more than this is needed if we are to follow this
road to explanatory adequacy. Nothing in Dore's work
suggests that the third possibility, that of grounding the
theory of speech acts in a more basic theory, is a
realistic one. Indeed, there is some indication that,
at least in one regard, he would consider such a reduction
impossible. To appreciate his argument, we can consider
the view that a theory of speech acts could be reduced
to a theory of non-linguistic communication with the
various conditions of Chapter 4 being satisfied, but*
against this Dore makes the point that (1975, p.57):
Certainly, some forms of communicative intentions
exist before language emerges, but linguistically
expressed intentions are not isomorphic with pre-
linguistic intentions and the former need not be
derived from the latter. (It is difficult to
imagine, for example, what would count as a pre-
linguistic 'asserting' of a proposition.)
Thus, even if we had an explicit developmental theory of
non-linguistic communication to put alongside an explicit
theory of the development of speech acts, there would
be at least one substantive term in the latter, namely
'assertion', which could not be translated into a
22^
substantive term of the former.- One of the necessary
226.Dore's difficulties of imagination are not necessarily
insurmountable. It is certainly not incoherent to consider
an act of pointing as corresponding to assertion. Cf.also
Grice's (1957) discussion of the differences between showing
photographs and drawing pictures where he seems to want to
say that the latter can be functionally equivalent to
asserting. It is patently non-linguistic and it is easy
to imagine it as pre-Unguistic even if it is, empirically,
extremely unlikely.
conditions on reductions described in Chapter 4 would
not be satisfied.
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It seems, then, that there is no plausible route for Dore's
proposals to approach Condition 4. This predicament is
made even worse when we recall that we are only discussing
Condition 4 on the counterfactual assumptions that
Conditions 2 and 3 are satisfied. In short, Dore's
suggestions can only realistically be seen as a preliminary
coding of data into a technical vocabulary. They cannot
be seen as constituting any sort of explanation,
6,1.2 Primitive speech acts and syntax
In Dore (1975) the author puts forward some ideas con¬
cerning the relationship between speech acts and syntax
which can be interpreted in terms of my framework. He
is at pains to argue that his approach through PSA's
yields a more valuable treatment of the 'holophrastic
stage' in child speech and he contrasts his own view
where "the PSA is formalized" (p.34) as in Figure 80:
Figure 80 From Dore (1975, p.34). Note that in this
paper the PSA does not admit intonational contours alone,
with that of McNeill whose "formalization of the holophrase"









Noun Phrase^ Verb Phrase
Verb Noun Phrase2
Figure 81 From Dore (1975, p.23)
"where only one constituent (but not NP^) is expressed
in any given one-word utterance" (ibid), that of Ingram
(1971) whose "version of a case grammar approach is




Agent Act Object State
Figure 82 From Dore (1975, p.25).
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and that of Greenfield, Smith and laufer whose "version
of a case grammar analysis would presumably be formalized




Figure 85 From Dore (1975,p.26).
227. The published version is Greenfield and Smith (1976),
already discussed in Chapter 4.
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It is not my purpose here to evaluate Dore's criticisms
of these alternative accounts. Suffice it to say that
I largely agree that taking the sentence, a structured
entity, as the pivotal notion in treatments of early
child language has led to a great deal of ohfuscation and
that the arguments advanced against the positions documented
in Figures 81 - 83 are generally telling ones. It is
Dore's own analysis which is of interest to me. He says
(p.34):
The child's transition to structural meaning is of
course the crucial issue of his acquiring syntax.
The central question for speech act development is:
how do the PSA constituents become grammaticalised?
Hote that here the question is quite distinct from that
discussed in 6.1.1. The domain of investigation is now
something like (it is difficult to be precise) the inter¬
action of a theory of linguistic communication and formal
principles of organisation of linguistic structures. It
is not appropriate to regard the "formalization" of
Figure 81 as arising from a phrase structure grammar as
linear order is not at issue and a most neutral inter¬
pretation is to view the downward direction in the tree
as representing some notion like "is realised as". Dore
next notes that Figure 8T (p.34):
... is clearly inadequate as a representation of
the child's knowledge after the one-word stage...
(my emphasis - PMA)
and proposes the schema of Figure 84 as a representation



















figure 84 From Dore (1975, p.35)
and on the interpretation of the right hand side of this
figure Dore says (ibid):
In this figure a predicating expression is intro¬
duced and it combines with a referring expression
to form a rudimentary proposition. The force
component begins to be expressed by elementary
kinds of illocutionary force indicators.
It is unclear -whether, at this stage, the child is supp-
2 28
osed to control word-order as a grammatical device , and
228. At this stage no category 'sentence' has been intro¬
duced and Dore says (p.35): "The notion of sentence is
introduced here to account for the child's increasing
control over word-order, grammatical morphemes, para¬
phrase, detection of anomaly, and so on, in multiple
word utterances" (my emphasis - RMA).
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so it is probably legitimate to interpret the right
hand side in the same way as the left hand side with the
leaves of the tree not being linearly ordered. However
(pp.34 - 5):
... since children soon begin to combine words in
a relatively non-random manner./"Figure 84_7 must












Here the child begins to form more complete prop¬
ositions which, furthermore, begin to become marked
syntactically and semantically according to the
conventions of the language he is learning (my
emphasis - RMA).
The right hand side of the figure in this passage must,
apparently, be interpreted in hybrid fashion with a notion
like 'realisation' obtaining between the Speech act and
its 'components' and a more traditional interpretation
corresponding to what we have under the Sentence node.
While some may not see the resolution of these issues as
vital, I submit that they have some importance, particularly
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if we take seriously Dore's use of "formalization" in
this context.
There are some attractive features to this account, not
least the attempt to integrate the formal aspects of
language structure with structures representing communi¬
cative functions without suggesting that the former can
somehow be reduced to the latter. However, there is a
great deal which is confusing and which casts doubt on
the status of the theory. There are, for example, several
4
unexplained notational modifications such as the change
from Primitive Force to Elementary Illocutionary Force
to Illocutionary Force and we are given no indication as
to what the distinguishing characteristics of these
categories are beyond the fact that they appear to co-
occur with either rudimentary referring expressions,
rudimentary propositions or sentences. But these latter
could be seen as equally in need of elucidation.
Because of factors like this it is difficult to cont¬
emplate rigourously testing the proposals against Conditions
1 - 4, but a brief word is perhaps in order. Putting
Condition 1 aside, the difficulties immediately emerge
with respect to Condition 2. There is vagueness as to
229. Actually the issue is extremely confused as Dore
suggests that the child's intention will become grammati-
calized in the modality component of the sentence but
this would insist on too close a correspondence between
intention and grammar and would lead no clear role for
the node labelled 'illocutionary force'.
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the exact nature of the domain under investigation and,
therefore, little wonder that no general theory of that
domain exists to which Dore can refer his proposals. As
for Condition 3, there appear to be some rather obvious
discontinuities in the development and such terms as
'Primitive Porce' and 'Rudimentary referring expression'
disappear at later stages but, being charitable, we might
suggest that a more careful set .of definitions would
see them being absorbed into categories which are used
at later stages. Any discussion of Condition 4 must*await
more precise formulation of the theory.
In summary, Dore's ideas to integrate functional and
structural development are very much to the point in
the present research climate. However, without a clearer
articulation of his proposals, it is difficult to see
him progressing beyond a position where "this view is
highly speculative" (p.35), and analysis reveals that
it may be not merely speculative but incoherent.
6.2 Gruber on performatives and constatives
Gruber (1975) begins from Austin's distinction between
constatives (utterances which admit of judgements in
terms of truth and falsity) and performatives (utterances
which do not admit of such judgements) and argues that,
in the earliest two-word utterances of one child studied
between the ages of 1.24 years and 1.42 years, all items
are interpretable as performatives with constatives only
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appearing at the end of the period. As the whole argument
proceeds from what I consider to be a fundamental
confusion between utterances and sentences and between
the theory of communication and the theory of sentence
structure, I shall not be concerned to evaluate the
details of the analysis in what follows. Rather I shall
be concerned with the logical structure of the proposal
and Gruber's explanation which backs it up. Consideration-
of the latter will necessitate some reference to the sort
of syntactic structures suggested by Gruber as under*-
lying the earliest sentences used by the child.
For simplicity, I assume that the domain under investigation
is the set of speech acts available to the child and
reconstrue Gruber's position as claiming that the speech
act of Stating only appears after certain other speech
230
acts. Putting forward the main claim of the paper,
Gruber says (p.517):
There is evidence from the behavioural context
that all of Dory's utterances for the first nine
weeks were performatives. The complement see, for
example, always appears to be accompanied by parallel
behavior consistent with the performative meaning
'I indicate to you'. V/henever see was uttered as
the complement of some referent, Dory was either
230. It is probably more accurate to see this domain as
the interaction between communication and formal sentence
structure as in 6.1.2 but, as Gruber himself makes no
distinctions along these lines, it is difficult to know
whether he had anything like it in mind.
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reaching for the object named or described by the
referent, pointing to it, or showing it to her
mother.
Thus a large class from the child•s earliest two-word
utterances are what we might refer to as Indicators, a
sort of performative where the utterance of the sentence
counts as an act of indication, on the assumption that
certain conditions not discussed by Gruber are satisfied
(cf. Austin (1962) on whether saying so can make it so).
Other performatives observed during this period are what
I shall call Desideratives and, in connection with these,
Gruber says (p.518):
From the behavioral context it was also clear in
the case of the performative'I demand of you' that
it was indeed the performative that was intended
and not the constative expressed by the adult form
'I want' or 'I am demanding'. For the performative
it is necessarily the case that the communication
itself is for the purpose of satisfying the desire.
A performative utterance cannot lie. ... Dory's
bodily activity accompanying these utterances,
such as reaching or beckoning for an object was
consistent with the utterance being for this purpose
of satisfying the desire.
Although Gruber does not commit himself on this, it
appears that Indicators and Desideratives are the only
251
classes of performatives used by the child in this period.
231. There is nothing in the data he presents to indicate
that this is not so, although there are examples which
will embarrass his principle that (p.519): "in general
cont.
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The change taking place at the end of this period is
described in the following terms (p.519):
Performatives are still produced ... But in addition
there are utterances that cannot be simply performatives
... Here Dory is describing things in her environ¬
ment. The complements now express predications of
the referent remote from the speech act itself.
Bodily activity signifying indication or demand
does not accompany the communication.
Examples cited include Kathleen coming, powder all gone.
shoe on floor and see the baby looking the last of wkich
appears to have both performative and constative
characteristics although Gruber does not explicitly
suggest this.
Let us agree that we. have three speech acts, Indicating,
Desiring and Stating of which the first two count, for
251. (cont.) a word chosen to represent holophrastically
an underlying structure in child language corresponds to
a word of adult language whose content approximates the
categories or structures of part of that underlying
structure". I refer to such instances as hi lamb where,
presumably, hi is expressing 'I indicate to you' and
thank you mama where, if this is to be construed as a
desiderative, thank you must be seen as originating in
something like 'I demand of you'. . To save the principle
Gruber could resort to some notion of association where
hi is somehow associated with seeing and indicating and
thank you associated with getting and demanding, but it
is unclear how far this path can be trodden without
reducing the principle to vacuity.
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G-ruber, as performatives and the last one as constative,
and examine the status of his proposal as a developmental
theory. Casting it in terms which are amenable to analysis,
we can see that what we have, if the domain of enquiry
is fixed as those speech acts which the child is capable
of performing, is a two-member developmental sequence,
(S.j , S2) where S^ = ^Indicating, DesiringJ and =
^Indicating, Desiring, StatingJ . By inference there-
will be later stages in the sequence as the child adds
to his inventory but we can usefully restrict our t
attention to the sequence studied by Gruber.
Passing over repetitive discussion of Condition 1, we might
suggest that Condition 2 is satisfied at least to the
extent that any general theoiy of speech acts will contain
analogues of these three early types. While this is
highly debatable for Desiring, I shall assume that it is
so for the sale of further discussion. Condition 3 is
then satisfied in a straightforward sense: the items from
the earlier stage persist into the later stage and one
additional item, Stating, shows up giving us a situation
which can be' schematised as X > X + Y where X denotes
the two-member set of speech acts ^Indicating, DesiringJ
and Y denotes the singleton set ^StatingJ. Why should
we find this development rather than the alternative,
Y —> X + Y? Gruber discusses this point and can there¬
fore be seen as looking for satisfaction of Condition 4.
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Accepting Ross's (1970) thesis that every declarative
sentence has, as part of its underlying structure, a
performative verb of saying with a first person subject,
second person indirect object and an embedded clause as
direct object corresponding approximately to the surface
form of the sentence, and the similar arguments for non-
declarative sentences found in, e.g., Lakoff (1972),
Sadock (1974), Gruber concludes (p.521):.
Given that every utterance is obligatorily dominated
by a performative sentence underlyingly, the simplest
possible sentence structure would be one which
consists of a performative sentence only. In such a
sentence the direct object (referent) (sic) of the
performative is a simple noun phrase as in 'I indicate
to you the book', as has been described. This would
be the underlying structure of the majority of the
child's utterances during the earliest period ...
It is not possible to claim, however, that during this
period the underlying structure of the child's utter¬
ances were of this simplest type only. As has been
pointed out, 'see broke' and similar utterances
appear to involve an underlying relative clause
as in 'I indicate to you the tning which Is broken';
also, we do not exclude the possibility of sentences
embedded as the direct object of the performative
(my emphasis throughout to reinforce the opinion
expressed at the top of page 474 above - RMA)
What we have here is a putative explanation which is
weakened and subsequently abandoned by the author himself.









where, in the former, the direct object of the performative
verb is a simple K (corresponding to the fact that objects
can be indicated and desired) and in the latter the direct
object of the performative verb is an embedded sentence
(corresponding to the fact that one cannot state or
assert objects but only propositions). This has a certain
intuitive appeal, but G-ruber argues against it by his
treatment of see broke as involving a relative clause
and his insistence that the performative-like verb demand
be allowed to take sentential direct objects from the
earliest stages of language development. Ultimately this
line of speculation evaporates in the view that all the
underlying structures are innately supplied anyway, and
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therefore questions of developmental sequence do not arise
in connection with them (p.522):
... these considerations are in accord with the
hypothesis of the universality of the base among
the languages of the world, which would be a matter
of innate competence .. .
The developmental sequence remains unexplained but there
is another avenue and G-ruber explores it. It involves
differences in lexicalisation. At the earlier
performative stage the child is seen as lexicalising^ the
performative aspect of a sentence together with its
direct object if it is a nominal or a lexical item repres¬
enting an embedded sentence if this is what we have in
direct object position. At the constative stage, however,
as well as these patterns, we also find (p.523): "the
advent of the ability to lexicalise analytically an embedded
sentence direct object so that both the underlying subject
and predicate of the embedded sentence have separate
lexical representations". The explanatory principle is
then presented as follows (ibid):
In regard to the two clear stages of development
observed here differentiation in lexicalization
competence consists in the acquisition of subdivisions
of the base into potentially lexicalizable constituents
proceeding successively down the underlying base
tree. During the performative stage complex utter¬
ances reflect a subdivision of the base between the
performative and its direct object ... During the
constative stage a further subdivision of the base
is acquired lower down the tree between the subject
481
and predicate of the sentence embedded as direct
object of the performative.
To illustrate this principle Gruber presents the example








tative see shoe allgone
stage
Figure 87
Two glaring weaknesses in the supposed explanation are
immediately apparent. The first is that the subdivision
governing lexicalisation at the performative stage does
not honour constituent structure in the tree and, there¬
fore, there is no reason to expect the split which Gruber
is suggesting between the performative aspect of the
structure and the rest of the tree rather than, say, a
split between the subject of the performative verb and the
rest of the structure or any other conceivable split.
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More importantly, we do not even have the beginnings of
an explanation for the absence of constatives from the
earliest two-word utterances. To see this we only have to
consider the putative structure of Figure 88 together with
some possible lexicalisations from the performative
stage. The principles we have been presented with do
nothing to rule out a structure of this sort. In particular,
since the underlying structures are innately supplied,
there is no question of this structure not being available
at the performative stage. Figure 88 shows the claimed










the structure and the remainder as far as lexicalisation
is concerned and G-ruber's principles would lead us to
expect such utterances as me shoe meaning 'the shoe
something or other' and say allgone meaning 'something
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or other is all gone'. The fact that we do not find
such utterances argues strongly against his explanatory
232
principles. We must conclude that Condition 4 remains
233
unsatisfied.
6.3 Attention drawing and reference
In a number of recent papers (Atkinson (1974,forthcoming),
Griffiths (1974, forthcoming), Lyons (1975, 1977a),
Keenan (1974, 1975), Keenan and Schieffelin (1976)) the
importance of routines, verbal and non-verbal, for *
manipulating the attention of an addressee has been
emphasised (for some observations on the development of
this ability from well before the start of linguistic
development, see Bruner (1975b), Bruner and Scaife (1975).
Lyons discusses this topic in terms of his notion of
quasi-referenoe and in Atkinson (1974, forthcoming) I
argue that the ability to refer to objects or sets of
objects presupposes, in a large number of cases, a
previous act of attention-drawing.
232. Gruber could resort to a principle that aspects of
statemental performatives are not lexicalised at the
performative stage but this would be blatantly ad hoc.
233. If Gruber's arguments were more cogent we would, of
course, have an argument in which the more basic theory
of Condition 4 is a theory of linguistic structure which
is being used to ground a theory of communicative develop¬
ment. This runs quite counter to the trends examined
in this chapter and probably reflects the fact that the
first version of Gruber's paper was written in 1967.
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Briefly, linguistic reference to a particular entity
assumes that the addressee can identify the entity under
the linguistic description used hy the speaker, for the
adult there are devices such as restrictive relative
clauses, superlative adjectival forms, phrases like the
first, etc. which enable him to realise this assumption
without recourse to non-linguistic means. The child,
however, at the beginnings of language development does
not have access to this sort of construction and usually
refers to objects simply by using a nominal (either •>
common noun or proper name) often with a schwa vowel in
the article position (cf.Dore, franklin, Miller and
Ramer (1976)). Of course, he cannot usually expect to
succeed in referring using such limited linguistic devices
unless he performs some additional act to reduce somehow
the possible range of referents. This act may take the
form of pointing, which is interpreted as directing the
addressee's attention along a particular line of regard
which includes only one entity fitting the simple linguistic
description used by the child, further possibilities,
however, are that the child may resort to linguistic
means to direct his addressee's attention and a considerable
portion of the argument in Atkinson (1974) is devoted to
producing evidence for this possibility. Certain forms
such as see, look, there (cf. now Gopnik (1978)), here and
this (in the speech of one child studied in the project
reported in Griffiths, Atkinson and Huxley (1974)) were
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most naturally interpreted as a.ttention-manipulators
and this was seen as the beginnings of an explanation
for why we find such forms being used so commonly early
in language acquisition. Taking the argument somewhat
further, I proposed that some uses of nominal forms were
best interpreted as having the same function, i.e., that
some uses of, e.g., doggy should be viewed not as
holophrastic encodings of something like 'That's a doggy'
but as attempts to get the addressee attending to a parti¬
cular dog often, but not always, with the intention 6f
going on to produce a statement about it. This possibility
was exploited to explain aspects of such recalcitrant
phenomena as replacement sequences (Braine (1971),
Bowerman (1973)) and, more generally, repetition. As
an additional suggestion I speculated that instances of
apparent questions on the part of the child could b^
similarly interpreted as attention-drawers and related
this to the peculiar phenomenon, found for a time in the
development of a fairly large proportion of children,
of the child apparently asking a question and then
answering it himself immediately (see Eeenan, Schieffelin
and Piatt (1976) for further speculation, argument and
data along these lines). Several of these lines of
research are admirably summarised and expanded upon by
Griffiths (forthcoming).
234. Lyons in the works cited above argues that quasi-
reference is to be distinguished from reference as the
latter is a bed-fellow of predication and the reader is
(cont.)
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As usual it is of little concern to me in this context
whether the various points made above are entirely
justified. What is of interest is the status of the
theorising said in order to approach that I need to spell
out one or two additional concepts. In Atkinson and
Griffiths (1973) it was argued, within a quasi-logical
framework the details of which are irrelevant here, that
an appropriacy condition on being able to refer to an
entity by the + X where X is a simple common noun was that
the entity should be the unique object in the addressee's
attention such that he believes it to be an X. lifting
this condition into the context of language development
is straightforward and we can now consider the speech
act of making a statement (or, for that matter, asking
a question or issuing a command). This involves, among
other things, in the framework of Searle (1969), proposit-
ional acts of referring and predicating and we can say
that it is a necessary condition on the performance of an
act of making a statement that acts of referring and
predicating are successfully performed. But the act of
234. (cont.) referred to these works for a more extensive
discussion of the theoretical foundations of the distinct¬
ion and some programmatic remarks on its significance
for the study of child language. It is interesting to
note that precursors to the distinction can be found in
the categories of judgements embraced in the Port-Royal
Grammar and Logic and in the metaphysics of Brentano (cf.
the distinction between categorical and thetic judgements
and its exploration in an interesting way in the context
of Japanese syntax by Kuroda (1972)).
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referring itself, it has just been argued, has as a nec¬
essary condition on its successful performance, the
fact that the addressee's attention is appropriately
directed.which can he achieved by non-verbal pointing
or by verbal means. It follows then that, while we
cannot conclude that verbal acts of attention directing
are a necessary condition for referring (as the same effect
can be achieved without them), we might expect such acts
to appear in the repertoire of the child before he produces
statements. Atkinson (1974, forthcoming) can thus bp
seen as amounting to a developmental theory of inventories
of speech acts with just two stages, (S^, S^), such that
denotes the set of speech acts with cnly one member,
(Attention-drawingj and 3^ denotes the set of speech acts,
(Attention-drawing, StatingJ. Whether this sequence can
be embedded in a more extended one is a question to which
I shall return briefly in 6.4.
Again putting Condition 1 aside we can see that the theory
is in a similar position to Gruber's with regard to
Condition 2. No one, to my knowledge, working within a
speech act framework has discussed the act of manipulating
an addressee's attention but, as already indicated,
it has been considered within rather different sets of
assumptions by Atkinson and Griffiths (1973) and Lyons
(1975). It certainly appears that a case can be made for
the primary function of English sentences of the form
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There' s ... and Here's ... being that of attention-
235
directing. It seems fairly safe to conclude, therefore,
that a full inventory of speech acts will include reference
to such an act. With the reference to appropriacy cond¬
itions which we find in the above, contact is made with
the Austin-Searle tradition which adopts some similar
notion as central and, on these grounds, it is tempting
to say that the proposal is on somewhat stronger ground
than those of Dore and Gruber both of which treated the
speech act an an unanalysable atomic construct. *
Just as for Gruber, Condition 3 is satisfied in an additive
fashion with containing everything in plus something
new and so we can schematise the development as Z » Z + Y
and ask, in accordance with Condition 4, why we find this
rather than Y * Z + Y where Z denotes the set
[Attention-drawingJ and Y denotes the set [statingj.
It seems unlikely that we are going to find an answer to
this by reference to the languages of the world all of which
might be expected to make available vehicles for making
A"7/*
statements and for manipulating attention. Ho readily
available cognitive or perceptual reduction suggests
itself and so we are left with the possibility that the
theory might be logically grounded and enough has been
said already to indicate that a case can.be made in this
235. Hor more extensive and enlightening discussion, see
Isard (1975) and for a formal framework in which speech
acts can be seen as changing the context, Apostel (1972).
236. see p. 489.
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direction. According to the theoretical framework
adopted the act of making a statement depends upon the
satisfaction of certain appropriacy conditions to do
with reference. These conditions may "be, although they
need not he, established verbally and, to this extent,
we can see that it is built into the structure of the
theory that attention-drawing (although not necessarily
verbal attention-drawing) precedes the making of statements.
The alternative sequence of development raised by Condition
4 is incoherent in this framework: one cannot refer using
simple expressions until one has done some additional
work.
Atkinson's suggestions (1974, forthcoming) do somewhat
better than the earlier proposals in this chapter and
that is hardly surprising since it was in writing those
papers that I became aware of the need for the sort of
evaluation criteria advanced here. The proposal is very
restricted in scope and we can now move on and consider
236. If we were to go beyond the bounds of human language
and consider non-human systems of communication, we could
speculate that we might find systems in which it was
possible to manipulate attention but which provided no
analogue of 'making a statement'. Within the immediate
spatio-temporal environment the making of statements is
something of a luxury. Once the attention of an addressee
has been directed in an appropriate fashion it is possible
for such an addressee to directly perceive whatever 'facts'
may be of relevance without the speaker supplying those
facts within the communication system.
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how Griffiths and Keenan have modified and extended the
above suggestions.
6.4 Vocatives and attention
Griffiths (1974), having described some of the ideas
discussed in 6.3, says (p.8):
I shall also try to show that drawing attention to
something can be decomposed into first getting some¬
one's attention and then, having got it, putting
something into it. The act also appears to pre-
4
suppose one having noticed the something oneself.
The obvious linguistic candidate for securing the attention
of someone is a vocative utterance. There are also
non-linguistic devices having the same function such as
waving and it is easy to see that an argument analogous
to that of the previous section can be constructed. Just
as the addressee's attention to a restricted set of objects
is a necessary condition on a speaker successfully
referring, so having an addressee attending to oneself
is a necessary condition on directing the addressee's
attention in a particular direction. Now, of course, it
is perfectly possible that one single-word utterance could
perform the dual function of both getting the addressee
to attend to the speaker and directing the attention of
the addressee in the direction of the speaker's interest.
Similarly, it is the case that statements can, in the
absence of an explicitly attention directing utterance,
serve to adjust the addressee's attention in such a way
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as to make the statement intelligible. But clearly there
are utterances which exclusively serve the 'attend to
speaker' function (cf. Dore's category 'Calling' in
6.1.1) and, most importantly, Griffiths finds instances
of these in his data before he finds instances which can
be plausibly interpreted as directing the addressee's
attention. Although Griffiths does not develop his
analysis along these lines, it seems profitable to view
what is being proposed as a three-stage theory in the
development of speech acts, (S^, Sg, S^) where denotes
the set [Calling] (to borrow Dore's term), denotes
the set [Calling, Attention-drawingJ and denotes the
set [calling, Attention-drawing, Stating]. Por such a
theory a discussion of Conditions 1 - 4 could now proceed
in identical fashion to that in 6.3 and the direction of
the development from S^ to Sg would be explained as
grounded in the theory which assumes that a successful
act of Attention-drawing presupposes an act of Calling.
In addition to raising the question of vocatives, Griffiths
also discusses what, following Dore again, we can call,
noticing. He rightly points out that the speaker noticing
an entity is a pre-condition on his directing his add¬
ressee's attention to it, although not, of course, on
his directing attention to himself with a vocative.and
we can infer that, if we wish to regard Noticing as a
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speech act, then a similar argument to those above
can be constructed to explain the fact that it appears
very early and, in particular, that it predates attention-
drawing. That is, we would have a partial ordering on




< Attention-drawing <- Stating, etc.
Figure 89
This partial ordering is explainable by reference to
necessary conditions on the performance of particular
speech acts.
Keenan and Schieffelin (1976) in the context of a discussion
of the notion 'discourse topic' attempt to bring together
a good deal of the above discussion. They present Their
central ideas as in Figure 90 (p.493).
There are two remarks to make in connection with this
schema. First the notion of discourse topic is not
directly relatable to anything which has been discussed
237. G-iven the earlier remarks on the lack of any audience-
directed intention in cases of Noticing, it is almost
certainly incorrect to regard it as a speech act assimilable
to any of the current frameworks. We could weaken the
idea of audience-directed intention to allow the audience
to be the speaker but, as Chomsky (1976) has pointed
out, this seems to destroy most of what is distinctive




































Figure 90 From Keenan and Schieffelin (1976,p.353)
above since, for Keenan and Schieffelin, a discourse
topic is a proposition rather than a single object or
set of objects: a discourse topic (p.343) "expresses a
concern (or set of concerns) the speaker is addressing".
Second the above figure is not presented as a develop¬
mental hypothesis but rather as a "dynamic model for
establishing a discourse topic" (p.353). Nevertheless,
it is possible to see the model as encompassing most of
the content of the ideas of Atkinson and Griffiths. So,
corresponding to the first line of the Keenan and Schieffelin
model where the speaker elicits the addressee's attention
we have the Calling function. In a conversation no
progress can be made until the addressee is attending to
the speaker and, in the language development of the child,
he must develop devices for focussing attention of
addressees on himself before he can go any further. There
is no correlate for the second line of Figure 90 in the
Atkinson and Griffiths proposals and there does not appear
to be any good reason to expect such a correlate within
O^Q
a developmental theory of speech acts. For the
third line we have the correlate of the child manipulating
the addressee's attention already discussed at length
238. What is involved here would be treated by Searle under
'input and output conditions' (see Searle (1969,p.57) but,
unlike some ox the other conditions discussed in the text,
it does not seem plausible to regard such input and output
conditions as being establishable by an antecedent speech
act. Because of this we should not anticipate them
fitting into any ordered sequence of speech acts.
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and, for the fourth line, again no correlate in what has
been discussed so far. This is because the ideas put
forward by Atkinson and Griffiths were all relevant to
what we might refer to as the 'pre-statement stage' of
language development and the identification of semantic
relations, which Eeenan and Schieffelin have as the
fourth stage of their model, involves the encoding of
statements - a process they see as necessary to the
successful communication of further statements which, in
one sense of the term, presuppose the earlier statement
content. There is clearly no contradiction here so long
as we realise that Keenan and Schieffelin are operating
with their own definition of discourse topic which is
not identical to the traditional notion of topic (see
Lyons (1968) for a summary of traditional views). So,
to all intents and purposes, we can see that the Keenan
and Schieffelin model accords well with the Atkinson and
Griffiths suggestions to some extent unifying them in a
259
coherent conversational framework.
6.5 Bruner on the ontogenesis of speech acts
The exact subject matter of Bruner (1975a) is not easy
to assess. Although the title of the paper is 'The
ontogenesis of speech acts', there is little in it
directly 'concerned with speech acts except for an emphasis
239. Keenan, Schieffelin and Piatt (1976) further develop
the abcve model without adding anything of interest to
the current discussion.
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on language use and some rather confusing discussion of
the standard philosophical literature.2^° Some of what
Bruner says indicates that he is interested in perloeutionary
force and its relationship to the intentions of the speaker
"but it is difficult to glean anything systematic from the
paper on this issue and it is perhaps fairest to say
that the real content of the work lies in a domain having




There appear to "be three aspects of linguistic structure
("broadly interpreted) approached "by Bruner. The first is
to do with sequencing in conversation and the "breaking dom
of conversation into units and, as such, it has nothing
240. To this point I note the following passage (p.3)'-
"The relation "between the instrumental or illocutionary
function of an utterance and its grammatical structure is,
I shall argue later, crucial to language acquisition" where,
assuming that "instrumental or illocutionary function"
is to be interpreted as providing alternative labels for
the same concept, Bruner displays a lack of awareness of
the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts.
241. What the argument of the paper boils down to is that
there are correspondences between aspects of pre-linguistic
behaviour and the structures which come to encode inform¬
ation about the environment. In many ways the analysis
of his arguments would fall most naturally into the format
of Chapter 4 but, since Bruner makes a great deal of the
integration of linguistic and non-linguistic communicative
behaviour emphasising the role of context, it seemed to
me that it could be appropriately included here.
497
to do with sentential structure. The second is concerned
with case relationships and their realisation in linguistic
structures. And the third, most closely related to the
title of the paper, discusses subject-predicate formations
in language and their relationship to topic-comment
structures. I shall consider each of these in turn.
The relevant data on the imposition of unitising structure
on conversations is provided by the study of interactions
between mother and child. The claim is advanced that
many of these interactions, before the child has any''
language, are broken down by the mother into 'segments'
(p.12):
In the case of intention-oriented interactions, the
principal form-of signalling is MARKING THE SEGMENTS
OE ACTION. Most usually it begins by the use of
terminal marking, the use of what might be called
a COMPLETIVE. The child takes a mouthful of newly
introduced food from a spoon; the mother exclaims,
Good boy] with distinctive intonation. Or he offers
back an object handed to him, and the mother exclaims
There.' Or he removes a ring from a peg-and-ring toy,
and the mother cries Aboom] It may well be that
completion marking of this kind serves as an initial
step in primitive semantic segmentation, the forming
of units.
The suggestion seems to be that the child's primitive
conception of ongoing interaction can be seen as a continuum
which we may represent as a straight line:
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As far as the adult is concerned, this continuum is
broken down into units each of which corresponds to a
'turn' in the interaction:
/ / / /
and the child is 'taught' this structuring by the mother's
use of completives (there is no suggestion that this is
the only device the mother has available for signalling
the end of a 'turn'). Once this amount of structuring
is achieved the child is in a position to individualise
items in the interaction sequence, to repeat items, to
vary items, to substitute some items for others, etc.
(p.13):
Segments of action are, in effect, positions occupied
in a sequence by varying or substitutable acts. It
is in this sense that we conceive of them as re¬
presenting privileges of occurrence for classes of
acts and, consequently, a particularly important
form of psycholinguistic learning.
But exactly what relevance has this to psycholinguistic
learning? The structure of the argument seems to be that
actions in interactional sequences can end up with the
sort of unitised structure referred to above and that this
is of relevance for the developing language of the child.
An attempt is being made to identify some aspect of
language structure with the structure of actions in early
interactions. But what aspect of language structure?
Certainly not sentence structure because the completives
typically terminate an action which would subsequently
be encoded by a whole sentence; they do not terminate
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pieces of action which can he related, to sentence-internal
242
units. Therefore, it must be some level of structure
above the sentence and, undoubtedly, there are principles
governing the construction of well-formed conversation
although these have not been well-articulated. It appears
that this is the most likely domain for identifying
structures which are isomorphic to the action sequences
243
Bruner discusses. But, even in this domain, remarkably
little is shown by the above argument. In conversation
we have the phenomenon of a question followed by an answer
or some response to indicate why an answer is not forth¬
coming. To my knowledge Bruner has not indicated any
sequences in non-verbal interaction which can be interpreted
in this way. Further we have the notion of a speaker
meaning something distinct from the literal meaning of
his words, this speaker's meaning being determined from
the literal meaning of the words by poorly understood
principles which almost certainly make reference to the
conversation in which the relevant utterance is embedded
(see Grice (1968, 1975) for the beginnings of a theory in
242. It might be suggested that Bruner's concern could
be related to the sorts of procedures put forward by a
number of N.American structuralist linguists which
depended crucially on the notion of substitution (see,
particularly, Harris (1951)) but there is no indication
that he has this sort of affiliation in mind.
243. One of Bruner's aims is to attempt to produce
functional explanations for phenomena which have given
rise to innateness claims. It is worth pointing out that
the domain of turn-taking in conversation is not one which
has led to such claims.
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this area). Exactly where are the correlates of this
complex facet of conversation in non-verbal interaction?
In short, it seems that Bruner has succeeded in identifying
only the crudest and least interesting aspects of con¬
versational structure in non-verbal interaction and this,
coupled with the fact that the structural properties under
analysis are at a level above the sentence, makes any
interpretation of these proposals as an attack on linguistic
nativism quite beside the point.
4
Moving on to the second set of arguments, these are of
more relevance to sentence structure. The first observation
is in support of a general proposition that "The facts of
language acquisition could not be as they are unless
fundamental concepts about action and attention are
available to children at the beginning of learning".(p.6)
This observation follows from a collation of the evidence,
much of which has already been discussed, from Bowerman,
Brown and Schlesinger on the semantic characteristics of
the child's first one and two-morpheme utterances.
Summarising this evidence, Bruner says (p.7):
These various sets of data suggest that the child,
in using language initially, is very much oriented
towards pursuing (or commenting upon) action being
undertaken jointly by himself and another.
As a general description this is unexceptionable, but
examination of later stages in the argument reveals that
Bruner probably intends something more than description.
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Recall that the structure of a sequence of actions which
was clajmed to emerge via the mother's use of completives
was represented as:
/ / / /
Row, going inside each unit in the sequence, we note that
it is claimed that mothers, from an initial stage where
the child focusses his attention on the agent of actions,
go through a process of "dramatizing or idealizing the
act itself with some kind of serial marking" (p. 13).
This is described in terms of the mother making sounds
to accompany the action, the end result being a distinction
between the Agent and the Action within a single act in
the sequence. That is, we have a structure which we can
represent as:
Agent-Action Agent-Action Agent-Action /...
and further speculation shows how this can be elaborated
to allow reference to a Recipient and, presumably, an
Object although there is no discussion of this latter
category. It is necessary then to assume, for the argument
which follows, that the output of this structuring of
actions are action units, each of which can be seen as
having a structure of the form:
Agent - Action - Object - Recipient
and this corresponds, in linear order, with the most normal
word order in an English sentence encoding each of these
notions, a correspondence which Bruner grasps and uses
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when he says (p.17):
The argument has been that the structures of action
and attention provide bench-marks for interpreting
the order-rules in initial grammar: that a concept
of agent-action-object-recipient at the pre-linguistic
level aids the child in grasping the linguistic
meaning of appropriately ordered utterances involving
such case categories as agentive, action, object,
indirect object and so forth.
But this is a poor argument at two levels. The first is
concerned with the facts concerning word-order in individ¬
ual languages. Not all languages have Agent-Action-Object-
Recipient as their canonical word order and, therefore,
the action sequences described by Bruner could not have
a facilitating effect on the acquisition of such languages.
Important in this regard is the finding that children
do not universally adopt SVO as their first dominant word-
order and do not necessarily follow the dominant order in
the adult language (for detailed treatment see Bowerman
(1973) and 4.3.2 above). The only way to save the hypo¬
thesis at this level is to suggest that the strategies
mothers and children employ in breaking down action
sequences differ according to the language being acquired,
but I have seen no evidence cited in support of this
suggestion and, indeed, it seems highly implausible. At
the second level, let us assume, for the sake of argument,
that the first objection can be answered and that, for
all languages, relationships can be observed between
canonical word-order and segmentation of action sequences.
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Still some serious issues would remain unresolved. For
example, no progress will have "been made on the question
of how non-canonical word-orders are learned and itwill
also remain to explain the source of the formal relatedness
between sentences with different structures. In short,
I believe that Bruner seriously under-estimates the structural
complexity of human languages and that, even if his attempt
to reduce certain superficial facts to a non-linguistic
domain worked, it would only produce a chink in the armour
of the Chomskyan position on innateness.^ *
The third set of arguments concerns the relationship
between aspects of attention and the topic-comment and
subject-predicate organisation of linguistic utterances.
The hypothesis being explored is that (p.4):
... early language, to be acquired, must reflect
the nature of the cognitive processes whose output
it encodes. One instance has to do with the iso¬
morphism between a central linguistic form, predication,
and the nature of human attention processing.
and further (ibid):
Concerning predication, I refer to the topic-comment
structure of utterances, reflected formally in such
devices as subject-predicate in grammar or as function
and arguments in logical analysis. Topic-comment
structure reflects an underlying feature of attention
... and its realisation in language by the use
244. I must emphasise that this is not to say that the
Chomskyan position is correct but merely to point out the
magnitude of the task of showing that it is not in all
respects.
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of subject-predicate rules is sufficiently akin
to this characteristic of attention to make these
245
rules easily accessible to a language learner.
The sort of evidence cited in favour of the above claims
comes from work on visual attention which Bruner describes,
following Beisser, as "positing wholes (topics) to which
parts or features or properties may be related and from
which the new wholes may be constructed" (p.4). This can
best be represented in a format analogous to that used
above in connection with the segmentation of action
sequences where the child's perceptual experience can
initially be represented as a continuum:
subsequently broken down into 'items' of experience:
/ / / /
which themselves are internally structured by attentional
mechanisms giving:
Topic-Comment / Topic-Comment / Topic-Comment/ ...
where each Topic corresponds to the child hypothesising
a particular 'object'of perception and each Comment
consists of the child filling in details of that object.
The claim appears to be that the Topic-Comment structure
245. Although a reference to Chomsky (1965) follows, it
is unclear, in this context, what the reference of "subject-
predicate rules" in the cited passage is supposed to be,
since such functionally defined notions are not explicitly
mentioned in the grammars Bruner appears to be trying
to make contact with.
505
emerging from this sort of analysis is formally analogous
to the topic-comment structure of utterances.
While the proposal is somewhat vague, it is difficult to
see it as suggesting anything very profound. First,
although it may make sense to see the topic-comment
distinction as one of the organising factors of utter¬
ances and discourse-structure, it cannot he identified
with the subject-predicate distinction, an organising
principle in the theory of grammar (for some discussion
of this, see Atkinson (forthcoming)). Second, without
giving the reader some clearer idea of what the "subject-
predicate rules" are supposed to be, it is impossible to
evaluate the substance of Bruner's claim. Third, even
if the child can get access to some aspects of grammatical
organisation via the structure of attentional routines,
again this would only represent the most primitive
beginnings of the acquisition of language structure. It
seems to me much more productive at the moment to view
routines manipulating attention as geared to the estab¬
lishment of topics in discourse, and I hope to have
demonstrated the fecundity of this approach for a theory
of the development of speech acts in earlier sections of
this chapter. Bruner's suggestions leave us rather in
the dark as to what is being explained; if it is the
high frequency of attention-drawing devices in early
language, then the considerations of 6.3 and 6.4 seem
more intelligible; if it is the acquisition of formal
506
structure, then there is much further to go than Bruner
appears to envisage.
Bruner (1975b) contains amplification of some of the points
discussed above but does not succeed in providing enough
detailed argumentation to make his positions convincing.
Strengthening confidence in my interpretation of the
first set of issues, we find (p.28):
let me suggest that the development of the exchange
mode marks the beginning of privileges of occurrence
in discourse, the emergence of rule-bound exchanges
that operate on a wide variety of objects, gestures
and calls which, so to speak, become tokens in a
standardised transaction.
and (p.29):
In such exchanges, the child is learning to deal
practically with such relational concepts as Agent,
Action, Possession, Instrument, Recijjient of Action,
and so forth ... Is it unreasonable to suppose that
mastery of the concept of a reciprocal task may
provide the basis for Mer interpretation of
sentences?
The topic-comment organisation of visual processing and
pre-linguistic play is explored at some length again with
a view to seeing the germs of predication in it, but what
I find an extremely confusing discussion of the properties
of predication can only conclude that "full transition
from these early components to full subject-predicate
organization in language is as obscure as ever it was" (p.55).
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Rather more argument is provided on the relationship
between the order of events and the order in which these
events are encoded in an utterance and the existence
of non-canonical word orders is recognised along with the
problems arising from them. That Bruner is making a strong
claim with regard to serial order in events and sentence
structure is reflected by his references to the work of
Cromer and E.Clark discussed in earlier chapters and his
citing of data from a child Matthew who, at twenty months
(p.59): *
... sees an airplane approaching overhead, points
and says "Airplane", follows the plane across the
sky with his eyes, and comments finally "All-gone",
followed a moment later by a connected utterance
"airplane allgone". The serial intercalation of
comments and context is appropriate, well timed,
and natural. The order of events provides the
245
serial order of the utterances.
Once again though we must note the existence of languages
which would not be readily learned in terms of such
strategies as well as the existence of non-canonical
orders in English. Bruner raises this second point when
he says (p.40):
Eor adult grammar, of course, event order is a weak
and rigid rule. Adult grammar obviously is ripe with
inversion rules, as in the interrogative and passive.
Obviously the mastery of such non-canonical orders cannot
be located in the normal order of events and Bruner's
245. Eor identical observations, see Menn (1975).
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solution is to argue for a "pragmatic approach" to the
problem. I find his reasoning on this issue difficult
to follow. To locate a source of non-canonical word-order
in pre-linguistic behaviour it would appear necessary
to demonstrate at least the following:
1) There is a non-linguistic behaviour preceding the
development of non-canonical word orders in which order
is a vital consideration.
2) There is a notion of canonical order definable for this
behaviour. *
3) Non-canonical orders are identifiable in this behaviour
before the emergence of non-canonical word orders.
4) The relationship between sequences manifesting the
canonical and non-canonical orders in the non-linguistic
domain shouLdbe relatable to the relationship {formal and
semantic) between canonical and non-canonical word orders.
Much of this needs further analysis but it seems to me
that one argument offered by Bruner comes close to
satisfying these conditions. He says (p.42):
There is also order violation in play. Reynolds
(1972) uses the expression "simulative mode" to
emphasise the fact that play bears a close resemb¬
lance to "real action", yet departs from it and need
not achieve the useful results of real action. Means
and ends are uncoupled and conventional or adaptive
order loosened. Once conventional or natural order
is no longer the sole determinant of the order of
acts, new principles of ordering emerge. One such
is the principle of emphasis. It Is a principle
used in adult speech as well. In ordinary adult
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discourse the order of a sentence is often chosen
for emphasis.
I have not seen Reynold's paper hut certainly 1), 2) and
3) above seem to be satisfied and Bruner has begun to
grapple with 4) via his reference to emphasis.
The only other suggestion in Bruner (1975b), which is not
examined in detail in Bruner (1975a) concerns the relation¬
ship between the emergence of a competence to use deictic
expressions and the source of this competence in pre-
linguistic routines. What the proposal amounts to is
that the appropriate use of deictic expressions pre¬
supposes, on the part of the speaker, some acquaintance
with his addressee's point of view (surely correct) and
that various pre-linguistic routines to do with the
direction of gaze as well as some early linguistic
phenomena such as the use of here you are and thank you
in giving and taking games can be seen as indicating
just such an acquaintance. At this level of generality
the suggestion is correct but does not have an exciting
A r
amount of content and so I shall not pursue it.
6.6 Halliday's functional model
Halliday (1975) represents an ambitious attempt to build
a model of language development on a foundation consisting
246. To examine this question meaningfully would require
a specification of what aspects of the addressee's
cognitions must be available to the speaker in connection
with each deictic form and this information must then be
seen as important in the behaviours Bruner draws our
attention to.
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of a functional semantics. The model is concerned, on
the one hand, with the development of functionally defined
semantic notions and, on the other, with the development
of a level of lexicogrammar consisting of realisation
rules mapping functional meanings onto forms. In what
follows I shall be principally concerned with the former,
both for reasons of space and also because Halliday
hims.elf devotes more time to this aspect of his theor¬
ising in his monograph. The study used one child,
Halliday's own, and it was found necessary to divide /the
total course of development into three phases. In Phase I
24-7
the child's system owes no direct allegiance to the
adult system although plausible adult models are suggested
for some of the child's forms. The system comprises, as
well as a small set of functional meanings and a small
set of forms, a simple one-one mapping between them so
that each form serves exactly one meaning and each meaning
is realised by exactly one form. Halliday sometimes
247. There is scope for discussion as to whether the
system is appropriately called a language at this stage
or whether it is better regarded as a primitive communi¬
cation system - discussion which Halliday provides to
some extent.producing criteria according to which it is 4
a language. It would, however, be possible to consider
alternative criteria which the system fails to meet as
Halliday points out. I agree with him that it makes little
difference what we call the system at this stage but feel
that there is room for disagreement on whether we emphasise
the continuity of functional development, as he does, or
the discontinuity of other properties.
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refers to the system at this stage as a 'Protolanguage'.
Phase II is a transitional stage where the child makes
generalisations within the set of functional meanings
which move him towards the abstract notion of function
which Halliday locates in the adult system. Also at
this stage he begins to learn a system of lexicogrammar
which can be seen as a complication of the mapping between
meanings and forms designed particularly to make available •
the possibility of more than one meaning being served by
one form. Additionally, Phase II is characterised by
the child's learning of dialogue which makes available a
new function, that of imparting information, and we shall
return to this below. By the end of Phase II the child
has left behind the protolanguage and is ready to embark
on the task of learning the language he hears around him,
a task which he begins to pursue in Phase III.
As already mentioned, Halliday sees the essential charact¬
eristics of the overall development in terms of continuity
of function, the way in which the set of functions avail¬
able to the child changes and, indeed, the way in which
the very notion of 'function' changes. In Phase I
'function' is co-extensive with 'use' but subsequently
takes on a more abstract sense which can be identified
only in the linguistic system whereas 'use' becomes
identifiable only through some notion of 'social context'.
It would be possible to investigate the macro-structure
of the development paying attention to these ideas but
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I have decided against this for two reasons. The first
is the simple one of space and the second is that I find
this aspect of Halliday's theorising extraordinarily
opaque. In order to interpret it in such a way as to
make my framework applicable to it I would have to make
a great many assumptions as a result of which Halliday's
position might have little to with the final product which
I matched against Conditions 1-4. As far as I am
concerned, it takes an act of faith to go along with
the transitions between the phases which Halliday describes.
This act I cannot perform with sufficient enthusiasm to
believe that subsequent analysis will yield a justification
for it, I have therefore decided to concentrate my
analysis on Phase I with the exception of some discussion
of the Informative function and its relationship to the
development of dialogue - a phenomenon which occurs in
Phase II.
Phase I is divided into six stages the last of these
being transitional between Phase I and Phase II. »Jix
week intervals divide the stages and Halliday provides
justification for this (p.12):
If I had chosen a longer period, then certain sig¬
nificant steps in the development would have been
left out; whereas if I had chosen a shorter period
I would have been at the mercy of random non¬
occurrences, items which simply had not been observed
over the period but which should have been recognised
as present in the system.
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For each of the six stages Halliday provides a repres¬
entation of the content systems for this stage along with
the expressions which realise each function. These latter
will not concern me in what follows and will generally
he omitted. For Stage 1 or, as Halliday has it, NL1, the























Figure 91. Adapted from Halliday (1975, p148)^^
248. For the reader unfamiliar with Halliday's writings
Figure 91 embodies the claim that the child has functional
meanings in four categories at ML1. Inese are Instrumental,
Regulatory, Interactional and Personal. Within the
Instrumental function he is capable of making either a
general demand for any object or a specific demand for
(cont.)
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In this format Halliday presents a sequence of theories,
(N11, HL6), for his child's development in D where
D is fixed as the child's semantic system and the mapping
from this semantic system to the level of expression.
Since it is one of the characteristics of Phase I that
the latter undergoes no development we can concentrate
on the former.
To begin with I wish to assume that the theory is a good
deal simpler than it is and concentrate on the major
functions (i.e., what we find instances cf down the left
hand side of Figure 91). For these functions we have a
developmental theory which we can represent as in Figure
92. (see p.515)
Halliday himself does consider predictions of the crder
of the emergence of the functions at this level of gener¬
ality and this provides some sort of justification for
the simplifying procedure. As far as Conditions 1 - 4
248. (cont.) his toy bird. This distinction is carried
by a distinction at the level of expression between
the two forms ha.,, and b^. Similarly within the Regulatory
function there are just two expressions, 5 and mnj encoding
a normal command and an intensified command respectively
and, in general, for every function which is not developed
to the right in Figure 91 there is one and only one form
regularly correlated with it. This is the property which
leads Halliday to insist that at this stage the child
does not possess a lexicogrammar but a simple mapping
between the two levels of representation with no inter¬
vening level of organisation.
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Inst Inst Inst Inst Inst Inst Inst
Reg Reg Reg Reg Reg Reg Reg
Inter—? Inter—> Inter—> Inter Inter Inte: i» Inter
Pers Pers Pers Pers Pers Pers Pers
Imag Imag Imag Imag Imag
?Heur Heur Heur
Inf
1111 1112 1115 1114 115 1116 Hln,
n>6
Figure 92 (Inst = Instrumental, Reg = Regulatory, Inter =
Interactional, Pers = Personal, Imag = Imaginative,
Heur = Heuristic, Inf = Informative)
are concerned and moving directly on to Condition 2, it
is to Halliday's credit that he provides some relevant
discussion. On the one hand, with respect to the form
of his theoretical vocabulary he has this to say (p.15):
In general we cannot represent the content of the
child's system at this stage in terms of the words
and structures of the adult language. We cannot
match the child's meanings with the elements of
the adult semantic system, which are again too
specific. What is needed ... is a kind of postural
notation for the content. What does this mean in
fact? It means some form of functional representation
of meaning. The content in other words, has to be
specified in relation to the functions of language.
Why a functional representation should be more 'postural'
(= less specific) than a non-functional representation is
not something Halliday elaborates on but, more importantly
from my point of view, Halliday directly addresses the
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question of constraining the set of functions countenanced
by the theory, i.e., he tries to delimit a general theory
of functions. He sees the functions necessary for under¬
standing Phase I as having three sources (p.15):
The question then is: what are the functions that we
can recognise as determining the child's semantic
system at this stage, and how do we arrive at them?
Here we must try to keep things in proportion shunting
between sensible observations on the one hand and
imaginative but at the same time goal-directed
theory on the other (my emphasis - Bilk)
Thus the first source is observation. When a child utters,
parents impute certain intentions to him in a fairly
consistent way. Whatever set of functions emerges from
such observations can be used in conjunction with theor¬
etical considerations to arrive at a final set. These
theoretical considerations involve two sources. The first
is theories of language structure which take functional,
notions as central and the second is theories of social
structure which assign an important role to language and
its functions. In connection with the former, Halliday
turns, not surprisingly, to his own work, e.g., Haliiday
(1967, 1970) and, for the latter, to the work of Bernstein
(1971) on 'critical socializing contexts'. Prom
Hallidayan linguistics come three functions: the ideational
function, the interpersonal function and the textual
function, and Bernstein provides another four: the
regulative, the instructional, the imaginative or innovative
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and the interpersonal. These seven functions, along with
whatever functions are the product of our observations
of early child speech are then submitted to some sort
of selection procedure with the result (pp.18 - 21):
Taking these factors into account I had suggested
a set of functions which would serve for the inter¬
pretation of the language of a very young child;
that is as an initial hypothesis for some kind of
functional or sociolinguistic approach to early








... later on there is in fact a seventh to be added
to the list ... This is the one we can call the
informative function of language ...
But this procedure is uncomfortable. What appears to be
going on can be represented as in Figure 93:
Functions:
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but we are told nothing about the constituents of X,
nothing about the procedure for identifying functions
across disciplines and nothing about the procedure of
selection. It is remarkable that Halliday makes such a
bad job of justifying his choice of functions, given his
realisation that a mere inventory of functions not related
to any general theory would be unsatisfactory. Condition 2
is not satisfied in a convincing way. Condition 3 appears
to be on much firmer ground as there is no development
in the set of general functions from HL1 to HL2, from
HI/5 to EL4 and from HI5 to HL6 while there is a straight¬
forward additive complication between HL2 and HI/5, between
Hl4 and HL5 and between H16 and HLn.
Consider now the transition from HL2 to UH3 from the
point of view of Condition 4. This condition raises
the question as to why the Imaginative function appears
after the four found at HL2 rather than the other way
round. Similarly, for the transition from EL4 to HL5
we ask why the Heuristic function should only appear after
the five functions found in HL4. and, for the transition
from HL6 to H1n, why the Informative function should
appear last of all. Halliday is not uninterested in these
questions and, as we shall see, he provides an attempt to
answer the last one. As far as the first two are concerned,
he says, with reference to the functions listed as in the
passage cited on the previous page, (p.37):
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The hypothesis was that these functions would
appear, approximately in the order listed, and in
any case with the 'informative' significantly
last ...
But, as we have already seen (p.40):
... in one important respect the hypothesis fails ...
there is no sign of a developmental progression
within the first four functions ... Furthermore, the
imaginative function seems to appear before the
heuristic.
Had the functions emerged in the predicted order it is
not clear what principles he would have invoked as
explanatory: the obvious generalisation is that the
pragmatic functions appear first and, to use Halliday's
term, the mathetic functions later but, in itself, this
is merely to set up superordinate categories and not to
249
approach explanatory adequacy. We must conclude that
Condition 4 is not satisfied by the transitions from NX2
to NX3 and from 11X4 to KL5. Predictions made by the
author on a basis he never makes clear are unfulfilled
and he makes no attempt to ground the development he finds.
There is more to say in connection with the transition
from NX6 to HXn. Halliday invokes the fact that, of the
seven functions he is concerned with, the Informative is
the only one which depends upon language for its fulfilment,
(p.31 ):
249. Cf, in this respect the position of Buhler alluded
to briefly in Chapter 1 .
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The use of language to inform is a very late stage
in the linguistic development of the child, because
it is a function which depends on the recognition
that there are functions of language which are
solely defined by language itself. All the other
functions in the list are extrinsic to language.
They are served by and realised through language,
but they are not defined by language. They represent
the use of language in contexts which exist independ¬
ently of the linguistic system. But the informative
function has no existence independent of language
itself. It is an intrinsic function that the child
cannot begin to master until he has grasped the'
principle of dialogue, which means until he has
grasped the fundamental nature of the communication
process.
There is much that I find difficult in this passage but
what is clear is that it is an argument for the Informative
function coming late (cf. fn. 226 above in connection with
the view that the informative function can only be served
linguistically). If Halliday is correct and this function
is defined only by reference to language itself, then
it clearly must follow some language and, if language is
construed functionally, then it must follow some function
or functions. But this does not show that it necessarily
follows all functions, i.e., comes last in the set of
seven. So, the notion of dialogue to which Halliday
refers becomes crucial. Mastery of dialogue is the sine
qua non for the emergence of the informative function and
if an explanatbry statement can be produced demonstrating
why dialogue follows the six functions preceding the
i
521
Informative we would be justified in optimism. Of dialogue
Hallidav says (p.30):
Dialogue is, for / the child__7, a very new concept.
Dialogue involves the adoption of roles which are
social roles of a new and special kind, namely those
which are defined by language itself.
But this fails to distinguish dialogue, in the required
sense, from the Informative function. There is little
illumination in being told that the Informative function
is to be understood by reference to dialogue which is
explicated in terms of new social roles where these
latter are those characterised by instances of the
Informative function. Furthermore, unless we see language
as characterised by the full set of six functions rather
than any subset of them, no convincing reason has been
offered for why, for example, at EL2, the child should
not develop dialogue and the Informative function (before
the Imaginative and Heuristic functions) on the basis of
his language at HL1 which includes the four early functions.
The transition from HL6 to HLn seems to go the way of the
earlier transitions without some independent character¬
isation of the 'new' social roles which make the develop¬
ment of dialogue possible. Condition 4 is nowhere
satisfied in Halliday's model of functional semantic
development.
I would like to consider briefly, and without going into
much detail, some of the finer points of Halliday's
content systems. We can compare Figure 91 above with










































Figure 94 Adapted from Halliday (1975, p.149)
523
What interests me about Figure 94 is whether there are
any explanatory principles governing its development from
Figure 91. In certain cases this question may not make a
lot of sense. So, consider the development within the
Instrumental function from NL1 to NL2. The only change
at NL2 is that the additional option of demanding powder
has emerged as a choice within the 'specific demand' option.
There is no reason to believe that, within Halliday's
framework, there is an interesting answer to the question
as to why this option only appeared after the option* of
250
demanding a toy bird. But now consider the development
within the Interactional function. At NL2 we have the
appearance of the function of Engagement subsequent to
the emergence of Initiation and Response and the intro¬
duction of a function of General Greetings to include
Normal Greetings and Intensified Greetings which were
treated as instances of Initiations at NL1. It seems to
me that in the case of these fairly gross functional
categories it is possible and desirable to demand an
explanation for order of development of the sort Halliday
himself tries to provide for the most general functions.
The need for this is particularly acute when we do not
250. Of course, at the right hand side of one of Halliday's
systems functional and 'referential' meaning are conflated
and the sorts of considerations pursued in Chapter 2
might be of relevance. I see no reason why the proposals
considered there could not be combined with a theory in
the Halliday mould but such speculation will not be
pursued here.
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have a straightforward general trend towards more and
more specific functional categories hut instances of
general categories being introduced to 'dominate' two or
more specific categories, exactly the situation we have
with the introduction of General Greetings. Halliday
provides no discussion of these issues and I have no
ready answers but, if his proposals are to be treated
seriously as an adequate developmental theory, they must
ultimately be approached.
In this chapter, perhaps more than in any other, I have
felt the lack of general theoretical concepts in the work
of the scholars discussed. There is a sophisticated
literature on speech acts in the linguistic and
philosophical journals, but it appears that the field
of child language has not availed itself of it in a
very meaningful way. The result has been a good deal of
ad hocness and ill-motivated categorisations which fail
to excite the imagination and can only delight the
critical faculties. This is not to suggest that theorists
of the adult language have solved most of the important
issues nor that studies of child language cannot enrich
our understanding of speech acts in general. Both of
these propositions are, I believe, false, but we can
demand a more sophisticated approach than has been evident
in the above and it is only with the advent of such a
non-taxonomic approach that progress will be achieved
in this area.
CHAPTER 7 : CONCLUSIONS
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My discussion has been lengthy but my conclusions can be
brief. It is my belief that the above analyses are
valuable in at least two ways. The first is that they
enable one to see the inadequacies and strong points of
theories within one coherent framework. One is often
struck, when reading research in child language, by
feelings of unease which it is difficult to be precise
about: in many cases, this feeling has been uncovered
and explained in the preceding chapters. The second is
quite independent of the particular methodological
conditions I have put forward and investigated at such
length. It is concerned with a general level of conscious¬
ness within the discipline. If this work has the'function
of making theorists in this area more conscious of the
need for evaluation procedures and stricter argumentation,
then it will have fulfilled its primary function. This
could be the case even though the methodological conditions
I have suggested fall by the wayside in later developments.
In several places I might be accused of having done
violence to an author's intentions by reformulation of his
theory in a way which makes my conditions applicable to
it. It seems to me that all the conditions demand is an
answer to 'What is this theory saying?' and that, where
it has been necessary to guess what an author's intentions
might have been or to remove a vagueness, this has always
resulted in a more precise and conceptually clear theory.
If it is thereby exposed as an inadequate theory this
can only be for the better and the onus is on the pro¬
ponent of the theory to put forward a precise interpretation
differing from mine which more adequately represents the
intended view.
The conditions have been interpreted as constituting
necessary conditions on the adequacy of developmental
theories and it remains to say something about why, taken
conjunctively, they may not be regarded as sufficient
conditions. As I have already pointed out in Chapter 1,
there is an additional component in such theories to
which Conditions 1 - 4- have no relevance. It may be that,
so far as consideration of the sequence of theories in
the developmental theory is concerned, there is little
more to say, but there is every reason to believe that
the mechanism, M of Condition 5 would repay a full and
extensive study. I shall discuss only some of the
problems it raises and then only in the barest outline.
We can assume that the child is equipped with a single
mechanism for learning in a particular domain of language
and we can construe this mechanism as a function which
accepts theories and data as arguments and has theories
as values. So, if we have a sequence of theories in D,
(T.j , Tg, our is produce a mechanism M
such that:
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M (Tr Dn ) = T2
M (T2, D2) =
M (Vl' Dn-1> = Tn
where is the child's initial 'uninformed' theory and
D.j , D2, are the relevant data to which the child
is exposed and which he uses between t^ and t2, between
t2 and t^, ... and between t^_^ and t^, respectively.
*
The notion of 'relevant data' in this formulation leads
to the major research problem of the exact nature of
this data in ar.y domain of language development. One
could cite the early work of Brown and Bellugi (1964)
on the role of parental expansions in the acquisition
of syntax and of Brown and Hanlon (1970) on correction
for truth-value rather than syntactic form as preliminary
attempts to investigate this problem. An area which is
receiving intensive investigation at the moment concerns
the general characteristics of the mother's speech to
the child (see, particularly, papers in Snow and Ferguson
(1977)) and I might also point to recent work on the
role of imitation by children in language learning (see,
for example, Bloom, Lightbown and Hood (1974)) although
this is of somewhat ambivalent status as between data
and mechanism.
Taking the discussion one step further, there is no need
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to assume that the child is equipped with a constant
mechanism for developing theories in D. A priori,
equally plausible is the view that the child's mechanisms








, we have a sequence of mechanisms,
such that:
T,, D,)1 T,
T2' V = h the scone of M.1
T
i- V =1i+i
Ti+i' h+1 > = h the scope of E^
T
n-1 - Dn-1> Tn
1
i the scope of M
are the relevant data to whichwhere D.] , I>2, ..., Dji_1
the child is exposed between t^ and ±2> ^2 ^5' ***'
tn_^ and t respectively.
The speculative nature of a framework such as this is
hardly in need of emphasis and, of course, the sequence,
(ML|, Mg, ) will itself be open to investigation
in exactly the terms I have been advocating here. That
is, (M.j , M^, ..., M_^) can be seen as a developmental
theory in D where D concerns the child's mechanisms for
learning in D'.
529
Examples from previous pages which can he treated in these
terms are not extensive hut the operating principles of
Slohin discussed in 4.4 constitute one obvious instance.
Furthermore, this is an instance which would require the
more complex version developed above. Slightly less
obvious is the reference to the 'maximisation of cue
validity' in the work of Rosch et al on the learning of
semantic categories discussed in 2.5 and the maximisation
of acoustic distinctness adopted by Jakobson and considered
in 5.1. The parallels between these last two examples
deserves remarking upon. It is interesting to note that
an attempt to reduce a language learning mechanism to
a more general cognitive facility does not fit easily
into the scheme outlined in Chapter 4. Rather, we seem
to need resort to the view that the language learning
mechanism can be seen as a particular instance of a
general mechanism (cf. the discussion of Blobin's views
in 4.4).
The reader might at this point object that my formulation
runs the risk of infinite regress as an additional
component of the theory including the sequence (M^, M^,
..., M ) will be a meta-mechanism which will explain
how the child moves from to Ih (1^i-r). There are
two responses to this. The first is that at some point
in the regress we might reach a non-developmental mechanism
and no meta-mechanism would be necessary to explain its
development. Thus someone who maintained that all learning
proceeded by inductive data-analytic techniques would
not be faced with such a regress. The second possibility
ard I am not clear that this is realistic, is to suggest
that at some point in the regress we will come across
a sequence the development of which can be viewed in
entirely maturational terms with no reference to an inter
action between mechanisms and data. The possibility
of infinite regress appears sufficiently remote for me
not to be too concerned by it at this stage.
*
Such formulation of general questions and general
responses to them are, of course, quite programmatic
but it is my belief that formulation in these terms can
only facilitate future research even if this involves
rejection of these formulations. I hope that the
previous pages have gone some way towards convincing the
reader that this is the case.
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